CHINA-VIETNAM: A STATUS REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000400770001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 25, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 February 1983
China-Vietnam: A Status Report
Four years after China's invasion of Vietnam--the first
"lesson"--relations between the two countries remain cool.
Negotiations, which were broken off in 1980, appear indefinitely,
postponed, and the two countries continue to issue sharp public
recriminations over events in Kampuchea and along the China-
Vietnam border. Chinese officials, moreover, continue to allude
to the possibility of a second "lesson;" their most recent such
threat was made in Bangkok last month. This paper reviews the
relationship between the two countries, the military balance
along their common border, and China's limited options should it
decide to launch a second lesson.
While Beijing and Hanoi are at loggerheads over several
issues--including conflicting territorial claims in the South
China Sea, Vietnamese territory occupied by China since the 1979
invasion, and Hanoi's expulsion of Chinese living in Vietnam--
Hanoi's occupation of Kampuchea remains the most signficant issue
between the two countries. Hanoi believes the establishment of a
client regime in Phnom Penh is necessary to its own security, and
therefore "irreversible." In our opinion, Hanoi believes that a
Kampuchea not under its control eventually must fall under
Chinese influence. Furthermore, Kampuchea is the only major
policy success since unification for the Vietnamese leadership,
and they are unlikely to repudiate it.
China's ability to threaten Vietnam indirectly through
Kampuchea is one of Beijing's few instruments of pressure on
Hanoi. China provides nearly all the arms and supplies for the
Communist Democratic Kampuchea resistance forces, and over the
Southeast Asia Division OEA;
na Division; OEA and
Information available as of 21 February 1983 was used in its
presentation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA
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past year has provided small amounts of aid to the two major non-
Communist resistance groups in an effort to maintain ASEAN's
cooperation against Hanoi. In addition, Beijing has joined ASEAN
in its campaign to deny legitimacy to the Vietnam-backed Heng
Samrin regime and to encourage international pressure on Hanoi to
withdraw. This campaign resulted in two votes heavily favoring
continued seating for the resistance forces in last year's United
Nations General Assembly.
The Military Balance
Beijing's pressure on two fronts--Kampuchea and northern
Vietnam--and the memory of the 1979 invasion have pushed Vietnam
to further militarize its society. Since 1979, Hanoi has
increased the size of its army from 600,000 to 1 million troops
and made massive reinforcements on its northern border. Vietnam
now maintains a defense in depth along all major invasion routes
from China, with rear area garrisons near Hanoi and combat units
in forward areas manning tactical defensive positions to prevent
significant loss of territory. New surface-to-air missile sites
have been constructed near the border, supplies have been
stockpiled in forward areas, and the chain of command has been
streamlined. Also, the size of the air force has been doubled.
The bulk of the more than $2 billion in Soviet military aid
delivered since 1979 has been used to upgrade Vietnam's defense
against China. The armor and artillery now in the Vietnamese
inventory are superior to Chinese weapons. The Soviets have also
supplied Fitter Su-22 attack aircraft, Hind attack and Hormone
antisubmarine warfare helicopters, as well as Styx, Sepal, and
Scud surface-to-surface missiles. Under Soviet guidance, Hanoi
has staged large-scale, combined arms field exercises aimed at
defending against an invading Chinese force to familiarize local
and mainforce troops with coordinated defense tactics.
The Chinese have also improved their frontier defense
posture. Since 1979 they have:
-- Established at least five new regional divisions along
the border.
-- Formed two new MIG-21 regiments, improved forward combat
airfields, and rotated bomber and fighter units to give
their crews combat area experience.
-- Conducted exercises in the border regions emphasizing the
refinements of air force ground attack operations and
high altitude interception.
-- Improved road and rail networks leading to major invasion
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Despite China's efforts, the balance of military power has
shifted dramatically in Vietnam's favor over the last 3 years.
In 1979 the Chinese invasion force of 500,000 troops outnumbered
the Vietnamese defenders by five to one. Today, China has only
270,000 troops (16 combat divisions) along the border,
confronting at least 500,000 Vietnamese (43 ground force
divisions, including 34 combat) in Hanoi's three northern
military regions. We estimate that Vietnam's forces deployed in
the three northern military regions have a three-to-one armor and
an almost two-to-one artillery superiority over Chinese forces
located along the Sino-Vietnamese border.
China's Limited Military Options
Neither China's military behavior nor its political behavior,
toward Vietnam suggest that Beijing intends to launch a major
military operation against Vietnam over the next several
months. We believe China will instead maintain tension along the
border to tie down large numbers of Vietnamese troops that could
otherwise be freed for duty in Kampuchea and to lend credibility
to the threat of a second lesson. Beijing will also continue to
back the resistance forces in Kampuchea.
If the Chinese believed large-scale military action were
necessary, we believe they would opt for concentrated strikes
against selected targets along narrow tactical fronts instead of
launching a border-wide ground assault as they did in 1979.
Destruction of economic targets, such as Vietnam's coal mines
near the border or port facilities at Haiphong, would be
plausible Chinese goals. An amphibious assault against Vietnam
or against Vietnamese positions on disputed islands is less
likely because of China's limited naval bombardment capability
and the shortage of suitable beaches along the Vietnamese
coast. China's South Sea Fleet, with the fewest combat ships and
submarines of China's three fleets, has done little since 1979 to
improve its seaborne assault capabilities, but it is capable of
naval skirmishing around the disputed South China Sea island
groups.
