AFGHANISTAN: THE IMPACT OF THE SOVIET OCCUPATION ON AGRICULTURE--1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000600220001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 11, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: (See Addressees List)
FIOM: Charles V. Boykin
Chief, Strategic Resources Division
Office of Global Issues
SUBJECT: Afghanistan: The Impact of the Soviet Occupation
1. The attached memorandum assesses the impact of the Soviet occupation
on 1982 grain production in Afghanistan. ti4e find that contrary to some
reports, crop losses imposed as a result of military action sere minimal.
This judgment is based primarily on satellite imagery taken during the 1982
3. Ca ments and questions are lcane_and may be addressed to the Chief,
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2. This assessment was produced Agricultural
Assessment Branch, Strategic. Resources Division, ice of Global Issues.
Attachment:
Afghanistan: The Impact of the Soviet
Occupation on Agriculture--1982, 25X1
GI M 83-10053, March 1983
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CV"
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: The Impact of the Soviet Occupation
on Agriculture--1982
Mr. Manny Rubio
Director, White House Situation Room
Mr. Geoffrey Kemp
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Bldg.
Mr. Elmer Klumpp
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary
International Affairs and Commodity Programs
Department of Agriculture
Mr. Douglas P. Mulholland
Office of National Security Affairs
Department of Treasury
Mr. David A. Peterson
Director, Office of Intelligence Liaison
Department of Commerce
Mr. Charles W. Greenleaf, Jr.
Assistant Administrator, Asia Bureau
Agency for International Development
Mr. Evil P. Eriksen
Director, INR/EC
Department of State
Mr. Dennis Murphy
INR/EC/RER
Department of State
Mr. George S. Harris
Director, INR/NESA
Department of State
Ms. Edith Van Hollen
INR/NESA
Department of State
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Impact of the Soviet Occupation
on Agriculture--1982 F--]
Addressees List: (Continued)
Messrs. Peter Modley and Michael Egbert
INR/IRE/CGC
Department of State
Colonel Raymond Deitch
JCS/J-5, South Asia-Far East Division
Room 2E973, Pentagon
D i e Eas -out Asia
Roam 2C238, Pentagon
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I I
SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Impact of the Soviet
Occupation on Agriculture--1982 F
OGI/SRD/AA
(11 March 1983)
Distribution List: (Attachment With Each
Orig - Each Addressee
1-DCI
1 - DDCI
1-ER
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - Exec. Officer/DDI
1 - DDI/Registry
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/USSR-Eastern Europe 25x1
1 - NIC/AG
1 - OCR/ISG
1 - C/CSG/CPAS
1 - C/DDO
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - C/GD/OGI
1 - C/GD/NE/GI
1 - ERA/GD/GI
1 - C/ECD/GI
1 - ONESA/SO/P
4 - CPAS/PDG/IMC/ICB
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1 - C/SRD/GI
4 - C/SRD/AA/GI
8 - PS/GI
Copy)
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
11 March 1983
Afghanistan: The Impact of the Soviet Occupation
on Agriculture--1982
Summary
Imagery reveals that crop losses imposed as a result of military action,
despite reporting to the contrary, were minimal in 1982, and even in the major
zones of conflict, crops were usually sown and harvested on time. Overall,
Afghanistan appears to have had a satisfactory grain harvest last year. While
some Soviet-occupied urban centers undoubtedly suffered spot food shortages
during the year, largely because of internal transport or distribution
problems, food supplies for the country as a whole remained adequate.
Furthermore, given favorable growing conditions and no major change in the
nature or the of the Soviet occupation, they should remain so
through 1983. ~,mPO,
Chief, AAB/SRD/OGI
This paper was prepared) Agricultural Assessment
Branch, Strategic Resources Division, Office of Global Issues (AAB/SRD/OGI) with
a contribution provided Eurasia Branch, Geography Division,
Office of Global Issues (ERA/GD/OGI). Comments and questions may be addressed to
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Afghanistan: The Impact of the Soviet
Occupation on Agriculture--1982
Most of the agricultural areas of Afghanistan were not seriously affected
by either the Soviet occupation or by insurgent activity during the 1982 crop
season. Fighting during that period was largely concentrated in a limited
number of strategic valleys and along major roads near Kabul. Imagery of
these areas also does not support claims that the Soviets or the Afghan army
deliberately or systematically destroyed crops and burned fields on a large
scale. It does reveal that in small and scattered localities, where the
entire population may have fled, some fields remained untilled throughout the
crop season, but such areas were not widespread.
