CHAD: THE REBEL GOVERNMENT AND ARMY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000402150002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 7, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency C. 1 C 6
7 o1
Washington, D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
7 September 1983
CHAD: The Rebel Government and Army
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Summary
Chad's Libyan-backed rebels led by Goukouni Oueddei have
organized a so-called Transitional Government of National Unity
and a military wing called the National Liberation Army that is
theoretically in control of the northern third of Chad. In
reality, the rebels are allowed little freedom of action by the
Libyans whose own forces in Chad are in real charge. The
rebels are a loose coalition of northern, central, and southern
Chadian ethnic and political factions that were defeated by
President Habre in June 1982. Their political headquarters is
located in Bardai, a town in the rugged Tibesti mountains just
south of Chad's Libyan-occupied Aozou Strip. Although unified
by opposition to the pro-Western Habre regime, the rebels are
plagued by factional rivalries and squabbling that impairs
their political and military effectiveness. Only close Libyan
tutelage and massive support have held the rebel government and
army together. We believe that the cohesiveness of the rebel
government could suffer if a prolonged military stand-off
ensues in Chad, with southerners in particular becomin restive
in the northern desert and eager to return home.
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division,
This memorandum was prepared by West Africa Branch, Africa
Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It has been
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Questions and comments
4r r. R P T
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Although the introduction of French forces has frustrated
for now Libyan hopes for a military takeover in Chad by the
rebels, French desires for a political settlement among Chadian
factions gives Tripoli room to maneuver white reinforcing its
hold over northern Chad. Libyan Leader Qadhafi probably
calculates that he can outwait France and the US in expectation
that their resolve will fatter over time. He probably views a
political settlement in Chad as a means of getting the French
out and eventually undercutting Habre's grip on power. The
rebels probably hope to draw the Libyans into military
confrontation with the French, however, just as Habre would
like to involve the French against the Libyans.
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The Transitional Government's Main Factions
The Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), formed in Libya
in October 1982, represents factions of three broad groups of Chad's 240
or so ethnically distinct peoples that have been fighting one another
since civil war broke out in 1965. The GUNT, like Habre's regime, appears
to have a disporportionate number of Toubou in key positions. The Toubou
are fierce warriors who have done the bulk of the fighting in the long
civil war even though they make up only 4 percent of the population. The
Toubou live in the sparsely populated desert and mountain waste-lands
above the 14th parallel. 25X1
Another large group in the GUNT is drawn from numerous fragmented
Arab clans that make up 14 percent of the population and reside in central
Chad in a belt stretching from Nigeria to Sudan. They are joined by an
assortment of Islamized non-Aran tribesmen that also inhabit the central
The third major grouping--the black Sara from southern Chad--are
people who account for a quarter of the country's nearly 5 million
population and reside below the 10th parallel. The Sara were heavily
influenced by French culture and Christianity during the colonial era, and
they dominated the predominantly Muslim north after independence from
France in 1960 until the late 1970s. F___1 25X1
restricted influence over policy decisions.
Chadians hold 14 of the 20 posts in the GUNT's cabinet. Southern
Chadians, who hold six largely technocratic positions, have increasingly
Despite the GUNT's facade of broad ethnic representation, the US
Embassy reports that it is skewed in favor of Muslims and particularly
toward members of Goukouni's Teda clan of Toubou. Northerners and central
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According to the US Embassy, several major factional leaders opposed
to Habre are not included in the GUNT. Mahamat Abba Said, leader of the
First Ariny--which is made up of non-Arab Muslims from central and eastern
Chad--has refused to participate in the GUNT and now resides in Lagos,
Nigeria. The US Embassy indicates that it is unaware of any other First
Army representative in the Bardai Government. Although Facho Balaam's
National Democratic Union (UNU)--made up of southern Sara intellectuals--
has at least one member in the GUNT, Balaam continues to travel throughout
West Africa seeking aid for the Union as an alternative to the rebel
government. F 25X1
Military Organization
The rebel National Army of Liberation now "controls" Chad north of
the 16th parallel but only because of massive assistance from Tripoli and
the presence of Libyan forces in Faya Largeau and other key towns. In
fact, the very existence of a "unified" rebel force is largely the result
of Libyan efforts.
The rebels' mid-summer offensive--during which they captured Faya
Largeau and drove to Abeche in the southeast
After counter-attacking
Chadian government forces recaptured Faya Largeau on 3U July, only direct
intervention by Libya--involving armor, artillery, mechanized infantry,
and combat aircraft--staved off a rebel rout and forced Habre's forces to
evacuate Faya Largeau in early August. F_~ 25X1
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Libyan Intentions
Despite the present military and political stalemate in Chad, we
doubt that Libyan leader Qadhafi has given up his long term goal of
installing a faithful ally in power in N'Djamena. According to his own
public statements, Qadhafi views Habre as an "imperialist threat" to
Libya. We believe he remains concerned that if Habre is allowed to
recover the north, Chad could become a center of Libyan opposition
activity. Moreover, in our judgment, Chad--because of religious and
cultural ties established in the 19th century by the Libyan-based Sanusi
Islamic order--remains a key target in Qadhafi's larger dream of 25X1
eventually creating a pan-Islamic state across the Sahara.
