POLAND: NEAR TERM ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000500240001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 3, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/16: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500240001-2
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
3 January 1983
Poland: Near Term Assessment
Summary
As a result of its clear victory over the
Solidarity underground, the Polish regime last
month suspended martial law and released most
internees. There is no reason to believe,
however, that in the coming months the nervous,
security-minded authorities will ease their
safeguards against resistance activities or
against possible spontaneous disorders stemming
from the poor economic situation. Jaruzelski
realizes that the population remains deeply
alienated, but his efforts at administrative and
economic reform have been limited and
ineffective. There is probably a considerable gap
between the maximum that he is willing to offer in
search of social accord and the minimum that
Polish society could find acceptable. We believe
that the enhanced role of the security services
and continuing concern over internal security will
hinder any improvement in Poland's relations with
the West. In particular, Warsaw seems in no mood
now to make conciliatory gestures to the US.
This memorandum. was requested by Stanley Moskowitz,
NIO/USSR/EE, for Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Palmer,
USSR/EE/Yugoslavia, Department of State. It was prepared by
Central Intelligence Agency
East European Division, Office of European
Analysis. Comments and questions are welcome and should be
addressed to Chief, East European
Division, EURA, L__=:]
EURM-83-10001
$ 25X1
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Since martial law was imposed on 13 December 1981, Poland's
military ruler Wojciech Jaruzelski has clearly shown the will and
the ability to suppress organized resistance. In recent months,
the regime has felt confident enough of its strength and its
control of internal security to make several conciliatory
gestures:
On 8 November, following a meeting between Archbishop
Glemp and Jaruzelski, it was announced that Pope John
Paul II would visit Poland next summer.
On 14 November, in the wake of Solidarity's failure to
mount significant strikes protesting the union's
dissolution, Lech Walesa was released from internment.
On 23 December all the remaining internees were
released, except for seven union leaders who were
formally arrested the same day.
On 30 December martial law was "suspended;" regime
officials have hinted at eventual clemency for some who
remain in jail for martial law offenses.
Although these gestures can be interpreted as steps toward
meeting Western demands for the easing of sanctions, several of
the moves were taken to meet the tactical interests of the
regime. Announcement of the Papal visit, for instance, was a
regime effort to ensure the Church's cooperation in preventing
strikes on 10 November and was made contingent on the existence
of calm in the country. Many Church leaders are still uncertain
whether the Pope will actually come. Additionally, the release
of Walesa was intended largely to remove a symbol of defiance and
a potential rallying point for domestic protests
At the same time, the authorities have taken other measures
to control would-be protestors and to retaliate against foreign
critics, primarily in the US:
-- On 8 October, Poland's parliament (the Sejm) passed a
new trade union law explicitly delegalizing Solidarity
and providing the authorities with numerous controls
over future trade unions.
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On 26 October, the Sejm passed a so-called
"antiparasitism" law which can be used to punish regime
critics.
Released internees have been systematically harassed and
in some cases urged to leave the country. On 16
December, Walesa was detained for nine hours to prevent
him from speaking at ceremonies commemorating the deaths
of workers in 1970 and 1981.
In mid-December, VOA and BBC medium wave broadcasts were
jammed for about one week, probably to prevent the
spread of information about Walesa's planned speech.
The authorities later "apologized" to the British.
On 14 December, the regime retaliated for US actions it
disliked by cutting off scientific and cultural contacts
arranged through USIA.
