SENEGAL: FACING CHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101210001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 4, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
4 June 1980
MEMORANDUM
SENEGAL: Facing Change
Senegal, long the flagship state of French-speaking
Africa, is beginning to confront the problems of being a
small, poor African nation and an impending change in
political Zeaderehip. President Leopold Senghor, 73, has
indicated his intention to step down when his term ends
in 1983, but there is rampant speculation that he might
retire earlier to facilitate transfer of power to his
talented but uninspiring Prime Minister. The uncertainty
on the political front is oocurring at a time of mounting
economic and social pressures and threatening foreign
developments. Together, there, actors have created unpre-
The Political Scene
President Senghor has provided Senegal with 20 years of
relatively stable political development and honest admini-
stration. He has emphasized cooperation and compromise and
has seldom forced confrontations. While accepting member-
ship in the nonaligned sow, he has tried to keep
Senegal well within the moderate, Western system he experi-
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This memorar&am was written by the Africa Division
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of the Office of Political Analysis., It was requested by the Director
of Central Intelligence, and has been coordinated with the Office of
Economic Research, the Office of Central Reference, the Directorate for
Operations, and the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. Research
was completed on 2 June 1980. Questions and comments are welcome and
should be directed to Chief, Africa Division, OPA,
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Senghor is an anomaly among African leaders in that
much of his active career took place in France. Born in
Joal, a coastal town south of Dakar, he was sent to a Catho-
lic school there and then on to Paris for secondary school
and university. The late French President Georges Pompidou
was a classmate and life-long close friend. During the
1930s, Senghor was a prominent literary figure in Paris and
one of the key innovators of the philosophy of negritude,
which stresses the values of African culture. Meanwhile, he
taught grammar in the French school system. As the first
African to earn the agrege (roughly equivalent to a Ph. D.)
he became a celebrity in Senegal. When France offered
representation in the French Parliament to its African
colonies after World War II, Senghor was elected as Senegal's
delegate.
During his years in the French National Assembly,
Senghor gradually worked out a socialist platform that was
more moderate than the positions of most of the other
African deputies in Paris and was also distinct from that of
the French Socialist Party and its Senegalese branch. He
had created his own party, the Senegalese Progressive Union
(UPS), well before independence became an issue. Senegal--
like all the other African colonies except Guinea--voted in
1958 to remain tied to France, but by 1960 it joined the
others in seeking independence and Senghor was chosen as
Head of State.
During the 1960s, Senghor concentrated on developing
political institutions for his new country and on suppres-
sing, mainly through conciliation but with an occasional
show of force, opposition from other political factions.
Senegal became a one-party st#rte, but policymaking was
shared within the ruling group.
In 1970 Senghor reinstated the position of Prime
Minister, and he has gradually increased the administrative
powers of its incumbent. The Prime Minister has been offici-
ally designated to finish out the President's term in the
event of a vacancy. In 1976--contrary to the prevailing
pattern in Africa--Senghor arranged a constitutional amend-
ment that formally allows opposition. The amendment spelled
out the three political labels under which the parties could
operate--socialist and democratic (assigned to Senghor's
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renamed Socialist Party), liberal and democratic, and Marxist-
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the 1978 election.
The Senegalese Democratic Party, led by a middle-aged
lawyer named Abdoulaye Wade, accepted the liberal and demo-
cratic label and functions openly and rather successfully as
an opposition party. It holds 18 of the 100 seats in the
National Assembly. The other legal parties are the revived
vehicles of oldtime politicians and have little influence.
There are a few modest illegal opposition groups that might
gain a sympathetic hearing, but they seem unprepared to
cause serious problems for the government.
Political attention is focused mainly on Senghor's
designated successor, Prime Minister Abdou Diouf. Now 44,
Diouf has held the second-ranking post in Senegal since
1970. He was born in Louga, a railroad town in the north-
west, and identifies himself as a Wolof. He attended
secondary school and university in Senegal and then went to
France for further training in law and administration.
Shortly after independence he entered the Senegalese admini-
strationtat a fairly high level and filled a variety of
positions in order to learn how the government functioned.
From 1963 to 1968 he worked directly. for Senghor, first as
Cabinet Director and then as Secretary General of the Presi-
dency. After two years as Minister of Plan and Industry, he
was appointed Prime Minister.
