REVIEW OF SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101350002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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.Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
March-May 1980
I-q
Domestic Politics
By late May, Brezhnev and his colleagues finally had
cleared the deck sufficiently to schedule meetings of the
Central Committee and Supreme Soviet for the first time
since the overthrow of Amin in December. A Central
Committee plenum, rumored imminent in March and again
in May, will almost certainly precede by one day the
Supreme Soviet session that is scheduled to begin
discussing environmental issues on 24 June.
Preparing the Five-Year Plan
The plenum could provide the occasion for a review
of foreign policy, but it seems more likely that the
Politburo will try to foreclose Central Committee debate
over the "lessons" of Afghanistan by focusing discussion
on economic policy. In fact, while the leadership clearly
has been preoccupied in recent months with the adverse
international repercussions from the Afghan intervention
and other foreign issues (the Olympic boycott, the Warsaw
Pact meeting, etc.), several reports have indicated that
the more mundane task of drafting the outline of the
1981-85 economic plan has been the main cause of the
plenum's postponement. F-1
What is unclear, however, is the extent to which
Afghanistan has complicated the leadership's foreign-
economic plan calculations. There were indications
This review is based on analysis and research work
completed by CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center
through 6 June Z980. The contributions have been
reviewed by appropriate individuals within NFAC but
have not been formally coordinated. Comments are
welcome and may be addressed to Chief, Internal Branch,
USSR-EE Division, Office of Political Analysis, Room
6 G 22, CIA Headquarters, PA M 80-10271C
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in late January that US economic sanctions had sent
the planners back to the drawing boards--and specifically,
that the foreign trade plan would not be completed until
June or July, despite the fact that options for the
1981-85 plan were to have been presented to the Central
Committee in February. By early April, however, Soviet
3 planners were claiming that "energy strategy," rather
.6'-than foreign trade policy, was the primary issue delaying
completion of the draft plan. To some extent, of course,
this is a moot distinction, since the availability of
Western high-technology equipment--to choose but one
variable affecting the plan--will have a direct impact
on the development of Soviet energy resources, with
implications for other sectors of the economy as well.
n
8
q, 10
9
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Sympathy for a partial, if only symbolic, return
to a more autarkic policy has always lurked in the hearts
of many of the older, Stalinist generation of Soviet
officials--especially those who have been lukewarm
toward detente with the West. A vivid example of
the mood of self-reliance among these officials
appeared on 18 April in the speech of Academy of
Sciences President Aleksandrov, who called on Soviet
scientists to make the USSR "completely independent"
of foreign trade. Evidently responding to US economic
sanctions, Aleksandrov's appeal to autarkic sentiments
probably had a strong resonance among the more orthodox
elements of the hierarchy.)
The Heavy Hand of Kirilenko
The Soviet leader who has seemed most interested in
playing to such sentiments in the past is Andrey Kirilenko.
It is possible to speculate, however, that Kirilenko saw
military intervention as an opportunity to rally the
conservative elements of the leadership--particularly
the ideologues and regional party bosses who have been
least enthusiastic about detente--and to undercut those
who advocate greater trade with the West at a time when
the main directions of the 1981-85 plan were being
In any case, Kirilenko has been unusually active in
this final year before the 26th Party Congress (the
date for which may well be set at the plenum later
this month). The media gave prominent coverage to his
reports at conferences of the machine-tool industry
(10-11 March) and electric power industry (2-3 June).
Kirilenko's hand may be seen also in a well publicized
Central Committee resolution on deficiences in the oil-
refining industry that received prominent press play on
1 June. Calling attention to the serious problems in
these key sectors at a time when the five-year plan
is being formulated can do no harm to their chances
of getting a bigger piece of the resource pie, and
Kirilenko has the reputation of an industrial lobbyist.
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He also headed the Soviet delegation to the Hungarian
Party Congress in late March, which provided the
opportunity to deliver yet another speech and
otherwise remain in the public eye. 0
The activity of Brezhnev protege Konstantin Chernenko
during this period further suggests pre-plenum, pre-congress
politicking. Chernenko was present, for example, at the
two industrial conferences that Kirilenko addressed
(just as the latter attended a meeting of national and
regional party officials on General Department matters
that Chernenko addressed in late May). Chernenko also
received his share of the media spotlight when he
delivered a speech in Chelyabinsk in connection with
the city's receiving the Order of Lenin.
