PANAMA: AIMS IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 22, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
22 July 1980
MEMORANDUM
PANAMA: Aims in El Salvador
Summary
Panamanian strongman Char Torrijos has been interested in foreign affairs
and has viewed himself as a major player on the regional and Third World stage
almost since he took power in 1968. Canal treaty negotiations with the United
States consumed most of his energies until 1978, and the Nicaraguan crisis of
1978-79 was his first major opportunity to advance his own political influence
and preferred solutions in the region.
He now is focusing on
EZ Salvador, where he sees himself as a mediator between contending military
and leftist forces. He wants to see a revamped junta that ultimately could
bring the radical left into the government. His growing belief that the right
will not accommodate the left, however, probably will lead him to adopt a more
aggressive policy to ensure a larger role for the radical left.
Nicaraguan Experience
Circumstances robbed Torrijos of a lasting major role in
Nicaragua. Cuba eventually occupied center stage in assisting
the revolution, and Venezuela and Mexico played more important
diplomatic roles in Somoza's ouster. Some of Torrijos' most
daring--and reckless--schemes during the Nicaraguan revolution
were deflected either by the United States or others.
This memor was prepared by the Latin America Division, Office of
Political Analysis. It is in response to a request from The Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Inter-American Affairs. It has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations, the Office of Central Reference, and the National
Intelligence Officer for Latin America. Comments and questions may be addressed
to Chief, Latin America Division,
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7
 I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7
SECRET
Torrijos' influence on post-Somoza Nicaragua has therefore
been limited. He halted the Panamanian training program for
Nicaraguan police earlier this year, partly as a result of-his
pique that the Cubans established themselves as the dominant
foreign influence in Nicaragua. Torrijos probably believes that
the Sandinistas viewed him more as a conduit for Cuban and Vene-
zuelan arms and money than as a force in his own right.
Still smarting from his quick displacement in Nicaragua,
Torrijos has been trying to lessen Cuban prominence in the
region.
Larger Role in Latin America
After 12 years, the Torrijos "revolution" is well estab-
lished and for Torrijos the challenge--and glory--is in foreign
affairs. He still retains complete control of foreign policy and
often bypasses both the Foreign Ministry and President Royo.
When Royo does take an initiative, he is taking his cue from
Torrijos.
Since his setback in Nicaragua, Torrijos increasingly has
sought a major international role. Some of his efforts are
orthodox diplomacy, such as his agreement to grant refuge to the
Shah and his drive to induce Japan to help build a new sea-level
canal through the country.
Torrijos, however, is also widening his circle of contacts
with progressive and leftist forces in Latin America, believing
he has a unique ability to bridge the center-right and the left.
For example, Torrijos has indicated a willingness to facilitate a
dialogue between Colombian authorities and the extremist 19th of
April Movement that seized the Dominican Embassy last February.
Fragmentary evidence suggests Panama may be allowing Colombian
insurgents to use its territory for arms smuggling and travel.
Panama's contacts with the revolutionary government of
Grenada are on the increase; Panamanians, for example, are train-
ing Grenadian police. Earlier this year, Torrijos tried to set
up a meeting between US officials and Prime Minister Bishop to
smooth US-Grenadian relations. Torrijos also appears to be
2
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7
SECRET
expanding his contacts with Belize. In Uruguay, Panama is appar-
ently willing to risk a formal rupture of relations by pursuing
its campaign for the release of imprisoned military dissident
General Seregni. Similarly, Panama's recent red carpet treatment
of former Argentine President Campora, which was an adjunct to
its efforts to gain the release of the jailed widow of Juan
Peron, has angered Argentine authorities. Although all these
initiatives fit Torrijos' established patterns, collectively they
reflect the quickening pace of Panama's diplomacy
The generally quiet internal political situation is conducive
to a greater. effort in foreign affairs. Domestic problems still
occupy some of Torrijos' time--notwithstanding his relinquishing
the title of Chief of Government in 1978--but the home scene is
far more settled this year than in 1978-79. Torrijos' shift last
year toward more centrist domestic policies has borne fruit and
both leftist and rightist groups are quiescent.
Salvadoran Policies
Torrijos' major foreign policy target is El Salvador, where
he believes he is particularly well qualified to mediate between
the military and the left. In contrast to his reactive policy
last year in Nicaragua, Torrijos has played an increasingly
activist role in El Salvador. His links to El Salvador are
deeper and also more varied than those he had with Managua. He
has good contacts with the military, especially with the junior
officers and other reformist elements. He has sustained a close
personal rapport with the Salvadoran ranks for the 30 years since
he was a cadet at their military school; many other Panamanian
officers are also graduates of El Salvador's military academy.
Torrijos has put out many lines to the Salvadoran revolutionaries
but he has neither the personal affinity for them nor the trust
in them that he had for Nicaragua's Sandinistas. He finds them
intransigent and politically naive, and becomes frustrated by 25X1
their internal squabbling. As for other segments of the political
spectrum, Torrijos may underestimate the strength of centrists
and rightists both in the military and in the'private sector.
