THE CHINESE VIEW OF THE CRISIS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA: PAST RELATIONS, CURRENT POLICY, PROSPECT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 7, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
THE CHINESE VIEW OF THE CRISIS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA:
PAST RELATIONS, CURRENT POLICY, PROSPECT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
E
Page
overview ..........
Pakistan ..........
Before the Soviet Invasion .........
After the Invasion 3
Huang Hua's Trip to Islamabad 5 6
Chinese Military Assistance 7
..........................
India ............
Cycles of Rapprochement and Hostility ................ The Vajpayee Talks 8 8
After the Vietnam Invasion: Chilled Interim
After the Afghanistan 10
nistan Invasion ..,.--,..-.. 12
Nepal ..................................................... 15
Iran ......................................................
Past Support for the Shah 17
After the Shah ............................
17
Policy Since the Hostage Seizure ............... 18
Afghanistan ...............................................
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
Beijing has interpreted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a
significant expansionist thrust that poses global dangers, particu-
larly to Western interests and indirectly to China itself. In the
past Beijing has viewed Southwest Asia as having relatively remote
implications for China's own security, but it has now seized on the
Afghan invasion to sound the alarm about Soviet intentions and to
press its case against detente as a smokescreen for Soviet aggres-
The Chinese view the Soviet move into Afghanistan as a particu-
larly disturbing extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine outside of the
Soviet bloc. For the first time Moscow used its own troops against
/ a Third World country. With Cubans active in Africa--and in the Horn
in particular--and the Vietnamese expanding in Southeast Asia, Beijing
believes that the Soviets are moving to establish a stranglehold on
the oil routes from the Persian Gulf. This hold will threaten the
balance of power between the Soviet Unicn and the West and will
ultimately jeopardize China's own security.
The Chinese have long held that Soviet expansionism is focused
on Europe, and thus China is not immediately threatened. Now, how-
ever, introducing a new wrinkle into its strategic line, Beijing
asserts that the invasion of Afghanistan has "linked" Soviet
strategies in the East and the West. While still acknowledging that
the primary threat is to the West, the new argument maintains that a
growing threat to Chinese interests has increased Beijing's "inter-
----- -- .. . _ . _ . ..
China realizes it has a limited ability to project its own power
into the region. To date, it has reacted to the threat almost solely
through diplomacy; it has yet to offer any commitment of significant
L economic _or _military assistance. The Chinese response thus far has
Reassurance to Pakistan. China moved promptly to reassure
Pakistan of its support, but this so far consists more of diplomatic
This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence officer for China by the Office of
Political Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
form than substantive assistance. The major elements of Beijing's
policy have been attempts to help broker a rapprochement between
Pakistan and India and to encourage maximum assistance from the
Z United States. Chinese officials have frequently talked about in-
creasing assistance to Islamabad above the levels already in the
pipeline, but there is no evidence that Beijing has yet offered a
new commitment. China has also hesitated to provide a firm response
to Pakistan's request for a security guarantee.
Renewal of Efforts at Normalizing Chinese Relations With
India and Iran. In the wake of both the Soviet invasion and the
election of Indira Gandhi, China has renewed its effort to
normalize relations with India; the effort was stalled a year ago
when the Chinese invaded Vietnam while the Indian Foreign Minister
was visiting China. Before the trip soured, the two sides agreed
to discuss the border question and made progress on other issues.
After the trip, despite the strain caused by the Vietnam inva-
sion, bilateral relations did not revert to the old level of hos-
tility. Beijing is continuing to seek improved relations with a
notable degree of determination and finesse. Gandhi, however, is
cautious about responding to Chinese overtures. Given her long-
standing deep suspicions of China, her country's close relations
with the Soviet union, and her policy of opposing further arms
Z_ assistance to Pakistan and the Afghan rebels, it is not likely
that there will be an early breakthrough in bilateral relations.
On the other hand, given the persistence of the Chinese effort,
the inclination of some elements in the Indian bureaucracy to
improve relations, and India's basic interest in coexistence with
its largest neighbor, it is likely that there will be a gradual
improvement in China's relations with India. The first signifi-
cant sign of this may come during a trip to India by Foreign Minister
3
iza depends on Tehran, the prospects for the future are clouded.