While Kirilenko and Chernenko--generally considered
to be the two leaders best placed to become General
Secretary in the near term--maneuver for position,
Brezhnev himself continues to surprise foreign observers
with his relatively healthy appearance and busy schedule.
current political atmosphere, the prospects for
advancement are best for party officials of the
Kirilenko type: conservatives who favor greater
self-reliance at home and assertiveness abroad.
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I I
Economic Affairs
The ailing Soviet economy has shown few signs of
improvement over the last three months. The leadership
has been reluctant to confront their problems directly,
relying, instead, on exhortations to bring about solutions.
Industrial Rebound To Be Short-Lived
Industrial production in the first quarter of 1980
was 5 percent above the same period last year. This
figure is misleading, however, since first quarter
1979 industrial performance was so poor. Gains in
almost all industrial sectors barely recouped actual
drops in output last year. In addition, the first
quarter rebound is only temporary. Below-plan output
of several commodities essential to overall economic
performance will preclude a sustained acceleration
of growth. Indeed, growth in production in April
slipped to 3 percent over the corresponding month in
1979, and we expect this pace to continue for the
balance of the year.
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Strengthened Hard Currency Position
soaring prices for energy exports
helped Moscow to slash its trade deficit nearly in half
in 1979 while recording a hefty jump in imports. The lower
merchandise trade deficit, combined with sizable sales of
gold and military equipment, has put the USSR in its
strongest hard currency position in many years. The USSR
will have a great deal of flexibility in its hard currency
accounts again this year. The US economic denial program
will restrain somewhat the volume of imports. Of greater
importance are the high prices for Soviet oil and gas
exports. Even with additional cuts in oil deliveries
to hard currency customers in 1980, Moscow will maintain
a comfortable payments position.
Economic Denial Measures Hurting
The Soviets will probably do little better than
offset half of the 17 million tons of grain denied by
the United States. Since the embargo, the Soviets have
replaced 6 million tons of the denied grain,
We doubt
that the Soviets will be able to purchase much more than
another 2 million tons of grain for delivery during the
balance of the Long-Term Agreement year. Largely as a
result of the embargo, a 2 to 3 percent drop in Soviet
meat production is expected this year.
The embargo is also having an effect on the
production of phosphate fertilizers, critically important
to Soviet agriculture. Planned phosphate fertilizer
output for 1980 was reduced recently by 26 percent,
partly ccount of the US embargo on superphosphoric
acid.
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But Grain Crop Prospects Look Good
Despite spring weather problems in some areas,
prospects for this year's grain crop are somewhat above
the 1976-79 average of 209 million tons. Winter grains
are developing well in areas other than the northern
Ukraine, and spring planting is only slightly behind
schedule for this time of year. Generally, soil
moisture conditions are good to excellent as of late
May. Nevertheless, weather conditions in June and the
first half of July are critical to the final outcome of
the crop.
Military Issues
Ustinov on the Sidelines
Ustinov has been out of view since early April.
During this time he has missed a series of appearances
obligatory for a Soviet Defense Minister, including the
May Day, VE Day celebrations, and the Warsaw Pact Political
Consultative Committee meetin .
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I I
The Politburo has traditionally given its ailing
members considerable time to recuperate. For example,
Kosygin spent four months recovering from last October's
heart attack. By giving Ustinov plenty of time to recover,
Brezhnev and company can avoid having to select a successor--
a difficult and potentially controversial political decision--
at least temporarily.
Ustinov's enforced rest, nevertheless, comes at a
bad time for his colleagues. His prestige in the leadership
never has been higher and the Politburo's dependence on him,
perhaps, never greater. No one in the Kremlin's inner
circle is well equipped to assume his responsibilities--
even temporarily. While hardly a one man band, Ustinov's
participation in Politburo discussions on Afghanistan and
related military and foreign policy issues will be missed.
And the deliberations as a result could become more
difficult.
Ogarkov to the Fore
Ogarkov does not have Ustinov's political status or
influence, however, and it is by no means certain that
the Politburo would award him the position permanently.