While few question Diouf's technical competence, he is
not particularly popular. He is uncommonly tall, reserved,
and does not project himself well before groups. More
seriously, he has had no experience in grass-roots or
electoral politics and has no political base of his own.
Since the last election in 1978, Senghor has increased
Diouf's responsibility and given him greater foreign and
domestic exposure. It is hard to see anyone but Diouf
succeeding Senghor, even if an election is involved, for he
would have the formal--though perhaps grudging--support of
the ruling party and would be unlikely to face a strong
opponent. Charges that he is impatient with the system
might even become an advantage for him with younger voters.
Senegal has a conventional military establishment that
is one of the best organized, disciplined, and competent in
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Africa. It is, however, so small--fewer than 9,000 in all
services--that the government continues to rely on the 2,000
French forces stationed in Senegal. The army is apolitical
and will probably be an influence for stability whenever
Senghor relinquishes power. Chief of Staff General Idrissa
Fall is close to Senghor and may retire about the same
time. While random acts of rebellion cannot be ruled out,
there are few indications that the Sengalese military would
be inclined to disrupt the succession.
It is becoming increasingly clear that Senegal is
approaching a new political era. Leaders of Senghor's
generation are dying or retiring, and their replacements
most likely will come from the group of young people whose
ideas have been formed since independence. Once the change
is effected, French influence may become less pervasive,
cultural and intellectual achievement may decline in pres-
tige, Senegal's preoccupation with international affairs may
lessen, the art of politics may be subordinated to technical
and administrative skills, and--above all--unpleasant econo-
mic realities may move to the forefront.
In the current waiting period, some jockeying for
position is going on, and corruption apparently is on the
upswing among officials who discount their future prospects.
An overactive Dakar rumor mill, anwhile, is keeping public
opinion stirred up. Diouf and young politicians associated
with him--such as Foreign Minister Moustapha Niasse--have
already broken up some of the powerful provincial political
machines, but the outcome of the struggle between old-style
and new-style politics is far from certain. Nevertheless,
Senegal has apolitically informed population and an apparent
dedication to democratic goverment and legal procedures
that is expected to contribute to a smooth transition.
The People
Senegal's 5,500,000 people are fairly free of tribal
divisiveness. The Wolof are the dominant ethnic group, and
their culture and language are being assimilated voluntarily
by the others. They are essentially local people, residing
in significant numbers only in Senegal and The Gambia.
Originally a warrior tribe, the Wolofs were pacified by the
French in the mid-19th century. Once under colonial rule,
they settled into a life of peanut culture, business, and
government service.
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There are five additional tribal groups of some import-
ance--Serer, Toucouleur, Fulani, Diola, and Malinke. The
Serer--President Senghor's tribe--are a relatively small
group of fairly prosperous farmers and traders who live
along the coast south of Dakar. The Toucouleur mainly
cultivate farms along the Senegal River, but many of them
operate small businesses in the cities. They belong to one
of the great ruling tribes in West African history and are
now thinly spread'among a number of countries in the area.
The Fulani--herdsmen and traders--are also widely dispersed
throughout West Africa and constitute the ruling group in
several countries; those in Senegal live mainly in the
desolate eastern area and play only a small political role.
The Diola and the Malinke both are mainly in the Casamance
and, as forest people, are culturally different from other
Senegalese. The rice-growing Diola are basically a local
people, while the Malinke are part of a large tribal group
important in several neighboring countries.
Senegalese are unusually mobile people. They not only
travel within their own country, but also become migrant
traders in Africa and foreign workers in Europe. During the
five-month dry season when little farm work can be done,
there is considerable informal,movement to Senegalese urban
centers and fishing ports. There is a reverse flow when
large amounts of labor are needed.,for`planting or harvesting.
Not all the movement is seasonal, howevet; and some displace-
ments last for years. The overall population growth rate is
2.6 percent a year, with the cities gaining population
somewhat faster than the rest of the country.
The internal migration involves mainly people from the
central regions where it is !sy to get around. Tribal
intermingling and intermarriage are traditional, but family
and village ties are carefully maintained by frequent
visits. Annual religious festivals attract hundreds of
thousands of Muslim worshippers.
The expatriate community--consisting mainly of French
residents--lives somewhat apart from the Senegalese population
because of its higher income level, though no legal restric-
tions separate it from the rest of the population. The
smaller Lebanese community still plays an important role in
Senegalese business. Aware that it is not well regarded, by
the local population, it tends to stay out of politics.