While Afghan refugees have frequently reported that the Soviet occupation
and the resultant exodus of refugees has triggered a reduction of the sown
area in Afghanistan, official statements refute that claim. In April of 1982
a member of the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture estimated that the total amount
of land allocated for sowing had increased by 3.5 percent from the previous
year. This allocation included a 5 percent increase for wheat, a 62 percent
increase for cotton, a 1 percent increase for vegetables, and a 0.3 percent
increase for fruits. Official announcements stated that 2.31 million hectares
had been planted in wheat, 73,000 in cotton, 94,000 in fruits and vegetables, and
2,400 in sugarbeets. Such increases are impossible to confirm, because
agricultural and other statistics have never been reliable in Afghanistan. 25X1
It is doubtful that the exodus of some 3 million Afghans*, out of an
officially estimated total population of 15.45 million (1979), has impacted
adversely on agricultural output. The pre-occupation agricultural labor force
was probably in excess of need. Furthermore, more than half of the refugee
group in Pakistan is composed of women, children and the elderly; most of the
able-bodied men, which make up the remainder, return periodically to
Afghanistan to assist in planting and harvesting as well as to fight. Thus,
labor inputs into agriculture appear sufficient in most areas to maintain
normal levels of production. 25X1
Although meteorological data for Afghanistan in 1982 are incomplete,
weather was generally good throughout the year.
There were no reports of floods or extended droughts, and the Panjsher Valley,
often subject to periods of adverse weather, experienced no weather-related
problems. Rainfall throughout the year was scattered in all regions, and
there were no periods of prolonged wetness. Most crops in Afghanistan,
however, depend on irrigation water and, therefore, the amount of water
obtained from snowmelt is a more critical factor. During the past winter
(1981-82), areas north of Kabul received slightly above-average precipitation,
and ground water supplies should have been adequate. Imagery reveals that
* Derived from late 1982 UN estimates.
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this was the case, for canals in the intricate irrigation networks ware
generally filled throughout the growing season.
The 1982 Grain Crop
Analysis of 1982 reconnaissance imagery of the grain producing areas of
the country indicates that fair to good crop conditions prevailed through the
growing season in most regions and that harvesting was initiated on or nearly
on schedule everywhere. Furthermore, repetitive, good quality imagery--
approximately 800 frames--covering the agricultural areas throughout the crop
season, clearly indicates that the Soviets did not systematically destroy the
grain crop before it could be harvested. The few examples of crop destruction
or burning that we observed are believed to have been the unavoidable
consequence of military activity.
crops were sometimes harvested too early, before they were fully ripe, because
of fear of Soviet destruction. Qnile such actions may have occurred in
isolated instances, especially along major roads where the military was most
active, imagery suggests that this was not a widespread phenomena.
Analysis of imagery covering the strategic Panjsher Valley, 60 miles
northeast of Kabul, reveals that the 1982 winter grain harvest was nearly on
schedule in late June and early July, and that yields ware probably in the
fair range in most areas. This region, a major insurgent stronghold, is
agriculturally rich, and villages in it are reported to have been subjected to
repeated bombings.
Some grain was undoubtedly damaged, as was a part of the
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mulberry crop that provides the population of this area with a dietary
supplement, but the damage was localized and on a snall scale. A small number
of fields were burned in several separate patches along the main road east and
west of Rokha (3515N, 6926E) and also in a side valley north of Nejrab (3502N,
6937E). Some limited abandonment of fields also occurred near these areas.
Near the town of Ezrya, further up the valley (3529N, 6945E), a large tract
remained untilled throughout the growing season. Furthermore, even though
many people left the Panjshir during the Soviet offenses, sane of then have
returned, and earlier predictions of the development of dire economic
conditions in the area have not materialized.
Agricultural production in areas along the main road between Kabul and
Peshawar, in the vicinity of Jalalabad, or in the valleys of Nuristan has
likewise not appeared materially influenced by the war. Swathing* in these
locations was on schedule or slightly ahead of schedule in mid-May, and
imagery indicates that most of the harvest was completed by mid-June. Imagery
also reveals that shocks** were thick and closely spaced in most fields,
suggesting that yields were good. This conclusion is further substantiated by
the fact that threshing yards in the area were active for several weeks. The
* The first stage of the harvest where the grain is cut.
** Shocks are a group of sheaves of grain placed on end and supporting one
another in a field.
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Ministry of Agriculture of Afghanistan reported above average yields of wheat
and barley in this region.
In the lower Konar Valley, near the Pakistan border northeast of
Jalalabad, yields in 1982 were less satisfying, ranging only from Poor to
fair. The relatively poorer crop here does not appear to be a result of
deliberate crop destruction by hostile military action, but rather the
consequence of a locally severe labor shortage which, in turn, precipitated
the abandonment of some tracts of previously cultivated land. Furthermore,
the Konar Valley grain crop was harvested in mid-May, and may have been cut
before it was fully ripe. This would naturally result in lower yields. This
area, however, contributes only a small percentage of the total Afghan grain
crop.
