UK-SPAIN: GIBRALTAR - STRUGGLE FOR A PIECE OF THE ROCK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000500430001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 15, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Centralintelligence Agency zlj 25X1
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 February 1983
UK-Spain: Gibraltar - Struggle for a Piece of the Rock
Summary
The British and the Spanish governments appear ready to
begin negotiations over the sovereignty of Gibraltar, a
process that promises to be both difficult and lengthy. The
major obstacle to progress in the talks is London's promise
to Gibraltarians, who want to maintain their link with the
United Kingdom, that there will be no change in sovereignty
without their agreement. Moreover, the rebirth of British
nationalist sentiment in the wake of the Falklands crisis
poses an impediment to quick action. The British will
continue to dampen Spanish expectations of a rapid solution,
but they probably hope to assuage Madrid in the short term
by reaching agreement on inclusion of the Rock in a Spanish
military command under NATO auspices.
Spain's new Socialist government clearly assigns a high
priority to the recovery of Gibraltar. Prime Minister
Gonzalez took the first step toward bringing the British to
the negotiating table when he opened the long-closed border
between Gibraltar and Spain to pedestrian traffic in mid-
December, thereby partially meeting the pre-condition for
talks set by London. The issue is an emotional one for all
Spaniards, and the Socialists will try to gain political
credit by pushing it hard. They will try to speed things
along by applying pressure on the United States and other
Alliance members to act in their behalf.
This paper was prepared by West Europe Division, Office of
European Analysis. Questions and comments are welcomed and should be
addressed to Chief, West Europe Division, EURA
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In our judgment, one possible interim solution could
include an arrangement for dual Spanish-British
administration and dual citizenship for Gibraltar's
residents. Over the longer term, the most likely outcome is
for Gibraltar to become a semi-autonomous region of S ain,
but the process could take generations.
Gibraltar and the Gibraltarians
Gibraltar, the two-and-a-half square mile British colony commanding the
mouth of the Mediterranean, has been an irritant between the British and the
Spanish since 1704. Although the Anglo-Dutch forces that captured the Rock at
that time were ostensibly acting on behalf of a pretender to the Spanish
throne, Gibraltar was ceded to Great Britain in the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713,
and has remained under its flag ever since. The Spanish, however, do not
accept the legitimacy of this colony carved from their territory, although
they have not tried since 1782 to regain the Rock by force.
Gibraltar's population of about 30,000 is a mixture of British, Genoese,
Spanish, Portuguese, Minorcan, Italian and Maltese stock and a fairly recent
group of Moroccans. The culture is predominantly Spanish and English, but the
institutions and government are British, and according to press and Embassy
reporting, so are the sympathies of the inhabitants.
Patriotic fervor explains some of the antipathy to a reversion to Spain,
but the Gibraltarians are also concerned by economic factors. Residents of
Gibraltar surely feel threatened economically because they enjoy a higher
standard of living than that of the adjacent Andalusian region,. which is
severely depressed. Some merchants are unhappy over possible Spanish
competition, especially those who have enjoyed a virtual monopoly on certain
items since the border was closed. Reporting from the US Consulate in
Tangier, for example, indicates that workers at the Royal Navy dockyard are
already concerned at facing competition from Spanish workers now that the
border is open, especially since the British have announced plans to close the
facility later this year. We have no information on how the British plan to
cope with the unemployment that closing the dockyard will create, but they
probably hope that the border opening will create new jobs in the tourist
industry to help take up the slack. The 3,000 people at the dockyard -- paid
at British wage rates -- plus those employed by the Gibraltar government, make
up about 60 percent of all employed men in the colony, according to press
information. In addition to being a major source of employment, the British
provide development aid, which the population is loath to lose.
Local Government
Gibraltar has had a measure of self government since 1950, when the
British inaugurated a Legislative Council. The people gained more internal
control in 1964 in the wake of a revised constitution, and in 1969 the British
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introduced a constitution which set in place a new body with 15 seats called
the Gibraltar House of Assembly. Chief Minister Sir Joshua Hassan leads the
Gibraltar Labor Party, also called the Association for Advancement of Civil
Rights, which -- except for one four-year period -- has been in power since
1950. The largest opposition party is the Democratic Party of British
Gibraltar, led by Peter Isola, which may take over government at the next
Assembly election -- to be held, within a year or so -- especially if Sir
Joshua declines to run.again.
