ZAIRE: PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S VISIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 28, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
Central Intelligence Agency cof<
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
28 July 1983
ZAIRE: PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S VISIT
Summary
Zairian President Mobutu will visit the United States in
early August. He is scheduled to meet with President Reagan on
4 August and will also confer with other top US officials. He is
likely to appeal for greater security and economic assistance,
arguing his case by pointing to his military support for the
beleaguered pro-Western regime in Chad and to recent Zairian
economic and political reforms. Mobutu's visit comes at a time
when his position at home appears secure.
The Setting
We believe that Mobutu, whose last official trip to
Washington was in December 1981, sees his visits here as
demonstrating to Zairian and international audiences that he is a
senior African statesman and important world figure and that he
has strong US support. The visit comes at a time when relations
between Kinshasa and Washington are good. According to the US
Embassy in Kinshasa, relations have improved considerably
following a period of uneasiness last year when Mobutu briefly
renounced US aid in reaction to sharp Congressional criticism of
his regime and Congressional cuts in the Administration's aid
request for Zaire.
Mobutu's Perspective on Chad
Developments in Chad are likely to be foremost on Mobutu's,
mind, according to the US Embassy in Kinshasa. The 1,500-to-
This memorandum was written byI Ithe Africa Division
of the Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It has been coordinated
with the Directorate of Operations. Questions and comments are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA
ALA-M-83-10121
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
 c r I n CT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
1,800-man Zairian force in Chad is assigned primarily to help
protect the Chadian capital, but Mobutu's orders also state that
President Habre may use the Zairian troops in any way he sees
fit. Zairian fighter aircraft, meanwhile, may be conducting
limited reconnaissance for Habre's forces, and a Zairian C-130
transport aircraft has flown logistic missions for the
Chadians.
We believe Mobutu will urge that a major portion of the
recently authorized $10 million in US emergency military
assistance for Habre be channeled to Zairian units in Chad, many
of which are poorly equipped. He may also ask for direct US
support to the Zairian contingent in Chad and request increased
aid to the Zairian armed forces more generally. He may bring a
specific military shopping list to Washington.
In pressing for greater military assistance, Mobutu may
stress that Kinshasa needs to be compensated for the military and
financial resources it is expending in Chad at a time when Zaire
is trying to cope with severe budgetary problems.
The Zairian intervention in Chad could backfire on Mobutu.
If Habre's forces meet with reverses and the Zairians suffer
casualties or are forced to withdraw from the country, Mobutu
would probably come under criticism within hiss re immee,although
Mobutu probably also hopes that he can parlay his
government's defense of Western interests in Chad into increased
US economic assistance. During his talks in Washington, he is
likely to point to significant economic and administrative
reforms he has instituted during the past year. These measures,
recommended by the International Monetary Fund and Western donor
nations, have included:
New limitations on government spending, including a pay
cap on public sector salaries, aimed at reducing the
budget deficit.
-- Improved accounting and marketing arrangements for cobalt
and copper, designed to reduce opportunities for
corruption in these key industries.
we do not believe his rule would be threatens .
Mobutu's Economic Agenda
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
-- Removal of most controls on farm prices, and
liberalization of restrictions on the movement of
agricultural commodities--actions aimed at stimulating
agricultural production.
Support for a New IMF Accord
Mobutu may urge that Washington respond to such efforts by
interceding with the IMF to speed negotiations now under way for
a one-year standby loan of approximately $250 million and a
compensatory fund facility of about $110 million.* He may argue
that his government already has accepted most of the reforms the
Fund is urging and that delay in reaching an agreement
result in increased hardship for the Zairian people.
Fund officials, for their part, generally appear satisfied
with Mobutu's reform efforts, according to the US Embassy in
Kinshasa. The Embassy believes the principal remaining issue--
reform of the country's exchange rate system, including a large
devaluation--is close to resolution.
Increased Bilateral Aid
While in Washington, Mobutu may also solicit greater
bilateral economic assistance. The United States furnished
approximately $24 million in economic aid during FY 1982; such
assistance has totalled about $625 million since Zaire's
independence in 1960.** In recent years, the US has provided PL
480 food, aid to agricultural and rural development, and
assistance in the nutritional and health fields. The activities
of the more than 200 Peace Corps volunteers in Zaire have
complemented the economic aid effort.
