POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH KOREA: A DIFFICULT ROAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101140001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 14, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
14 May 1980
SUMMARY
South Korea is finding the transition to a new goverment tortuous.
The major political parties are riven by dissension; low wages and
apparent government disinterest have led to unprecedented work slowdowns
and rioting; and students are beginning to demonstrate against what
they--and many other South Koreans--see as government unwillingness to
expedite the transition process. Most iimportant, however, is the growing
public suspicion that the powerful military establishment is bent on
manipulating the transition to its advantage and in sharplj slowing the
pace of political liberalization.
Indeed, General Chun Doo Swan, military strongman and new head of
the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), has emerged as the most
powerful figure in South Korea. The military establishment
The author of this memorandum isl I Gffice of 25X1
Political Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed
to the Chief, North Asia Branch, East Asia-Pacific Division, OPA,
Research was completed on 2 May 1980. This paper was coordinated 25X1
with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research,
and the National Intelligence Officer for China, East Asia and Pacific.
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and most businessmen, whose principal interest is stability, appear to
have accepted his appointment to KCIA on the grounds that Korea now
needs tough-minded leadership although some have reservations about
Chun's style and intentions. The politicians, who see Chun's growing
power as a threat to their own aspirations, and the students are opposed.
While Chun probably would prefer--at least for the time being--to continue
to manipulate the political situation from behind the scenes in hopes of
avoiding additional opposition, he also has made it clear that the
military would step in if serious instability developed.
The combination of a volatile political atmosphere and an ambitious,
conservative military leadership appears to be driving South Korea toward
more turmoil. The students, disgruntled workers, and others who are
criticizing the interim government and the military most loudly seem
to be playing into Chun's hands. Their recent call for an immediate
end to martial law could provoke the kind of instability that Chun needs
to step in.
General Chun almost certainly will move in this direction if the
situation on the campuses and in the streets gets out of hand. None-
theless, he probably recognizes the risks involved. Korean military
officers view Chon's move to KCIA as the principal factor behind the US
postponement of the bilateral security talks originally scheduled for
this summer. This, in turn, has created some concern about Chun's
ability to manage relations with the US effectively. If Chun were to
assume even greater power through the extension of martial law, uneasiness
about the prospects for the aZZ-important relationship with Washington
could grow.
In addition, a military takeover might--at least initially--generate
even more chaos in the streets. Fearing that, many within the government
would almost certainly urge mollifying the students and others
opposed to Chun by removing him before he could seize power. On the
other hand, many would argue that a strong hand was needed to control
the situation, especially because of the widely held view that North
Korea would attempt to take advantage of any drawnout disarray. We
believe that the military could bring enough force to bear to at least
reduce the turmoil and that Chun would be able to maintain his position.
The prospects for political liberalization in South Korea will
be influenced heavily by both the nature and the outcome of any con-
frontation. AZZ parties--including Chun--appear to recognize that a
return to the excessive controls of the Park era would not be accept-
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able to the Korean people. Neither Chun nor the leaders of the current
interim government, however, are likely to permit the kind of ZiberaZiza-
tion that the students and opposition are demanding.
If a confrontation between students and the military can be
avoided, the government has a better than even chance of sticking to
its transition schedule, which calls for constitutional revision later
this year and presidential elections next summer. If a confrontation
develops, the entire transition process will be slowed; it is an open
question when or whether Chun Doo Hwan would relinquish the authority
he would acquire from the resulting turmoil.
Introduction
As President Choi Kyu Hah enters his seventh month as
South Korea's chief executive, the political situation is
becoming more uncertain and unstable. Students and laborers
have begun to demonstrate against the government, calling
for an end to martial law and speedier political liberaliza-
tion. Opposition politicians also are losing patience with
what they see as foot-dragging in the government, especially
the government's unwillingness to discuss its plans for
constitutional revision. Most important, concern is grow-
ing that army strongman and KCIA chief Chun Doo Hwan is
preparing to use domestic instability as a rationale for
seizing control of the government.