Beijing is also seeking to improve relations with the government
in Tehran, but its efforts have been hampered by the chaotic situa-
tion in Iran and the fact that China was a strong supporter of the
Shah through the end of his reign. Beijing is seeking to foster a
more propitious atmosphere through its media commentary, which places
some distance between China and the United States, and through a
variety of private and official contacts. Since the pace of normal-
US Engagement in the Region's Defense. Long before the December
invasion of Afghanistan, Beijing sought to engage the United States
and other Western nations in fuller support of Pakistan. China was
,s? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
highly critical of the US aid cutoff to Pakistan in 1979 and expressed
pleasure over indications that Washington would reverse this policy
in response to the Soviet invasion. Beijing's main concern is that
3 the aid be of sufficient magnitude to encourage Pakistan to stand firm
in its resistance to the Soviets; too little, China has argued, will
be worse than useless. Beijing, however, has not indicated the amount
it considers sufficient; it has been reported that Chinese leaders are
irritated that President Zia has not already accepted the aid Washington
It appears China's ultimate goal is for the United States to be-
come, in effect, Pakistan's protector. At the same time, China has
deflected US efforts to discover what it plans to do in aiding
Pakistan. Beijing has, for example, been particularly reticent in
discussing Foreign Minister Huang Hua's recent trip to Islamabad.
Creation of Informal Alliance of Southwest Asian States. One
theme that has emerged in public and private Chinese comment since
the Soviet invasion is the promotion of an informal anti-Soviet
alliance of Southwest Asian nations. Candidates mentioned for this
alliance have varied
-, but Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and even India have been mentioned
promoting assiduously since early January. It is not clear how far
this idea has matured in Beijing. At a minimum, Beijing is attempt-
ing to steer all states in the region as far away from close ties
with the Soviet Union as possible and to thwart creation--however
unlikely--of a Moscow-New Delhi-Hanoi axis.
as possible members. A prerequisite to any such alliance is a
rapprochement between Pakistan and India, a move China has been
in rendering material assistance.
Aid to the Afghan Rebels. Although China publicly denies it is
aiding the rebels, it is attempting to make Afghanistan a quagmire
for Moscow by encouraging unity
among opponents of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul. Beijing has
sought the cooperation of Pakistan and other governments in this
effort. It is not known for certain, however, if China has succeeded
/ Following is a discussion of China's re at' s with the various
countries in Southwest and South Asia.
Before the Soviet Invasion
China has long been a faithful ally to Pakistan, but its support
has always been limited by Beijing's inability to furnish high levels
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
3 Kabul, the Chinese counseled Pakistan to use restraint in the quiet
support it gave the Afghan rebels lest it give the Afghans or Soviets
pretext for a diplomatic crisis or military action. To this end,
Beijing approved of Islamabad's effort to improve relations with
Moscow and Kabul. China also encouraged the Pakistanis, with greater
of sophisticated equipment. Beijing has, however, consistently advised
and supported Islamabad diplomatically. After the April 1978 coup in
emphasis, to improve their ties with the United States.
During 1973-79, China renewed its military and economic aid pro-
gram to Pakistan. In 1978, China reportedly gave Islamabad $25 mil-
.,, lion for the purpose of building a highway and airfield, Beijing's
77 first new aid agreement since 1973. In 1979, Beijing apparently
40 gave Pakistan additional economic aid amounting to slightly less
than $25 million. Some of the assistance in both these ears ma
L-/J have been in the form of long-term, low-interest loans.
/A Pakistani
military delegation visited Beijing in February 1979 and reportedly
requested a variety of military supplies from China
Throughout much of 1979, the Chinese leveled heavy criticism at
the American aid cutoff to Pakistan and said that the United States
~Z was making too much of an issue of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.
