(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000501080001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 5, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Memorandum for:
The attached was prepared by
in response to a request
from the Vice President for West European
reactions to the President's 23 March
speech.
6 April 1983
EURA
Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
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 f_ _. _I .. ~_. I II I "'lllklllllln iI . _ II M I I ul W_ I] _
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5 April 1983
Allied Reactions to President Reagan's 23 March Speech
Allied governments have reacted coolly to the President's
missile defense proposals. While they publicly welcomed the
speech as a sign the US will improve its military capabilities,
most have downplayed the possibility of a near-term shift in NATO
strategy by emphasing the futuristic aspects of space-based
missile defenses. Allied governments believe that the 23 March
speech was designed chiefly to build domestic US support for
increased defense spending, and they probably will conti lip o
refrain from airing their misgivings publicly.
Privately, however, in major West European capitals Allied
officials have expressed concern that the President's proposals
were made without consulting NATO, and that they may have a
negative. impact on arms control, European defense, and INF
deployment prospects. During the next few months West European
leaders will be increasingly preoccupied with INF and almost
certainly want the US to emphasize publicly its commitment to INF
arms control and modernization rather than new missile
West Germany
Defense Minister Woerner publicly cautioned on 24 March that
the President's proposals would not solve the security problems
facing NATO today and stressed that the Alliance will continue
its current strategy for the next 10 to 15 years. The next day
official press spokesman Sudhoff said that the government
expected the development of anti-missile systems by the US would
take Europe's legitimate defense needs into account. Both
Woerner and Sudhoff took pains to note the arms control aspects
of the 23 March speech and said the West will continue its
copy
efforts to achieve balanced disarmament agreements.
EUR M 83-10108C
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CSU Party leader Strauss has a different interpretation of
the impact on European security of a "fortress America." He
stated publicly that an invulnerable US would be even more
willing to come to Europe's defense than it is now under the
"Mut
l
ua
Assured Destruction" concept.
The United Kingdom
The US Embassy in London reports that British officials have
been privately skeptical of the new missile defense plan and
critical about the lack of consultations. They worry that, if
implemented, the President's proposals may violate the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty and foAd c perceptions of US
indifference to arms control
British officials share West German concerns that Washington
may be adopting a "fortress America" mentality that could de-
couple US and West European security ties. They also fear that
the development of a US anti-missile system will cause the
Soviets to improve substantially their anti-missile capability.
This in turn would increase the vulnerability of the UK's small
deterrent force and encourage opponents of London's plans to
build new Trident nuclear submarines._ Finally, Foreign office
officials' believe that the 23 March speech om the
public debate at a crucial point for INF.
The Embassy in Paris reports that French officials privately
fear that development of new missile defenses will have a
negative impact in Europe because it may be interpreted by
European publics as a sign that NATO's deterrent strategy is
obsolete. The French fear that this perception could lead to
increased public opposition to INF basing. They share the
British fear than an improved Soviet anti-missile capability
would heighten the vulnerability of their independent nuclear
deterrent forces.
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Defense Minister Hernu is particularly worried that a new
American focus on missile defenses would be interpreted by the
public as a sign of growing American isolationism. He said this
perception has already been fueled by recent articles emphasizing
the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and by
General Rogers' statements about the desirability of reducing
NATO's reliance on the early use of these weapons. Hernu
believes the US should present the missile defense project as
part of a long-term attempt to strengthen the US defense posture,
a move most Frenchmen would approve 25X1
Other Allies
The Italian NATO Affairs expert unofficially told Embassy
officials in Rome that he questioned whether the USSR would now
begin similar ABM programs and start a new arms race. The
Norwegian State Secretary in the Ministry of Defense does not
b
li
e
eve the West should pursue the technological research
described by the President but should heed the UN Secretar
y
plea that space be used only for peaceful purposesF__~ 25X1
The Allies will want further discussions of anti-missile
systems to be coordinated with them. They will want it made
clear that such discussions do not alter NATO's deterrent
strategy and that such systems are not seen as instruments for
making the US invulnerable and giving it a first strike
capability against the USSR. The UK and France, in particular,
will continue to object to the development by the US of new
technologies that call into question the survivability of their
independe
t
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Distribution:
Orig - Vice President Bush
1 - IMC/CB
4 - IMC/CB
1 - EURA
2 - EURA Production
1 - EURA/EI
2- EURA/EI SI
DDI/EURA/EI/S
5Apr83)
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