(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101670001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 21, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101670001-8
NATIONAL FG~REIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
NOTE FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
This memorandum was drafted by
the Western Europe Division,
you to a State Department policy initiative
on Portugal that could have serious negative
implications for US-Portuguese relations.
Our concern is shared by INR and the Por-
tuguese policy desk at State. This memo-
randum has been coordinated with the NIO
for Western Europe and with the Iberian
Branch in DDO.
Office of Political Analysis, to alert
Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Director
Attachment: Potential Adverse I~~~pact of
New US Policy Toward Portugal
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101670001-8 j,
21 July 1980
SUBJECT: Potential Adverse Impact of New US Policy Toward Portugal
1. The State Department has launched a policy initiative
on US use of the Lajes base for access to Southwest
Asia. The position spelled out in the cable has stirred considerable
controversy within the Department and caused the Charge in Lisbon to ask
for reconsideration. (We understand that PM Bureau Chief Bartholom ew,
possibly in conjunction with DOD/ISA, simply outgunned the European
Bureau.) In our view, this approach ignores Portuguese sensitivities
that have been carefully spelled out by Embassy Lisbon and seems likely
to have a negative effect on US-Portuguese relations, partir_ularly
during this tense pre-election period.
2. The Portuguese have been most forthcoming to US military requests--
despite the ferocious competition between Eanes and Sa Carneiro and
among political leaders in general, which tends to complicate dealings
with Washington. As you know, internal Portuguese politics make it
impossible for any one person or institution to "deliver" Portugal on a
particular issue; this was amply demonstrated last month when the government's
favorable response to a US request fora feasibility study on hom eporting
was overruled by Eanes in his capacity as Armed Forces Chief. (Last
week, the government accepted the study team's visit--without waiting
for Eanes's response.) Though Eanes sometimes emphasizes Third World
interests to the disadvantage of the US and NATO, his action in this
case does not seem to be directed so much against the US as against Sa
Carneiro, who is tr_ying to circumvent the President's authority with the
military.
3. In return, the Portuguese want to be taken seriously, Lisbon
seeks a relationship in which its needs for military and economic assistance
will be considered not as a dole but rather as a profitable US investment
in strengthening a valuable ally. What the Portuguese fear most of all,
of course, is being taken for granted. An unprecedented series of US
This m~morandzvtt teas prepared btu the Western Furopc
Ih'.visior: of the Offi.cE~ of FoZiticaZ i na -~s2,s. e paper was coordinated
raith the 1Vat:ionczZ InteZZiyence Officer for N'est.c~r-rt L'urope and the Iberian
Branch in the Directorate of Operat~i.otts, h'E~srarcla teas conrpZeted on 21
JuZr~ 1980. questions and comments mad ~li.rected to the Chief of the Iberia
Aegean Branch of t1~tc; Western Europ,~~ Di-vision
PA M #80-10327
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requests on politically sensitive issues in recent months has caused
Portuguese officials to complain that we are pushing then too fast with
too much and overloading their circuits with military requests. Clearly
evident is Portuguese concern that the US is eroding Portugal's sovereignty--
trying to "gobble their territory one slice at a time." Evidence of the
government's distress was registered on 18 June in a formal note delivered
to the US Embassy in response to our declared intention to have F16
aircraft destined for Israel transit Lajes in late June. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs announced that henceforth the US must request prior
authorization for use of Lajes for non-~JATO purposes, rather than simply
informing the government as had been the practice. In Lisbon's view,
this was not a "change" in Portuguese policy, but a "clarification."
4. While we do not know what assurances President Carter obtained
from the Portuguese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during his
recent visit to Lisbon, it seems clear that the policy approach
(essentially, to ignore the Portugese note of
i8 June will have a negative impact on relations with Portugal and
could jeopardize negotiations over US access to Beja and homeporting
rights. Since last March, the signals from Lisbon on what the Portuguese
goverrm ent expects from the US have been clear and consistent. We
believe that Lisbon will interpret this new move as a sign of Washington's
insensitivity to Portuguese needs and concerns.
6. Sa Carneiro's government has already been accused (and not only
by the left) of "mindlessly following" the US lead. The potential
ammunition that a tough US stance would offer to the dissidents within
the Democratic Alliance, to Eanes in his feud with the government, and
to the Socialists and Communists in an election year, could force S~
Carneiro to back away from his responsive approach to US requests.
7. Relations with Portugal are on firm ground, but in the contest
for votes in this crucial election, normally pr?o-l'S forces--such as the
Socialists--could focus on US "arrogance" and make it a campaign issue.
This in turn could stir up concerns that Portugese sovereignty is indeed
threatened and that Portugal is being exposed to possible retaliation by
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interests. Insensitivity by the US could also heighten frustrations
within the Portuguese military where there is a general fear that the US
views Portugal only as "real estate" and not as a partner in NATO.
8. Though we obviously cannot become involved in an intramural
policy dispute at State Department, it does seem to be appropriate for
us to register our assessment of the potential negative impact of this
policy directive.
yrN~...... ~ ~ Sanitized. Copy Approved, for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101670001-8 ir~~~
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SUBJECT: Potential Adverse Impact of New US Policy Toward Portugal
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - DDCI (w/att)
1 - Exec Re is try (w/o att)
1 - D/NFAC ~w/att)
1 - DD/NFAC (w/att)
1 - NFAC/Registry (w/o att)
1 - NFAC/Action Staff (w/att)
1 - NFAC Senior Review Panel (w/o att)
1 - NFAC Coordination Staff (w/o att)
1 - NIO/WE (w/att)
1 - Secretary of Production Board (w/o att)
1 - Presidential Briefing Coordinator (w/o att)
2 - D/OPA (w/att)
2 - OPA/Production Staff (w/o att)
1 - CD/WE (w/att)
1 - Branch files (w/att)
1 -Author (w/att)
NFAC/UPA/WE/IA 21Ju180)
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