CHINA'S AFGHANISTAN POLICY: THE PAKISTANI CONNECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000400680002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 28, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05: CIA-RDP85T00287R000400680002-4
I I G J A 1
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
28 January 1982
China's Afghanistan Policy: The Pakistani Connection
Summary
2,i
China?'s policy toward Afghanistan emphasizes the need to
sustain military and diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union to
withdraw its military forces. Pakistan plays a crucial role in
Beijing's attempts to prevent a compromise solution that would
allow Moscow's continued control over Kabul. China, however, is
particularly concerned about. support for this line in Pakistan,
where the Chinese worry that Soviet coerc.ion and enticements, as
well as Islamabad's apparent interest in reducing tensions with
Moscow, may eventualbring about political settlement short of
Beijing's demands.
Concern and Reaction
For the Chinese, the invasion of Afghanistan typified Soviet
expansionism by adding another link in the Soviet encirclement of
China. It also heightened the threat to Pakistan, China's
longtime ally in South Asia. Beijing moved quickly after the 25X1
invasion to strengthen further relations with Islamabad
This memorandum was prepared byl l of the 25X1
Office of East Asian Analysis, China, Foreign Affairs Branch with
acontribution from China, Defense Issues 25X1
Branch. Questions and comments are welcome and may be directed
to the author 25X1 25X1
EA M 83-10021
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Eyewitness accounts have noted the widespread use of
Chinese-manufactured arms--supplied via Pakistan--in
Afghanistan. These have included a large percentage of the
insurgents' heavier weapons, such as 14.5mm antiaircraft guns and
12.7mm heavy machine guns. In addition, an undetermined, but
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Encouraging Islamabad's Opposition to Moscow
China has not softened its approach toward the Soviet
occupation, but Beijing is obviously concerned that changes in
Pakistani relations with Moscow could eventually alter
Islamabad's opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
Because of Pakistan's role as a conduit for aid to the rebels--
and its standing as China's foothold in the region--the Chinese
have tried to keep their policies parallel to those of
Islamabad. Beijing has also tried to limit Moscow's room to
exploit divergencies. In 1981, China reportedly expressed
official concern to Islamabad over earlier Pakistani discussions
with the Soviets and disappointment that Beijing was not
co.nsulted beforehand. More recently, Islamabad's talks with
Moscow last year in Geneva--and the possibility--of another round
of these discussions -have renewed Chinese worries about a
private Pakistani accommodation. 25X1
President Zia's visit to China in October 1982 apparently
did not assuage Beijing's heightened apprehension. 25X1
B e ]J i l l y C o n c l u d e d after t he v 1s i t Lridt Li d 25X1
was softening his opposition to the Soviets. Moreover, Zia's
7i remarks in Beijing about increased Soviet subversive 25X1
activities in Pakistan, the Afghan refugee situation, and
frictions in US-Pakistani relations almost certainly troubled the
Chinese as well. The positive atmosphere surrounding Zia's
recent US visit presumably eased Chinese anxiety somewhat,
although Beijing is probabl,v still wary about tensions between
Islamabad and Washington.
Although) )expressing understanding of Islamabad's 25X1
diplomatic efforts, the Chinese reportedly told Zia in 0ctobe-r
that his government's talks with Moscow could confer legitimacy
on the Babr-ak regime and that Beijing did not see Soviet
"flexibility" on the withdrawal issue. The Chinese also warned
about Moscow's expansionism and urged continued adherence to the
United Nations' principles for a political settlement--withdrawal
of Soviet troops, return of the refu ees and nonalignment and
self-determination for Afghanistan. 25X1
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SECYdET
Prospects
The fact that China has reportedly given the Kampuchea issue
and a reduction in Soviet troops on the Sino-Soviet borders
higher priorities than Afghanistan in its own talks with Moscow
uf;derscores Beijing's skepticism that quick or significant
changes could occur in the Soviet role there. Soviet actions and
China's strong interest in preserving its alliance with Islamabad
will determine how Beijing shapes its policy toward
Afghanistan. If in the context of Sino-Soviet talks Moscow moved
to resolve the issue of Afghanistan first, we believe China would
be likely to support arrangements which reduced the direct Soviet
threat to Pakistan and enabled the Afghan refugees to return
home. Without such Soviet action, however, Pakistan's own
negotiations with the Soviet Union and Islamabad's will toward
off Soviet pressure will remain determining factors in Chinese
behavior. If Zia concludes a "secret" deal with Moscow, it would
at a minimum cool the atmosphere of Sino-Pakistan relations. 0 25X1
In. the absence of a settlement, we expect China to maintain
the current level of its military aid to the insurgents and
diplomatic pressure on the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. China
issued unyielding statements during the UN debate on Afghanistan
last fall, and its authoritative commentaries in recent months
have denounced the Soviet presence as a'"serious threat to
China's security"--a charge that has been used rarely by Beijing
io the last few years. To buttress Pakistan's resolve, we expect
Beijing will play down to Islamabad the prospects for Sino-Soviet
normalization and for flexibility by Moscow on Afghanistan. At
the'same time, Beijing will also continue to argue against
diplomatic moves by Islamabad that could lead to improved ties
with Moscow. 0
25X1
3
SECT
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