Leaders of both parties said they agreed to "trust" the United Kingdom to
safeguard their rights vis-a-vis Spain at the time of the last Assembly
election in February 1980, and the parties probably see little choice but to
reaffirm this position in the future. If negotiations over Gibraltar do begin
in earnest, any Gibraltarian government will nonetheless demand to be
represented on the British negotiating team, even though the British probably
would not allow them more than observer status. Gibraltarians at times have
half-heartedly talked about complete independence, but they are aware that the
colony's tiny size and economic vulnerability preclude such an outcome.
Spanish Efforts to Reclaim Gibraltar
In the modern era, Spain's efforts to regain Gibraltar began in 1940
when, according to Spanish accounts, General Franco formally petitioned London
for its return. He prudently refused Hitler's offer to send German troops to
capture the Rock, however, both because of Allied economic pressure and out of
concern that the Germans, once ensconsed in Spain, would not leave. Franco
renewed his attempts to regain Gibraltar after the war.
The Gibraltarians themselves made it very clear that they preferred to
remain British. A deputation of prominent Gibraltarians testified to this
effect before the United Nations Special Committee on Colonization in 1963,
but the Committee nevertheless passed a resolution calling for decolonization
negotiations. Succeeding Spanish governments have based their claim to
Gibraltar on both history and the United Nations resolution; in Spanish eyes,
the Rock should revert to them and any calls for Gibraltarian "self-
determination" are a fraud and a smokescreen. The Gibraltarians strongly
underlined their preference, however, when they voted 12,138 to 44 in a 1967
referendum to retain their link with Britain rather than pass under Spanish
sovereignty.
Frustrated by British reluctance to begin negotiations, Franco tried to
apply pressure, but only succeeded in angering London. In a series of
escalating steps, Franco tightened access to the Rock, the British reacted by
offering more rights and privileges to Gibraltarians, and Franco tightened
restrictions again. Finally, the British promised -- via the Gibraltar
Constitution Order in Council of 1969 -- that they "will never enter into
arrangements under which the people of Gibraltar would pass under the
sovereignty of another State against their freely and democratically expressed
wishes." Franco closed the border completely shortly thereafter.
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After Franco's death, the successor Spanish government held several
inconclusive "talks" with the British over Gibraltar. In April 1980, Foreign
Secretary Lord Carrington met Foreign Minister Oreja in Lisbon and agreed on a
target date of 1 June 1980 by which all restrictions on Gibraltar were to be
lifted and negotiations opened to overcome all differences between Britain and
Spain over Gibraltar. The British, however, specifically reaffirmed their
commitment that the people of Gibraltar would not pass under the sovereignty
of another state against their wishes.
The negotiations never got underway. The British insisted that the
border must be opened before negotiations begin, but the Spanish Government of
three years ago was a weak, minority coalition that had to cobble together a
majority vote on every contentious issue, and it apparently felt unable to
open the'border without having something from the British first.
The dispute surrounding the royal honeymoon in mid-1981 also upset
relations between the United Kingdom and Spain, but brought additional
benefits to Gibraltarians. When Prince Charles' plans to board the royal
yacht in Gibraltar caused a furor in Spain and forced King Juan Carlos to
cancel his plans to attend the wedding, the British House of Lords -- angered
by the "affront" to the royal family -- was sparked into action. It amended
the British nationality bill against the Thatcher government's*wishes and gave
the people of Gibraltar the right to full British citizenship. Feeling
against Spain was running so high that the government, deciding it had little
chance to reverse the Lords' action, took no steps to oppose it. Consulate
Tangiers reports that the Gibraltarians are enthusiastic about this
opportunity to apply, on an individual basis, for "full" British nationality
and see it as a symbol of recognition for their loyalty to Great Britain.
The Spanish became even more leery of proceeding after the Falklands war
broke out last spring, fearing that heightened British nationalism would 25X1
induce London to take a harder line in any negotiations. According to US
Embassy reporting, the British realized that Spain faced internal difficulties
stemming from the transition to democracy and were unwilling to add further
strains by pressing hard on the border question. As a result, the British
acceded to successive Spanish requests for delayed target dates. The British
pointed out, however, that it would be impossible for Spain to join the EC if
the border remained closed since there can be no closed borders among members
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* Until the bill was changed, Gibraltarians were to be entitled only to
dependent territory citizenship, which does not carry all the rights of full
citizenship, such as the right to immigrate to the United Kingdom without
reference to any quota. Approximately 20,000 Gibraltarians are eligible to
apply for full citizenship. Other Gibraltarian residents are either British
citizens or are transient aliens.
