UN NUCLEAR ENERGY CONFERENCE POSTPONED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000600550002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 23, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency 25X1
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
23 May 1983
UN Nuclear Energy Conference Postponed
Summary
The UN Conference on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (PUNE)
that had been scheduled for August has been postponed. The Pre-
paratory Committee has been unable to agree on an agenda or on
procedures acceptable' to both developed and developing countries.
The major obstacle is the refusal by some countries, especially
India and Argentina, to accept language in the agenda that would
ban the use of transferred technology for the development of
peaceful nuclear explosions.
The UN General Assembly probably will call for another
preparatory meeting in 1984. Even if that meeting succeeds in
overcoming the differences between developed and developing
states, an event we believe doubtful, the preparations for PUNS
will necessitate scheduling it no sooner than late 1985 and
probably not until mid-1986, after the
19
85 r
eview of t
he Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
This memorandum was prepared byl
(
Intern
ational
25X1
Security Issues Division, Office of Gl
is based on information as of 23 May 1
oba
983
l Is
. C
sues. Thi
omments an
s analysis
d queries
are welcome and may be addressed to Ch
ief
, We
apons Prol
iferation
Branch, OGI,
25X1
GI M 83-10126C
May 1983
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PUNE Postponed
The UN Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
(PUNE) will not convene in August 1983 as originally planned.
The Fourth Preparatory Committee, which met in New York between
28 March and 8 April, was unable to draft an agenda or rules of
procedure acceptable to both developed and developing states. As
a result, the Committee recommended in its report to the UN Gen-
eral Assembly that the PUNE Conference be postponed to a date
determined this fall by the 38th General Assembly. On 10 May the
General Assembly approved the Committee report. 25X1
Developed States Positions
Major substantive and procedural differences separated the
developed and developing states at the four Preparatory Committee
meetings which have taken place.- In discussion of potential
agenda items, developed countries, led by the United States, have
insisted that discussion regarding the access to sensitive
nuclear technologies include a recognition of the need to main-
tain effective safeguards to prevent the development of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. According to
reporting by the US Mission at the United Nations, developed
states further argue that the necessary role of safeguards must
be taken into account in any resolutions dealing with technology 25X1
transfer adopted during PUNE. To this end, developed states
emphasized that the primary role of the IAEA in developing and
maintaining effective safeguards must be protected.
On a procedural matter, developed states insisted that
resolutions reached at PUNE reflect unanimity. Otherwise,
despite opposition by some developed states, developing states
could use their numerical majority to establish the principles
that will govern future international nuclear commerce.
1Si nce the late-1970s developed and developing states have
periodically met in international forums (International Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Evaluation and the Committee on Assurances of Supply)
to establish a nuclear trade regime which would reconcile two
seemingly contradictory objectives. Developing states want a
regime that would promote the fullest possible transfer of
nuclear equipment, materials, and technology for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy from developed to developing states.
Developed states stress that such a regime would also have to 25X1
ensure that these transfers would not directly lead to the pro-
liferation of nuclear explosive capabilities. The PUNE Confer-
ence is the latest attempt to reconcile these objectives.
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During coordination meetings, developed states were for the
most part united on these and other issues. Various proposals
were offered regarding the timing of PUNE, the definitions of
substantive and procedural items, and the kind of voting neces-
sary to pass resolutions according to Embasy reports. We believe
these proposals constituted ideas to break the impasse with
developing states rather than major differences between the views
of developed states. Only on the question of attendance in the
event that developing states forced an unacceptable agenda on
developed states did any explicit differences emerge. The United
States took the position that it would not attend PUNE if the 25X1
developing states, used their voting majority in either the Pre-
paratory Committee or the UN General Assembly to vote through an
unacceptable agenda and decisionmaking process.
