SOVIET ACTIVITIES AFFECTING US INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101360001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 17, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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D/NFAC
The attached is the fifth in a series of
memoranda that summarize Soviet global activities
that affect US interests. Dr. Brzezinski re-
quested this bimonthly series last summer and
stressed that he wanted to receive it on a
regular basis. We have since learned from
Marshall Brement (the Soviet expert on
Brzezinski's staff) that the NSC finds the
product useful.
This memorandum has been approved by NIO/USSR-EE
Helene L. Boatner
Director
Political Analysis
FO M 5 101 EEDDITIONS PREVIOUS
5?!
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17 JUN 1980;
MEMDRANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Soviet Activities Affecting US
Interests
This is the fifth in a series of reports that
chart the USSR's actions to advance their interests
abroad. It gives special attention to those
activities that either seem deliberately designed
to counter US policy or have the potential for
developing into issues inimical to US interests.
Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Attachment:
As stated
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
Soviet Activities Affecting US Interests
Summary
Soviet leaders probably believe that they have made
considerable progress in limiting international damage as a
result of the invasion of Afghanistan and in habituating the
international community to a long-term Soviet military presence
in Afghanistan. Last month's meeting with French President
Giscard and the scheduled meeting with West German Chancellor
Schmidt later this month allowed the Soviets to demonstrate
a high-level political dialogue with the key states of West
Europe despite the Afghan invasion and the US "quarantine."
The Soviets probably also believe that they did not do badly
at the second Islamic Conference in view of the fact that
the US bore the brunt of criticism at last month's meeting
and that there were signs that the Moslem consensus on
Afghanistan was weakening.
This memorandum was prepared by the USSR-East European Division
of the Office of Political Analysis. Comments may be addressed
25X1 25X1
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SECRET
With prospects for resuming detente with the US poor,
the Soviets are encouraging West Europeans to engage in a
political dialogue that involves such sensitive Third World
areas as Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East.
Moscow is trying to show the West that it understands Western
concern for the security of Middle East oil routes and that
the invasion of Afghanistan was not intended to threaten the
control of the region's resources. The Soviets will in turn
exploit any US unwillingness to enter a direct dialogue on
these sensitive issues in their discussions with the West
Europeans.
Regardless of Washington's level of enthusiasm for
Soviet proposals to inaugurate a high-level dialogue over
outstanding political differences, the Soviets will maintain
a propaganda campaign against the US. The Soviets consider
the campaign particularly important for their propaganda efforts
in Europe and for support of their efforts to drive a wedge
between the US and some of its more important European allies.
Playing on the fears of some West European leaders, the Soviets
will blame the US for destabilizing the international situation
and for refusing to restore the atmosphere of detente.
Damage Limitation in the Aftermath of Afghanistan
Moscow's success in limiting the damage of its invasion
of Afghanistan is probably a source of satisfaction in the
Kremlin. The Soviets have reason to believe that they have
seen the worst of West European and Islamic reaction and that
their ability to hold high-level political discussions with
West European leaders is symptomatic of the divergence in US
and West European policies toward the USSR. These meetings
allow the Soviets to try to enlarge the existing divergencies
between the US and its allies.
-- The summit with Giscard produced no movement on
the issue of Afghanistan, but it eased the way for
the Schmidt visit to the USSR later this month.
-- The meetings with Schmidt will provide an opportunity
to exploit Bonn's concern with the direction of
US policy and to portray Bonn and Moscow as interested
in lessening international tensions and buttressing
detente.
-- Swedish Foreign Minister Ullsten's visit in May and
the scheduling of Norwegian Foreign Minister
Frydenlund are additional examples of Moscow's
ability to conduct "business as usual" with the
West Europeans without US approval or participation.
-2-
SECRET
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The Soviets will use all of these occasions to try to exploit
US-West European differences over Middle East peacekeeping
issues, the appropriate response to the Iran and Afghanistan
crises, the modernization of theater nuclear forces, and
European security issues.
The Soviets similarly have reason to believe that they
did not do badly at last month's Islamic Conference in
Islamabad, where the consensus on Afghanistan that was
hammered out in January showed signs of weakening. The
conference failed to issue a new condemnation of the USSR,
and several radical Arab states expressed reservations about
the January condemnation. The Soviets were also pleased by
the fact that the Afghan rebels failed to gain recognition
at the conference and are probably hopeful that a newly
formed Islamic committee will lead to greater acceptance of
the Babrak Karmal government. Even the Iranians--Moscow's
harshest critic--admitted that the committee must enter into
some kind of dialogue with Kabul. More importantly, the
Soviets probably took comfort in the fact that the US came
in for the lion's share of criticism at the meetings, where
US rescue efforts were equated with the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.