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Class is a bigger factor in the social structure of
Senegal than ethnic identification. Under the influence of
the French, education became the mark of the African elite;
diplomas and advanced degrees are still highly respected.
Professional careers in and out of government pay well and
bring high status. The elite among the emerging second
generation tend to be technicians and civil servants.
A majority of the population is farmers, and they are
viewed as socially inferior. Within this category, there
are subranks for different types, ranging from peanut
farmers at the top of the pyramid to herders at the bottom.
Another large group, sometimes overlapping the farmers,
includes those involved in petty commerce, fabrication and
repairs, and personal services. The unemployed--onl ew
percent of the total--form the lowest category.
Religion is both a unifying and a divisive force in
Senegal, where well over 90 percent of the population is
Sunni Muslim. A special feature of Senegalese Islam is the
heavy influence of the mass-membership Muslim brotherhoods.
Adherence to a brotherhood is an individual matter--one in
which ethnic, class, and even national lines can be crossed
There are a number of broths hoods, each with distinct
rituals and revered teachers, but the two-largest can swing
considerable weight and could influence the political
succession. The Tijanes and the Mourides have long competed
for adherents, economic privileges, and political patronage.
The differences between them go back to their historical
origins and ethnic makeup.
Tijanism is rooted in the 12th century Islamic renais-
sance in North Africa. It entered Senegal through Mauritania
and found an enthusiastic reception among the Toucouleur
farmers of the Senegal River basin. In the 19th century,
Toucouleur warriors and clerics spread the brotherhood
widely through West Africa. Toucouleur influence still
permeates the sect, which avoids central control and accords
individual caliphs authority over their own disciples.
Tijane orthodoxy emphasizes study and meditation and a
devotion that strictly follows Koranic prescriptions. Its
schools draw Islamic students from all over Africa. Tijanes,
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proud of their orthodoxy, their ties to historical Islam,
and their autonomy within their own caliphates, look down on
The Mouride movement originated early in the 20th
century when a Wolof preacher established a brotherhood that
provided an alternative to the Wolof warrior society des-
troyed by the French conquest. After the conquest, many
Wolofs heeded Mouride injunctions to concentrate on prayer
and work, and they laid the foundation of the peanut economy.
Eventually, the Mourides reached an. accommodation with the
French administration--carried over to the independent
Senegalese Government--that recognized a mutual interest in
political stability and economic production.
Mouridism reflects the hierarchical organization and
communal social structure of the Wolofs and is spreading
through Senegal along with other aspects of Wolof culture.
Its devotions tend to be emotional, though the greatest
stress is placed on obedience to the caliph and support of
the brotherhood through hard work. Mourides criticize the
Tijanes for intellectual snobbery.
Although their differing,packgrounds contribute to the
tension between the Tijanes and the Mourides, much of their
rivalry is directed toward the futures Senghor, a neutral
because he is a Christian, has always carefully balanced his
relations with the major brotherhoods. As prosperity declines
and the political succession looms, however, they are intensi-
fying their competition for members, money, and government
patronage. Both the Tijanes and the Mourides have recently
undergone their own generational change as longstanding
leaders have died and been r *laced by younger, less charis-
matic, and less experienced ones.
In general, the Tijane brotherhood has been more coopera-
tive and less demanding of the government. Most top poli-
tical officials, including Prime Minister Diouf, are Tijanes,
reflecting that group's ties with Senegal's intellectual
elite. The Mouride leadership--controlling the country's
largest bloc of votes and dominating the richest economic
sector--can virtually veto any national candidate who does
not please them. Since any successor to Senghor will almost
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certainly be a Muslim, political juggling to maintain the
support of the brotherhoods and cultivate their leaders will
continue.
The Economy
Senegal inherited one of the most advanced economies of
West Africa when it became independent. At the same time,
however, the French West Africa grouping that had served as
its market area broke up into eight nations and left Senegal
Peanut production--well established in western and
southwestern Senegal since the turn of the century--remains
the basis of the economy. Peanuts are one of the few crops
viable in Senegal's sandy soil and dry climate. They com-
prise nearly half of the total exports--sold almost exclu-
sively to France for peanut oil, but no longer at subsidized
prices--and constitute the principal source of cash income
for about 70 percent of the population. The government has
not succeeded in its efforts to encourage crop diversifica-
tion and to nationalize and regulate peanut marketing.
