ANGOLA: POLITICAL SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101820001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 31, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
There has been some restructuring and shifting of
power in the Angolan Government during the ten months
that have elapsed since President Neto's death last
September. The issues that faced Neto persist. The
problems may be more serious because no government
leader seems to have the talent or authority to deal
with them.
Internally, the government is facing numerous
political, economic, and social problems--the most
serious of which is the continuing insurgency by the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) and ethnic and ideological factionalism within
the ruling group. These problems will not be resolved
in the near future.
The ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA) also is plagued by debilitating inter-
national problems that must be resolved before the
government can secure its hold on the country and turn
its attention to economic development. The most serious
of these is the Namibian issue and continuing South
African military incursions into Angola. Prospects for
the resolution of these problems are dim, but the
Angolan Government hopes that a settlement of the
Namibian issue can be reached during the coming months.
The Namibian issue is central to several of the other
problems facing the MPLA Government.
This memorandum, requested by the National Intelligence Officer for
Africa, was prepared by Africa Division, Office of Politi-
cal Analysis. It was coordinated wit the Directorate for Operations
and the Office of Strategic Research. Research for this paper was
completed on 30 July 1980. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to Chief, Africa Division, OPA, on
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Background
Since Neto's death we have been able to decipher the
outlines of the new power structure in Angola, but we have
little hard information on the attitudes of the new leaders
on such important issues as relations with Cuba and the
Soviets and the quest for improved relations with the West.
By Angolan standards President Neto was a moderate.
Although he frequently declared his allegiance to Marxism-
Leninism, Neto generally was a pragmatic socialist. He was
moving toward a closer relationship with the West and was
purging the party and government of those who disagreed with
him. His goals apparently included reorganizing the govern-
ment at the national and provincial levels, accommodating
black demands for more power while filling key positions
with individuals who shared his views, securing the country's
northern and southern frontiers by making accommodations
with Angola's neighbors, and taking a more earnest look at
the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the UNITA insur-
gency in the southern part of the country. Neto also was
attempting to move Angola toward truer nonalignment.
Some MPLA leaders became concerned that the government
would lose its revolutionary zeal and that Neto's desire to
seek an accommodation with the West was a betrayal of the
Angolan revolution. But there apparently was little overt
opposition to Neto's actions within the ruling group--an
uneasy coalition of ethnic antagonists with conflicting
ideological views.
The Situation in Luanda
Little information is available on the ideological
orientation of Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, Angola's new Presi-
dent. Much of the information on him and other influential
members of the country's political elite is contradictory.
Although it is generally believed that Dos Santos was associ-
ated with Neto's opening to the West, the new President, a
Soviet-educated black, is more left-leaning than his prede-
cessor. Dos Santos does not appear to be a hardline Marxist,
however, and he is an acceptable choice to Angola's major
factions--at least for the time being.
Although Dos Santos has sought to continue most of his
predecessor's policies, he lacks the authority to take new
initiatives on issues that deeply divide the MPLA. Dos Santos'
C "T
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position is not yet secure. Some observers believe that he
is an indecisive leader and that his longterm prospects for
survival are not good. Dos Santos only recently has begun
to mold his government and secure his position. Last month
he shuffled his cabinet in an apparent effort to consolidate
power before the MPLA congress scheduled for the end of the
year. Additional cabinet shifts can be expected, which may
provide an indication of Dos Santos' direction.
Increasing Incoherence
Intraparty divisions reportedly are worsening, and
there is a growing restiveness among the general population
because of deteriorating economic conditions. The President's
political survival will be determined by the manner in which
he handles these issues.
Angola's blacks have long been dissatisfied with the
disproportionate power wielded by the country's mulattoes,
and since Neto's death they have stepped up their efforts to
assert themselves. The black nationalist "Catete Group"
could move to unseat the Dos Santos government in the coming
months if its adherents believe the President is not respon-
sive to their wishes. They also may attempt to elect one
of their members to the presidency during the MPLA congress
in December. Other individuals and groups--both civilian
and military--with varying degrees of support also may be
emerging. Efforts by competing factions to gain greater
power could give way to violence. Since contenders for
power would be likely to seek support from the Soviets or
Cubans, Havana and Moscow would play a crucial role in an
internal power struggle.
Dos Santos is aware of the possible challenges to his
rule. Although he will attempt to avoid direct confronta-
tion, he probably will take steps to divide and weaken
potential opponents during the next few months.
Foreign Influence
The Soviets--whose relations with Neto were strained--
appear to be firmly behind Dos Santos. We believe their
influence in Luanda has increased since Neto's death.
The Cubans' position in Angola appears to have slipped
in recent months. Dos Santos' visit to Havana last March
did not go well, and there were signs of personal friction
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with Castro. There also were indications of differences
over Afghanistan and the use of Cuban forces in Angola. The
Angolan populace is antagonistic toward the Cubans, and
friction between Angolan and Cuban troops persists.
Nevertheless, the Cubans are committed to Angola, and
no significant reduction in the Cuban military presence can
be expected before a Namibian settlement is reached and a
modus vivendi achieved with UNITA.
The Angolan Government is firmly committed to SWAPO,
but would like to establish a demilitarized zone on the
Angola-Namibia frontier. The MPLA could take a tougher line
on Namibia, however, in the face of continuing South African
attacks and Soviet pressure to resist seeking a settlement.
Some MPLA members would like to reduce the Soviet and
Cuban presence in Angola and lessen Luanda's dependence on
the bloc. Many of these are disappointed with the lack of a
positive US response to initiatives seeking to establish
diplomatic relations. US reluctance to normalize relations--
because of the Cuban presence--has weakened the position of
moderates in the MPLA.
On the other hand, the increasing frequency and intensity
of South African incursions into Angola, together with the
debate in the US over modification of the Clark Amendment
that restricts US assistance to Angolan factions has strengthened
the hand of the hardliners in the MPLA and reinforced the
conviction of some Angolans that the US intends to desta-
bilize their government. In recent months, Angolan officials
have increased their verbal attacks on the US.
Barring a coup or assassination of Dos Santos, there
probably will be no drastic changes in Angolan foreign
policy until after the party congress in December. We
believe Angola will continue to seek contacts with the West
primarily for economic reasons--but the country will remain
basically dependent upon Cuba and other Communist countries
for security assistance. Reacting out of frustration, the
regime could adopt a harder line toward the West in an
effort to demonstrate its ideological purity and commitment
to the revolution.
Unanswered Questions
-- We do not know the degree of consensus within the
MPLA in regard to plans for a demilitarized zone
on the Angolan-Namibian frontier or plans to
improve Angola's relations with the West.
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SUBJECT: ANGOLA: POLITICAL SITUATION
Distribution:
NIO/AF
D/NFAC
DD/NFAC
NFAC/Reg.
DCI Briefing Coordinator
PDB
DDO/AF
OSR
D/OPA
OPA/PS
OPA/AF
P&PG
NFAC/OPA/AF,1 (31Ju180)
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