In appealing for greater assistance, Mobutu may argue that:
-- Increased aid is necessary during the current period of
difficult economic adjustments.
Zaire's last IMF program, a three-year $1.1 billion loan agreement
approved in June 1981, lapsed after only five months when Kinshasa failed by a
wide margin to meet the Fund's performance targets.
Us military aid deliveries to Zaire were about $7.6 million in FY 1982
and have totalled around $115 million since 1960.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
 r rn ncT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
Zaire's economic problems result largely from external
factors--worldwide recession and falling commodity
prices--over which Kinshasa has no control.
The present level of assistance is inconsistent with the
two countries' historical ties as well as with Zaire's
importance and pro-Western orientation.
The United States tends to take Zaire for granted and in
some instances provides greater assistance to less
consistent supporters of Washington's positions on foreign
policy issues.*
Mobutu also may ask that Washington back his government's
efforts to get public and private creditors to reschedule Zaire's
$4.5 billion medium- and long-term debt. Western nations and
private banks have periodically rescheduled Zaire's debt since
1976, and the Zairians doubtless hope that they will receive more
such relief once they come to terms with the IMF. Mobutu and his
financial advisers are probably hoping for a massive, long-term
rescheduling.
Other Concerns
On other economic issues, Mobutu may ask that Washington
make additional purchases of Zairian cobalt for the US strategic
stockpile. He may contend that the United States should take
advantage of current low world cobalt prices and Kinshasa's
willingness to make such sales on concessional terms. He may
also point out that such purchases would assist his government by
old cobalt and b
f
uns
reducing Zaire's 25,000-ton stockpile o
ay its debts
re
t
i
p
o
on
putting Kinshasa in a better posit
At the same time, he may voice concern over recent reports
that the Congress plans to consider legislation to subsidize
domestic US cobalt producers. The United States imports more
than 90 percent of the cobalt it uses, and nearly 60 percent of
the imported cobalt comes from Zaire.
Mobutu may express interest in greater US trade and
investment. US private foreign investment in Zaire totalled
*Zaire, which currently sits on the UN Security Council, has supported US
positions regarding Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, and other issues in
the UN. It has also opposed efforts by Cuba and other radical states to
dominate the Nonaligned Movement.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
about $123 million at yearend 1981, according to the US
Department of Commerce. Major US firms with investments in Zaire
include General Motors, Goodyear, Warner-Lambert, Ray-O-Vac,
Continental Grain, Gulf, and Citibank. The United States and
Zaire are currently trying to negotiate a bilateral accord aimed
at facilitating increased investment.
Economic Outlook
In the near term, we expect that Mobutu will continue to
endorse economic reforms needed to secure continued Western
financial support. He probably recognizes that he has few other
options. Even with such assistance, however, he probably will be
able to do little more than slow Zaire's economic decline until
the ongoing international economic recovery results in
significantly higher mineral prices. Moreover, the presence of
large cobalt and copper stockpiles in some countries, as well as
the availability of substitutes, will tend, at least initially,
1 -1
to dampen pressures for major price increases.
Over the longer term, we are skeptical that Mobutu will
display the political will needed to continue pursuing the strong
belt-tightening and other measures that might turn the economy
around. He has adopted economic reforms in the past with little
lasting effect, and we doubt that the current recovery program
will fare much better.
Political Issues
Mobutu probably believes that several political decisions he
has made in the past year strengthen his case for strong US
support. Taken as a whole, we believe these actions demonstrate
that he is fully in control of his country and remains a major
actor on the African scene.
Past Difficulties
At the time of his last visit to Washington in December
1981, Mobutu had endured a year of troublesome political
developments, including:
-- The sudden resignation in April 1981 of his Prime
Minister, Nguza Karl-i-Bond, who fled to Belgium and
proceeded to denounce Mobutu for repression and
corruption.
-- The theft from his residence in August 1981 of several
personal articles of symbolic importance, which increased
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
his concerns about his personal security, according to the
US Embassy in Kinshasa.