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Current Spanish Position
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, with the assurance of a solid majority in
parliament, began his own campaign on Gibraltar even before taking office in
December. Both he and his Foreign Minister-elect, Fernando Moran, made an
early announcement that the recovery of Gibraltar would be a major goal of the
new Socialist government. They took the first step to induce the British to
the negotiating table by opening the border between Gibraltar and Spain to
pedestrians at midnight, December 14.
The Spanish have already begun to implement this strategy. The US
Embassy in Madrid reports that Spanish officials repeatedly expressed the hope
during Secretary of State Shultz' visit in December that the United States
would attach sufficient importance to Spain's NATO membership to urge that
London be more forthcoming on Gibraltar. One senior Foreign Ministry official
described the situation as a bilateral problem that requires a multilateral
solution.
So far, the United States has resisted involving the Alliance in the
Gibraltar issue, and insisted that it must remain in the bilateral arena.
Other NATO countries, if pressed, are likely to echo this line. We believe
most NATO countries probably are willing to nudge one side or the other gently
from time to time, but will essentially argue that the United States is the
third party most concerned with the outcome -- both because it is the Alliance
leader and because it uses military facilities in both countries.
British Position
The British have shown increasing willingness to negotiate with the
Spanish over the return of Gibraltar in recent years. The Colony still has
strategic importance; in peacetime the British can monitor the passage of
Soviet naval traffic -- especially submarines -- through the Strait, and in
wartime they can control it. Nevertheless, with the decline in Royal Navy
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activity in the Mediterranean, the value of the naval base and dockyard at
Gibraltar have diminished and defense planners have come to view them as a
luxury. The government announced in 1981 that the dockyard would be closed in
1983. Other facilities on the Rock also have been pared to save money.
British officials recently have indicated to US Embassy officers that if
negotiations hinged on financial matters alone they would be glad to
With the partial reopening of the border, the Foreign Office is hopeful
that Spain will open the border completely, as the Lisbon agreement
stipulates, and agree to begin talks this spring. According to the US Embassy
in London, Foreign Office officials insist that any British retreat on
sovereignty is completely out of the question for now, and, indeed, Prime
Minister Thatcher's policy probably will echo the tough line she displays
toward Argentina on the Falklands. In addition, the small Gibraltar "lobby"
in the United Kingdom is influential, and will stand firm on this point.
The Foreign Office thinks, however, that once talks start it will be
possible quickly to resolve current NATO command problems regarding Gibraltar
and the Mediterranean. In talks with US officials, the British have already
expressed willingness to allow a Spanish military command in NATO that
includes Gibraltar -- perhaps even headquartered on the Rock and flying the
Spanish fla -- but to make no concession on the issue of sovereignty.
The Foreign Office told US Embassy officials in December that it hopes
realism and self-interest will lead the Spanish government to settle for
enhanced commercial and human contacts with Gibraltar in addition to a
military presence. If negotiations begin, the British plan to concentrate on
steps to improve economic and social cooperation and to emphasize that the
long-term goal for Spain must be to convince Gibraltar's inhabitants that
Madrid has their interests at heart. The Foreign Office will hammer at the
idea that progress on sovereignty will take years, while hoping that a quick
breakthrough on NATO command arrangements will-provide the political benefit
the Spanish feel pressed to achieve. To counter Spanish threats that they are
reconsidering their NATO membership, the British probably will argue that a
Spanish exit would make it harder to hold discussions with Madrid about a NATO
military installation of some importance to the Alliance.
If Things Go Wrong: Stakes for the West
Although negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain now look
imminent and the long-range outlook is more optimistic than even last year,
there are still many uncertainties. The return of Gibraltar is an issue that
draws emotional support from Spaniards of every political party and economic
class and, according to Embassy reporting and press comment, the public echoes
the government in linking NATO membership to progress on Gibraltar. The new
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Socialist government has softened its line on NATO membership since winning
the election in October, but still refuses to move forward on military
integration and continues publicly to raise questions about the wisdom of NATO
membership. If negotiations with Britain go sour, therefore, we think the
Socialist government could be faced with a wave of anti-NATO feeling that
would make it easy to drum up public support for taking Spain out of the
Alliance. It could probably justify this step -- even to the Spanish military
-- by going ahead with another of its campaign promises, a referendum on NATO
membership, in which polls suggest it would find it easy to elicit a negative
Spain might also reassess its application to join the EC. We believe the
government would embark on this course with some misgivings, because the long
years of isolation under Franco have left Spaniards with a strong desire to
"join Europe." Indeed, Embassy reporting indicates that many Spanish see
membership more in terms of political benefit than economic blessing.