We believe that if the (CUNT gained power in N'Djamena with Libya's
logistical and military backing, Qadhafi would expect the new regime to
meet certain demands in repayment for his support. Chief among these
demands would be that N'Djamena recognize Tripoli's claim to the Libyan-
occupied Aozou Strip--a 200 mile-deep area below Chad's border with
Libya. Tripoli would also require the government to declare Chad an
Islamic republic and sign a defense pact with Libya as a step toward
fulfilling Qadhafi's longer term goals. According to a source of the US
Embassy in Paris, Goukouni recently referred publicly to the possibility
of unifying Chad with Libya. Qadhafi would further expect N'Djamena to
acquiesce in the use of Chadian territorupport subversion against
neighboring states, particularly Sudan.
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The de facto partition of Chad is not a stable situation, in our
judgment. Habre cannot accept the loss of the north, his birthplace and
the home of most of his top lieutenants. The forces belonging to Habre's
northern faction probably are pushing him to continue fighting and may
become disenchanted with his leadership if he does not. We suspect Habre
is making plans to attack in the north before the Libyans become
thoroughly entrenched and that he will try to draw the French into the
fighting. uation, is unpre2'5xiable and will likely remain so for
some time.
the risk of setting the stage for another round of fighting.
Outlook
In our view, future Libyan tactics aimed at eventually placing the
rebels in power in Chad depend in large part on Qadhafi's assessment of
French and US resolve. The possibility of a military takeover of Chad by
the Libyan backed rebels has been frustrated at least for the near term by
the introduction of French ground and air forces and by the establishment
of a line along the 15th parallel beyond which the French say Libyan and
rebel forces will not be allowed to pass. Having achieved a military
impasse based on a de facto partition of Chad, however, the French clearly
are interested in promoting a political settlement between Chad's warring
factions that would allow Paris to eventually withdraw its forces. =
For now, the Libyans are using the lull in the fighting to resupply
their forces and to dig in for what could be a long stay in northern
Chad. We believe Qadhafi is unlikely to tangle with French forces and
probably calculates that he can outwait and outmaneuver the French and the
US. In our judgment, the Libyan leader may be content for the time being
with de facto control of northern Chad, and he probably favors a political
settlement among Chadian factions as a means of getting French forces out
and undercutting Habre's grip on power. Goukouni says the GUNT is
agreeable to reconciliation negotiations under OAU auspices on the
condition that French forces be withdrawn. We believe a withdrawal of
French troops coupled with the introduction of pro-Libyan factions into a
future government in N'Djamena would enhance Qadhafi's chances of
achieving his goal of establishing a friendly regime in Chad--albeit at
We believe that Goukouni also calculates that a prolonged military
stand-off will work to his disadvantage, and that he probably hopes to
involve the Libyans in fighting with the French just as Habre would like
to involve the French in a confrontation against the Libyans. Southerners
in the rebel coalition, who expect to return home via a military victory
against Habre, may become restive in the desert north and consider
switching sides. The rebels in fact initiated an attack in early
September against Habre's forces in the area of Oum Chalouba, apparently
without the foreknowledge or approval of the Libyans. When French Jaguar
aircraft arrived to reconnoiter the scene the rebels fled in panic and
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appealed for Libyan intervention, falsely claiming that they were being
bombed by the French. In this instance, the Libyans reacted with caution,
sending neither troops nor aircraft to aid the rebels, with the result
that the fighting subsided without changing the general situation. F-~
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SUBJECT: Chad: The Rebel Government and Army
Original - Frederick L. Wettering, Director, African Affairs, NSC
1 - Chester A. Crocker, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 - Jim Bishop, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 - Robert Cabelly, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 - Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, Political Military Affairs,
Department of State
1 - Pierre Shostal, Director AF/C, Department of State
1 - Leonardo Neher, Director INR/AF, Department of State
1 - Terrel Otis, Libya Desk Officer, Department of State
1 - Jackie France Desk Officer, Department of State
1 - DIO/AF, Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - Noei U. oc Department of Defense
1 - C/NESA/AI/M
2 - AF/W
4 - ALA/W
1 - UUCI
1 - Executive Director 25x1
1 - SA/DCI/IA
1 - DUI
1 - AUDI
1 - DDO/Africa
1 - NIO for Africa
1 - NIC Action Group
I - 25X1
1 - ILS
1 - C/DDI/PES
1 - D/ALA
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research Director
4 - OCPAS/IMD/CB 25X1
2 - ALA/AF
ALA/AF~ I(7 SEPT 1983)
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