(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101930002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 26, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
26 August 1980
Selected International Reaction to President
Carter's Decision to Ship Uranium to India
Worlr aide reaction to !'resident Carter's decision
to
override the Nuc7can Regulatory) c;omo? s. T on and j approve the
shipment of some 38 metric tons of low enriched uranium to
India for use in the Tarapur atomic power station has been
gen?raIly restrained, although there are exceptions. tl st
countries ,appear to he withholding comment pending the final
disposition of the case by the US Congress. The widely
publicized review of US nonproliferation policy, as well as
the belief in some quarters that: the upcoming Presidential
viccLion may affect US nuclear policy, probably has sLm'engtr't? i_G'
the international tendency to await the rincZ outcome before
In addition to the above factors, the countries of
Western E?uro_e by and large do not seem to regard the Tarapur
fuel iluest ion as an indicator of the direction of US
nonproliferation policy, nor, indeed, as a matter of great
importance. They also presumably view India as a special.
case in terms of nonproliferation policy and therefore
probably do not perceive any-relevance to themselves--or
even to overall US nonproliferation policy--in the Tarapur
issue. They probably believe that some flexibility is
necessary in US treatment of India and do not necessarily
expect--or desire--consistency with the specifics (in
contrast to the spirit) of US nonproliferation policy. 25X1
:rii'Le !?lerrlo al durmi was prepared by 1nter''Y;C?t'Lr'm aI
issues Division, Office of Po:ltlcal Analysts at the request.
of Senator. J. Bennett Johnston. it was coordinates with Lie
appropriate regionu1 divisions within GSA and with the
Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Foreign National
Assessment for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence. Research 25X1
was completed on 23 August 1980. Corlmentii and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Political-/lititarii
Issues Branch, International Issues Piviaion CPA,
25X1
PAM S 0 -T 0 3 7 E
?
./
?
CENTRAL, INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL [P Rh I CN ASSESSMENT CENTER
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 25X1
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In the Far East neither South Korea nor Taiwan has
commented publicly on the issue. There is no rcason to
believe that. their private consideration of the Tarapur fuel.
issue has led to reevaluation of their o1,1n nuclear programs
or to a belief that Washington would now take a more lenient
view should they attempt to resume nuclear weapons-related
work. Seoul and Taipei recognize that their marked dependence
on the United States as a supplier of both nuclear technology.
and materials and military equipment places them in a posi.tioii
far more vulnerable than that of India. They also recall
that, despite what many nations regarded as a relatively
mild US reaction to the Indian nuclear explosion in. 1.974,
11'ashintiton thereafter adopted a position of rigid opposition
to Korea's and Taiwan's attempts to develop nuclear weapons.
Thus, for the near and mid-term, the nature of US nuclear
dealings with India will probably not strengthen the position
or arguments of those advocating nuclear weapons work in
Seoul and Taipei.
Argentina is the only South American country that has
criticized the proposed shipment of fuel for the Tarapur
reactors, and it has done so within the context of its own
efforts to obtain US uranium exports. In mid-May, in
anticipation of the President's decision, senior Argentine
1,3 nuclear officials complained to the US Embassy in Buenos
~,~ Aires that, in comparison to its treatment of India, US
policy towards Argentina was discriminatory. They described
the Tarapur decision as "strictly political," not based on
the legal aspects of the US Nuclear :don-proliferation Act
(NNPA) of 1978. Since then, the Argentine Government has
apparently followed US political developments regarding
'
Tarapur closely.
Among other countries of particular proliferation
concern, Ira( probably would be especially angered by the
Tarapur waiver, although it has not commented on the subject
to date. Iraq has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and accepted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safe-
guards as required by the treaty. Baghdad resents US attempts
to persuade Western European nations to refrain from selling
Iraq sensitive nuclear facilities and materials despite its
compliance with NPT--and by extension NNPA--safeguards
requirements. US leniency toward India, which has refused
to comply with the safeguards requirements of the NNPA and
t?:h.icli has detonated a nuclear device, would he seen by Iraq
as confirming its suspicions that the United States is not
as concerned about the generalized spread of nuclear weapons
as it is about keeping advanced technology out of the hands
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S
South Africa, like Argentina, has resisted US attempts
to get it to adhere to the NPT or to accept full-scope
safeguards, and its nuclear program stands to suffer as a
result. Approval of the Tarapur fuel shipment would, at
best, confirm the belief of South African officials that US
nonproliferation policy is discriminatory. At worst, it
could bolster their conviction that complete compliance with
US demands for full-scope safeguards may not be an inflexible
requirement for future nuclear cooperation with the United
proliferation is no more than an instrument of foreign
policy to be used to achieve specific dinlmmnrir n~,anrr;.,~~
Finally, Pakistan has, predictably, reacted sharply
against the 1Vhhtc house decision. The Pak.i.stani press,
which usually reflects the government's position, has
openly denounced the proposed shipment, remarking that
"President Carter's widely proclaimed stance on nuclear non-
discriminates against Pakistan, they are unlikely to interpret
the Presidential waiver as an indication of a general weakening
of US determination to stop the Pakistani nuclear program.
I
Because*of
their e ie- that the US accords India special treatment and
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101930002-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101930002-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101930002-8