ANGOLA: IMPACT OF CLARK AMENDMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000400320001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 14, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000400320001-4
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
14 April 1983
NOTE TAD: Tom Cormack
Executive Secretary
FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attached is our more detailed response
to the Director's question on Angola and
the Clark Amendment.
Robert M. Gates
M
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000400320001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000400320001-4
14 April 1983
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: ANGOLA: Impact of Clark Amendment
1. The following is the DDI's response to your request for information
concerning the insurgency in Angola and the impact of the Clark Amendment.
This memorandum supplements the one we provided yesterday on the subject. 25X1
2. The Clark Amendment, prohibiting the granting of US security
assistance to insurgent groups in Angola without express Congressional
authorization, was originally introduced in December 1975, approved by the
Senate in February 1976, and signed into law by the President at the end of
June 1976. The debate in the US over the Clark Amendment during this period
held the attention of the contending forces in Angola, but in our judgment the
legislation had little effect on the fighting there. 25X1
3. Background. The Alvor accord, in which Portugal promised
independence to a transitional government comprised of Angola's three major
guerrilla groups, began to break down almost immediately after it was signed
in January 1975. The three groups--the National Front for the Liberation of
Angola (FNLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA), and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)--were
ethnic and ideological rivals. The MPLA at that time enjoyed important
advantages over the other two movements. An urban-based group--it was
especially strong in and around the capital city, Luanda--the MPLA was
supported by a majority of educated Angolans. Its leader, Agostinho Neto, was
a well-educated Marxist who had been able to submerge factional differences
within the organization. 25X1
4. The MPLA in 1975 thus had a considerable edge over its rivals in
regard to leadership and political organization. It was also able to absorb
foreign assistance more readily than its competitors. It benefited both from
Soviet aid and from a pro-MPLA bias among many Portuguese officials in
Angola. 25X1
5. The FNLA, ethnically the most narrowly-based of the three competing
groups, drew its support almost exclusively from the Bakongo people in
northern Angola and southwestern Zaire. Under Holden Roberto, the FNLA was
generally considered the most pro-Western of Angola's liberation groups. It
received materiel support from neighboring Zaire and considerable assistance
from Beijing. Despite organizational and leadership weaknesses that
ultimately proved fatal to the FNLA, at independence (November 1975) it still
had a fairly strong military force. 25X1
ALA M.83-10060
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000400320001-4
 cororT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000400320001-4
6. UNITA, formed by Jonas Savimbi in 1966 after he had broken away from
the FNLA, as of 1975 was the smallest of the three groups. Militarily it was
by far the weakest, in terms of both manpower and foreign support. UNITA's
potential at the time rested largely on the abilities of its charismatic
leader, Jonas Savimbi, and on its ability to draw support from the country's
largest tribal group, the Ovimbundu. These factors would prove to be
F__ I
important long-term assets.
7. The Military Struggle. The first clashes among the groups occurred
in early 1975 and mostly involved the FNLA and the MPLA. In February and
March 1975, the FNLA seemed to have the military advantage and was frequently
on the attack. But Soviet military aid to the MPLA began to increase at
around that time, and the military balance soon shifted. Shortly thereafter,
it became apparent that the types and amounts of weapons being acquired by the
MPLA--including artillery, rockets, and recoilless rifles--could not be
matched by their opponents. Nor could the FNLA and UNITA compete with the
MPLA's superior organizational and combat skills. By mid-1975 the MPLA was
consistently able to take the offensive. MPLA successes, first against the
FNLA in the north and later against UNITA in the south, forced the latter
groups to form an uneasy coalition.
8. Cuban intervention on the side of the MPLA beginning in the early
fall of 1975 greatly enhanced the MPLA's military position. The FNLA-UNITA
coalition sought assistance from South Africa. Pretoria responded first with
arms and training, and during the fall it sent in around 1,500 troops. FNLA
forces in the north--supported by Zairian troops--and South African, UNITA,
and some FNLA troops advancing from the south temporarily succeeded in turning
the tide of battle against the MPLA by the end of October 1975. This led the
Soviets to mount a major airlift of arms and Cuban troops into Angola during
the last two months so of 1975. The Cubans had around 11,000 troops in
Angola by December.
9. The massive Cuban intervention dramatically turned the tide in favor
of the MPLA in early 1976. Major defeats were inflicted on the ill-
disciplined FNLA and Zairian troops in the north. The Cuban and MPLA forces
did not fare nearly as well at first against South African and UNITA forces in
the south, but Pretoria's decision to withdraw its troops starting in January
1976--in part because of the controversy in the US Congress over continued aid
to UNITA and the FNLA--was followed by major MPLA and Cuban gains against
UNITA.
10. The Clark Amendment. The Clark Amendment, in our judgment, did not
have a decisive effect on the military situation. It is our assessment that
greater outside aid to UNITA and/or the FNLA would not have enabled them to
defeat the MPLA and Cuban forces.
11. The large Soviet military aid effort and particularly the
introduction of thousands of Cuban combat troops were the most important
-2-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000400320001-4
 Cc rD cT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000400320001-4
factors in determining the military outcome in 1976. Without the Clark
Amendment, South African forces might well have remained involved in the
conflict for a time, but it is debatable whether Pretoria would have been
willing over the long term to pay the domestic and international political
costs of a protracted struggle. In any case, it is doubtful that the South
Africans could have matched the Soviet and Cuban effort. They probably
concluded by early 1976 that the forces they were backing could not win.
12. Subsequent Developments. By mid-February 1976, Savimbi's forces had
retreated into a remote area of southeastern Angola, which became the base for
their long-term guerrilla struggle against the Cuban-backed regime. In
South Africa now appears to be
UNITA's only major external backer, but the organization has continued to
develop politically and militarily and today it poses a serious threat to the
MPLA regime.
13. FNLA forces, for their part, retreated in 1976 to the bush in
northern Angola and into southern Zaire. The FNLA is now virtually moribund,
beset by factionalism, poor leadership, and lack of outside support. It poses
no threat to the MPLA.
-3-
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000400320001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000400320001-4
SUBJECT: ANGOLA: Impact of Clark Amendment
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ED/DCI
1 - SA/DCI/IA
1 - Exec Registry
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/Africa
1 - NIC/AG
1 - PDB Staff
1 - C/DDI/PES
2 - D/ALA
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research Director
4 - OCPAS/IMC/CB
9 - ALA/SCD
DDI/ALA/SCO/C
(14 April 83)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000400320001-4
cc IT"
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000400320001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000400320001-4