Constitutional Revision amid Political Uncertainty
Working under the watchful eye of the military and its
leader Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan, Choi has pledged
to guide the country through the process of revising
President Park Chung Hee's authoritarian Yusin constitu-
tion and holding new elections for President and the National
Assembly.
Choi is determined that the government take the lead
in constitutional revision, despite protests from the
political parties, which have drafted their own document in
the National Assembly. Choi has made it clear that he
places the emphasis on national security, economic growth
and political development--in that order. He has indicated
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also that he is opposed to radical changes in the political
system. Moreover, Prime Minister Shin Hyon-hwack's defense
of some aspects of the Yusin constitution have led politi-
cians and the public to believe that the government will
not greatly modify the current system, or that it will
institute a form of government that makes it impossible
for liberal democratic forces to assume power.
In drafting a new constitution, Choi must balance
popular expectations of democratic reform with the need to
preserve national security. He clearly hopes to salvage
those aspects of the Yusin constitution that provided
stability and economic growth, such as a strong executive.
At the same time, however, he will have to accede to certain
demands for a greater measure of liberalization and a
broader-based democratic system. On balance Choi's draft
is likely to be conservative and may not measure up to the
demands of the liberal opposition.
Although popular sentiment appears to favor direct,
popular election of the president, many--including President
Choi himself--would prefer an indirect election by the
National Assembly. This would ensure the election of a
conservative candidate acceptable to the military. Such
a system--in which the candidate best able to control or
buy National Assembly votes would become the President--
would be violently opposed by the opposition political forces,
students and hardline dissidents. Indeed, an effort to
institute such a system--even if it had explicit military
backing--might provide more widespread unrest.
An alternative would be to institute a "dual executive"
system with a relatively weak president and a strong Prime
Minister. If the government attempts to press for such a
system, a prolonged fight could ensue between the government,
on the one hand and the National Assembly and the coalition
of political parties on the other. Given Korea's national
security considerations, the final document is likely to
provide for some kind of strong executive and provisions
for emergency powers to deal with internal and external
threats.
The government's ambiguous attitude toward constitu-
tional revision and its steadfast refusal to make a commitment
concerning the basic form of the new government has heightened
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suspicions among political leaders and students. Choi's
refusal to set a specific timetable has further raised
suspicions and will continue to fuel opposition demands
that the government make known its intentions.
Party Politics
Although presidential elections are still at least a
year away and the form of government remains undecided,
maneuvering for presidential nominations is already dominat-
ing party politics. Many Koreans continue to see the pro-
government Democratic Republican Party (DRP) as the benefi-
ciary and handmaiden of the Yusin system. Moreover, the
government and the military do not appear to support the
party and its president, Kim Jong Pil.
Kim, one of the architects of the 1961 coup d'etat
that brought Park to power, and founder of the KCIA and the
DRP, is a consummate politician. He is probably the most
experienced and best qualified of the three presidential
aspirants. Kim suffers, however, from an image of corrup-
tion in his early career and from his close association
with the Park government. Although he is the party's
obvious choice for presidential candidate, he faces challenges
from Yi Hu-rak one of his political rivals, as well as
from "young turks" who are attempting to bring about a
"purification" of the party by forcing out corrupt elements.
Another threat to Kim Jong Pil's position might come
in the form of a new pro-government party. Such a party--
supported by the military, big business and the bureaucracy--
would presumably be a "reformed" pro-government party that
would stand for security, stability and economic growth--
Yusin themes couched in new language. Reports that such a
party might emerge have been rife since early this year.
Forming its nucleus would be members of the Yujonghoe--
Park-appointed National Assembly deputies--members of the old
National Unification Conference numbering 2,500 persons
and other former government personalities. 25X1
Although Korean political observers suspect that
Choi, Shin and Chun Doo Hwan are privy to and support such
efforts, there is no convincing evidence that this is the case.
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Suspicions abound that political funds for the new party were
accumulated by illegal means--including foreknowledge of the
currency devaluation earlier this year--but the evidence is
heavily circumstantial.
