CUBA-NICARAGUA: SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN INSURGENCIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101170001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 23, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
23 May 1980
CUBA-NICARAGUA: SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN INSURGENCIES 25X1
Summary
Apparently preoccupied with their own domestic affairs during the
past month, neither Havana nor Managua has undertaken any major new
initiatives in support of Central America's revolutionary movements.
Of note was the attendance-~
-of an FSLN delegation at the 19-20 April meeting in Mexico of
the Communist parties of Central America, Mexico, and Panama. The
Sandinista delegation acknowledged the FSLN's adherence to the inter-
national Communist movement and also pledged "all out support" to
Salvadoran revolutionary forces "at the appropriate time."
El Salvador
In a mid-April conversation with the US Ambassador,
Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge reiterated Sandinista
.his memorandu-n was requested by the National Security Adviser to
the President. It responds to specific questions and is not intended to
be an analysis of the overall relationship between Cuba-Nicaragua and
Central America. It was prepared by the Latin America Division of the
Office of Political Analrsye under the direction of the National InteZZi-
genos Officer for Latin America, and coordinated with the Clandestine
Service and the Office of Strategic Research. Information in this
meeq-randwt ref lscts tn, ftion available through 15 May 1980.
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sympathy for the left in El Salvador but added that the FSLN
would not allow its territory to be used to destabilize the
Salvadoran junta. To substantiate this familiar line, Borge
claimed that Nicaraguan authorities recently had intercepted
April meeting in Mexico indicate increasing FSLN involvement
with the Communist left and a close identification with
Cuba. This preparatory session for a formal conference next
fall was devoted largely to country-by-country status reports,
with an emphasis on expressions of support for the revolution-
ary forces in El Salvador.
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statements of the FSLN delegation at the 19-2
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Another suggestion of low-level FSLN involvement
occurred in mid-April, when five alleged Sandinista militants
were captured in San Jose, Costa Rica, while attempting to
recruit university students to join the Salvadoran insurgents.
According to a public statement by Costa Rican authorities,
the militants had infiltrated from Nicaragua with letters of
introduction and other documents from various Nicaraguan
revolutionary movements, most of which we had not heard of
previously. The group probably was acting largely on its
own, but at least some higher level Sandinistas apparently
were aware of the effort. According to the Costa Rican
statement, the captured recruiters claimed under interroga-
tion that Julio Ramos, Popular Sandinista Army (EPS) chief
of military security and intelligence, had refused them
assistance "because of the international problems this would
cause for Nicaragua in the event of discovery."
Cuban and Other
Communist Involvement
In his lengthy speech on 1 May, Fidel Castro noted that
"the Salvadoran situation . . . demands the most ample
support to halt . . the imperialists." This theme was
reflected by Havana's international news service, which
pointed out that "the popular revolutionary struggle" was
intensifying in El Salvador, and that "international support
for that combative nation is also rising."
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.Honduras
In a move that may signal a marked increase in Communist
militancy, a leader of the Communist Party of Honduras (PCH)
who advocates a harder revolutionary line is reported to
have resigned from the part in mid April or early May.
this may well
emerged in the PCH in 197 .
oriented Special App- 1$ F-- I
precipitate numerous V- A+- al Cuban-supportedtf action action-
precipitate
mem rs o the America Department of the CubancoenPCH to
Party (PCC) had urged the moderate leadership of
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five and aggre
adopt more ac
ently were reluctant to do.
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ssive tactics, which they appar-
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I. Cuban Training of Central American Insurgents
El Salvador '
We believe that as many as 500 Salvadoran leftists have
received training in guerrilla warfare and related subjects
in Cuba since late 1978. The training, which remained rela-
tively modest in 1979, appears to have increased markedly
this year.
By mid-1979 more than 100 members of the Popular Libera-
tion Forces (FPL)--the largest and most active revolutionary
terrorist group--had completed a four-month course in Cuba
to E1 Salvador to ser
and returned
planned force of 2,000 guerrillas.
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Honduras
The Cubans also have trained members of the Honduran
Communist Party (PCH), in part to support Salvadoran leftists.
They appear to have instructed greater numbers since the PCH
initiated its support of Nicaraguan revolutionaries in
1978.
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ve as instructors for a
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let
Third Country Involvement
To supplement its own efforts, Cuba is encouraging
third-country involvement.
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II. Support for the Right
A comparison of Cuban assistance to the left with
external support of the extreme right is difficult, particu-
larly in view of the Castro regime's non-material aid--such
as tactical guidance, brokering of contacts with leftist
groups elsewhere, and Havana's efforts to unify leftist
groups. Our knowledge of rightwing groups is sketchy. We
believe there is less foreign involvement in rightist terror-
ism, partly because the large sums of money available from
domestic rightwing groups and individuals for the purchase
of materiel and trained assassins makes external aid less
necessary. Similarly, armed forces personnel active in
counterterror have little need for external assistance.
ht is strongest in
Several months ago, e
leader of Guatemala's archconservative National Liberation
Movement told the US Ambassador that should civil war break
out in El Salvador, his party would render whatever assist-
ance it could to prevent a Marxist takeover.
The Guatemalan armed forces are frustrated over US
policies and harbor some sentiment for intervention on
behalf of the right in El Salvador. In 1977, when Guatemalan-
UK tensions were at their height, the Salvadoran armed
forces were the only Central American military to supply
arms--albeit only a token amount--to build the arsenal of
their Guatemalan colleagues. Guatemalan officers'charact-
erize progressive Salvadoran military leaders--such as junta
member Colonel Majano--as Communists, but strong ties exist
between the more conservative members of the two military
institutions.
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The Central American business community is also tightly
knit, and the ideological kinship between Guatemalan and
Salvadoran entrepreneurs may account for some cross-border
aid.
It seems unlikely, however, that external assistance to
the Salvadoran right will become as crucal. as Cuba
other foreign assistance is to the extreme left.
III. Origins of Terrorist Acts
The level of politically motivated violence in El
Salvador has reached new heights since the implementation o
major socioeconomic reforms and increased security measures
in March.
Of 212 deaths reported in the two-week period ending on
20 April, 73 persons were killed by security forces, 11.8 by
the radical left, and 21 by the extreme right--reflecting
the general pattern since February. In recent weeks, however,
a growing number of bodies have been discovered with no
clues to the assassins' identity. Rightwing death squads
are increasingly active and more deaths probably are attribut-
able to them. Search operations by the military also have
continued to produce civilian casualties.
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SUBJECT: Cuba-Nicaragua: Support for Centril American Insurgencies
Distribution:
Original
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- Brzezinski
- DCI
- DDCI
- D/NFAC
- DD/NFAC
- NIO/LA
- Exec Registry
- NFAC Registry
- D/OPA
- Production Staff
- Joyce (PPG)
- C/LA
- DC/LA
- LA country files
- Distribution in LA Div.
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