Although the unsettled Salvadoran scene has sometimes caused
shifts in his thinking, Torrijos has generally tried to influence
both the military and the left toward a political solution modeled
on his own revolution. For Torrijos, the two essential ingredients
are isolation of the right and a political partnership between
the revolutionaries and the reformist military. 25X1
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7
SECRET
Having worked closely with reformist military elements
during the past year, Torrijos knows them well and has high hopes
for their spokesman, Col. Majano. Having been told beforehand of
the plot against the Romero government, Torrijos served as adviser
to the young officers involved in last October's coup. The first
post-Romero junta visited Panama shortly after its takeover and
the two governments issued a joint statement on bilateral and
multilateral issues.
With the installation of a second junta and continuing divi-
sion in the Salvadoran military, Torrijos has intensified his so
far unsuccessful campaign to convince military leaders in El
Salvador that an opening to the revolutionaries would be in their
interest. Believing the hardline Minister of Defense Garcia to
be the real power in El Salvador, Torrijos has urged him and
junta member Gutierrez to break completely with rightist groups.
Torrijos has now become convinced, however, that Garcia will not
relinquish his overriding goal of eliminating the left.
Torrijos places his faith instead in Majano and his consti-
tuency of young officers. Torrijos and his close advisers have
let it be known that they see little hope in the Salvadoran junta
as now constituted, and that they prefer a revamped government
led by Majano that would launch a dialogue with the insurgents.
Torrijos recognizes that the dissolution of the Nicaraguan National
Guard severely limited his political influence in Nicaragua and
does not want a similar situation to develop in El Salvador. As
international'criticism of the junta increased this spring be-
cause of growing rightist violence, he attempted to temper the
sharpest denunciations of the Salvadoran military.
While Torrijos harbors reservations about the insurgents, he
has given them reason to accept his bona fides. He has aided
them materially and logistically,
Salvadoran leftists have met with a variety of Torrijos' repre-
sentatives and are establishing a permanent presence, perhaps a
headquarters, in Panama. Torrijos intends to husband his influ-
ence with them, hoping that eventually they will take his advice
and give the progressive military a chance to pursue a political
rather than a repressive solution to the civil strife.
4
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7
SECRET
Torrijos' aid to the insurgents coincides with Havana's
efforts to set up support mechanisms for the Salvadorans, and
some of the help is carried out in conjunction with the Cubans.
More so than in Nicaragua, however, Torrijos is playing his own
game. His colleagues in the National Guard are telling him that
another Cuban-backed uprising in Central America could eventually
threaten Panama's own stability. Last week, Panamanian authori-
ties exposed two government employees for passing classified
documents to the Cuban Embassy. One of the employees was also
engaged, in a propaganda campaign for the Salvadoran revolution-
Outlook
Torrijos' contacts, determination, and resources make it
almost certain that he will play an increased role in El Salvador.
Although the extent of his influence is difficult to quantify, the
Salvadoran balance of forces is fragile, and Torrijos' contribu-
tion could easily help tip the scales. In the near term, his
greatest influence will be with the military. Over time, his
courting of the left should expand his role with the radicals.
As long as Torrijos retains some hope of influencing the
present junta, his goals will continue more or less parallel
to those of the United States. We suspect, however, that he is
close to favoring destabilizing tactics.
As Torrijos' pessimism about the current Salvadoran junta
grows, he is likely to press for the "Majano solution." Since
he relates so well with the younger officers and lends them an
ear for their frustrations, Torrijos may have an exaggerated view
of how ready and able they are to act on their discontent and
overthrow the hardliners. Torrijos will also want to break the
military stalemate while discord among the guerrilla leadership
offers potential for negotiation and while Castro's influence is
not paramount.
5
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7
In the absence of more determination by the Salvadoran
progressive military, and with violence mounting, Torrijos is
likely to turn more toward the radical left. He would want to
increase his influence with them to cover his bets as well as
make accommodation a more pressing priority for the junta.
Besides his own visceral antipathy toward the extreme right that
push him in this direction, Torrijos is surrounded by policy
advisers telling him that the US is working to undercut him in
the region, and they would encourage such a shift.
6
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7
DISTRIBUTION FOR TYPESCRIPT MEMOS
Original - Requestor
2 - NIO/LA
2 - Production Staff
1 -
3 - Joyce (PPG)
1 - Coordination Staff
1 - Ambassador Leonhart
1 - OER Registry
2 - Bruce Clarke, D/NFAC
1 - NSC Presidential Briefing Coordinator
1 - PDB
1 - C/LA
1 - DC/LA
1 - Cathy for country files
1 - analyst
1 - OPA/FO
4 - Distribute copy to each branch
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101680001-7