New Democratic Party (NDP) efforts to nominate a single
opposition presidential candidate have so far failed and,
in fact, appear to be leading to a deep schism that could
only benefit the DRP. Popular dissident Kim Dae Jung--
realizing that he would be at a disadvantage as a member
of an NDP dominated by party president Kim Young Sam's
supporters--has decided not to join the party and is hinting
that he might form a second opposition party.
Kim Young Sam will continue to appeal for opposition
unity behind the NDP, to recruit new members, and to strengthen
his grass roots organization. He will refrain from directly
attacking his rival and maintain a pose of moderation and
reason, but he will attempt to purge Kim Dae Jung's
supporters from the NDP or to weaken their influence.
Kim Dae Jung, meanwhile, has already taken steps to
form a confederation of opposition figures who may not be
willing to support Kim Young Sam. Kim Dae Jung is taking
the position that only the out-of-office dissidents who
refused to compromise with the Yusin system are the "core
of the democratic forces," and is attempting to rally these
to his cause. If he finds adequate support he might form
another party, but in doing so he risks splitting the opposi-
tion forces to the point where the DRP would win in a fair
election.
Although opposition and majority parties are likely to
continue to cooperate in the National Assembly in the
interests of forcing the new government to accept a more
liberal constitution, this marriage of convenience is not
likely to last beyond the constitutional referendum. Should
the government submit to referendum a form of government
centering on a strong prime minister, the three Kims would
in all probability shift their attention to winning election
to the National Assembly.
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The Role of Chun Doo Hwan
Army strongman General Chun Doo Hwan--who last month
assumed command of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency
(KCIA)--is now clearly the most powerful man in South Korea.
Since his takeover of the Army last December, Chun has
gradually increased his power and influence, and has filled
the power vaccum created by Park's assassination last October.
He commands the powerful Defense Security Command and has
de facto control over the country's armed forces, exercised
through his "core group" supporters and Korean Military
Academy (KMA) graduates.
Through his position in the KCIA, Chun enjoys direct
access to the President and has an important voice in national
security questions, particularly those involving domestic
stability and relations with North Korea. President Park
used one security agency to balance off the other, but Choi
has given up that lever of power by putting Chun in control
of both. Choi has thereby made himself even more a captive
of Chun and whatever ambitions he might have.
Chun almost certainly will play a decisive role in
constitutional revision and the election of a new president.
Excepting the KCIA, the military has permitted the civilian
leadership to carry out the day-to-day administration of the
country without direct intervention. The military does,
however, exert its influence on civilian decisionmaking and
the political process, in part through the direct personal
contact that Chun has with the President and the Prime
Minister, and in part through the atmosphere of fear and
suspicion generated during nearly seven months of martial
Reaction to Chun's takeover of the KCIA has been mixed.
The military has generally supported the move, and business
interests and others whose primary concern is economic
stability have also welcomed a strong hand at the security
helm, although some have misgivings about Chun's style and
ambitions. Major presidential aspirants, however, generally
regard the young general's rise to power as a threat to
their own prospects and to the nation's political liberaliza-
tion program. Students are highly suspicious of Chun's
motives and have begun calling for his ouster.
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Publicly, Chun has disavowed political ambitions and
has reiterated to Americans and Koreans alike that his sole
ambition is to become Army Chief of Staff. He has attempted
to portray himself as a simple soldier who wishes only to
serve his country. To many of his fellow officers, however,
he has long been known as a "political general." He probably
sees himself as a great patriot and potential national leader
in the mold of Park Chung Hee, whom he served closely and
whom he regarded as a father figure. Chun may, therefore,
regard himself as Park's rightful heir and may believe that
it is his mission to preserve and continue the Yusin tradi-
tion.
Chun's actions so far suggest that eventually he will
move to extend his authority even further, although he may
have no concrete, long-range game plan. It seems obvious
that the longer he retains his absolute control over the
military and civilian security organs, the less willing he
will be to return to a position of lesser power.
