NICARAGUA: ACCELERATING MILITARY ASSISTANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000600750001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 14, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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14 September 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy NIO/Latin America
International Security Issues Division
Office of Global Issues
SUBJECT: Nicaragua:,Acceleratintr, Military
Assistance
1. In response to your request, the attached memorandum
discusses the Nicaraguan military buildup, emphasizing develop-
ments in 1983. The memorandum--a downgraded version of an
intelligence assessment published in early July--is classified
Secret,
2. The memorandum was prepared by
International Security Issues Division, Office of Global
Issues.
3. Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed
to the Chief, Communist Activities Branch, OGI
25X1
25X1
25X1
Assistance U), G M 83-1019 Secret
Attachment:
Nicaragua: Accei-EatiDq Military
Unclassified When Separated
From Attachment.
25X1
SECRET
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SUBJECT: Nicaragua: Accelerating Military Assistance
OGI/IS/CA
Addressee
CPAS/ILS
D/OGI, DD/OGI
OGI/PG (including sourced copy)
Ch/IS ID
Ch/IS/CA
14 Sep 1983)
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Central Intelligence Agency
14 September 1983
NICARAGUA: ACCELERATING MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Summary
The pace of military-related deliveries to Nicaragua
increased substantially during the first half of 1983, exceeding
the total number of shipments observed during all of last year.
Communist countries, led by the USSR, continued to be Nicaragua's
main suppliers, providing hardware under 1982 and 1983 agree-
ments. Most deliveries consisted of hardware such as helicopters
and trucks to improve logistical capabilities against the
insurgents, although Nicaragua also received additional ground
force weapons. At the same time, Cuba reportedly substantially
increased the number of military/security personnel in Nicaragua,
Introduction
Efforts to provide military assistance to Nicaragua
quickened in the first half of 1983. Cuba, the Sandinistas'
staunchest benefactor, reportedly nearly doubled the size of its
military/security presence in country and probably increased its
involvement in counterinsurgency operations. The USSR, although
relying on other countries to ship weapons, became more active in
delivering military-support hardware to Nicaragua.
GI M 83-1.0199
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The recent Nicaraguan buildup, precipitated by increasing
anti-Sandinista military activity, demonstrates Havana's--and
presumably Moscow's--growing concern that the insurgents pose a
real threat to the stability of the regime. The revolution's
success is critical to Havana because it vindicates Castro's
activist policy in the region. For its part, Moscow--eager to
undermine US influence--has gradually expanded its involvement in
the region, believing that continuing instability undercuts and
diverts US attention and resources from problems elsewher
Supplying Nicaragua: Patterns Through 1982
Soon after seizing control in July 1979, the Sandinistas
began to develop Nicaraguan military capabilities to consolidate
their power. Between July 1979 and the end of 1982, Managua
concluded military accords valued at more than $200 million,
mainly with Warsaw Pact countries and Cuba. That level of
assistance--unprecedented in Central America--was four times the
worth of all agreements during the preceding 25 years. During
the same period, the number of foreign military/security advisers
in Nicaragua (mostly Cubans) increased to more than 2,000, and a
large number of Nicaraguans were sent abroad for military
training.
Communist countries--mainly the USSR, Cuba, and East
Germany--have been Managua's principal benefactors:
o Although Moscow initially moved cautiously in supplying
Managua and took pains to conceal its role, by 1981 the
value of Soviet military assistance far exceeded
Nicaragua's accords with all other countries. Soviet
agreements provided for a variety of tanks, other ground
force weapons, helicopters, transport aircraft, and
support equipment (such as trucks). Moscow, however,
relied on other countries (Algeria and Bulgaria) to
deliver the arms. The Soviets also assumed an
increasingly influential advisory role, including
formulating combat plans.
Identified Cuban materiel support consisted mainly of
ground and air defense weapons and ammunition. Perhaps
more important was Havana's provision of as many as 2,000
military/security experts by the end of 1982 to help
transform Sandinista forces into a conventional army,
upgrade airfields, and perform other tasks. Cuba also
has been the principal foreign training location for
Nicaraguans, providing aircraft and other instruction.
o East Germany provided nearly 1,000 trucks and small
numbers of advisers to Nicaragua. Most of these experts
probably are security/intelligence officers--the
specialty of most East Germans posted to LDCs.