-- Efforts by a group of former legislators to form a second
Zairian political party.
-- Indications that rebels belonging to the Front for the
National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), the Angola- and
Zambia-based group that had invaded Zaire's mineral-rich
Shaba Region twice in the late 1970s, were stepping up
preparations to resume hostilities.
-- The election of a Socialist government in France, as well
as differences with Belgium over anti-Mobutu
propagandizing by Zairian exiles in Brussels and over
unresolved bilateral financial disputes. These
developments left Mobutu worried that he could no longer
count on the two West European governments that had
previously provided him with key backing, including direct
military intervention on his behalf during the 1978
invasion of Shaba.
As a result of these difficulties during 1981, according to
US Embassy reporting, Mobutu felt increasingly beleaguered and
insecure. The Embassy reported that his interest in the day-to-
day management of the country had declined and that a general
sense of malaise had gripped the Zairian leadership. According
to the Embassy, the situation did not bode well for Zaire's
stability.
Mobutu Reasserts His Leadership
Since then, with the passage of time, Mobutu appears to have
th
e
regained much of his zest for governing, in part because
Shaban rebels and other opponents failed to mount a serious
Thus when Mobutu meets with US officials in August,
challenge.
he will project the image of a strong and confident leader. C~ 25X1
Mobutu can point to a number of domestic political
achievements over the past year. In the second half of 1982, his
government completed the most extensive series of local,
regional, and national legislative elections ever held in
Zaire. Organs of the official party screened all candidates to
ensure their loyalty, but according to US Embassy reporting the
elections were competitive and--despite some instances of vote
fraud--reasonably fair by Zairian standards. 25X1
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
Mobutu may note that late last year he gave his tough new
Prime Minister, Kengo wa Dondo, a broad mandate to "clean
house". Kengo promptly launched a large-scale anti-corruption
campaign, resulting in the arrest of dozens of middle-level
officials and small businessmen but very few high-level
figures. We believe the campaign was designed primarily to
impress the United States and other Western countries, but it has
also been popular with many Zairians, according to the US Embassy
in Kinshasa.
Mobutu may also point to a general amnesty he declared this
May for imprisoned and exiled politicians. His government
appears to have released most political prisoners--precise
figures are unavailable--including 13 former legislators who had
been jailed last year after trying to establish a second
political party. A few prominent exiles have accepted the
amnesty, but most are remaining abroad.
Very few of the several thousand Shaban rebels in Angola and
to
rdin
'
g
s amnesty, acco
Zambia.have availed themselves of Mobutu
factional divisions and severe material and financial problems.
We doubt that they can mount another invasion anytime soon,
although militant elements within the group might carry out
oint
t
.
some p
isolated guerrilla or sabotage operations a
Despite these political trends in Mobutu's favor during the
past year, the poor state of the economy could spark outbreaks of
unrest with little advance warning. According to the US Embassy,
living standards in Zaire are lower today than at independence.
But major disturbances that might threaten Mobutu's regime are
unlikely anytime soon, in our judgment. The population's evident
preoccupation with economic survival, Mobutu's proven adroitness
at repression of some opponents and cooptation of others, and the
relative reliability of key military units in Kinshasa all work
in favor of the regime's survival, at least over the next two
years.
Foreign Policy Achievements
Mobutu may also point to actions he has taken in the past
year on African issues. In addition to Zaire's role in Chad, he
may note that he hosted the annual French-African summit
conference in October 1982. With some 37 countries
participating, this meeting contrasted sharply with unsuccessful
efforts by other African leaders last year to convene a summit of
25X1
25X1
SF CRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
the Organization of African Unity. Mobutu no doubt believes that
the Kinshasa summit affirmed his status as a leading African
statesman. It also eased his worries about his relations with
the Socialist government in Paris; President Mitterrand attended
the conference and privately pledged continuity in French-Zairian
relations, according to the US Embassy in Kinshasa.
