(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 7, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
7 April 1980
MEMORANDUM
AN APPRAISAL OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN SURINAME
Military noncommissioned officers who staged a violent
takeover in February have cooperated with President Ferrier
in establishing an interim Cabinet largely composed of
political unknowns and technocrats. Ferrier has succeeded
so far in counseling moderation, assuring continuity, and
guaranteeing international recognition.
Although influential center-leftist politician Eddy
Bruma--who played a key role as formateur in naming the new
cabinet--was excluded from a specific post, he is expected
to remain a major actor behind the scenes in formulating the
policies of the caretaker regime. Havana was quick to offer
aid to the new government. Although the. new leaders repor-
tedly declined for the moment, Cuba--which will be watching
developments closely in hopes of exploiting the shaky
political situation--may try again.
Despite Ferrier's success in guiding the political
process back on a constitutional track, the situation has
not yet stabilized and the outlook over the longer term is
less optimistic. Signs suggest that the sergeants who
staged the coup are not content with the makeshift arrange-
ment for the exercise of power and may be seeking a larger
role in influencing developments. Moreover, a distinct
This memorandum was prepared by the Latin America 25X1
Division of the Office of Political Ana ysis. was coordinated with
the Clandestine Service and the Office of Economic Research. estions
and comments may be directed to Chief, Latin America Division, 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
I 51URET
possibility exists that leftists in the government are
taking advantage of the confusion to establish a firm foot-
hold and to influence the inexperienced military and civilian
officials. 25X1
The New Appointments
The inclusion of a number of nationalists and leftists
in the new administration suggests that it will be more
left-of-center than any previous Surinamese Government.
Although we do not expect a radical shift over the short
term, a trend toward greater reform is probable. At a press
conference following the swearing-in ceremony, Bruma pledged
that the government's highest priorities were to inaugurate
"fundamental changes" in the society and to "maintain a
progressive stand."
A handful of ministers closely linked to Bruma probably 25X1
will dominate the Cabinet. Former Bruma political partner,
Dr. Chin A Sen--reported to be strongly independent but with
no experience in government--was named Prime Minister. 25X1
Internal Affairs Minister Frank Leeflang--who, along with
his mentor, Bruma, was instrumental in the legal defense of
the rebellious Army sergeants whose trial sparked the coup--
is said to be easily manipulated. Others close to Bruma
include the ministers of education and development.
One appointemnt flagged by the US Embassy as a possible
source of trouble for Washington is a top adviser to the 25X1
Prime Minister who is 25X1
a Trotskyite. The source told the US Embassy that the
adviser--a former associate of Bruma's in the Netherlands
during the 1950s--may be working with radicals in the
military to nudge the government leftward.
Defense Minister designate Van Rey, the only officer
involved in the NCO revolt, reportedly has ties to the
Marxist People's Party. A reliable US Embassy source claims
that Van Rey was a prominent member of the Communist Party
in the Netherlands. Van Rey's deputy, a sergeant who serves
2
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
on the newly formed National Military Council (NMC), also
may have leftist sympathies. In addition, the Development
Minister and several sub-Cabinet officials have connections
with leftist parties.
Most of the appointees are generally competent, non-
political professionals who should be an improvement over
the ministers in the previous coalition government. None-
theless, their narrow ethnic base--most are black creoles in
a multiracial society--and uncertain links to the political 25X1
parties may hamper their effectiveness. For the time being,
however, civic and political leaders are extending cautious
support to the government. The appointment of a major union
figure as Education Minister will help cement labor backing
and ibute to defusing a potential source of criticism.
