POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN SPAIN: OVERVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 19, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
WASHINGTON, 0. C. 20505
;2 1 AUG 1880
NOTE FOR TFIE DIRECTOR
Here is the mood piece on Spain
requester: by Ambassador Kubisch when
You and the DDCI lunched with him on
15 July. During a subsequent exchange
with the Assistant NIO for Western
Europe, Ambassador Kubisch indicated
that he was in no particular hurry for
the paper; we therefore delayed until
we could send him this internally
coordinated overview from the Interagency
Intelligence Memorandum on Spain.
cc: DDCI
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
Central Intelligence Agency
The Honorable Jack Kubisch
Department of State
Room 7208
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Jack,
In response to your request for a mood piece on
Spain, here is the Overview of the Spanish Interagency
Intelligence Memorandum that is due to go to press
shortly. The Overview provides a bird's eye view of
Spain today along with our best estimate of where the
country is likely to be heading between now and the
next scheduled election in 1983. The I IM itself is
a lengthy and comprehensive study of prospects for
Spanish democracy, but it does not delve very deeply
into the Spanish position o.i negotiating a new bases
agreement. We would be pleased to undertake a more
detailed study of any of the issues raised in the
Overview, if you think it might be useful to you.
Yours,
STANSFIELD TURNER
Attachment:
Political Prospects in
Spain: Overview
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
ILLEGIB
19 August 1980
MEMORANDUM
Summar?+
Our prognosis for Spanish democracy is guardedly
optimistic. The institutional framework is in place,
and the political leaders have demonstrated their
ability to cope with shocks to the system in a demo-
cratic manner. Despite growing popular disillusionment
with democracy's failure to solve problems overnight,
only a negligible minority would prefer a return to
Francoist authoritarianism. The major strain on the
system throughout the 1980s is likely to be the "Basque
Problem" and its attendant terrorism; a convincing case
could be made for considering this a serious threat to
the consolidation of democracy, but we believe that the
odds now narrowly favor a peaceful solution. In foreign
policy, Spain's first priority will continue to be
"joining Europe" (in the broadest sense) while maintain-
ing enough "independence" to serve as a bridge between
the West and the Third World. The most contentious
international issue is the government's recent decision
to join NATO sooner rather than later; the apposition
is adamantly opposed, and political pressures over the
next year or two mail cause the government to back off
again.
This memorandum,
requested by Ambassador Kubisch, was prepared by
the Western Europe Division of the Office of Political
Analysis. The paper was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe, the Office of Economic Research, and the Directorate
of Operations. Research was completed on 1 August 1980. Questions and
comments may be addressed to the Chief of the Iberia Aegean Branch, Western
Europe Division, OPA,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
Spain has completed its transition from authoritarianism to parliamentary
democracy in a strikingly short time with relatively little disruption--
revealing in the process an unexpected unity in a society that has
historically been bitterly divided between "the two Spains."
The success of the transition owes a great deal to the transformation
of Spain that took place during the latter half of Franco's 40-year
rule. Economic, social, and political evolution laid a firm foundation
for the move to democracy. The Spanish people were ready for change; in
a sense, they were waiting for Franco to die, so that they could get on
with becoming a moderp, pluralistic society.
Nevertheless, democracy would not have been achieved with such
deceptive ease but for a group of talented leaders who rose to the
occasion. King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Suarez, in particular,
mapped out the reform program and kept the military in line. Above
all, they fostered a consensus among political leaders on the basic
reforms that were necessary--a positive feeling that all were headed in
the same direction, however much they might quibble about the pace.
