MOSCOW IN ASIA: WHY NOT OVERTURES TO INDONESIA AND NORTH KOREA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000102460001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102460001-0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
28 October 1980
Moscow in Asia: Why Not Overtures to Indonesia and North
Korea?
Introduction and Summary
As Moscow looks at the Far East, its position must
seem bleak. Relations with China are at the lowest
point in a decade, Japan is intensifying its defense
preparations and Soviet relations with the ASEAN states
are limited and cool. Above all, the closer ties
between Beijing, Tokyo and Washington are based on the
presumption that Moscow is the antagonist. The Soviets
can point to their deepening relationship with Vietnam
as the only bright spot on this generally dark horizon.
The Soviets almost certainly assess from time to
time the feasibility of developing new relationships to
counter this trend. North Korea and Indonesia present
possibilities for new overtures, but in both cases
there are significant constraints that make major
Soviet demarches unlikely.
Initiative Toward Indonesia
Soviet-Indonesian relations are cool and Moscow would
like to improve them to advance Soviet interests in South-
east Asia and to undercut those of Beijing. Moscow probably
sees Indonesia's long-standing fear of Chinese expansionism
in Southeast Asia as an opening to a closer relationship.
This memorandum was prepared by
Office of Political Analysis, USSR-EE
Division at the request of Michael A. Armacost, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State. Comments and queries are
welcome and should be addressed to Chief, OPA/USSR-EE/Soviet
External Branch
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102460001-0
 SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102460001-0
Other factors, however, have militated against this.
The anti-Communist regime in Jakarta has become increasingly
nervous about the burgeoning Soviet relationship with Hanoi
and the near permanent.presence of Soviet warships in the
South China Sea. This concern has become more acute in the
wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet-
Vietnamese agreement of last July on oil exploration; the
Indonesians fear the exploration agreement may involve
waters whose sovereignty Jakarta disputes with Hanoi.
Another factor in Jakarta's reticence is a concern about
Soviet meddling in Indonesian internal affairs, especially
in light of the elections scheduled for 1982.
Soviet attempts to justify the invasion of Afghanistan
met open criticism from Jakarta, and Indonesians have con-
sistently criticized Moscow's support for Vietnamese expansion
in Indochina.
A significant warming in Soviet-Indonesian relations
over the near term, therefore, seems unlikely. Moreover,
the Soviets are not, to our knowledge, making any extensive
new efforts to woo the Indonesians. Even if they should,
the Indonesians are unlikely to be responsive. This might
change if Indonesia's fear of Chinese intentions ever out-
weighs its concerns about the Soviet presence in Southeast
Asia but for the moment this possibility appears remote.
An Overture to North Korea
Soviet relations with North Korea are also cool. The
Soviet Union is the major supplier of advanced military
equipment and industrial goods to North Korea, but P'yongyang
tilts toward Beijing and its position on key foreign policy
issues relating to Asia is pro-Chinese. P'yongyang refused
to condemn China's invasion of Vietnam and continues to
support the Pot Pot regime in Kampuchea. North Korea has
also criticized Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and is
unwilling to endorse the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Moscow has made no significant overtures to improve
relations with North Korea. In fact, the initiative to
improve Soviet-North Korean relations, where it does exist,
appears to be coming from P'yongyang in an effort to balance
its tilt toward China. Moscow, however, has not responded
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102460001-0
 SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102460001-0
to these feelers.
25X1
25X1
25X1
only a middle-level Politburo member--Moscow Party Chief
Grishin, who has no foreign policy responsibility--to the
recent Korean party congress. Grishin's remarks while in
P'yongyang made it clear that the two sides continue to
differ on a number of issues.
There is little pressure on Moscow to compete with the
Chinese for P'yongyang's favor. The Soviets know that
Pyongyang does not want to be completely dependent on
China. Moscow also recognizes that Beijing cannot provide
the military wherewithal that North Korea needs to establish
military superiority on the Korean peninsula and, in any
event, is unwilling to give Pyongyang such blanket support.
It is also very risky for Moscow to make any serious
attempt to improve relations with North Korea. To win
decisive influence in P'yongyang, Moscow would have to back
Kim's near obsession with reunification. This would entail
providing more sophisticated arms and other tangible help.
Moscow is unwilling to provide this kind of support, however,
out of fear that Kim Il-song would use it to provoke a
conflict on the Korean peninsula.
The Soviets are aware that, in view of the US combat
presence in South Korea, a war there would automatically
draw in the United States and would add yet another irritant
to Moscow's relations with both the United States and
Japan. No matter how isolated the USSR is in Asia at this
time, the Soviets are anxious to avoid entanglement in a
confrontation with the United States in Northern Asia. In
line with this policy, Moscow has not delivered significant
new weapons systems to North Korea since 1974.
Soviet policy toward North Korea is thus unlikely to
change--at least until Kim Il-song leaves the scene. Moscow
seems content to give North Korea sufficient economic aid
and military equipment to maintain a degree of influence in
North Korea but not enough to alter the military balance and
stability on the peninsula. With no new Soviet approach to
Pyongyang on the horizon, Soviet-North Korean relations are
likely to remain poor and plagued by mutual distrust.
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102460001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102460001-0
SUBJECT: Moscow in Asia: Why Not Overtures to Indonesia and
North Korea?
Michael A. Armacost
D/NFAC
NIO/China-EAP
NIO/USSR-EE
Presidential Briefing Coordinator
PDB Staff
D/OPA
NIC
OPA/PS
PPG
OCO
C/OPA/USSR-EE
C/OPA/NESA
C/OPA/USSR-EE/SRE
OPA/USSR-EE/SRE
OPA/USSR-EE Chrono
OPA/USSR-EE/SRE Chrono
NFAC/OPA/USSR-EE/SRE
(28 SEPT 80)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102460001-0