In Beijing's view, at a time when the USSR menaced South Asia by its
actions in Afghanistan, Washington should have offered Pakistan
greater support. Beijing expressed concern that the US
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
refusal to supply arms and economic assistance to Pakistan might
compel Islamabad to adjust its foreign policy and be more accom-
modating toward Moscow
After the Invasion
7
q8
3D
33
the major Chinese reaction to events
in South Asia was to urge the United States to give Pakistan strong
support and to attempt to accelerate the pace of normalization of
relations with India. The purpose of the latter move was, in part,
to relieve pressure on Pakistan. China was reported during this
time to be considering promoting the creation of an informal regional
alignment including Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey to oppose the Soviet
move into Afghanistan and may have had hopes that India would join.
Beijing hoped such a grouping would offset if not thwart the crea-
tion of a Moscow-New Delhi-Hanoi axis.
/ China has a so
strongly supported Pakistani efforts to gain support through the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
Huang Hua's Trip to Islamabad
Huang Hua's 18-23 January Islamabad trip demonstrated China's
cautious approach toward substantive support to Pakistan
Judged by its public manifestations, the Huang visit was no-
table for its subdued tone. Huang, unlike Chinese leaders on earlier
trips to Islamabad, made no provocative references to Kashmir--re-
flecting China's new effort to improve relations with India. Chinese
media also gave the trip low-key treatment that appeared to play down
Beijing's commitment to Pakistan, again possibly out f
Indian sensitivities.
China, nonetheless, sees little alternative at this time to con-
tinuing its support for Pakistan. Since Huang's trip it has continued
to lobby a number of countries about the need to step up assistance to
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
AM-.*
Pakistan. It has also continued efforts to alert India to the Soviet
danger and to reconcile India to a strengthened Pakistan.
Chinese Military Assistance
While China has reacted cautiously to Pakistan's request for ad-
ditional military equipment, the close military relationship between
the two countries continued in 1980. As part of an earlier aid agree-
ment, Pakistan accepted final delivery of 15 F-6s in early February,
making a total of 200 given or sold to Pakistan since 1965.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
Ri:~k-~nw`"-~`:~.~'kl..i`~~..i+:'~3I+~Hw-,. .-- ,. c-,-'s'-:.:;.: r_... ,...... - ?.a~~.~'~
Cycles of Rapprochement and Hostility
Normal relations between China and India have been blocked since
1962 by a border dispute and by the tendency of the two countries
,LZ to allow the vicissitudes of relations with third parties, especially
Pakistan and the USSR, to affect the status of their bilateral rela-
tions. Since the early 1970s, relations between China and India have
been marked by cautious, brief efforts at improvement, followed by
long periods of renewed bickering.
Some progress has been made, however. In 1976 the two countries
restored normal diplomatic ties at the ambassadorial level: relations
LFemained strained, however. After Indira Gandhi left office in 1977--
to the undisguised glee of Beijing--China looked forward to better
relations under the less pro-Soviet government of Moraji Desai and in
early 1978 invited Indian Foreign Minister A. B. Vajpayee to Beijing
Vajpayee's trip, which occurred in February 1979, went well until
China invaded Vietnam--which has close relations with India--while
Vajpayee was still in China. Following this affront, which was
politically embarrassing to the Desai government, relations between
the two countries remained chilled, but did not revert to earlier
levels of animosity.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Beijing again attempted
q L to revive the effort at rapprochement, and the Indira Gandhi govern-
ment has expressed interest in moving ahe,-.d.
The Vajpayee Talks
If significant progress is to be made in improving Sino-Indian
j, Zrelations, both sides must try to pick up some of the pieces dropped
a year ago. The main question the then Foreign Minister went to
China to explore was the border dispute, a complex issue for both
parties, as it touches on key security concerns in China and sensi-
tive domestic issues in India. The dispute involves three areas:
LI
-- Western Sector (Aksai Chin). As a result of long-term moves
into the area and military conquest in 1962, China controls
26,000 square kilometers of high barren plains and mountains
through which it has built a road linking the western Tibet
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9 -
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
-- Middle Sector. Between the Aksai Chin and Nepal, China and
LI) India dispute control of several tracks that are associated
(the Autonomous Xizang Region) to Xinjiang. Although not
vital to Indian interests, New Delhi claims the Aksai Chin
as part of the state of Ladakh but also knows that China
considers the road crucial to its control of Tibet.
with pilgrim routes between India and Tibet.
-- Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh). This region, which is
controlled by India along the "McMahon Line," is claimed
by China as a traditional part of Tibet. China, however,
Z-- may have asserted this claim mainly as a bargaining chip
to be sacrificed in the greater interest of securing the
25X1
25X1
,.{ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 The atmosphere of "trust and confidence" that had been built up
q Z_ was dissipated by the Chinese attack on Vietnam on 17 February.
Vajpayee, who was touring the provinces, cut short his visit by a
A. %r 1 -1
After the Vietnam Invasion: Chilled Interim
While Sino-Indian relations cooled again after the Vietnam inva-
sion, they did not deteriorate significantly. India sharply criticized
the Chinese for committing aggression and Vajpayee expressed indigna-
tion at its occurrence while he was in China. New Delhi, however,
did not yield to Soviet pressure to recognize the Heng Samrin govern-
ment in Kampuchea. Beijing, for its part, did not revert to anti-
Indian propaganda; its comments on Sino-Indian relations continued
to be upbeat. Chinese leaders recognized that a combination of bad
feeling about China in New Delhi compounded by Indian political in-
stability temporarily prevented progress in normalization. Indian
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
... -. y -. ^.. ... "' { ? Vii' i..: ....7ia+irsYaii ?.. ? ?s5i'~.~
? ; ..x>. '::~' _ iy 3r ,. a .y,_ sue"' -
leaders were apparently impressed that China ignored the sharp
criticism and remained temperate in its public comments about India.
Minor irritants, however, did occur.
25X1
25X1
25X1
3 the Dalai Lana to visit the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia. Beijing
did not make a serious issue of the trip, however,-and New Delhi, in
L ti' a reversal of policy, reportedly was willing to allow him to return
to Tibet if China recognized his position as spiritual leader and
would allow Tibetans to live as they choose--conditions that are
unacceptable to Beijing. The Indians were also reportedly irritated
that a Chinese delegation to an Indian international trade fair in
November failed to arrange new contracts and made no effort to in-
Chinese and Indian reaction to developments in Bhutan and Nepal
in the months following the Vajpayee trip indicated that neither
Beijing nor New Delhi was willing to let minor irritants resulting
from third-party relations further sour their bilateral relations.
One potential issue that both sides took steps to defuse was the
intrusion of Tibetan sheep across the unmarked Bhutan border, an
annual occurrence but an issue that raised the specter in New Delhi
Al-
of Chinese encroachment in a sensitive neighboring country. though the question was played up in the Indian press, both China
,
Z
d Idil
anna payed down its importance
While signs that Bhutan was considering moving closer to Beijing
caused concern in New Delhi, the concern did not appear to damage
Sino-Indian relations. Both China and India handled Sino-Nepali
relations in a manner that did not complicate Sino-Indian relations.
' By the end of the year, Sino-Indian relations had not progressed
much past the point reached on 15 February 1979. Both sides were
001,
awaiting the outcome of the Indian general election for a new op-
portunity to make further progress.
.~u,?~,~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
The Chinese leadership's initial reaction to the election of
Indira Gandhi was to view India as a country that was not a "stable
r factor for peace in South Asia."
?.,7
Beijing's already strong sus-
picions of Gandhi were reinforced by the pro-Soviet statement the
Indian representative to the UN made on 11 January in defense of the
While Beijing privately viewed Gandhi's return to power with con-
cern, it did not abandon its policy of moderate media comment on Indian
affairs during the transition and sought immediately to establish good
relations with the new government. Hua Guofeng sent Gandhi warm con-
gratulations on her return to power, and when New Delhi appeared to
back away slightly from its 11 January position by making mildly
critical statements about the Soviet invasion, Chinese media played
up the Indian call for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. New
Delhi, in turn, began generating a mixture of statements about China
that Beijing chose to interpret in a positive light. Beijing, for
example, ignored Gandhi's statement in a press interview that India
had been a victim of Chinese aggression and she did "not think that
China has changed"; instead, Beijing highlighted statements by Gandhi
and other Indian officials expressing a desire for better relations.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
25X1
25X1
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
311
By mid-January Beijing had altered its initial pessimistic as
In line with this new assessment, Beijing began offering New Delhi
3t new assurances of good intentions. During his 18-23 January trip to
Islamabad, Foreign Minister Huang Hua was careful to avoid offending
L Indian sensitivities; he did not, for instance, refer to the Kashmir
question, something Chinese officials had frequently done in the past.