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Sino-Vietnamese Relations, 1979-82
Relations between Hanoi and Beijing deteriorated sharply in
the late 1970s because of disputes over-the level of Chinese aid,
territorial conflicts, and Vietnam's poor treatment and
subsequent expulsion of over 300,000 ethnic Chinese living in
Vietnam. By mid-1978, China had cut off all aid to Vietnam.
The Chinese were encouraging the Pol Pot regime in Phnom
Penh in its hostility toward Vietnam. In late 1978, Hanoi
invaded Kampuchea to put an end to repeated harassing actions by
Pol Pot's forces along Vietnam's western border. China
retaliated in February 1979 by invading Vietnam.
Territorial disputes also figure prominantly in the bitter
relations between the two countries. The Chinese continue to
hold small pieces of territory that they overran during the 1979
invasion, and thus have the upper hand in negotiations over
border disputes. The Chinese suspended talks on the border
question in March 1980, for example, arguing that Hanoi was using
the talks to disseminate propaganda. Beijing since has rebuffed
all Vietnamese overtures to reopen the talks as well as Hanoi's
calls for holiday ceasefires.
In addition, the two sides have conflicting claims over two
island groups in the South China Sea--the Paracels (held by
China), and the Spratlys (held by Vietnam, the Philippines, and
Taiwan). Control of these island groups would not only extend
each country's territorial waters but also give it control over
potentially rich offshore oil reserves. In September, Hanoi
warned foreign oil companies not to sign contracts with Beijing
for exploration in disputed waters. The warning came six weeks
after 33 US and other Western oil firms submitted bids to China
to explore large areas of the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China
Sea, including one area determined by seismic surveys to have
excellent prospects.
Frequent, small-scale clashes along the Chinese-Vietnamese
border add fuel to the propaganda war. In mid-October China
accused Vietnam of committing 109 incidents over the previous six
weeks, resulting in three Chinese killed and 11 wounded. The
Vietnamese countered in January with a claim that in 1982 Chinese
troops shelled or crossed into Vietnamese territory 401 times,
killing or wounding "hundreds" of civilians, and that the Chinese
had violated Vietnamese sea.and air space 6,000 times each.
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Chronology of Events
17 February 1979
18, April 1979
19 December 1979
6 March 1980
8 March 1980
14 June 1980
21 July 1980
Chinese invade Vietnam in
response to Hanoi's invasion
and occupation of Kampuchea.
Chinese withdraw after six
weeks.
First session of Sino-
Vietnamese normalization talks
opens in Hanoi.
After 15 sessions talks break
off; the two sides agree to
meet again in Beijing.
China ends second round of
talks; suggests they resume in
Hanoi in late 1980.
Vietnam proposes a third round
of talks.
China refuses to resume talks.
Vietnam calls for the
resumption of talks on 15
July.
China warns Vietnam about
unspecified "grave dangers"
following Vietnamese incursion
into Thailand two days
earlier.
China declares the Soviet-
Vietnamese joint oil
exploration agreement null. and
void.
China again declines to resume
talks with Vietnam, stating it
will do so only when Vietnam
takes action to create the
necessary conditions.
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2 January 1981 Vietnam proposes cease-fire
during 3-9 February and
returns 14 Chinese prisoners.
20 January 1981 China rejects the proposed
cease-fire.
26 January 1981 Prisoner exchange.
16 February 1981
18 July 1981
Vietnam states that China in
the past two years is
responsible for at least 4,000
provocations, resulting in
over 34 "heights" seized and
more than 200 civilians
killed.
Vietnam protests Chinese
provocations; proposes a
cease-fire and. another round
of talks.
Vietnam condemns "arrogant and
illegal" Chinese announcement
establishing flight "danger
zones" over territory that
includes disputed Paracel and
Spratly island groups.
31 August 1981 Vietnam urges China to resume
talks.
7 September 1981 China, citing over 900 border
incidents since May, refuses
Vietnam's proposal.
28 December 1981 Vietnam proposes another
cease-fire for the period 20-
29 January.
4 January 1982 China rejects the proposal.
18 January 1982
30 January 1982
Vietnam issues White Book on
Paracels and Spratlys
justifying Vietnamese
sovereignty and rejecting any
Chinese claims.
Vietnam proposes that talks
resume within the next six
months.
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16 February 1982
18 February 1982
27 July 1982
Vietnam proposes the
resumption of talks.
China rejects the proposal.
Prisoner exchange.
Vietnamese call in Chinese
Ambassador for substantive
discussions--the first time
since his arrival in December
1980--and tell him that
Vietnam wishes to improve
relations "within the
framework of present
difficulties."
14 August 1982 Vietnam proposes a cease-fire
from 27 August to 8 October.
26 August 1982 China rejects the proposal.
25 September 1982
17 January 1983
25 January 1983
Vietnam warns China and
foreign companies doing
business with China against
drilling for oil in the Gulf
of Tonkin.
Vietnam proposes ceasefire
from 5 to 19 February to
observe Tet holiday.
China refuses ceasefire
proposal.
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SUBJECT: China-Vietnam: A Status Report
OEA/SEA/ITB
Desaix Anderson, State
Frazier Meade, DOD
Alan Kitchens, State
Commodore Stewart A. Ring, DOD
Richard Childress, NSC
OEA/SEA
OEA/MSI
OEA/NEA
OEA/CH
D/OEAA
C/Production/OEAA
PDB
C/NIC
NIO/EA
DDI
Executive Director
CPAS/IMD/CB
C/PES/DDI
OCR/ISC
C/EA/RR
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