CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101200001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 30, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
30 May 1980
MEMORANDUM
CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW
reputation for statesmanship intact.
Summary
Chancellor Schmidt views his proposed visit to Moscow
on 30 June with mixed motives that, in summary, make it
appear an unavoidable ordeal. Given Schmidt's already
established image as the peace candidate in the West German
electoral contest, the trip has become almost essential to
his campaign. Yet it offers more risks than opportunities,
since his conservative opponent, Franz Josef Strauss, is
prepared to exploit any misstep by Schmidt. The Soviets
have so far not shown any willingness to make substantive
concessions to the Bonn government leader, although they
regard his visit as a forceful demonstration that, despite
their invasion of Afghanistan, the USSR is able to maintain
a political dialogue with West Europe. Despite the emphasis
both sides place on dialogue and despite the wide range of
topics likely to be discussed--aims control, Afghanistan,
Iran, inner-German relations--the Soviets are not likely to
yield any more in the way of substance to Schmidt then they
did to French President Giscard earlier this month. Although
Bonn and Moscow are still dickering over dates, the Soviets
clearly are eager for the visit to take place. Schmidt
would probably be satisfied to return from Moscow with his
This memorandum, requested by the National Security Council, was prepared
by the Western Europe Division and the USSR
Division, Office of Political Analysis. Research was compete on 30 May.
The paper was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Western
Europe and the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR Division. Questions
ion
Di
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and comments may be addressed to the Chief, Western
and the Chief, USSR Division
PA M 80-10249
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Diplomatic Gamesmanship
Schmidt decided soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to announce
publicly his readiness to accept a standing Soviet invitation to Moscow.
Domestic political reasons aside, he hoped then to forestall rapid escalation
of Soviet-US tensions. One of the precepts of West German foreign policy is
that Bonn-Moscow relations can "contribute to stability in Europe" only if
the superpowers retain a joint interest in detente.
In early April, the Soviets responded by reiterating the invitation. They
clearly wanted to preserve the status guo ante Afghanistan in bilateral relations
and may have hoped as well to spur movement on bilateral economic relations and
perhaps influence Bonn's decision on an Olympic boycott. Nevertheless, Schmidt
moved to obtain West German support for the boycott and resisted Soviet
pressure to convene the bilateral economic commission in April. (The commission
finally met in Bonn yesterday.)
We have only sketchy information on the Bonn-Moscow maneuvering over a date
for the visit, but Schmidt evidently played hard to get. Meanwhile, he let it
be known that the visit would be coordinated with Bonn's allies and, in a May Day
speech, Schmidt announced he would tell the Soviets in Moscow to get their troops
out of Afghanistan. At this point, he was clearly willing to risk a Soviet decision
not to fix a date for the visit; a rule of this game is that he who decides not to
meet becomes the foe of detente.
Finally--as French President Giscard was meeting Brezhnev in Warsaw on 19 May--
Bonn proposed that Schmidt's visit take place on 30 June and 1 July. The Soviets
are still mulling over the dates, but they are nevertheless expected to schedule
the visit.
The Stakes
The Soviets regard Schmidt's visit as a demonstration that, despite their
invasion of Afghanistan, the USSR is able to maintain a political dialogue with
the West. They also see the visit as an opportunity to further divide Bonn from
Washington. The event thus will be accorded full Soviet media treatment and
official acclaim as proof that, despite the US, Bonn, like Moscow, wants to lessen
international tensions and buttress detente. In addition, West Germany's
economic and military weight in Europe and Schimdt's standing in the Alliance make
his visit more significant and valuable to the Soviets than Giscard's recent
meeting with Brezhnev. Indeed, the Soviets may have agreed to meet with the
French in large part to spur Schmidt to come to Moscow.
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However, it will be awkward for Schmidt, while shooting continues in
Afghanistan, to bring off a peacemakers' summit in Moscow--one that appears
worthwhile both to West Germans, who in general are highly skeptical of Soviet
motives, and to the other Western allies. Although Giscard broke the ice regarding
summit meetings with Brezhnev, the disappointing result devalued the argument both
Giscard and Schmidt had used about the utility of communication. It is
necessary, therefore, for Schmidt to strive for more substance, even though he
already knows the meeting with Brezhnev will probably have to be defended against
The Issues
Schmidt will be anxious for a pubiic Soviet statement of support for further
cooperation between East and West Germany. This will require bargaining, because
Moscow presumably influenced postponement of Schmidt's planned visit to East
Germany as well as that regime's threat that sports relations between the two
Germanies will suffer because of the Olympic boycott. Without a statement on all-
German relations, there may be no communique at the end of Schmidt's visit. Q 25X1
Movement toward arms control negotiations on theater nuclear forces is high
on Schmidt's agenda. His signal to Moscow, in an April speech, that TNF deployments
might be delayed if arms control talks got underway, assures Soviet probing of his
intentions, but Schmidt lacks room for maneuver. Soviet unresponsiveness and the
negative US reaction to the signal caused him to reaffirm the NATO position.