Embassy reporting indicated that Great Britain also 25X1
expressed reservations about attending in such circumstances, but
the Swiss, as hosts, the Belgians, and the Austrians-indicated
that they planned to attend. The representatives of the other
developed states in the West European and Others Group either
lacked instructions from their governments on this question or
maintained that they hoped that compromise solutions to the
outstanding issues could be found, enabling PUNE to be held to
everyone's satisfaction. 25X1
The Soviets and their allies lent their support to the
developed states positions and voted with the United States
against a December 1982 UN General Assembly resolution which
criticized the Preparatory Committee's lack of progress, implic-
itly blaming the Committee's problems on the positions taken by
developed states. According to US Mission and Embassy reports, 25X1
Western developed states and the Soviets exchanged views through-
out the Preparatory Committee meetings in a cooperative and
complementary fashion.
Developing States Positions
Led by India, Argentina, and until recently Yugoslavia,
developing states took positions at the Preparatory Committee
meetings which differ markedly from those of`the developed
states. The developing states emphasized that the nonprolif-
eration language of numerous UN resolutions only requires that
states refrain from using transferred or indigenous nuclear
technology to produce nuclear weapons. By implication, this
would permit the use of these technologies to produce peaceful
nuclear explosives for engineering projects. As indicated in UN
documents, developing states argue that some nuclear suppliers
use nonproliferation concerns as an excuse to restrict the
transfer of nuclear technology. As a result of this emphasis on
nonproliferation, which developing states in general view as
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unwarranted, the IAEA with its budget derived primarily from
assessments and contributions from developed states, has been
unable to provide the nuclear training and aid that these
countries maintain is their right. PUNE, in this context, is
needed to establish the basic "code of conduct" for nuclear
suppliers and recipients alike, under the auspices of the United
Nations rather than the IAEA. This "code," developing countries
agree, would note that safeguards on transferred technoloy are
necessary, but it would no longer permit developed states to
impose unilateral export restrictions.
Developing states remained opposed to language being in-
cluded in the rules of procedure which would require unanimity to
pass resolutions on substantive issues. Developed and developing
states, during the interval between the Third and Fourth Prepar-
atory Committee meetings and at informal negotiating sessions
during the Fourth meeting, discussed various mechanisms to
establish a unanimous decisionmaking mechanism without creating a
precedent for subsequent UN-sponsored Conferences. Formal
discussions were not held at the Fourth Committee meeting because
of the time spent on nuclear nonproliferation issues, according
to the US Mission.
Divisions Among the Developing States
The development of fissures in the positions of developing
states was the most noteworthy aspect of the Fourth Preparatory
Committee meeting. We believe hardliners, with Argentina and
India in the lead but with others such as Brazil and Chile in
agreement, appear to have concluded that they preferred not
holding PUNE prior to the 1985 NPT Review Conference. It appears
that they came to this conclusion when it became apparent that
the compromises necessary to get an agreed agenda and rules of 25X1
procedure meant relinquishing their goal of using PUNE as part of
a process to establish a new nuclear economic order favorable to
the interests of recipient countries. US mission reporting
indicates that the rigid opposition of these 25X1
hardliners to a prohibition against using transferred technology
for the development of peaceful nuclear explosives alienated
other developing states, especially countries such as Egypt,
Indonesia, and Yugoslavia, which are NPT signatories and are
already constrained by the terms of the Treaty not to use their
nuclear facilities to develop either nuclear weapons or peaceful
explosive devices. F -1 25X1
6.
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utner aeveloping states, sucn as Inaonesia, Nigeria, 5auai
Arabia, and Yugoslavia, broke with the Indian position on post-
poning PUNE to after the NPT Review Conference.
Outlook
During its fall 1983 meeting, the UN General Assembly,
according to the US Mission, will probably call for the convening
of a Fifth Preparatory Committee in order to demonstrate that P UNE
remains important to developing states. We believe an agreement
on the agenda and rules of procedure will still be difficult to
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obtain because both India and Argentina seem intent on blocking
progress not only in PUNE but also in the IAEA's Committee on
Assurances of Supply. We believe their strategy is to raise the
level of confrontation between suppliers and recipient states
betweeen now and the 1985 NPT Review Conference so that the
Conference will end in failure as it did in 1980. On the basis of
Embassy reporting, we have concluded that the hardliners believe
success in highlighting what they regard as the inequities of the
NPT could revive the developing states' political will to hold
PUNE in the context of establishing new nuclear trade conditions
favorable to the interests of developing states.
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