He probably owes his current status in large measure to
Ustinov. Without the assistance of Ustinov, Ogarkov's
advantage over potential rivals in the Defense Ministry--
for example, Warsaw Pact commander and former chief of
the General Staff, Viktor Kulikov--may evaporate. In
addition, Brezhnev and company would not relish the
prospect of placing a line military officer, with whom
their contact has been largely professional, in a-position
to gain Politburo rank. But, in the absence of candidates
with strong political and military credentials (like Ustinov),
the Kremlin's leaders-would probably be forced to turn to
Ogarkov or someone like him.
Public Unease and Official Concern About Afghanistan
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There are some indications, moreover, that the
Soviet public is not enthusiastic about the present
course, although most seem to accept the regime's
stated reasons for being there. Soviet citizens are
aware that Soviet troops have suffered casualties, and
questions put to official lecturers indicate that they
are concerned. Families with sons of draft age are
said to be enrolling them in higher education programs
in order to obtain draft-exempt status. Moreover, the
invasion has reportedly sparked a flare-up of anti-
Russian feeling in the highly nationalistic republics
of Georgia and Estonia.
Soviet authorities are aware of popular concerns
but have chosen to deal with them very circumspectly.
No campaign has been launched to arouse patriotic
fervor. Internal propaganda seems designed to minimize
the impact of events in Afghanistan on the Soviet public.
Press treatment, in fact, continues to portray Soviet
actions largely in terms of peaceful assistance--dam
construction, medical help, and the like. First Deputy
Chairman of the KGB Semen Tsvigun reportedly even told
army officers recently not to use repressive measures
against soldiers expressing dissatisfaction over
Afghanistan but instead to try to talk them out of
their discontent.
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NFAC/OPA/USSR-EE/SRI/ I(13 June80)
Copy # 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - Executive Registry
4 - D/NFAC
5 - DD/NFAC
6 - NFAC/Registry
7 - Executive Secretary, NFAC Production Board
8 - Senior Review Panel
9 - NFAC/Foreign Liaison Staff
10 - Chairman/National Intelligence Council
11 - NIO/USSR-EE
12 - NIOPolitical-Economics
13 - NSC/Presidential Briefing Coordinator 25X1
14 - Arms Control Intelligence Staff
15 - DDO/SE
16 - DDO/SE 25X1
17 - OER/U/SE
18 - IOSWR/LSB 25X1
19 -
20 - D/OCO
21 - PPG
22 - PPG
23 - P&PG
24 - D/OPA
25 - DD/OPA
26 - OPA/Production Staff
27 - OPA/Production Staff
28 - OPA/USSR-EE
29 - OPA/USSR-EE/SRI
30 - OPA/USSR-EE/SRM
31 - OPA/USSR-EE/SRE
32 - OPA/USSR-EE/EE
33 - A. Denis Clift
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President
Room 298
Old Executive Office Building
34 - Les Denend
National Security Council Staff
The White House
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35 - Marshall Shulman
Special Adviser to the Secretary of State
Room 7246
Department of State
36 - William Shinn
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Room 4217
Department of State
37 - Reginald Bartholomew
Director, Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7317
Department of State
38 - Anthony Lake
Director, Policy Planning Staff
Room 7311
Department of State
39 - Dr. Roger Molander
National Security Council Staff
Room 373
Old Executive Office Building
40 - Fritz Ermarth
Director, Strategic Planning
National Security Council Staff
Room 365
Old Executive Office Building
41 - Marshall Brement
USSR/Europe
National Security Council Staff
Room 368
Old Executive Office Building
42 - Steven Larabee
USSR/Europe
National Security Council Staff
Room 368
Old Executive Office Building
43 - Gen. Jasper Welch
Director, Office of Policy Analysis
National Security Council Staff
Room 375
Old Executive Office Building
44 - Brigadier General William Odom
Military Assistant to Dr. Zbigniew Brezezinski
National Security Council Staff
International Situation Room
The White House
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45 - David Aaron
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
46 - Ambassador Henry Owen
Economic Affairs
National Security Council Staff
Room 351
Old Executive Office Building
47 - Walter Slocombe
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ISA)
Room 4 E 813
Department of Defense
Pentagon
48 - The Honorable George S. Vest
Assistant Secretary of State, European Affairs
Room 6226
Department of State
49 - Robert Barry
Deputy Assistant for European Affairs
Room 6219
Department of State
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