SURINAME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000400040002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 17, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21 CIA-RDP85T00287R000400040002-4
Central Intelligence Vncy
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 January 1983
SURINAME
Summary
Cuba is bent on exploiting the situation in Suriname to
promote the emergence of a pro-Cuban, leftist, anti-US
government there. We believe Havana will keep a low profile
to avoid triggering Dutch or US intervention, but, i-f asked,
will provide modest assistance aimed. at consolidating Army
Commander Bouterse's grip on power. Havana eventually may
seek to enthrone a more cooperative leader, however, if the
politically unsophisticated and erratic Bouterse proves
unreliable-or ineffective.
While the Castro regime presently has no major political or
economic stake in preserving the dictatorship of Army Commander
Daysi Bouterse in Suriname, the Cubans see an opportunity there
to promote the emergence of a pro-Cuban, leftist government
hostile to the US in much the same fashion as the governments in
Grenada and Nicaragua. We believe, however, that Havana is wary
This paper, requested by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, was prepared by
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Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It. contains
information available through 17 January 1983. Questions and
comments are welcome and should be directed to Chief, Middle
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Duplicate of C05511497:
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of; provoking intervention by the US or the Dutch, and of alarming
both Brazil and Venezuela, and therefore is likely to continue to
concentrate on low profile assistance to Bouterse. If Bouterse
shows signs of losing his grip, Havana may decide that his lack
of political sophistication renders him expendable and may try to
engineer a switch to a political figure of more acceptable
international repute--such as Foreign Minister Naarendorp.
The Cubans apparently have no illusions about Bouterse's
ideological credentials and probably see him as little more than
an exploitable--albeit politically inept--opportunist. They have
been careful to make no major investment of Cuban political
prestige or economic/military resources in helping him
consolidate his rule. Therefore, while Bouterse's replacement by
a centrist or rightist government would,be a disappointmeht in
terms of a lost opportunity, it would `involve no other real cost
for the Cubans.
Castro probably considers the arbitrary executions of.
Bouterse's opposition early last month as a major gaffe for an
emerging political leader who enjoys no popular support. The
Cuban ambassador in Paramaribo, an experienced intelligence
officer, almost certainly has informed Havana of the-wave of
popular revulsion that followed the executions. The ambassador's
reporting presumably has given Castro little reason to be
optimistic either about Bouterse's future or about propects for
improving Cuba's popular image in Suriname over the short term.
We believe there is little chance that Havana will exercise
the option of sending troops to bolster Bouterse's position if
events in Suriname continue as at present. Such blatant
interference to prop up an unpopular dictator would presumably be
rejected by Castro as counterproductive--a move certain to
trigger US or Dutch intervention and a military confrontation
that would embarrass Havana. Concern has been. high in Havana for
over a year that Washington is spoiling for a fight, perhaps with
Cuba itself, and, in our estimation, the Cuban leadership, with
persistent doubts as to Bouterse's revolutionary bona fides, does
not want to risk a military encounter with the US for such a
modest return.
Havana could simply ignore Bouterse's predicament, arguing
that any major Cuban investment in the future of an ideologically
questionable dictator, especially one with a bad reputation both
at home and abroad, is not justified. We believe, however, that
this is unlikely. Havana decided to help Bouterse some time ago
and, after establishing a diplomatic mission in Paramaribo and
developing close personal ties to him, the Cubans are not about
to write him off. Castro has always favored an activist foreign
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policy and likes to take advantage of opportunities as they
occur. All signs indicate that he sees much to exploit in the
Suriname situation.
The option that appears to hold the most promise for Havana
would call for a continuation of the present low key approach.
We believe Castro will offer the usual types of low-risk help
that has bolstered Cuba's image elsewhere--doctors, nurses,
medical technicians, teachers, construction workers, agricultural
and livestock experts, and the like. Castro will probably want
to keep the Cuban presence small to avoid sparking frictions in a
population that already has demonstrated hostility toward
Cubans. Should Bouterse ask for it, Castro would probably send a
modest contingent--no more than 100--of political and military
advisers and bodyguards. The latter would come from the_Cuban
Interior Ministry's Special Troops--Castro's Green Berets'. Teams
of Special Troops, personnel, serving in mufti as well as in
uniform, have been provided over the years to many chiefs-of-
state, including Angola's Agostinho Neto in the late 1970s,
Chile's Salvador Allende in the early 1970s, and,
to Grenada's Maurice Bishop.
With Special Troops guaranteeing Bouterse's personal
security, we believe Havana would urge him to consolidate his
position by strengthening the People's Militia as a domestic
security force personally loyal to him, making effective use of
the regime's control- of the media, and developing grass roots
political support through the creation of mass organizations for
the country's workers, farmers, youth, and women. As it has done
in other countries, Havana would provide experienced advisers to
guide him in all of these tasks.
It is safe to expect the Cubans to try to undermine US
influence in Suriname at every opportunity. This will be done on
both an individual basis, with approaches to leaders within and
outside the government, and a mass basis, with the population in
general. Havana, using local allies, is likely to begin
distributing anti-US propaganda materials when the political
climate is deemed appropriate. Measures to discredit US
diplomats may be undertaken as a means of reducing or eliminating
the official US presence.
Should Havana's cultivation of Bouterse eventually fail to
pay off, or if, after a substantial Cuban investment has been
made in Suriname, Bouterse continues to alienate important
sectors at home and abroad, the Castro regime would not hesitate-
to attempt to effect a transition to a new leader--perhaps
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r ti
Foreign Minister Naarendorp--who might be more cooperative.
There are several precedents for such a shift in allegiance by
Havana, and Bouterse, already wary, apparently knows there are
limits to Havana's commitment.
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orig - Thomas 0? Enders, Assistant Secretary of State
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- Ken Skough, ARA/CCA
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