PHILIPPINES: PROSPECTS FOR VIOLENT OPPOSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101630001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 15, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/07: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101630001-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
15 July 1980
Philippines: Prospects for Violent Opposition
25X1
S UMMARY
Members of the non-Communist opposition, frustrated
over their inability to influence the political situation,
are becoming more vocal about using violent tactics against
President Marcos' regime. Prominent Marcos opponent former
Senator Aquino recently suggested for the first time that
he too is giving up nonviolent means. Aquino's assertion may
be designed to prevent further erosion of his influence within
opposition circles and to nut nrAssure on Marcos to seek an
The Non-Communist Opposition
Most leaders of the non-Communist opposition are
politicians from pre-martial-law days. They have little
popularity as an alternative to Marcos because the public
believes the primary difference between them and Marcos
is that they are out of power while he is in. The non-
Communists are also handicapped by their inability to agree
on commo7-an-,~ leadership, or organization for countering
Marcos.
In recent months, various prominent opposition members
have talked more freely about the need for a coalition with
leftists and the use of violent tactics. Thus far, we have
no reports that this has gone beyond the discussion stage.
The use of violence as a political tool was common in the
Philippines prior to martial law, and it would not be out
of character for Marcos' opponents to resort to this tactic
if they concluded nonviolent methods were ineffective.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/07: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101630001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/07: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101630001-2
Urban terrorism, which requires neither sophisticated
organization nor materials, would be well within the
capability of the opposition, but random terrorist acts
alone would not topple Marcos. Only a sustained campaign
that could elicit other acts of antigovernment activity
by a wide variety of groups would cause Marcos serious
problems. It is not clear that enough members of the non-
Communist opposition have either the will or the desire
The Role of Senator Aquino
Aquino, the most popular opposition figure, in the
past argued in favor of nonviolent opposition. In early
1980, reports circulated in Manila that he was trying to
negotiate an accommodation with Marcos. This tarnished
his image among his opposition colleagues, who believed
he was preparing to sell out to Marcos. Aquino's departure
in May for medical treatment in the United States further
undercut his influence with the opposition. 25X1
Aquino may have several motives for implying that
he too has concluded violence now is necessary. If, as
reported, his moderate colleagues are increasingly attracted
to terrorism as a tactic, he probably would not want to
foreclose this option and risk further undercutting his
position as a leader. Aquino also may believe that Marcos
will. be more inclined to accommodate his opponents if he
concludes that widespread urban terrorism is likely. Moreover,
He probably hopes that the US will be sufficiently concerned
about threats of widespread violence to put pressure on
Marcos to relax martial law regulations and to permit greater
political participation. Like most Filipinos, Aquino tends
to regard the United States as responsible for both the
cause and the solution of whatever problem arises in the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/07: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101630001-2