When difficulties arose, the memory of the Civil War encouraged compro-
The goal of all major parties was to promulgate a constitution
guaranteeing the rights of all Spaniards and providing for a parliamentary
democracy similar to that in other West European countries. This was
accomplished by the referendum in December 1978 and the legislative
and municipal elections that soon followed. The result--a democratic
framework and a constitutionally elected government in charge--was
either fully supported or at least acquiesced in by all major institu-
In many ways the process of consolidating democracy is proving a
greater challenge than the transition itself. The issues are no longer
so clear-cut, and the spirit of cooperation that earlier dominated has
gradually given way to a more contentious atmosphere. Though the parties
still agree on the general shape of Spain's future, there has been a
shift toward more partisan politics as Suarez moves to buttress his
position and the Socialists act more like an opposition. Though this
dwindling of the spirit of consensus is part of the evolution to democracy,
it will weaken the government's ability to deal with a series of problems,
many of them made more urgent for having been deferred so that the
constitution could be put into effect as quickly as possible.
The most volatile of these deferred issues, involving nothing less
than the fundamental. restructuring of the Spanish state, is the demand
for regional autonomy. The constitution's largely open-ended provisions
on devolution respond to a widely held desire--fueled by 40 years of
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
Francoist authoritarianism and hundreds of years of administrative
centralism--for decentralization. Regions with little tradition of
autonomy or even sense of identity are clamoring for home rule, but
the Basques and Catalans are the driving force. The "Basque Problem" in
particular is a tough challenge for Madrid, which must strike an equilibrium
between devolving enough power to the regional government to head off
the radicals while keeping ultimate control to itself. Basque terrorism
and military reluctance to grant regional autonomy compound the problem
and add to its urgency.
Because of political preoccupations, major economic problems were
not addressed until late 1977. Though the all-party Moncloa Pact
helped reduce inflation from 28 percent to 16 percent in one year, the
government has had little success in reducing it further. The unemploy-
ment rate, very low under Franco, soared to over 10 percent in 1979 and
is almost double that in parts of depressed regions like Andalucia and
These seemingly intractable problems have contributed to a growing
skepticism about the current goverrmient--indeed, about any democratic
government. Exaggerated expectations that democracy would solve all
problems have been dashed, and this has led to declining turnouts in
referendums and elections. Should this trend continue, the political
center--which suffers more from abstentions than the extremes--could be
hurt, and the system itself weakened.
Along with disillusionment, a sense that government has not really
changed much has grown. Although there is a flourishing opposition and
a government responsible to parliament, when it comes to basics, things
still get done much as they did under Franco. Politicians meet behind
closed doors to thrash out their differences, and agreements are presented
25X6 to parliament as faits accomplis. The smaller parties are squeezed out
of the action, and even within the larger parties, a few key people make
the decisions. Suarez's style of government
draws upon the Francoist textbooks. Moreover, it is
becoming increasingly clear that the system--the electoral laws, government
control over patronage and television, and ingrained distrust of any
alliance of the left--shores up the conservative establishment.
':dough Suarez's position has weakened, he would be difficult to
dislodge. Parliamentary arithmetic requires the Socialists either to
strike a deal with the right (which seems highly implausible) or to
split Suarez's Union of the Democratic Center (UCD). Despite its squabbling
factions, the UCD is unlikely to fall apart--partly because of Suarez's
considerable skills and partly because the defectors would fear losing
their positions of power. If over time, the UCD begins to function as a
party rather than an electoral coalition, its grip on power could become
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
 n'r
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TOO287ROO0101890001-4
The Socialist Party (PSOE) faces a serious challenge. How can they
respond to a system in which they are always the bridesmaid? The party
has gone far toward becoming a responsible center-left party with a
social-democratic orientation. Like all major Spanish parties, it is
rent by factions, but none is likely to split off anytime soon. Having
brought the party through the trauma of his resignation and reelection
last year, Felipe Gonzalez now seems to have the PSOE firmly in hand.
Frustration and fear of political isolation could drive the Socialists
toward a more militant line, but, on balance, the perilous economic
times that lie ahead would seem to dictate moderation. The Socialists,
therefore, will probably focus on enhancing their positions in municipal
government and organized labor while integrating themselves into the
complex network of political, economic, and organizational ties that
underlie the power structure in Spain.