Outside the peanut-growing area, Senegalese farmers
produce traditional food crops--cereals in the north and
rice in the south. Cattle are r;?ised?.by Fulani herdsmen in
the north and east, and fishing is a major occupation along
the coast. The recurrent droughts of the last decade have
adversely affected most traditional types of food production.
Senegal has the most developed industrial sector in
French-speaking West Africa. Much of this industry is
devoted to materials processIll!", though there is some
manufacturing for import substitution. Costs are extremely
high, however, and despite the existing industrial base
Senegal has not been able to stimulate expansion in the
manufacturing sector. Some mining is carried on, and
phosphate is a major export--the only one going predomi-
nantly to non-French buyers.
Transportation facilities are relatively good. There
is a first-class port at Dakar, as well as a major inter-
national airport. The road network is above average for
West Africa, and there are railroads connecting Dakar with
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St. Louis on the Senegal River and with Bamako, Mali, on the
Niger River. The Gambia, however, cuts off easy access to
Senegal's Casamance region.
Imports on a sizable scale are needed to operate Senegal's
basic economy and to supply consumer goods to satisfy the
demands of the local elite and the expatriate community.
Prices for these imports--notably for fuels, but also for
manufactured products--have escalated rapidly in recent
years -and_have been a major cause of Senegal's 15-percent
In addition, Senegal has a large and growing "parallel
economy" based on a more informal exchange of goods and
services. This supports much of the urban population and
also extends into the rural areas. The problems in the
modern economy have been reflected in heightened competition
in the parallel economy and the resulting increase in
hustling has contributed to uneasiness in the cities.
The economic situation is getting worse. Recurrent
failures in agricultural production--due mainly to drought--
have been the most serious problem. Restricted markets and
extreme price fluctuations fo;?peanuts and phosphates have
also contributed, along with soaring import costs, to a
balance-of-payment$ deficit and 4,,,.sharp decline in govern-
The Senegalese Government is aware of its economic
problems and has taken steps to address them. A new five-
year austerity program, with concrete targets and an orienta-
tion toward free market competition, was introduced late
last year. A 25-percent incase in minimum wages--the
first such raise in four years--was put into effect in
January to alleviate hardships among workers.
Prospects for improvement are grim. The agricultural
sector is near the limit of its development, and there is
little hope of expanding the high-cost industrial sector.
Development of the river valleys has long been recognized as
the brightest hope for the economy, and Dakar has strongly
advocated such a course. Such large-scale projects would
require international financial backing, however, and many
donors regard them with skepticism. Moreover, Senegal does
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not fully control its rivers. The lower 200 miles of the
Gambia River lie entirely within The Gambia, and the north
bank of the Senegal River belongs to Mauritania; the head-
waters of both rivers are in Guinea. After years of negotia-
tions, Dakar appears to have gotten one dam project on the
Senegal River under construction and is nearing agreement
with Banjul on the form a joint project on the Gambia River
is to take. Practical results are still remote.
Prime Minister Diouf has become identified with the
formulation and implementation of economic policy, and he
may eventually be blamed for failing to achieve improvement.
As the economic situation has gotten worse, there has been a
loss of confidence in the government and a growing tendency
for groups with grievances to resort to violence, especially
Foreign Affairs
President Senghor has made foreign affairs his special
province; he has interwoven theory and policy articulately
and tirelessly. His program is an extension of the literary
and philosophical theories Senghor has developed during his
career, and he uses it to ado ess Senegal's political
weaknesses and focus on external solutions. Despite his
persistence, Senghor has gotten-little serious support from
foreign leaders, and he sometimes appears to speak alone
even in Senegal.
Senghor is preoccupied with the danger he perceives in
the expansion of Soviet and Cuban influence in Africa and
from the ambitions of Algeria and Libya, which he sees as
Soviet-dominated clients. S. views the Soviet and Cuban
presence in Ethiopia and Angola and the Algerian and Libyan
involvement in the Western Sahara and Chad as evidence of
Soviet intentions to establish a preponderant position in
Africa. Moreover, he believes Senegal is surrounded by weak
states vulnerable to Communist influence. His proposed
solutions call for mutual defense arrangements among black
Africans--whether ad hoc support of particular states or
permanent defense agreements. On another level, he regularly
pushes for a formal organization to unite the French-speaking
nations of the world in order to bolster what he sees as
their heritage of political moderation.
