(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000502320001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 14, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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'r Central Intelligence Agency !/"o
Washinpon.D C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 December 1983
US Intervention in Grenada: Reactions and
Future Implications
attaches importance to their views.
their foreign policies are distinct from
Washington's and that the US Administration
Summary
Initial reaction among Washington's major
European allies to the landing in Grenada was
generally hostile, but information released since
the fighting ended has produced more understanding
for US motivations, especially in the United
Kingdom and West Germany. The Grenada episode
nonetheless will probably have a longer-term
effect of reinforcing a predisposition on the part
of leftwing political parties to think that the
Reagan Administration is too quick to use military
force. Conservative governments usually
sympathetic to US policies, especially those of
Prime Minister Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl, will
also have to deal with increased skepticism
concerning Washington's willingness in a crisis to
consult adequately with its allies. Thatcher, in
particular, will in our view remember for a
considerable time the political embarrassment
Grenada caused her. in order to forestall
criticism that they are too closely aligned to
Washington, both Thatcher and Kohl will probably
try to find new opportunities to demonstrate that
This memorandum was prepared by British-
Benelux, Canada Branch, Western Europe Division, Office of
European Analysis. It was requested by Fred C. Ikle, Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. Questions and Comments ma~~ be
i
on,
addressed to Chief, Western Europe Divis
EUR M 83-10286
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British Reactions: The Limits of a "Special Relationship"
British reaction to US landings in Grenada was more intense
than that of other European allies because the island is a member
of the Commonwealth (although under Maurice Bishop, not a member
in good standing) and because of public perceptions of a Reagan-
Thatcher split over the invasion. The Labor Party opposition
used Grenada, and especially what most British politicians saw as
only pro forma consultation and disregard for Thatcher's
objections, to cast doubt on US trustworthiness and particularly
on whether Thatcher's strong support of US policies gave her
sufficient influence in Washington.
Opposition leaders also used the invasion to revive interest
in "dual key" controls for INF, an issue the government thought
it had defused, and the US Embassy reported polls showing sharply
increased distrust of US leadership. Such reactions on the part
of the opposition were, in our view, predictable. Of more
fundamental concern is the possibility that a new wave of anti-
American rhetoric following on the open disagreement between
London and Washington will undercut efforts by Labor moderates in
any future Labor government to preserve the "special
relationship" with the United States on the same basis as in the
past.
Similar doubts about US intentions will, we believe,-also
continue to beset the Tories. The Embassy reports that about
one-third of Conservative MPs supported the US action, and in our
view an even larger number believe Britain should have joined the
intervention. Nevertheless, a future Conservative Prime Minister
is likely to see Grenada cited to prove that Washington takes its
British ally for granted; rightwingers, regardless of their
opposition to Communist regimes, will we think also be more
suspicious that the US is willing to intervene unilaterally, even
in areas of traditional British primacy.
Prime Minister Thatcher, after expressing her disapproval of
US actions in a typically forthright manner, has attempted to
repair relations with Washington and cooperate with efforts
designed to facilitate the withdrawal of US forces. Although the
Prime Minister remains a steadfast advocate of the "special
relationship," the Grenada affair has caused political
embarrassment that, in our view, she will long remember; one
cabinet member has even speculated to US officials that Foreign
Secretary Howe's status has been permanently weakened. In
addition to incurring charges from the opposition that she was
unable to influence US actions, Thatcher's image as a strong
leader who has revived Britain's activism in world affairs was
damaged by her refusal to join the Caribbean Commonwealth members
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and the United States in the intervention. A number of rightwing
Tories, normally Thatcher's base of support, have continued to
criticize the Prime Minister's decision not to participate.
London's efforts to take a lead in reconstruction on Grenada are
in part designed to disarm these critics.
We believe the "Grenada effect" will continue to be seen in
greater efforts by Thatcher to play up issues where London's
policy is distinct. from Washington's and to demonstrate that her
government does not blindly follow the US lead. She may also
become less willing to defend US policies, particularly in
Central America, where British interests are limited and where
defense of Washington wins few friends among the British
electorate. We think such considerations are already apparent in
increased British skepticism about US Middle East policy and in
Thatcher's announced intention to increase contacts with the
Soviet bloc. At the same time, the Prime Minister will demand
more extensive consultations in the future and will not hesitate
to remind US officials of the damage Grenada-like incidents can
do to the "special relationship."