What Chun eventually decides to do will be determined--
at least in part--by his ability to maintain his support
within the military. Although Chun has consolidated his Army
support by removing dissident elements, disgruntled officers
remain. He does not seem automatically to have his way in
his dealings with the military; he is rather considered
first among equals, with important decisions being made by
a small group of his close supporters in a collegial fashion.
As long as this "core" group--which controls the key combat
units in and around Seoul--is satisfied with Chun's actions,
he has a good chance of retaining his position.
Two possible developments could weaken Chun's Army
support. First, his support would weaken if it became
obvious that he was attempting to expand his powers over the
civilian government because of purely personal ambitions.
If, however, his act were seen as justifiable because of
social or economic instability or a North Korean threat,
Chun probably would be able to weather opposition to an
extension of his power. Indeed, he has had little difficulty
to date in removing pockets of resistance to his growing
political strength. Second, Chun's support would weaken
if it appeared that the US-ROK security alliance was
endangered because of his political maneuvering.
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The US Government's recent postponement of the annual
US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting is recognized by
influential South Koreans as a demonstration of US dissatis-
faction with Chun's appointment as acting director of the
KCIA. So far, however, there is no evidence that Chun's
maneuvers are jeopardizing his support in the military.
Nonetheless, should a widespread perception arise that the
security alliance had been damaged irreparably or that a
US troop withdrawal was imminent because of American dis-
pleasure with Chun, anti-Chun elements could coalesce and
demand his ouster. Faced with such a prospect, Chun
probably would move quickly to seize control of the entire
government in the name of national security.
Many senior military officers might come to regard the
US attitude as interference in Korean domestic affairs and
rally to Chun's support. Even if widespread dissatisfaction
with Chun were to develop, it is doubtful that anti-Chun
elements would attempt to press for his removal, given the
perception that any armed attempt to remove Chun would be
almost certain to lead to a bloody internecine struggle
within the military. Chun, meanwhile, probably would continue
to attempt to convince the United States that he has no
political ambitions and to press for an early rescheduling
of the Security Consultative Meeting. It is highly unlikely
that he would resign any of his posts in the face of a US
For the near term, Chun will probably continue to
consolidate his position both in the military and in the
civilian sectors. He will continue to purge those officers
who do not show him their full support, and to reward those
faithful to him. He will proceed with his reforms of the
KCIA in a like fashion, removing all older, senior officials
who were supporters or proteges of former KCIA chief and
Presidential assassin Kim Chae-kyu and replacing them with
younger military officers and persons he can trust. Although
he has pledged to remove the KCIA from civilain politics,
he is more likely to reduce its public visibility while
in fact stren thening its position in civilian matters.
i 25X1
Over the short run, Chun probably would prefer to
remain behind the scenes, influencing civilian decision-
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making by advising President Choi and Prime Minister Shin.
If, however, there is a serious disruption of public order
or widespread instability, Chun would almost certainly
intervene and expand his control of the government. Indeed,
the rapid retreat from tight Yusin controls and the lax
enforcement of martial law and censorship over the past
few months could mean that Chun is deliberately permitting
the situation to deteriorate, hoping to demonstrate that
the country needs a strong leader and a conservative con-
stitution. Such a deterioration could evoke a sense of
disgust among the majority of the population, who would
undoubtedly draw parallels with the situation in 1961, when
social-political order suffered a near-collapse.
The development of a chaotic situation would facilitate
a complete military takeover. Civil instability of this
magnitude would endanger national security, and a military
takeover could be carried out with the concurrence and
support of the Korean military, who are already being told
through DSC briefings that the situation is as dangerous as
that of 1961, when the military staged the coup d'etat that
brought Park Chung Hee to power.