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Senghor's foreign commitments indicate that he intends
to stay in office at least another year. He is acting
chairman of the Organization of African Unity until July,
filling out the term of the late William Tolbert of Liberia.
Later this year, he will be visited by French President
Giscard., In 1981, he expects to preside over a summit
meeting of French-speaking countries--one of his principal
F__ I
The day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs has few
unusual aspects. Senegal is on good terms with all of its
neighbors and faces no immediate security threat. Neverthe-
less, Senghor's foreign policy statements contain large
doses of alarm about racist threats against black Africans
by aggressive Arabs from North Africa and beyond, threats of
Communist designs against moderate and pro-Western states,
and threats that the world's wealth countries will further
victimize the poor ones.
Mauritania, which shares the Senegal River valley and
its Toucouleur population with Senegal, has long been a
subject of concern to Senghor. He distrusts the Moors--
numerically and politically dominant in Mauritania--as
racists and potential radicals and frequently reminds
Mauritanian leaders that Senegal stands ready to protect the
rights of Mauritania's black minority.` Since the emergence
of the Western Saharan problem and the war with the Poli-
sario Front, Senghor has supported the principle of self-
determination for the Western Sahara and worked for a
negotiated settlement. While he is a friend of Morocco, he
would particularly like to see a neutral and stable Mauri-
tania that would be a buffer 4gainst Algerian expansion.
Relations with The Gambia--an enclave within Senegal--
are equally important. After some early sparring, the two
countries have agreed to renounce merger schemes, to respect
each other's rights, and to cooperate closely on matters of
common interest. They are linked through the permanent
Senegambian Commission in Banjul and also in several mul-
tilateral development programs.
Relations with Guinea-Bissau, a cause of considerable
concern during its Communist-supported war for independence,
have improved since the Portuguese departure. Senegal still
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is concerned about Bissau's radicalism because of the tribal
ties between the Casamance region and Guinea-Bissau.
Mali is a source of worry because of its apparent
inability to control its vast tribal territories, but
government-to-government relations are untroubled. Guinea
and Senegal for many years were openly hostile--mainly
because of their differing political ideologies--but since a
highly publicized reconciliation between the two presidents
in ]978, tension has been greatly reduced. Although the
border has opened and trade has resumed, there still are
sizable numbers of Guinean exiles living in Senegal.
Senghor is honored as an elder statesman by most African
countries, and Senegal plays an active role in African
regional affairs. Although Senegal fears it may be losing
its longstanding competition with Ivory Coast for French
favors, the two countries frequently cooperate on matters of
It is France, however, that is of greatest importance
to Senegal. President Giscard's state visit in November is
anticipated in Dakar as indicating a favorable response to
requests for additional economic aid. Senegal--which
normally gets about $150 million annually from Paris--has
long headed the list of French aid recipients. Military
ties between the two countries=also are close. Besides
relying on the French contingent stationed near Dakar,
Senegal looks to France for equipment and training. Joint
military exercises are held periodically, and France has on
occasion been permitted to increase its military presence in
Senegal to support operations elsewhere in Africa. Despite
these arrangements, Senghor *pears to believe that Giscard
tends to favor some of the newcomers among African leaders--
even those, like former Emperor Bokassa, with dubious
reputations--to the detriment of ties with older, tried
Senegalese-US relations are good, though Senghor would
probably like to see them even closer. He has long sought
signs of US willingness to act in defense of free world
interests in Africa.
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Dakar maintains diplomatic relations and conducts
business with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries,
though it makes clear that it opposes any attempts by them
to extend +-h--1-
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SUBJECT: Senegal: Facing Change
Distribution:
DCI
D/OPA
NIO/AF
OPA/Production
P&PG
OPA/AF
NFAC/OPA/AF/ (4Jun80)
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Senegal
Farim
Rjo ~ G INE ISSAU ?iche
50 100 Miles
I t~l
50 100 Kilometers
502736 9-77 (541834)
Lambert Conformal Projection
Standard parallels 8? and 32? - Railroad
Scale 7:3,800,000
Boundary representation is
Road
not necessarily authoritative l
T Airport
0
F--
0
Bopue MAURITANIA
Sddhiou
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