The Socialists could come to power in a grand coalition with Suarez,
but this is unlikely before 1983 unless political or economic matters
take a drastic turn for the worse. Both parties fear such an alignment
would boost their respective rivals--the Coninunists on the left and the
Democratic Coalition on the right. Suarez, moreover, would be loathe to
give the Socialists a further cachet of legitimacy that could bolster
their election prospects.
Though the government's mettle will be fully tested by its economic
and regional problems, the bogeymen of the early transition period--the
Conmiunists, the far right, and the military--no longer appear a serious
threat either to democracy or to Suarez's tenure. The first election
revealed that neither the Communists nor the right can muster much more
than 10 percent of the vote. Though the Communists are still strong in
labor, they have been shoved to the political sidelines during the past
year, and even labor seems less inclined to respond to agitation by the
Cammunist-dominated Workers Commissions. The old Francoist establishment
has been largely absorbed by Suarez's party, though a rear guard still
marches to Manuel Fraga's drum in the Democratic Coalition, and a still
smaller number fulminate in the political wilderness of the ultraright.
Military opponents of the transition are leaderless, and their capacity
for independent action has been sapped by decades of inactivity. Short
of a major breakdown in internal order, the chances of a coup or even a
pronunciamiento are remote.
Suarez, then, seems reasonably well-placed to carry on at least
until the next legislative election, which must be held no later than
1983. From that standpoint it matters little that the forces keeping
him in power have become more negative than positive: credible alternatives
to him are few and far between; to splinter would mean loss of power by
his party; the Socialists and Communists will think long and hard about
a more radical course that would strain the system and bring on an
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85TOO287ROO0101890001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
As long as democracy is not seriously threatened at home, Spain
will be active in foreign affairs, seeking to carve out a larger role
for itself on the world stage. How its critical domestic issues are
played out will influence the direction and pace of Spain's foreign and
defense policies, but there are enduring elements in its external outlook
that are likely to prevail. The fundamental tenets, which evolved under
Franco, emphasize Spain's European, Western, and Mediterranean identity;
reach out for defense and friendship ties with the US; and highlight
historical and cultural links with Latin America and the Arab World.
More recently, Madrid has sought to expand relations with Eastern Europe
and to cultivate Africa below the Sahara.
Spain's chief foreign policy goal is to join the EC, and this is
supported by all major parties. Negotiations are likely to be painful
and protracted because of unrealistic Spanish demands, French tactical
delays, and internal EC problems that may first have to be resolved.
Despite these potential difficulties, Spain is likely to achieve full
membership in the EC eventually--though almost certainly not by the
early 1983 date it projects
There is also a consensus on the need for Spain to participate in a
defense system broader than any it can provide for itself. All parties
accept in principle the desirability of extending the bilateral treaty
with the US--on suitable terms. The leftist opposition, however, parts
company with the government on membership in NATO, which it adamantly
opposes. Should the government continue to link NATO membership to
the bases agreement, it could jeopardize leftist acquiescence to that
agreement. In a new, more assertive mood, Suarez has chosen to push
forward with a membership bid. Since his motives for doing so at present
appear largely tactical--to throw the Socialists off balance, put pressure
on the EC not to delay Spain's admission, and persuade the US to weigh
in with the UK on Gibraltar--they may shift with the political winds.
Nevertheless, Spain has taken an important step toward integration in
the Western defense system.