00
Three days after returning to Beijing, Huang led the Chinese
delegation to the Indian 30th anniversary celebrations in Beijing,
where he gave an especially warm statement calling for consolidation
of friendship between China and India.
1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
The Chinese, however, continue to harbor doubts about India's
intentions and the prospects of better relations any time soon. These
doubts were recently fed by a shrill statement Gandhi was reported in
the press to have made to a political rally on 21 February condemning
Chinese occupation of sections of Indian, Bhutanese, Nepalese, and
Burmese territory and charging that China posed a danger to the Indian
border. Beijing dealt with this charge by expressing "surprise and
regret" over Gandhi's remarks which flew "in the face of facts" and
"vilified China." Beijing's public commentary, however, ended on an
upbeat note by recalling the Gandhi government's expressed desire
to seek normal relations with all neighbors, including China.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
Despite this upbeat comment, Chinese officials continue to ex-
press private concern about Gandhi's ultimate intentions./
The Chinese Ambassador in Washington has re-
cently indicated that Beijing's relatively sanguine view of Soviet-
Indian relations may be eroding. The pace of normalization, he told
Ufa a senior American official in late February, has been slowed as a
result of the new Gandhi government and there still existed a schism
between the two countries- In regard to Chinese-Indian relations,
he said, the problem was not the border issue since China had not
violated the border. India's hostile attitude, he suggested, had
not been caused by past problems, "but by good Indian-Soviet rela-
t//
Sino-Nepali relations continued to be close in 1979 and are
likely to remain so in 1980. The most significant bilateral event
last year was the signing of a border demarcation protocol that China
handled in a manner that did not raise the ire of New Delhi. Because
of its size and geographical location, Nepal has always tried to stay
on good terms with its two giant neighbors, and India and China have
traditionally been sensitive to each other's influence and activities
in Nepal.
When widespread political discontent erupted in civil disorders
last spring, Beijing supported King Birendra's government and was
careful to avoid the appearance of interfering in Nepal's internal
affairs. China was particularly concerned that the disorders would
lead to Indian military intervention.
?,,_,_ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
3 The King's call for a political referendum in May
restored public calm, but Beijing reportedly remained concerned that
I ~I the vote would lead to increased power for the supposedly pro-Indian
I~ Nepal Congress Party.
Chinese suspicions of India, however, were not
reflected in media comments. 25X1
In August King Birendra visited Beijing, reciprocating Vice Premier
Deng Xiaoping's visit to Katmandu in 1978. The Chinese assured him that
Sino-Nepali relations were a "model" of good neighborliness. In November,
2 Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited Katmandu to sign a border demarcation
ro
protocol that concluded a year's work by a joint border commission.
Beijing was careful not to allow the Huang visit or the border
accord to offend India. The Indian Government has reportedly been
concerned over Nepal's unilateral action of signing the border protocol
without first consulting India. The agreement Nepal and China signed,
however, left untouched the sensitive trijunction area where the borders
of Nepal, China, and India meet. Huang avoided making anti-Indian
statements in public i
Since Indira Gandhi's return to power, however, New Delhi's
suspicions about Nepal have been renewed despite the apparent absence
1S of real Chinese provocation. In a conversation with a senior American
official in late January, Gandhi complained about Chinese "mischief
making" in Nepal. When an American diplomat in Katmandu asked the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
~.. a.,~ C R,. 1 ~---- :.- ..ate- _ .= ~?,-M
Indian Ambassador the reason for this concern and specifically about
reports that Gandhi was concerned about Sino-US collusion, the Ambas-
sador said he was unaware of the exact cause but speculated that the
concern might arise from periodic anti-Indian campaigns undertaken by
pro-Chinese factions of the local Nepali Communist party. These groups,
the Ambassador said, had created an issue about Indian mistreatment of
Nepalese in Assam when one really did not exist; if the Chinese Embassy
in Katmandu was not actively involved in this anti-Indian agitation, he
suggested that it did not appear to be doing anything to curtail it
Past Support for the Shah
Iran and China established diplomatic relations in 1971 and
began to exchange high-level economic and political delegations.