Several thousand individuals remain in jail under arrest
or convicted of martial law offenses and, as of mid-
December, the regime continued to arrest underground
The "suspension" of martial law reflects the authorities'
increased confidence that they have crushed the will to resist as
well as their desire to show Western and domestic audiences
movement toward normalization. We believe they did not proceed
with the full lifting of martial law because of:
-- continuing deep concern about persisting underground
activity and, perhaps more importantly, possible
spontaneous unrest due to the poor economic situation
distrust of the civilian bureaucracies by military
officers, particularly Jaruzelski
a calculation that the potential economic return to
Poland from the West for the full lifting of martial law
was not promising enough to justify the security
Assuming there is no significant resurgence of unrest,
martial law will be lifted sometime during 1983, perhaps as early
as March, as some senior Church officials hope, or possibly as
late at 22 July, Poland's national day. The exact timing may
become interned with regime maneuvering over the Papal
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There is no reason to believe that, in the coming months,
the nervous, security-minded authorities will ease their efforts
to quash the underground press, arrest fugitive leaders, and
generally prevent underground organizational work. Jaruzelski in
his speech to the nation on 12 December emphatically declared
that "anarchy will not be allowed to enter Poland." 25X1
Jaruzelski and his moderate advisers realize nonetheless
that the populace remains deeply alienated and have consistently
said that the clock cannot be turned back to July 1980.
Jaruzelski will have some chance, if he is willing and able to
use it, to refocus his attention away from what has been his
primary goal to far, the destruction of Solidarity, and more
toward the creation of a social accord and the introduction of
economic and bureaucratic reforms that he has stated are
necessary for Poland's recovery. His publicly declared, long-
term goal is to create a strong, efficient state bureaucracy that
will be able to manage the country effectively and to improve
living conditions thus preventing yet another explosion of
public anger. 25X1
His initial efforts to reform the economy and to fill the
void left by the dissolution of Solidarity, however, have been
limited and ineffective. In fact, there probably is a
considerable gap between the maximum that Jaruzelski is willing
to offer in search of social accord and the minimum that Polish
society could find acceptable. Jaruzelski will remain intent on
opposing the creation of any institutions with substantial
autonomy, and his efforts to improve bureaucratic efficiency do
not allow for meaningful inputs from society or restraints on the
regime's freedom of action. 25X1
Whatever Jaruzelski's personal intentions or desires, he
does not have a free hand even though he seems to be firmly in
control of the top leadership. He must continue to rely heavily
on entrenched party and government bureaucrats who have a stake
in maintaining the old system with its often ineffective
methods. He doubts the competence of many in the party
apparatus, but cannot make wholesale changes quickly, if only
because he, as a military man, has to be seen paying some respect
to the "leading role" of the party. Even though the number of
military commissars overseeing factories will apparently shrink,
party-military frictions may increase because the military is
likely to continue to wield considerable political power--despite
the expectations of many party officials. 25X1
We believe that concern over internal security and the
enhanced role of the Ministry of Interior will continue to have a
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noticeable impact on Poland's relations with the West. Showing
their traditional anti-Western bias, many officials in the
security services will argue that the country faces very
difficult economic times ahead and that contacts with the West
must be tightly controlled. They might argue that former party
leader Gierek's efforts to woo the West allowed internal enemies
too much freedom, eventually leading to the creation of
Solidarity. They probably would also point out that Poland can
expect little help from depressed Western economies, and that,
even if it were offered, the West would expect in return a degree
of liberalization damaging to internal security.
Warsaw seems in no mood to, make conciliatory gestures to the
US. The Jaruzelski regime blames Washington for leading the
drive for sanctions and has taken extreme umbrage at some of the
statements made by President Reagan and Secretary of Defense
Weinberger. Restrictions on USIA and a cutback in contacts with
US diplomats probably reflect a calculation that there is little
more the US can do to punish Poland and may also be intended to
create a bar ainin
Although the Poles may be prepared for a long, cold spell in
their relations with the West, particularly the US, they will not
burn all their bridges and probably harbor hopes of splitting the
US from its allies. They have frequently admitted that, whether
they like it or not, they need trade with the West. They would
be interested in beginning talks on official debt rescheduling,
especially if this opened up the possibility of new credits.
Despite their keen interest in economic aid, they will not make
concessions which they believe might endanger their domestic
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W
SUBJECT:
Poland:
Near Term Assessment
Distribution:
Original
+ 1
Addressee
1
DDI
1
ADDI
1
DDI REGISTRY
1
Ex Dir
1
OD/EURA
2
EUR/PS
4
IMC/CB
1
C/EURA/EE
1
EURA/EE/NE
Chrono
1
EURA/EE/NE
Production
1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/16: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500240001-2