Nevertheless, Spaniards often mention NATO and the EC as two approaches to the
same objective, and leaving one might imply leaving the other, particularly if
Spanish negotiations on EC entry continue to stall over the threat Iberian
agricultural products pose for the French or if Spanish industries become more
concerned about the tough competition they face inside the Community.
Spanish membership in NATO could falter for a variety of reasons, but
should Spain leave the Alliance specifically because of Gibraltar, the United
Kingdom probably would reap a large amount of blame. Other Alliance members
would at the minimum fault the United Kingdom for not managing the situation
more adroitly. Some would see parallels between London's attitude toward
negotiations over Gibraltar and the hard line taken on the issue of
sovereignty by the British in their dispute with Argentina over the Falkland
Islands. Moreover, several Allied governments expended considerable effort to
get the original NATO invitation to Spain approved by their parliaments, and
would undoubtedly be unhappy if Spain left NATO over a bilateral dispute.
This could, in turn, intensify strains among the Allies, as the United Kingdom
resisted becoming a scapegoat.
If the Gibraltar negotiations fail, the United States could also expect
to bear the brunt of some Spanish frustration, because Spain probably would
conclude that the United States had failed to press the United Kingdom
sufficiently. We doubt the Spanish would go so far as to reject a US basing
agreement, but at the very least, the Spanish would become more prickly in
bilateral relations. In a such case, the Spanish would tend to refuse
overflight requests, take legalistic attitudes toward anything already agreed,
and even make entry and exit to US bases in Spain more difficult.
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Outlook
It will be exceedingly difficult, even with evidence of good will, to
satisfy all three participants in the Gibraltar debate. The British will feel
bound to keep their promises to the Gibraltarians. The ardently British
Gibraltarians will hold the United Kingdom to its constitutional obligations
and resist any attempt to change their status. The Spanish government,
pointing to the UN resolutions and thinking they hold high cards because of
the US bases agreement and NATO membership, will undoubtedly press hard for a
quick resolution -- hoping that success would score points with a suspicious
military and a public that greeted the Socialists' election with high hopes.
We believe that, ultimately, the British desire to shed the colony will
work in Spain's favor and probably lead to some long-range solution likely to
satisfy most of Madrid's demands. The attitude of the Gibraltarians toward
Spanish sovereignty over the Rock probably will evolve only slowly, however,
and the negotiators are likely to look for some solution that involves gradual
change. One possible interim outcome would include a formula for dual
Spanish-British administration and dual nationality for Gibraltar's
residents. In the end, Gibraltar could become another of Spain's semi-
autonomous regions, with significant local powers in fields such as education,
public works, police, and tax policy. The hurdles on the road to such a
solution, however, may take years to overcome.
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Distribution:
3~- Dennis Blair - NSC Staff - Requestor
1 - Jack R. Binns - Director, Office of Northern Europe Affairs
1 - Robert D. Blackwill - Deputy Assistant Secretary n. European Affairs
1 - Dirk Gleysteen - Director, Office of Southern European Affairs
Flanigan - Director, Office of Western European Affairs
1 - Alan H
.
1 - John Hawes - Director, Office of European Security and Political Affairs
1 - Alan Lukens - Director, Office of Analysis for Western Europe
1 - Robert Dean - Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs
1 - Ronald S. Lauder Deputy Asst. Secretary of Defense
1 - Commodore Darby - Asst. Deputy Director for Political-Military Affairs
2 Douglas Mulholland - Special Asst. to the Secretary National Secretary
2 - David Peterson - Director, Office of Intelligence Liaison
1 - Stephen Geis - Officer'in Charge, United Kingdom Affairs
1 - Ward Thompson - INR/WEA/UK
1 - ExDir
1 - OD/EURA
1 - EURA Production Staff
4 - IMC/CB
1 - Division File
1 - Branch File
1 - Author
DDI/EURA/WE/BBCJ
17Feb83
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