China considered the Shah a major stabilizing force in the region.
After the 1978 Afghanistan coup, Beijing moved to strengthen its ties
with both Pakistan and Iran. It viewed both countries, along with
Saudi Arabia, as vulnerable to a Soviet "pincer movement" aimed at
control of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean_
To underscore China's interest, Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited
Tehran in June 1978, and in late August Premier Hua Guofeng, on his
return from an East European trip, stopped off in Tehran
Hua's visit, however, was
marred by an upsurge in anti-Shah demonstrations and a harsh govern-
ment reaction; the Chinese, concerned about the stability of the regime
but believing it would survive, used the Hua visit to demonstrate
Beijing's su ort. The considered the Shah's troubles to be Soviet
inspired
After the Shah
During the last days of the monarchy and through the period just
after Khomeini's return, the Chinese looked to the United States to do
something to save the situation. A middle-ranking Chinese diplomat in
Europe suggested that the United States resort to assassination of un-
specified persons to influence events. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
complained openly that US measures in Iran were "no good." Referring
to both Cuba and Iran, Deng warned that the Soviets would "never be
impressed by halfway positions."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
When China realized an Iranian Islamic Republic was inevitable,
it moved quickly to recognize the new regime and attempted to limit
the damage caused by the memory of Hua's 1978 visit to Tehran. Beijing's
media coverage, which had been largely reportorial in the last days of
the Pahlavi monarchy, began to describe the old regime as "autocratic" and
`- noted that the new Bazargan government stood for opposition to the mon-
archy, release of political prisoners, and establishment of a democratic
republic. The propaganda also noted that the Persian Gulf was menaced by
both the United States and the Soviet Union, with the Soviets posing the
greater threat.
Shortly after the Shahi-Khomeini meeting, Iranian state television
reported that Shahi had conveyed a Chinese "apology" to the Ayatollah.
r~ Both Shahi and the Chinese immediately denied the interpretation, but
Iranian officials soon affirmed its validity. After several weeks, the
~r1 apology question faded and China began to rebuild its relations with
Tehran.
The seizure of the US Embassy derailed the Sino-
Iranian rapprochement.
Policy Since the Hostage Seizure
China's initial response to the hostage crisis was to
restrict media coverage to impartial
reportage. In response to repeated requests from US officials for
,Lt, public expressions of disapproval of the Embassy takeover and concern
about the fate of the hostages, Beijing issued a cautious statement
on 26 November, three weeks after the takeover, that balanced an
affirmation of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs
of other countries with a call to respect the principle of diplomatic
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
c
At the United Nations, China joined in the unanimous resolution
calling on Iran to release the hostages and gave a qualified vote on
31 December supporting the resolution calling for possible sanctions if
the crisis were not resolved; Beijing's decision to cast this vote was
an apparent reversal of an earlier decision and came only after receiv-
ing the President's 31 December letter to Hua Guoferg. On 13 January,
China did not vote on the resolution imposing sanctions, taking the posi-
tion that sanctions would not be effective in releasing the hostages,
that they would serve to increase Soviet influence in Tehran, and that
a Chinese vote for them would reduce Beijing's already marginal influ-
ence i
Tel
ran
n
Beijing's general policy toward Iran since the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan has been to step up efforts to normalize its own relations
with Tehran. China continues to be concerned about a possible ultimate
takeover in Tehran by a pro-Soviet political group. While Beijing sees
the current regime as reactionary and unpredictable, it contends that
there are elements that could coalesce into a stable government and could
play a role in thwarting Soviet designs in the Persian Gulf. Beijing
therefore enthuastically welcomed the election of Bani-Sadr, sending him
a warm message expressing hope for "friendship and amicable cooperation"
between Chi
"
na and the
fraternal" Iranian people.
