THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101990001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 8, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
8 September 1980
MEMORANDUM
THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLAND
SUMMARY
We do not think that Moscow is now seriously considering
military intervention in Poland. Although the Soviets are deeply
troubled by developments there, they probably do not view the
concessions granted so far regarding independent trade unions as
sufficient cause for the use of Soviet military force in Poland.
The Soviets probably also do not consider these concessions irre-
versibZe and will place substantial pressure on Warsaw to curtail
them. In fact, with Kania's replacement of Gierek as first secretary,
their hopes appear buoyed that the development of political and
social chaos in Poland that might have compelled then to use military
force in the near future has been forestalled. Nevertheless,
Moscow's anxieties are still high, and if Kania does not limit the
concessions granted the strikers or if he cracks down too force-
fully and sparks a violent popular reaction which the government
cannot control, the Soviets may yet have to step in militarily.
Current Soviet-Attitudes
The Soviets behaved cautiously during the Polish labor
crisis. Only-after the settlement of the strikes on the
Baltic coast-that is, when the immediate danger of an ex-
plosion had lessened--did they openly begin to express their
This m was prepared by
USSR-EE Division, Office of Political Analysis, and was coordinated with
the Offices of Strategic Research and Economic Research, and the National
Intelligence Officer for USSR-Eastern Europe. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, USSR-EE Division, OPA,
Duplicate of C03227738:
RIP: Release more.
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anxieties. Subsequent critical commentary reflected Moscow's
recognition that the negotiated settlement with the strikers
may have set in motion a process of political liberalization
of the Polish system, which could at some. point prove to be
beyond the control of the Polish Communist Party and could
spread elsewhere in Eastern Europe. It also was a sign of
Soviet dissatisfaction with Gierek's handling of the crisis.
Whether or not Moscow had a hand in Gierek's ouster, the
Soviet leadership is openly pleased with the-choice of Kania
as first secretary and consider him to be the best possible
replacement at this juncture.
It remains to be seen whether Kania will live up to his
image as an orthodox, hardline apparatchik, who will strictly
limit the gains made by the strikers. At the very least, the
Polish party has bought time as far as Soviet military inter-
vention is concerned. But if Kania proves unable or unwilling
to curtail the new unions, the Soviets would step up first the
political, then the military, pressure tactics on him to reverse
the erosion of party control in Poland. If these pressures
failed, Moscow would intervene militarily.
Fundamental Threat to. Party Control
The agreement reached between the strikers and the
Polish regime at the end of August, if implemented liberally,
would threaten the very foundations of the Communist system
in Poland. The theoretical justification of the Communist
party's control is its claim to rule as the vanguard of the
working class.- But with the overwhelming majority of the
workers rejecting the party-run unions for unions that will
truly represent their interests, that justification would be
undermined.
The Soviet Union, quite clearly, would not stand by
idly if this occurred. The case could even be made that
Moscow has already decided that its military intervention is
necessary--that the threat is so dangerous that it should be
stamped out before it has a chance to spread.
The Soviets may have already decided that the Polish
leadership has given up too much of its authority in agreeing
to the unprecedented-establishment of free trade unions and
the partial lifting of censorship. The Politburo may have
reasoned that, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the political
and social conditions for continued dissipation of the
party's authority had been established.. There is no reason
to believe, however, that this is the case and that the
Soviets have gone that far in their thinking--let alone
their contingency planning. We belive that the .Soviet
decision to intervene will depend on where the situation
goes from here, not. on what has happened so far.
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Even if the Soviets had decided in favor of intervention--
and there have been no signs of Soviet military preparations
that would precede such a move--Kania's accession to power
would call for a delay in plans. If Kania can erode the
concessions and restore the Polish party's shaken authority,
thus obviating the need for Soviet military intervention,
Moscow would-be delighted. It would much rather achieve
its goals without suffering the substantial damage to Soviet
global interests military intervention would bring.
Possible Precipitants of Intervention
The Soviets nevertheless realize that the situation in
Poland will continue to be unpredictable and unstable for
the immediate future and that they must monitor events
closely during the coming months for any signs that their
concerns are materializing. A rapid breakdown of the Polish
party's control does not appear imminent, but should it
occur, the Soviets would move in quickly with force.
The essential grounds for Soviet military intervention
in Poland are:
--the Communist Party's loss of control over
Poland, including its ability to contain the
political actions of the workers and the
dissidents, and
--any compromise of the basic socialist orientation
of the regime's domestic and international policies.
The path to either or both of these worst case scenarios
(from Moscow's point of view) could be lengthy and full of
zig-zags. An accumulation of seemingly minute factors could
convince the Soviet leaders to intervene. We will not
necessarily realize when the Soviets, themselves, actually
cross that decision threshold to intervene, but once they do
there may not be any turning back even if it appears to
Western analysts that the Polish regime is getting the
Moscow will keep an especially sharp eye on the develop-
ment of the new independent trade unions, which pose a
potential serious threat to the Communist Party's control
over Polish society. Moscow would be particularly concerned
if unions spring up across the country, cohere into a
potent political force, and influence national economic
decision-making, especially trade with the USSR and defense
spending. In the wake of Cardinal Wyszynski's meeting with
Lech Walesa, the Soviets will be especially sensitive to any
signs that the unions are developing meaningful alliances
with the Catholic Church or political dissidents, receiving
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bLUMET
substantial aid from unions and other organizations in the
West, or adopting openly hostile attitudes and policies
toward the Soviet Union. Soviet media are already attacking
assistance provided to the independent unions from Western
The relaxation of censorship is another issue that the
Soviets will find difficult to live with. Although the
media restrictions the Gierek regime pledged to lift are
minimal when compared to the near total abolition of censor-
ship agreed to by the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia in
1968, this issue was one of the primary Soviet complaints to
the Czechoslovak party in the months before the invasion.