Spain's primary commi bnent--ideological, political, and economic--
is to the West, but it also retains strong interest in the Third World,
particularly in Latin America and among Arab nations. Because its
aspiration to serve as a bridge between the West and the Third World
is founded on real security and economic concerns as well as desire
for enhanced international stature, Spain will continue to work
this vein, undeterred by the possibility that its efforts will be a
source of unpredictability in its relations with the West. Spain
will seek ties to Western institutions that leave it a credible
"independence" to trade on in the Third World. This could work
to the benefit of Western and US objectives--if Spanish influence in
these regions can be harnessed to common goals. There is a danger,
however, that if Spain is rebuffed in the EC negotiations, it would
put greater emphasis on its Third World vocation.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
On both the domestic and the external side, the indications are
that Spain faces a rough period ahead in which it must make difficult
choices. The team that will be making those decisions is most likely to
be the familiar one: Suarez, the King, and the Union of the Democratic
Center. This being the case, we can make certain assumptions. The
Basque Problem--including its most virulent manifestation, terrorism--
will drag on well into the 1980s no matter what happens; the roots of
the problem are too deep. But the passage of the Autonomy Statute last
year gives some cause for hope; the major interlocutors--Suarez's party
and the Basque Nationalist Party--are responsible people who realize
that the alternative to cooperation is chaos. The odds now seem to
favor a political, as'opposed to a military, settlement. Nevertheless,
we cannot be confident that the Basque government will be able to cope
with terrorism or that Basque aspirations for self-government will be
satisfied through the autonomy process. One way or another, the Basque
Problem will remain one of the most serious threats to the consolidation
of democracy in Spain.
The loss of popular confidence in the government will probably
continue--and may even deepen--because the problems Suarez must deal
with are not responsive to the face-to-face solutions at which he is
most adept. Moreover, he will find it exceedingly difficult to change
his Francoist spots and conduct an open, participatory government. In
the long run this could be a danger to Spanish democracy. There are
signs, however, that Suarez may be forced to change as his position
weakens and dissidents in his party push for more participation.
Suarez will pursue to his full ability Spain's bid to enter the EC:
it is the cornerstone of his foreign policy, and his prestige is very
much tied to it. We suspect that his commitment to joining NATO is not
so solid and could be susceptible to tactical change. Nevertheless, the
chances seem better than they have for a long time that Spain will try
to join the Alliance before 1983. At the same time, Suarez will vigorously
pursue his elusive dreams in the Third World. Should Suarez for some
reason falter, other UCD leaders would probably follow the same policies,
although a member of the social democratic faction might be more inclined
to back away from NATO.
Were the Socialists to come to power, it is unlikely that there
would be major shifts in domestic policy. The main difference in party
platforms is on regional devolution, where the Socialists are advocating
federalism. Even there, the Socialists, once in power, would think hard
before following through on positions that developed as tactical responses
to government initiatives. NATO membership would become much more uncertain,
and there might be a slight increase in Third World activities. Fundamentally,
however, the Socialists are pro-European and. like Suarez, they would push
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
We believe Spain has created a functioning democracy capable of
supporting alternative governments and of withstanding the stresses on
the way. So far, the political leaders and the constitution have coped
with shocks in a democratic manner. The vast majority of people and
institutions support democracy--only a minuscule company of diehards
would prefer a return to Francoist authoritarianism. A significant
crisis might shift the center of political gravity to the right or
left, but it would avoid the extremes. The military might nudge policy
in a particular direction, but the possibility of a praetorian intervention
in the political process--either to install a new government or to assume
political power--seems remote.
The eventual shape of the government structure will depend on how
the vague passages in the constitution and the autonomy statutes are
interpreted, and it is too early to tell how his will come out. It does
not seem likely, however, that a state as highly centralized as Spain will
go overboard in granting powers to the regions. There will certainly be
an elaborate system of checks that can be exercised by the central govern-
ment. The result could be something both uniquely Spanish and also a model
Ior other autonomy-minded regions in Western Europe.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4
Distribution: Political Prospects in Spain: Overview
Orig - Ambassador Jack Kubisch
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Registry
1 - D/NFAC
1 - DD/NFAC
1 - NFAC Registry
1 - NFAC Action Staff
1 - NFAC Senior Review Panel
1 - OCO Coordination Staff
1 - Presidential Briefing Coordinator
1 - NIO/WE
1 - OER Re 1st
1 - OER
1 - DDO/EUR
1 - POB Staff
2 - D/OPA
2 - OPA Production Staff
3-P&PC
1-CD/WE
1 - Branch Files
1 - Author
NFAC/OPA/WE/IA l9Aug80)
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101890001-4