The Zairian leader may also refer to his decision in May
1982 to reestablish relations with Israel, making Zaire the
first--and thus far the only--African country fully to restore
ties broken at the time of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The move
cost Zaire some Arab economic assistance
Mobutu probably will ask US officials for a status report on
the Namibian problem and the related issue of a Cuban troop
withdrawal from Angola. He is likely to express support for US
positions and initiatives on these issues.
Relations with Washington
Although Kinshasa's relations with Washington have generally
been good during Mobutu's nearly 18 years in office, occasional
periods of tension have arisen. In 1975 Mobutu, apparently
fearing US complicity in an alleged plot to overthrow him,
expelled the US Ambassador. Mobutu took strong exception to the
human rights policies of the Carter Administration, but US
logistic support to the Zairian military during the rebel
invasions of Shaba Region in 1977 and 1978 helped to mollify him,
according to US Embassy reporting.
Following Mobutu's brief "renunciation" of US aid in May
1982, relations improved with Ambassador Kirkpatrick's visit to
Zaire in July 1982, Mobutu's meetings last summer with
Ambassador-at-Large Walters and other visiting State Department
officials, and Vice President Bush's trip to Zaire last
November.
The bilateral relationship is likely to continue to be
characterized by occasional periods of uneasiness, in part
because Mobutu probably will try periodically to play off Zaire's
traditional friends--especially France, Belgium, and the United
SF ('RET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
States--against one another, as he has in the past. But we do
not expect any change in his basically pro-Western orientation.
Prospects
We do not anticipate that Mobutu will be removed from office
in the next two years. Even if he were, we would not expect an
anti-Western government to come to power, although a post-Mobutu
regime might make some adjustments in the direction of a more
nonaligned policy. According to the US Embassy in Kinshasa, most
members of the civilian and military elite are Western-oriented
and distrustful of leftist ideology; they are likely to be
watchful for Soviet or Libyan efforts to meddle in the post-
Mobutu era.
Indeed, we believe a resurgence of the widespread violence
and political instability that plagued Zaire before Mobutu took
power in 1965 will be a real possibility no matter what kind of
regime succeeds him. Strong ethnic and social tensions exist
beneath Zaire's present surface calm, according to US Embassy
officers. In our judgment, various ethnic-regional groups would
probably look upon Mobutu's departure as an opportunity to settle
old scores. The Shaban rebels and other dissidents would
probably be emboldened to attempt new revolts, creating new
opportunities for Soviet and Libyan meddling.
At the same time, we believe most Zairians want to avoid a
recurrence of the anarchy and bloodshed of the early 1960s. We
also think there is a greater sense of national identity today
than there was then. In view of these countervailing factors, a
post-Mobutu regime's ability to minimize violence and instability
may depend on the extent to which it is seen by the populace as
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
firm and decisive, representative of the main tribal and regional
groups, genuinely attempting to address economic problems, and--
perhaps most importantly--as having strong Western political,
economic, and military backing.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S VISIT
External Distribution:
Original - Fred Wettering, National Security Council Staff
1 - Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President
1 - Judge William P. Clark, National Security Adviser
to the President
1 - George Shultz, Secretary of State
1 - Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
1 - James Bishop, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
1 - Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of African Affairs
1 - Hugh Montgomery, Director, State/INR
1 - Herman Cohen, Deputy Director State/INR
1 - Leonardo Neher, Director, State/INR/AA
1 - Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense
1 - Peter Spicer, Defense Intelligence
Officer for Africa
1 - Noel Koch, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
International Security Affairs,
Department of Defense
1 - Edward McMahon, State, AF/C
1 - Douglas Mulholland, Special Assistant
to the Secretary (National Security),
Treasury Dept.
1 - David Peterson, Director, Office of Intelligence
Liaison, Commerce -Dept.
Internal Distribution:
1 - Executive Director
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - SA/DCI/IA
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/AF
1 - C/DDO/AF
1. - DDO/AF
1 - DDO/AF
1 - NIC/AG
1 - PDB Staff
1 - C/DDI/PES
1 - DDI/CPAS/ILS
1 - D/ALA
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research Director
4 - CPAS/IMC/CB
10 - ALA AF Division Files
DDI/ALA/AF/C (26Jul83)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000402030001-4