Schmidt could not give even the appearance of altering that stand without handing
the opposition a powerful election issue and affronting Foreign Minister Genscher,
who will accompany him to Moscow. 25X1
The Soviets can be expected to intone their familiar litany of alleged US
violations of the spirit of detente, in particular Washington's sponsorship of
last December's NATO TNF decision. In a effort to further Washington-Bonn differences,
Schmidt's hosts will probably also press him to urge the US to ratify SALT II
There is no indication at present, however, that the Soviets are prepared to
qualify in any meaningful way their demand that the NATO TNF decision be revoked or
shelved. In fact, Moscow has reaffirmed its contention that the initiative on arms
questions now lies with the West. The Soviet Ambassador to East Germany asserted
to the US Ambassador to Berlin this week that 20,000 Soviet tropps and 1,000 tanks
had already been withdrawn from East Germany by 25 May, more than four months in
advance of the deadline Brezhnev set last October.
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JLVINI.I
The Soviets will probably also seek an expression of support from Schmidt for
a conference on military detente in Europe. Moscow apparently hopes to secure
agreement by the participants in the CSCE review session in Madrid this November
to hold such a conference. The Soviets may also try to exploit US-German differences
over the need for a Western consensus now in support of a post-Madrid conference.
On matters such as these, however, and on other such issues that may arise--
East-West cooperation on energy, confidence-building measures to ease military
confrontation in Europe--Schmidt will not feel free to make formal bilateral
agreements.
Bilateral economic relations will be on the agenda, but Schmidt will play
down this topic because the Soviets show signs of wanting a ceremonial display of
growing economic cooperation--signing a new agreement, for example--presumably for
its effect on Washington. The Soviets will nevertheless emphasize their concern
about bilateral economic relations. Earlier this year, Moscow appeared to signal
that even West German support for an Olympic boycott would he acceptable as long
as bilateral trade remained unaffected. The Soviets have indeed proven willing
to overlook West Germany's boycott decision in the course of planning Schmidt's
Schmidt is obliged to discuss Afghanistan and to report that he expressed
condemnation of the Soviet invasion. There is little indication the Soviets will
be any more forthcoming on this issue than they were with Giscard. It is unlikely
that the staying power of the current Afghan regime--the critical factor in any
possible Soviet withdrawal--will look any different at the end of June than it
does now. This week, in fact, Brezhnev seemed to be toughening the Soviet position,
saying that the deadline for the "beginning" of Soviet withdrawal could be set in
conjunction with an Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan settlement guaranteeing the end of
outside interference. But he left the conditions for further Sovietwithdrawal--
much less its completion--even more vague than the recent Afghan proposal. In
line with Soviet efforts to suggest greater flexibility on Afghanistan, it is
possible that Moscow may make some additional ambiguous noises about withdrawal.
Concerned about Iran and wishing to show alliance solidarity, Schmidt will
probably request public reaffirmation, at the highest Soviet official level, that
holding the US hostages is a violation, of international law. He does not expect
a positive response to this request. The Soviets may point to Gromyko's ambiguous
remarks in Bonn last November as indicative of Moscow's commitment to the inviolability
of diplomatic personnel. But it is highly unlikely that Moscow will jeopardize
its efforts to court Khomeini by offering anything more than lip service on the
hostage issue. The Soviets instead are likely to castigate the US for increasing
tension in the Persian Gulf region and advance their own proposal for an international
conference safeguarding access to Persian Gulf oil as an alternative to US policy.
The Soviets, who have already called Bonn's attention to this latter theme, hope
it will have some appeal for the West Germans because of their interest in secure
energy supplies.
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.)LW\L1
On the Arab-Israeli issue, the Soviets are likely to suggest sympathy for
West European concerns about the impasse on the future of the West Bank. Brezhnev
this week, for example, expressed Soviet interest in a return to "collective"
approaches to the problem. But Moscow is unlikely to use the visit to launch
major new initiatives since its primary interest at this time is probably to
use the lack of progress to discredit the US approach to peace.
Having gone far down the campaign trail as West Germany's "peace candidate"
and crisis manager, Schmidt would find it difficult to pull back from the Moscow
visit. His last formal visit to Moscow, in 1974, was a difficult encounter and
Schmidt probably expects this one to be another strenuous clash of interests. He
may still hope that the Soviets will postpone the visit until after the West German
election in October. But it has been clear since early May, that Schmidt is
facing up to the necessity of the visit. About then, he reached an understanding
with Foreign Minister Genscher that they would go to Moscow together and that the visit
could not be made to depend on any specific accomplishments. On their return,
they will face together the critique of opposition candidate Franz Josef Strauss,
who will assure that they deliver a precise accounting.
Moscow clearly intends Schmidt's visit to serve as proof that the Soviet
concept of differentiated detente is workable and that the USSR can continue to
conduct "business as usual" with the West Europeans, without US participation or
approval. Moscow may also feel that the visit will retroactively blunt the
impact--both inside the USSR and abroad--of Bonn's decision to support the Olympic
boycott. Thus while Schmidt may end his visit with little of substance to show
for it, the Soviets will regard his trip as a major success simply for having
taken place.
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Distribution: Chancellor Schmidt's Visit To Moscow
Orig - Robert Blackwill, NSC
1 - Thomas Niles, State
2 - D/NFAC
1 - NFAC/Registry
1 - NFAC/Action Staff
1 - NI0/WE
1 - Secretary Production Board
1 - OER Registry
1 - NFAC Senior Review Panel
1 - NFAC Coordination Staff
1 - Presidential Briefing Coordinator
1 - PDB Staff
2 - D/OPA
2 - OPA Production Staff
3 - P&PG
1 - CD/WE
2 - NE files
1 - Author
NFAC/0PA/WE/NE 30May8O)
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