The grain crop also looked poor in a few locations of Paktia Province,
southeast of Kabul, where insurgency at times has been intense. As a result
of military activity near the town of Khost, some agricultural land and crops
were destroyed, and military equipment has been observed in grain fields at
the edge of town. Even here, however, winter grains sown in fields adjacent
to the battle zones were harvested. The proximity of this area to Kurram
Province in Pakistan, where a large concentration of Afghan refugees has
settled, permits peasants living in Pakistan-based camps to work their fields
in Afghanistan without much difficulty.
A number of western journalists and Afghan refugees in Pakistan have
filed accounts of the barbing of villages and the destruction of crops by
Soviet forces in Lowgar Province, south of Kabul. One report, written in
September, stated that harvested grain in that area had been burned and that
irrigation systems in several villages along the Kabul-Gardez road had been
destroyed. Refugee sources also report that Soviet and Afghan troops have
attempted to create a "sanitary zone" along this road by burning the
vegetation. Unfortunately imagery is not available to either confirm or
refute these claims.
Kabul has not published crop production data for 1982, but in September
of 1981, Soltan Ali Keshtmand, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, estimated
that wheat production in 1982 would reach 2.9 million tons, a level that
compares favorably with that for several years since 1975 and with the
officially reported production of 2.75 million tons in 1981. In September of
1982, USIA estimated Afghan grain production for the year at more than
2.85 million tons. This is attributed in large part to increased use of
fertilizer and improved seed, more irrigated land, and greater credit
availability to all farmers. Our agronomic analysis indicates that such
production figures are indeed possible, considering the favorable weather and
good harvests observed on the imagery. Because of hoarding, black marketeering,
and the Afghan tendency to under report production figures to avoid taxes,
however, the total will probably never be known by officials in Kabul.
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Preparing for the Future
In addition to continuing its efforts to contain the Afghan insurgency,
whose impact on agricultural output has thus far been only nominal, the LSSR
has found it necessary to involve itself with regime policies relating to land
reform, reclamation, and the application of improved agricultural
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technology. That support has not been extensive to date, however, and it is
now quite clear that its primary purpose--the winning of regime allegiance in
the countryside--has failed. The land reform program, for example, by mid-
September 1982, involved only 40,000 peasants and a mere 75,000 hectares of
land. A program of this magnitude is obviously insufficient to impact
significantly on overall agricultural production.
The Soviets are also lending support to regime efforts to restore and
extend existing irrigation systems, upon which most of the country's
cultivated agriculture is dependent. While recent information on the full
extent of Soviet involvement is at this time limited,
the USSR has agreed to lend its support to irrigation projects designed
to benefit agriculture in Afghani territory adjacent to the Amu Darya in the
north; on the Rud-e Jolgeh-ye Janab, not far from Ghazni; on the lower Darya-
ye Konar and the Darya-ye Kabul near Jalalabad; and in a number of other
locations throughout the country. As of June 1982 the regime claimed that
about 3,000 hectares of arid land had been newly supplied with irrigation
water; that the regulation of irrigation on another 15,000 hectares would soon
be completed; and that the repair of irrigation networks serving another
3,000 hectares was at that time underway.
Finally, Soviet advisors are being used by the Kabul regime to promote
the mechanization of agriculture, the increased use of fertilizer, and the
distribution and sowing of improved seed. Most of the investment associated
with these efforts is currently concentrated on a few state farms, which
collectively comprise some 34,000 hectares of land. These farms, showpieces
of the pro-Soviet regime, have been targeted by the insurgents, and according
to goverrment claims, many of them have suffered extensive damage.
Agriculture elsewhere remains largely unmechanized and dependent on large
inputs of manual labor and the widespread use of animal power.
Soviet Aid
Although the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan has now entered
its fourth year, insurgents still control 80 to 90 percent of the
countryside. As a result most of the rural areas continue to be self
sufficient in food. In the cities, however, shortages are critical at times,
and the Soviets are increasingly finding it necessary to provide agricultural
commodities. Unconfirmed Afghan official reports have put 1982 grain imports
from the Soviet Union at a figure considerably higher than the 80,000 metric
tons reported in 1981, another indication of the precarious condition of
Afghanistan's cities. Unofficial reports have stated that up to 140,000 tons
of wheat and flour were committed to Afghanistan in 1982, but considering the
poor Soviet harvest, the amount actually delivered is conjectural. Kabul
reported in May 1982 that 5,000 tons of improved wheat seed had been obtained
from the Soviets. Also, at the same time, 80,000 tons of chemical fertilizer
were supplied on a loan and cash basis. The Afghans now produce much of their
own fertilizer at the large plant at Mazar-e-Sharif. 25X1
Despite a projected slight decrease in cultivated hectarage, agricultural
output in 1983--barring climatic adversity--should satisfy consumer demands,
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including those of the insurgent forces, throughout rural Afghanistan. Spot
shortages may continue to plague major Afghan urban centers, however, given
the shortcomings of the distribution system, the susceptibility of Soviet
convoys to insurgent attacks, and the tendency of the occupied urban areas to
increasingly depend or. Soviet imports.
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Figure 7
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