25X1
Contentious Issues Ahead
Suriname's new leaders could find themselves caught in
a struggle between competing factions seeking to amass
power. Despite important strides toward consolidating
control within constitutional parameters., civilian and
military officials still face formidable problems in accom- 25X1
modating their interests to the existing constitutional
framework. Demands are strong within the military establish-
ment for sweeping social and political reform; unless these
demands prompt rapid action by civilian intermediaries,
however, military impatience could breed new trouble. 25X1
Parliamentary elections scheduled for later this month
have been canceled and could be delayed legally until the
mandatory date of October 1981; no consensus has appeared
among rival elements of the new government concerning the
feasibility or timing of elections. Other issues also
remain unsettled. The unresolved relationships between the
Cabinet and the NMC and between the Parliament and the NMC
will continue to hamper government effectiveness. The
military's role already has caused friction, and the interim
Prime Minister reportedly has been angered by the Council's
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
efforts to give him orders. Armed forces leaders continue
to push for a larger role in political affairs. Prior to
the coup, the NCOs complained of the inertia within the
highly fractious political system and scored the 39-man
legislature for corruption, cronyism, and bureaucratic
inactivity.
Finding an acceptable role for Parliament and an
accommodation with the myriad political parties that make up
Suriname's complex political system will be difficult. The
apparent intention of several parliamentary leaders to
proceed as if nothing has changed may produce an early
confrontation with Army elements. The prohibition against
armed forces' participation in the Cabinet will require a
constitutional amendment, and parliamentary accession probably
will be a critical question. Bruma reportedly is pressing
Ferrier on the need for changes to accommodate military
representation within a legal framework.
Coup leaders believe that the country is in an economic
slump and have announced their intention to press for greater
development efforts. Although the economy has remained
relatively stable since the revolt, the uncertain political
situation could dampen investor confidence. US investments
include about $500 million--mainly in bauxite mining and
aluminum production--the bulk of the country's exports.
Economic performance has been sluggish in recent years, and
development has been slowed by an exodus of skilled workers
to the Netherlands. Government leaders have not yet formu-
lated a new economic program, nor have they indicated where
they might turn for assistance.
Havana's Bid for Influence
Encouraged by the change in government, the local left
and Cuba probably will explore opportunities for broader 4
influence. two Cubans
identified as intelligence officers by the US Embassy in
Guyana have approached Bruma with offers of unspecified aid
and urged establishment of a Cuban Embassy in Paramaribo.
4
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
J~1.1[L1
25X1
Bruma evidently temporized on both issues, claiming that the
time was not right. Unconfirmed reports from the US Embassy,
however, indicate that a follow-up three-man Cuban mission 25X1
arrived with new offers of military aid.
Havana has sought to expand its presence in Suriname
since relations were established last May and has moved 25X1
quickly to widen its contacts with left-leaning members of
the new government.
According to the Netherlands Ambassador, the Cubans
also met with Defense Minister-designate Van Rey, who claims
that they made a "generous offer of assistance." Van Rey
reportedly did not reject the offer, although he has indi-
cated that Council members would prefer the help of the 25X1
Netherlands. Earlier this month, Van Rey entreated the
Hague for reactivation of Dutch military assistance. To
forestall the establishment of close ties with Havana and
more radical policies, the Netherlands already had promised
continued development aid. Both Bruma and Van.Rey appear
cautious over moves that could jeopardize generous financial
and developmental assistance from the Netherlands--about
$1.6 billion over the past 15 years. 25X1
Suriname's interim government will probably be friendly
to the United States but more authoritarian and left-leaning
than the ousted democratic coalition. Thus far, the collegial
grouping of military council members and civilian ministers 25X1
has been inclined toward moderation, but creeping radical-
influence could impede a full restoration of democratic
practices. President Ferrier probably will have difficulty
steering the politically inexperienced coup leaders along a
constitutional path and guaranteeing the revival of political
5
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
parties and the electoral process. Moreover, the Army
noncommissioned officers who masterminded the takeover are
frustrated with the existing parliamentery system. Fed by
leftist sentiment among a handful of them, dissatisfaction
could give way to renewed unrest. Unless moderates can
exert control, possibly with the leverage afforded by aid
from the Netherlands, they could be upstaged gradually by
those who view Cuba as a political model.
6
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5
SUBJECT: AN APPRAISAL OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN SURINAME
4 - OPA/LA
1 - NIO/LA
1 - NIC Staff
Distribution:
Original - Amb. Bowdler
2 - Prod. Staff
3 - OPA Front Office
I Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100890001-5 , i i,