The Soviets have had the least success in countering
the adverse effect of the US trade embargo, particularly the
grain embargo, and the Olympic boycott, which have caused
unexpected expenditure of hard currency and some loss of
international prestige. No single aspect of US retaliation
appears to have bothered the Soviets unduly, but Washington's
across-the-board response caught the Soviet leadership off
guard. The disruption these actions have caused may be
responsible for the recent increase in propaganda activities
and forgeries aimed -at :the , US .
Soviet Search for Dialogue
The Soviets presumably want to use their contacts with
the West Europeans not only to divide the US from its allies
but to encourage Washington to enter a political dialogue
with Moscow as well. Moscow's pitch is twofold: to establish
that the USSR is willing to discuss the breakdown in relations
with the US in a serious fashion but that Washington remains
intransigent; to convince the West Europeans that US overemphasis
on Afghanistan is having deleterious effects on the delicate
balance in Europe. In this way, the Soviets hope either to
get their dialogue with the US eventually or at least to
establish that Washington is responsible for the failure to
do so.
-3-
SECRET
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Soviet probes on guaranteeing the security of the oil
routes of the Persian Gulf are designed to project a sympathetic
pose toward the West and, at the same time, to assert a comparable
interest and gain a possible negotiation forum on Persian Gulf
issues. Last month's Warsaw Pact proposal on "unhindered
access to the main international sea routes" was an effort,
for example, to keep alive the idea of East-West negotiations
on the security of oil routes and to generate some interest
among the nonaligned states. The proposal has not elicited much
response from the West thus far, but the Soviets are likely
to try other variations on the theme of East-West negotiations
to protect the oil routes, if only to convince the West
Europeans that it is the US--not the USSR--which jeopardizes
the stability of the Persian Gulf area and access to its oil
resources. This tactic is particularly important to the
Soviet effort to drive a wedge between the US and its allies.
Presumably the Soviets also see opportunities for
inserting themselves into the Arab-Israeli settlement process
by exploiting the Egyptian-Israeli impasse and playing up to
both Arab and European desires for new initiatives for a
settlement. Before the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet
officials condemned the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. More
recently, however, Soviet foreign ministry officials have
hinted that the USSR may be considering a tactical shift in
their approach to Middle East peace negotiations, which
could presage Soviet efforts to exploit US-West European
differences over the role of the Palestinians in the peace
process and the use of US political leverage against Israel.
Brezhnev recently referred publicly to the need to return to
"collective efforts" by all of the interested parties in the
Middle East, particularly the US and the USSR, and the
deputy chief of the foreign ministry's Near East Department
privately indicated that the return of the Sinai and the
establishment of Egyptian-Israeli diplomatic relations could
be accepted as the foundations for building a comprehensive
settlement.
New Opportunities
The Soviets have already intensified their activity in
Latin America, which is designed in part to exploit the worsening
of relations between the US and key Latin American states. The
Soviets no longer appear to be constrained by the need to
placate Washington in its own backyard and, as a result,
have offered military training to the new radical government
in Grenada and have concluded several assistance agreements
with Nicaragua. There is also the possibility that the
Soviets will provide weapons through third parties to leftists
in El Salvador. Moscow has also gained from the refusal of
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Argentina and Brazil to join US efforts to restrict grain
sales to the USSR, and the Soviets will intensify their
contacts with these key states.
The Soviets will also press to advance their interests
in areas where they have previously been excluded. Jordan's
King Hussein has agreed to visit the USSR following the
Olympics, and the Soviets will use the occasion to lobby for
Jordanian purchases of Soviet weaponry. Both Libya and
Algeria have reportedly tied their subsidies to Amman to
purchases of Soviet arms. In the wake of Moscow's emphasis
on guaranteed access to the oil of the Persian Gulf, Kuwait
announced that it would be willing to sell oil to the Soviets
for hard currency.
The Soviets in any event intend to increase the volume
of the current propaganda campaign against Washington.
the Soviet
campaign will be directed primarily against President Carter
and Zbigniew Brzezinski in order to blame them for the
current decline in East-West relations. The Soviets consider
the campaign important for their propaganda efforts in
Europe (particularly in West Germany) and for support of
their efforts to drive a wedge between the US and some of
its more important European allies.
-5-
SECR'ET
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SECRET
SUBJECT: Soviet Activities Affecting US Interests
Distribution:
Copy - Orig - The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
1 - Marshall Brement, NSC
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Secretary
1 - D/NFAC
1 - DD/NFAC
1 - Exec. Secy., NFAC Production Board
1 - NSC Presidential Briefing Coordinator
1 - NFAC/SRP
1 - NFAC/Registry
1 - NIO/USSR-EE
2 - D/OPA
2 - OPA/PS
3 - PPG
1 - OPA/USSR-EE Chrono
1 - Originator
NFAC/OPA/USSR-EE~ (15Jun80)
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