Destabilizing Elements
Students: Government fear of widespread student unrest
led the authorities earlier this year to take measures to
remove potential student grievances before they could lead
to disruptions. The authorities have capitulated to the
students on one issue after another. They have virtually
dismantled the unpopular Student Defense Corps, which had
been used under Park to control student activities; they
reinstated hundreds of students who had been expelled from
school for their anti-government activities; and they
have permitted the students almost unlimited campus
autonomy. Moreover, the government and Martial Law Command
have followed a policy of nonintervention in on-campus
rallies and demonstrations, even though they technically
These concessions, however, appear only to have whetted
the students' appetite. In mid-April student demonstra-
tions began to shift from campus-related issues to national
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issues, with students demanding the abolition of compulsory
military drills. Early this month the demonstrations grew
in scope and intensity as students attempting to take their
protests into the streets were blocked by riot police in
Seoul and other provincial cities. Further escalation of the
student demonstrations could lead to more violent encounters.
The death of a student at the hands of the police would
produce an even more violent confrontation between students
and authorities and would dramatically increase the chances
of military intervention.
Most of the current turmoil is being caused by a small
number of hardline student agitators and the majority of the
students would prefer to follow a more moderate line. None-
theless, an emotional issue could spark massive demonstra-
tions against the government. One such issue is the govern-
ment attitude toward constitutional revision. Students are
already criticizing what they perceive as an unresponsive
government position on political liberalization. The con-
tinuation of martial law also has come in for heavy student
criticism.
Students also will almost certainly attempt to exploit
economic issues, especially labor problems, and the execu-
tion of Park's assassin, Kim Chae-kyu, expected later this
month. Many students and dissidents regard Kim as a hero
and patriot whose deed has returned democracy to Korea.
After the Supreme Court upholds Kim's death sentence, the
pressure will be on Choi to grant clemency. Student demonstra-
tions demanding clemency for Kim are likely to excite further
the tense campus atmosphere as the execution date approaches.
Unless student demonstrations become more violent, or
move off the campuses into the streets, the government might
continue its policy of permitting on-campus rallies and
demonstrations without police intervention. The military
will be content to let the police handle student demonstra-
tions and will be reluctant to sully the image of the
military by using troops to quell student protests. Both
the government and the Martial Law Command, however, have
issued stern warnings that they will act to prevent further
student violence and there is little doubt that there is a
limit to military patience.
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Labor: Although the government has long experience in
dealing with student disruptions, it now faces a new, un-
familiar threat from labor turmoil and strikes, which have
begun to proliferate.
The condition of the South Korean economy, long a source
of political strength and stability for the government, has
turned against Seoul during this difficult political transi-
tion period. Largely due to adverse external developments,
inflation and unemployment are on the rise and will continue
to increase over the next several months, bringing new
demands from labor. In particular, workers have demanded
wage increases many times higher than the government guide-
Compounding the problem is the sudden release of workers'
pent-up resentment over labor union collusion with manage-
ment. Indeed, a bloody labor riot in a coal-mining town in
late April may mark a turning point in the tone and direc-
tion of the Korean labor movement. Workers now appear
ready to protect and expand their interests and rights parallel
with political liberalization, and are likely to be bolder
in making demands for better treatment, pay, and fringe
Exacerbating the situation is the threat of the Federa-
tion of Korean Trade Unions (DKTU) to organize a nationwide
struggle committee to force the government to repeal its
controversial National Security and Defense Law, which
prohibits strikes and calls for binding arbitration in labor
disputes. Such open resistance to the government--in the
form of mass rallies in major cities throughout the country--
is certain to encourage workers to press their demands for
higher wages. This new mood in labor-management relations
is likely to lead politicians to use the economy as an issue
against the government, further encouraging students to
join in with workers in anti-government riots. Social activist
organizations such as the Urban Industrial Mission--largely
quiescent since Park's assassination--might attempt to
encourage workers to press for their demands.
Fearing that government resistance to worker demands
could lead to more bloody confrontations, President Choi
seems inclined to settle future wage disputes in favor of
the workers. As more unions receive higher wage settle-
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ments, others will be encouraged to raise their demands.
This, in turn, will result in a further upsurge of the
inflationary spiral. Higher wages would also make it more
difficult for Korea to compete internationally with other
low-cost labor economies. If strikes proliferate, a decline
in foreign investor confidence could have a serious impact
on the long-term development of the economy.
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