CUBA: CASTRO'S NEXT MOVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101710001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 24, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/16: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101710001-3
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
24 July 1980
CUBA: Castro's Next Moves
Summary
Although the flow of Cuban refugees into Florida is continuing at a rate
of about 500 per week, the usefulness of the exodus from Mariel as a means of
leverage against the United States has been decisively undercut. In addition,
the drop in the rate of the refugee flow means it will take much Longer for
the Castro regime to achieve all of the economic and political benefits it
expects from reduced consumption and the expulsion of troublemakers and the
disgruntled. As a result, President Castro is now in the position of having
to come up with new schemes to bolster sagging confidence at home, regain
international prestige, and entice the US into a dialogue on bilateral pro-
blems. To the extent that problems in Cuba and international tensions deny him
success both at home and abroad, his self-confidence will .falter and his over-
all conduct of policy will probably become more erratic.
Castro recognizes certain restrictions on his freedom to
maneuver. For example, he does not want to provoke Moscow's ire
or take the kind of action that could draw a US military response.
He believes US patience has already worn thin and he does not
want to do anything to give what he views as Washington's "hawks"
an opportunity to argue for military force.
This memorandum was prepared by the Latin America Divi-
sion of the 0 ice o Political Anal sic and the Center
for Analysis Office of Political
Analysis. was coon z rec ra of Operations and the
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. Comments and estions are
welcome and may be addressed to Chief, Latin America Division,
2,X1
25X1
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SECRET
Neither does he want to do anything that might contribute to
the chances for a change in administration in Washington in
January. Although concerned about the present downward trend in
bilateral relations, he sees a change in administration as even
less favorable for Cuban interests.
Castro has seen his initial probings of the US attitude
toward a broad bilateral dialogue rejected. Nevertheless, he
almost certainly believes he must continue his efforts to engage
the United States in talks. He probably also remains convinced
that insisting on talks that cover all issues--not just refugees
--is a tactical imperative.
His restrained performance at the celebrations in Nicaragua
on 19 July is a sign he has decided on a new, more reasonable
approach, at least for now. His major address on 26 July--the
most important holiday in Cuba--should give further clues as to
the path he will follow in the next several months.
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Despite his awareness of Cuba's internal problems, Castro is
unlikely to restrict his international activities and concentrate
on remedying problems at home. On the contrary, his longstanding
ability to focus public attention on the United States and his
success in recent years in exploiting opportunities in Africa and
Central America argue for increased Cuban efforts in the interna-
tional arena.
Victories, however, are not likely to be achieved easily.
The Soviet troops fighting in Afghanistan will make Castro's
attempts to sustain a leadership role in the nonaligned movement
more difficult. Increased international tensions will make Cuban
military adventures abroad more risky.
The decreased likelihood of success on the international
scene, in concert with the bleak prospects for improvement at
home, will further depress Castro. As a consequence, his leader-
ship may prove more erratic--characterized by more impulsive and
less judicious behavior both at home and abroad.
The Options
Castro apparently is convinced that a dialogue with the
United States could lead to a major improvement in Cuba's present
status. He has indicated his willingness to talk through several
channels so far this year. He even orchestrated the refugee
exodus in such a manner as to try to force the US to the negoti-
ating table. With his trial balloons deflated, his refugee
gambit successfully countered, and elections in the US drawing
near, he may decide that further attempts to force the United
States into discussions should be postponed until after November.
On the other hand, he could continue to try to compel Washington
to focus on Cuba.
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Should he choose the confrontational course, Castro has a
number of options. At the lower end of the risk spectrum he
could:
--Attempt to bypass the US cordon sanitaire in the
Florida Strait by opening different Cuban ports to a
resumption of the boatlift.
--Generate pressure on Washington through the exile
community in the United States.
--Encourage a large refugee influx into the US Naval Base
at Guantanamo Bay, thus undermining base security and
focusing international attention on a major bone of
contention with the US.
--Increase pressure on US citizens in Cuban prisons,
expecting to trigger human rights sensitivities in
Washington.
--Promote a vigorous new campaign for Puerto Rican
independence or bring the Guantanamo Naval Base issue
to the UN.
--Harass the personnel of the US Interests Section in
At the higher end of the risk spectrum, the options are more
ominous. Castro could:
--Create an incident at the Guantanamo Naval Base by
violating regulations governing navigation through the
base.
--Threaten the base by manning the permanent gun emplace-
ments to the north of the base that are now empty.
--Increase the tempo of his support to hemispheric revol-
utionaries, confident that this would get quick atten-
tion in the United States.
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The Decision
If Castro chooses confrontation, his moves probably will
remain in the low-risk category for some time, at least through
November.
Castro is faced with conflicting incentives. On the one
hand, he realizes he must manufacture bargaining capital if he is
to achieve any significant progress in bilateral talks. Because
he has little of a positive nature to offer, he may concentrate
on negatives. He may hope to gain US concessions in exchange
for:
--Lowering his anti-US propaganda.
--Tempering Cuban agitation for Puerto Rican independence.
--Ceasing his harassment of the US Interests Section in
Havana or US citizens in Cuban jails.
--Reducing the flow of refugees to acceptable, more
manageable levels.
To force Washington to focus on these issues, however, he
must raise them by various contrived crises and subterfuges to
the level of serious irritants. In short, he has an incentive to
continue to antagonize the United States.
On the other hand, the Cuban leader recognizes that such
actions might undercut the administration's election campaign.
Castro's public remarks in Nicaragua last weekend showed concern
over the implications for Cuba of a Republican victory in November.
Thus, Havana also has considerable reason not to provoke the United
States. Indeed, he may even seek to create good will by solving
the asylee problem at the US Interests Section or by unilaterally
reducing the level of anti-US invective in the Cuban media.
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Unless unforeseen developments help to halt or reverse the
present downward trend in the fortunes of his regime, Castro will
become more frustrated and his resistance to the riskier options
could diminish. He then would become more prone to compulsive
actions and would depend heavily on his proven ability to exploit
crises to his advantage.
As a result, the chances of a miscalculation on his part--
such as the "Blue Fire" incident--would be greatly enhanced and
he might embark on a course of action that produced the opposite
of what was intended, such as a military clash with the United
States. Despite his reputation for political acumen, the Cuban
leader is not immune to serious blunders.
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