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Other countries, acting either on their own or on Moscow's
behalf, also supported the Nicaraguan buildup:
o Bulgaria delivered about 25 Soviet-made medium tanks last
November and has provided instruction for Nicaraguan
pilot candidates.
o Other East European countries, such as Poland, reportedly
have provided similar training.
o Algerian ships delivered a variety of ground force
weapons to Nicaragua in 1981 and 1982.
o Libya supplied a few trainer/counterinsurgency aircraft
and helicopters in 1982 and a small group of pilot-
instructors.
o France concluded a $17.5 million contract in December
1981 for two helicopters, 100 air-to-ground rocket
launchers, two patrol boats, 45 trucks, and training.
Rapid Buildup in 1983
The pace of military assistance to Nicaragua became
increasingly rapid during the first half of 1983, as Managua
concluded accords estimated to be worth nearly $50 million.
Moreover, the rate of deliveries was about twice as fast as
during all of 1982, when 14 military-related deliveries were
observed.
Identified deliveries in 1983 are estimated to be worth
roughly $40 million. The value of 1982 shipments is estimated at
approximately $100 million, but that figure included relatively
expensive tanks. First-time deliveries to Nicaragua in 1983
included air-to-surface rockets and launchers from France and
Soviet-made AN-26 transport aircraft, while additional MI-8
helicopters, ground force weapons (including armored vehicles)
and trucks were also supplied. As in previous years, the USSR
relied on other countries to deliver weapons, while it directly
shipped military-support items. Although a Libyan effort to
deliver weapons via Brazil was frustrated last spring, Qadhafi
probably will attempt again to resupply Nicaragua.
The fast pace of military deliveries in 1983 reportedly has
been accompanied by sharp increases in the number of Communist--
mainly Cuban--personnel posted to Nicaragua. The estimated
number of Cuban military/security personnel in Nicaragua is
approximately 3,000. Moreover, one of Cuba's top field
commanders, General Arnaldo Ochoa, has arrived in Nicaragua to
take command of both Cuban and Nicaraguan forces. Ochoa
previously commanded Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia.
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Impact on Capabilities
Deliveries of helicopters, transport aircraft, rocket
launchers, armored vehicles, and trucks this year will improve
Managua's ability to conduct and support counterinsurgency
operations. Helicopters will be especially useful for transport
as the rainy season inhibits truck movement, and communications
equipment will improve the S ndini ' to command and
control units in the field.
Nicaragua's ability to pursue conventional operations has
also improved with the acquisition of tanks, other armor, and
training, but the Sandinistas still face problems:
o The Sandinista military has a total strength of about
25,000 active-duty forces and some 60,000 to 80,000
reserves and militia. We believe this force could mount
a successful defense against any one country in the
region and could make limited cross-border strikes at any
time with relative impunity. In a large-scale attack on
Honduras, Sandinista forces probably would penetrate a
considerable distance, but their progress eventually
would be constrained by operational and logistic
difficulties and insufficient training.
o Air defenses, a Nicaraguan concern in view of the
superior but aging Honduran Air Force, have been upgraded
through the acquisition of air defense weapons. Still,
the Air Force lacks jet fighters in Nicaragua to counter
the threat posed by Honduras's Super Mysteres.
o The Sandinista Navy is little more than a small coastal
defense force. Indeed, its patrol boats are inadequate
even for that task. More, the impending delivery of
French vessels, which are lightly armed, will improve
capabilities only marginally.
Outlook
We believe that continued insurgent pressure will force the
Sandinistas to focus attention in the near term on further
improving their capabilities to conduct small-unit antiguerrilla
operations. They also will probably continue to strengthen.
forces along the border with Honduras. As a result, the
composition of deliveries to Nicaragua in the near term probably
will resemble recent shipments, rather than including signifi-
cantly more advanced arms. The emphasis on containing the threat
to the regime as well as constraints on capabilities, the fear of
US retaliation, and probable Soviet disapproval still argue
against Managua's initiating a major operation against
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Over the longer term, weapons could be transferred to
Nicaragua from Cuba in the event of war with Honduras or if the
Sandinistas and Cubans believed that collapse of the regime were
imminent. Cuba probably would serve as the focus for an
emergency resupply of Nicaragua, drawing from its extensive
inventory of modern aircraft, ground force weapons, and air
defense hardware. Castro also could send additional personnel.
The USSR, Cuba, and selected East European countries will
remain Nicaragua's largest and most dependable suppliers of
military assistance. Under present circumstances, there is
little apparent need for Moscow to abandon its policy of directly
delivering only aircraft and support equipment, suggesting
continued use of other countries to transship weapons. The most
active non-Communist supplier probably will be Libya, although
actual deliveries may continue to be erratic. In any case,
completion and expansion of ports on Nicaragua's east coast would
facilitate seaborne deliveries by providing an alternative to
shipping through the Panama Canal. Capabilities for air resupply
will expand as airfields are improved.
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