MEXICO: NEW ACTIVISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100820001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 27, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
Anticipating further moves to the left in Central America, Mexico
has embarked on a new, more active regional policy--underscored by
po!iticaZ and economic initiatives--designed to enhance the influence of
the Lopez PortiZlo government. Although initial efforts focusing on
Nicaragua, EZ Salvador, and Guatemala appear to have been poorly organ-
ized, they may be part of a broader, evolving strategy for the entire
Caribbean Basin. *
President Lopez PortiZZo is the driving force behind the new
initiatives. With two and one half years remaining in his term, the
Preidrnnt is no longer so preoccupied with domestic problems and is
intent on enhancing his own image in the foreign policy sphere. Mexico's
gi,oL,ing oil wealth--and the leverage it provides--is facilitating his
"''carts.
This memoran um was prepared byl Ithe Latin America 25X1
ion of the Office of Political Analysis. It was requested by the
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Information in
this ,nemcrandum includes all reports received through 26 March. It was
coorlinatcd with the Clandestine Service. Questions and comments may be
cii. ressed to Chief, Latin America Division 25X1
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Mexican motives are guided by traditional foreign policy tencto--
such as independence from the United States and support, for rcvo?ut-o';
change in Latin America--as well as a perceived need to coopt the dc:,c.-
tic left. Mexican leaders also are worried about growing Cuban--and
ultimately Soviet--influence along their country's southern border.
concern, however, does not portend greater cooperation with the Unitci:
States. Indeed, Mexico's fundamental desire to chart its own course,
its narrower perception of the Cuban/Soviet threat, and its Zong-stan..'in~.:
willingness to curry favor with leftist movements implies widening
policy differences with the US.
Mexican policy toward the region now primarily involves efforts to
provide economic and political support to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua,
to maintain a cool posture toward the governing junta in EZ Salvador,
and to influence the ri htwi Guatemalan re ime to broaden its base of
support.
At Lopez PortiZlo's direction, the PRI has
formed the Conference of Latin American Political Parties--headed b> PR.
President Gustavo Carvajal--to cultivate progressive groups in the
region.
Attitude and Initiatives
Lopez Portillo publicly committed himself to an expanded
Mexican role in Central America in a speech delivered in
Managua on 24 January. The Nicaraguans, he explained,
could be the "protagonists" of a new Latin American future--
a "third turning point"--that avoids past shortcomings of
both the Mexican and Cuban revolutions. He encouraged the
Sandinistas to "invent their own revolution" and to keep it
free of internal and external "8emons of exploitation and
ignorance." During a later press conference, Lopez Portillo
noted that Nicaragua offers a revolutionary alternative for
Latin America--a fundamental reason for Mexican support.
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Lopez Portillo's determination to gain influence in
Managua is underscored by his assertion that Mexican aid to
the Sandinistas will be "unconditional"--not tied to ideolog-
ical or political considerations. Mexico has promised to
supply about half'of Managua's petroleum needs--7,500 barrels
of oil daily--reportedly at reduced prices starting in
April. Mexico has sent technicians to help in energy,
fishing, education, mining, telecommunications, and public
administration fields. In addition it has signed several
agreements to provide technical, cultural, agricultural, and
Believing that the radical left will continue to gain
strength in El Salvador, Mexico will maintain contact with
the revolutionaries and try to influence them.
We have no evidence of concrete Mexican aid to
Salvadoran radicals, but they have access to Mexican media
and are permitted to demonstrate in Mexico City. PRI
President Carvajal has denounced the repression by security
forces in El Salvador, and Lopez Portillo's recent descrip-
tion of Central American governments as "repressive regimes"
is another step in distancing himself from the junta.
In Guatemala, Lopez Portillo is pursuing a two-pronged
strategy designed to pressure the Lucas regime to undertake
liberal reforms and to control both leftist and rightist
terrorism. He has delayed his planned visit there and is
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holding in abeyance promised economic aid, including deliveries
of oil under favorable credit terms. Nonetheless, Mexico
does not want to alienate the Guatemalan leaders and will
attempt to avoid pushing the Lucas regime further into a
siege mentality. Senior Mexican military officers reportedly
are becoming increasingly concerned that Guatemalan guerrillas
could pose an internal security threat to Mexico's southern
states, the scene of considerable social and economic instabil-
ity. (S NF NC)
Motives
Mexico has several motives for expanding its ties with
the region's emerging revolutionary forces:
--Necessity for-Revolutionary Change. For decades,
Mexican governments have supported in principle
the need for revolutionary change in Latin America.
The Mexicans believe that historical forces make
inevitable sweeping socioeconomic restructuring in
the northern Central American countries. Lopez
Portillo and other leaders believe, therefore,
that Mexico must move into closer association with
progressive and revolutionary groups.
--Independence of the US. A hallmark of Mexican
foreign policy is the desire to project an image
at home and abroad of a progressive, sovereign
state, free of US control, and able to plot an
independent course in global and regional affairs.
By pursuing policies in Central America that
diverge from or even conflict with those of the
US, Mexican nationalists can conspicuously assert
their autonomy in foreign affairs.
--Domestic Political. The assuaging, if not disarm-
ing, of the Mexican left is an important element
in the Mexican political process--an important
reason for the break in relations with Somoza's
Nicaragua.
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--Alternatives to Cuban Influence. Mexican and
Cuban views on the future political development
of the region are in some ways compatible, and
therefore, a dilemma for Lopez Portillo. Although
Mexico would like to see progressive governments
emerge, it does not want them to be aligned
exlusively with Havana or to emulate Cuban politi-
cal and economic models. The Mexican President
wants to offer leftist revolutionaries an alterna-
tive to Cuban and Soviet support, but he realizes
the direct competition with the Castro regime may
damage a relationship that serves Mexico's inter-
national and domestic needs.
Mexican views of Cuban support for leftist insurgents
in Central America differ dramatically from Washington's, and
Mexico is therefore unlikely to be swayed by arguments that
Cuba is a destabilizing presence in the region.
Despite this seeming tolerance for Cuba's role in the
area, many Mexican leaders--particularly those in the
security forces--are concerned about the potential emergence
of Marxist, pro-Cuban governments on Mexico's southern
flank. This area is poorly defended, and, because of long-
standing socioeconomic problems, would be vulnerable to
infiltration by radical leftists.
Mexico and the US
Mexico's views are more narrowly focused and are based
on different concerns than those of the US; therefore,
considerable potential for bilateral discord exists--parti-
cularly if radical influence continues to increase in
Nicaragua and El Salvador. On the other hand, Mexico's
policy toward Guatemala--tempered by geographical proximity
and security concerns--is more compatible with Washington's.
Although Mexico privately expresses distaste for the right-
wing military government, it does not want leftist forces to
gain control there. A serious radical threat to the Lucas
administration would prompt Mexico to reexamine its
Gautemalan policies.
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