Commonwealth Reactions: Much Ado, Little Action
The Grenada affair displayed once again the Commonwealth's
inability to deal with contentious issues that pit some members
against others. In the organization's meeting last month, those
Caribbean states who joined the US in the intervention argued
strongly against proposals for condemnation presented by Asian
and African members, who professed to see an increased US
willingness to intervene in their affairs. British officials
have told US counterparts that Thatcher was pleased that she
avoided any outright condemnation and persuaded her colleagues to
deal with the future of Grenada and not the past in their
communique. Thatcher apparently induced the Commonwealth members
to limit themselves to studying ways in which the smaller members
can fend off intervention by larger powers. The Commonwealth
states also agreed to help restore self-government to Grenada,
although some members were reluctant, in the words of one
diplomat, to "let the US off the hook."
West German Reaction: A Stick for the Opposition
West German reaction was similar to the British, although
less intense because Grenada does not have the historical
connotations for Bonn that it does for London. Nevertheless, the
affair did provoke some political problems for Kohl. A number of
Social Democrats, anxious to find ammunition for the Bundestag
debate on INF, used the invasion to place Washington on the same
moral plane as Moscow. In our view, the invasion has added to a
general concern among Social Democrats -- and among many other
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West Germans -- that the administration is, as some SPD leftist
charged, "trigger happy." F___-] 25X1
The Grenada affair also embarrassed the Kohl government by
revealing a source of disunity within the coalition. Foreign
Minister and Free Democratic Party leader Genscher maintained
publicly that he had not been consulted about US actions and that
if he had been asked, he would have advised against the
invasion. Kohl endorsed his Foreign Minister's stand, but
Genscher and Kohl both were sharply rebuked by Christian Social
Union leader Strauss for failing to support the United States.
Since the landing, additional information from the Caribbean has
induced more public support for US actions on the part of
Christian Democrats and Kohl has successfully played down the
matter. Because West German interests were not directly 25X1
involved, the issue of prior consultations did not have the same
resonance in Bonn that it did in London, although the Anglo-
American rift was commented on extensively in West Germany.
Like Thatcher, Kohl has stressed throughout his tenure the
close relationship between his government and the US
administration. He has used West German-American consultations
on arms control and other critical matters to combat Social
Democratic charges that he has no influence on US policy and thus
should follow a more independent foreign policy line. We believe
Grenada has heightened Kohl's determination to show that
Washington takes Bonn's opinions seriously on issues of concern
to West Germany and that the US government will undertake no
Grenada-like actions (particularly in the field of East-West
economic relations) that will embarrass his administration.
French Reactions: Public Anger, Private Cynicism
President Mitterrand's public reactions to Grenada --
describing US action as a violation of international law -- came
more quickly and were more blunt than those of other Allied
leaders. In our view, however, the Grenada affair will have few
long-term effects in France. French governments of various
political complexions have often intervened in Third World
countries with little or no consultations, and France has for
years followed an independent line in foreign and defense
policy. At most, US actions have reinforced preconceived French
notions that US policy has become more blatantly
Italian Reactions: Between Realism and Concern
Prime Minister Craxi played down Grenada, and the invasion
had no discernible impact on the INF debate in the Italian
Parliament. As in other Allied nations, Grenada served to
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"prove" to leftists that the Reagan administration is too quick
to use force to solve political dilemmas. Most Italian
politicians, however, appear to regard the Caribbean as a US
sphere of influence and Grenada as an American problem; in our
view, many were, in fact, relieved that they were not consulted
in advance. Nevertheless, Grenada probably has increased worry
that untoward US actions against Libya or in Lebanon will
threaten Italian interests. Like the other Allies, Italian
officials are concerned that Grenada not become a precedent for
unilateral US actions in re ions where their interests are more
directly engaged.
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Orig - Fred We
1 - DDI
1 - OD/EURA
2 - Production Staff
4 - IMC/CB
1 - Branch File
1 - Division File
EURA/WE/BBC 19Dec83
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