On 11 February, Vice Premier Ji Pengfei led an unusually high-level
delegation to the Iranian Embassy's reception marking the first anniver-
sary of the Iranian revolution. In publicly reported ?omments, Ji
praised Iran for its success in opposition to foreign aggression. In
private remarks to an Iranian official, he soundly condemned the Shah
and urged Iran to support the Afghan rebels and improve relations with
China has kept up its contacts with Iran in other ways throughout
the hostage crisis. It maintains an Embassy in Tehran but apparently
has not yet been allowed to send an ambassador. It concluded a trade
agreement with an Iranian delegation to Beijing during the second week
of the crisis. In early February, a delegation of Chinese Muslims
visited Iran to attend celebrations honoring the revolution. Chinese
officials claim they used members of this delegation, as well as other
contacts with Iranian officials, to urge an early, peaceful resolution
of the L.
- --' - .
ostag
Beijing is taking care, however, not to become too closely identi-
fied with the United States. While its media coverage tends to avoid
negative comments about the United States, Beijing has reported
Iranian statements that Tehran will follow a course independent of
both Washin ton and Moscow.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
Before the Invasion
Beijing initially expressed little public concern about the
April 1978 coup that installed the pro-Soviet Taraki regime in
Kabul, and it recognized the new government within two weeks.
China assumed that Afghan nationalism would assert itself even-
tually, as it had in the previous Daoud regime. As Soviet involve-
ment in Afghanistan increased, however, Beijing sharpened its
criticism of the USSR. China was circumspect in its ublic comments
about the Kabul government
for some $6-7 million i,,. mutual trade; Afghanistan had earlier
agreed to deliver 5,000 tons of cotton to China. Beijing's main
China maintained correct relations with both Taraki and Amin
and retained a diplomatic mission in Kabul. In March 1979, China
gave Afghanistan a 250-bed hospital in Kandahar. In the same
r month it signed a protocol for the construction of a textile mill
in Bagrami. In October the two countries signed an annual protocol
(several months after an earlier protocol had expired) that called
imports to Afghanistan were tea and textile machinery.
We have no conclusive evidence of direct Chinese assistance
to the Afghan rebels before the invasion, despite charges by
Moscow and Kabul. Reports of Beijing's willingness to furnish
such assistance are contradictory.
China's major concern about the situation in
Afghanistan appeared to be that it would lead to greater instability
After the Invasion
China has kept open its mission in Kabul since the Soviet
invasion, but it has not recognized the Babrak Karmal regime and
has also urged Pakistan not to recognize it.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
Z By 18 January, however, Beijing had
3 apparently changed its view and began to make disparaging public
comments about "Soviet puppets in Kabul." By mid-February China
reportedly decided to suspend all trade relations with Afghanistan.
We have no conclusive evidence that China is currently aiding
the Afghan rebels. Beijing is known to be willing to supply arms
through Pakistan; Chinese diplomats have stated this willingness
2-0 to numerous foreign officials. Pakistan, however, was reported in
January and February to be hesitant to cooperate with China in aiding
the rebels until it has a foreign military aid commitment large enough
to allow Islamabad to offer strong resistance to a possible Soviet
invasion.
ft
While China denies assistance to Afghan rebels, it has strongly
endorsed their cause. In media comments, Beijing has repeatedly
stressed the need.for the continued struggle of the Afghan people
and also their need to unite. In late January, for example, the commen-
tator in an article in Renmin Ribao entitled "Unite and Persist in
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
Fighting," noted the establishment of the "Liberation Alliance of
Afghan Muslims" as a possible beginning of unity among the resistance.
Chinese media also stress the brutality of the Soviet occupation.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9
Next 11 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100840002-9