Although it appears unlikely at the moment, the possi-
bility exists that the present or a future Polish leadership--
whether out of fear of the consequences a crackdown could
bring or from a genuine sympathy with the workers' desires--
could assume the lead in the liberalization process and take
it much further. This could create a situation reminiscent
of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Soviet party officials have
already noted that there are trends evident in
Polish society similar to those present in Czechoslovakia
during the Prague Spring. If Moscow perceived these trends
in the Polish party leadership, it might feel compelled to
take preventive action before the process reached an
An opposite course by the Polish leadership--a crackdown'
on the unions and all.opposition--while probably more in
line with the desires of the Soviet leaders, could inad-
vertently lead to Soviet intervention. If the workers
responded to this tightening by resuming their strikes,
there would be a -strong likelihood of violent confrontation
which, if it got out of the Polish authorities' control,
could trigger the use of Soviet force.
Another development that would profoundly disturb the
Soviets is a serious outbreak of labor unrest elsewhere in
Eastern Europe or in the USSR. Unrest appears unlikely in
the USSR at the moment, but the reports of strikes at major-
automotive plants in Tolgiatti and Gorkiy earlier this year
have to give the Kremlin pause. Strikes and/or calls for
free trade unions in other East European countries will
induce the Soviets to step up their pressure on the Polish
leadership to curtail the new unions.
These variables will interact in a complex, protracted
process, the specific developments of which cannot be predicted
with any certainty. Moscow's perception of this process may
be quite different from ours or the Poles'. No one of these
factors is likely to develop by itself. But a combination
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of developments could suggest to Moscow that a trend toward
liberalization was approaching the point of irreversibility,
that Soviet vital interests were at stake and that the
situation could only be put right by military intervention.
A Decision to Intervene
Once the Soviet threshold of tolerance is crossed,
Moscow would take direct action. The Soviets would first
demand that-the Polish leadership contain the liberalization
process. If Warsaw either refused or was unable to bring
the situation under control, the Soviets might opt for still
another change in leadership, believing that only a more
hardline group could put a stop to the erosion of power.
Past experience suggests that the Kremlin would resort
to political and military pressure to get the Poles themselves
to bring the situation under control before sending in
troops. This would-probably include high-level visits between
Moscow and Warsaw, increasingly explicit warnings in the
Soviet press, and possibly threatening military movements.
Several factors probably would be at work here--among them
a hope that the Poles would back down when faced with a
display of overwhelming force. The absence of unanimity
within the Soviet Politburo could also be a-vital factor.
It would be no easy matter to get the entire Politburo--or
perhaps even.a significant majority--to agree that armed
intervention was the only way to hold the Poles in line.
This certainly seems to have been the case in 1968, when
Kosygin, Suslov and others reportedly held out to the last
moment in opposing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet-leaders, in reaching a decision to use
military force, would have to weigh the constraints, which
are substantial. They must assume that:
-- the strongly anti-Russian Polish people would
fight, as might part or all of the Polish Army.
-- Poland's-submission would require the largest
military operation by the Soviet armed forces since
World War II and would involve protracted combat.
-- Moscow's effort to salvage detente in one of its
most critical areas--Europe--would receive a
setback from which it would be along time
recovering.
-- intervention would probably entail a substantial
long-term occupation that would complicate Soviet
security planning in both Europe and Asia.
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In the final analysis, however, the Soviet leaders would
decide to bear these enormous costs rather than lose control
of Poland:
-- Poland lies astride the traditional invasion
routes to and from Russia and is thus a vital
corridor, essential to Soviet military planning.
-- A less politically reliable Poland-would leave
East Germany in an exposed position.
-- A Soviet failure to act forcefully could encourage
similar unrest elsewhere in Eastern Europe and,
possibly, in the Baltic republics of the USSR as
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. t1l. rc r?1
SUBJECT: The Prospects for Soviet Military Intervention
in Poland
Distribution:
Original
NSC Staff (Brzezinski)
1
NSC Staff
1
DCI
1
DDCI
1
D/NFAC
1
DD/NFAC
1
NFAC/Registry
1
NIC
1
NIO/USSR-EE
1
NIO/Warning
1
NSC Coordinators/PBS
1
D/OPA
1
D/OER
1
D/OSR
2
OPA/PS
3
PPG
1
OCO Foreign Liaison Staff
1
PDB Staff
1
C/OPA/USSR-EE
1
C/OPA/USSR-EE/SRE
1
C/OPA/USSR-EE/SRI
1
C/EE Branch OER
1
OPA/USSR-EE/SRE
1
OPA/USSR-EE/SRI
OPA/USSR-EE/SRE Chrono
NFAC/OPA/USSR-EE/SRE
8Sept80)
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