JAMAICA: MANLEY'S RECENT PERFORMANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 27, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3
27 March 1.9r80
MEMORANDUM
Jamaica: Manley's Recent Performance
Key Judgements
--Prime Minister Michael Manley, digging in for an uphill re-
election effort, is yielding unprecedented influence to'ruZing-
party radicals. The influence of the leftists, however, is
reaching a peak at a time when the tenure of Manley's govern-
ment is likely to be short-lived.
--Manley will join the leftists in a campaign effort to make the
International Monetary Fund a scapegoat for seven years of
economic decline under his administration. We doubt, however,
that he believes this short-term political tactic will lead to
a workable strategy of economic development for Jamaica.
--Since his private exchange with US officials last November,
Manley has softened his public criticism of Washington while
still trying to keep the support of local radicals, Cuba, and
--Manley is personally more committed to fundamental social and
economic reform in Jamaica than to Western-style democracy.
Nevertheless, he has made major concessions to his majority-
based opposition by agreeing to electoral reform and to an
This memorandum was prepared by John Gannon of the Latin America
Division of the Office of Political Analysis. Information in this
memorandum includes all reports received through 26 March. It was
coordinated with the Office of Economic Research and the Clandestine
Service. Questions and comments may be addressed to Chief, Latin
America Division
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3
Y LJ \,r 1\iJ 1
early election--a year before the end of his constitutional
--Trends still strongly favor the election this year of the ,~
moderately inclined Jamaica Labor Party, but political andn;
economic stability on the island is rapidly deteriorating.
The loss of IMF support will intensify the island's already
severe social and economic problems.
--We expect Cuba to increase its clandestine assistance to
Manley in the months ahead, and we believe that the Soviets
will maintain close contact with members of Manley's party and
government. We doubt, however, that either Communist country
is now considering any action to help Manley stay in power
unconstitutionally.
Prime Minister Michael Manley, digging in for a tough
reelection fight, is yielding unprecedented influence to
ruling-party radicals. At the same time, however, he has
been trying to avoid conflict with the United States.
Trends still strongly favor the election this year of the
moderately inclined trade union-based Jamaica Labor Party
(JLP), but political and economic stability on the island is
deteriorating rapidly.
Recent Actions
Last weekend the radicals engineered a vote by the
ruling People's National Party's (PNP) executive council to
discontinue negotiations with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Eric Bell, Manley's widely respected Finance
Minister, quit in protest on Sunday before the Cabinet
approved the break. Richard Fletcher, Bell's ablest deputy
and a relative of Manley's, also resigned.
Manley, who had privately supported Bell's talks with
the IMF, bowed to the radicals and appointed one of their
foremost spokesmen, Hugh Small, as Finance Minister--the
first time a radical has held the post in any Jamaican
government. The Prime Minister probably is skeptical of the
radicals' promised alternative development plan--he rejected
a previous plan in favor of the IMF in 1977--but he will
2
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3
join the leftists in a campaign effort to make the IMF at
scapegoat for seven years of economic decline under his
administration.
The influence of leftists--who now control the state;
owned media as well as the key ministries of finance and
national security--has reached a peak at a time when the
tenure of Manley's government is likely to be short-lived.
Strictly from a political standpoint, Manley's support for
the radicals will enable him to exploit their considerable
energy and organizational talents through the election and
will probably keep them united behind his leadership if the
PNP loses the election. The alternative for Manley--contin-
ued support for the IMF and a break with the left--would not
have helped his reelection chances and probably would have
left him with an insufficient power base to serve as an
effective opposition leader.
Manley and the United States
Since his frank, private exchange with US officials
last November, Manley has softened his public criticism of
Washington while still trying hard to maintain the support
of local radicals and of both Cuba and the Soviet Union. He
has backed down from the increasingly anti-US position he
took last year, first at the Nonaligned Summit in Havana and
later in a joint communique with Iraq. He has supported the
United States in the UN on major issues concerning the
hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
In Miami last December, Manley stated that he does not
believe that the CIA is trying to destabilize his govern-
ment--the first time he has exonerated his favorite "whipping
boy"--and later in Jamaica he dramatically praised the
United States as a positive influence on modern civilization.
In a departure from past behavior, he has made no public
effort to exploit the personally embarrassing leak to the US
press of his meeting with US officials.
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3
On the other hand, Manley has done little to restrain
the anti-US pronouncements of the minority radical factions
of his party and government, and the government-controlled
media have continued to take positions sympathetic to Cuba,;,
and the Soviet Union. Jamaican leftists, on the whole, art
conducting business as usual, confident as ever of Manley's
protection.
Economic Policy
Manley's performance on the economy also had been mixed
before he opted to side with the radicals. His most important
actions, however, had favored political moderates and the
restoration of Jamaica's three-year agreement with the IMF.
He had been openly critical of the stiff, IMF-required austerity
and apparently had believed that the existing agreement
would impose excessive social and political strains without
promoting real economic growth. Nonetheless, he had told
the radicals that, despite his respect for their political
position, he backed a new IMF agreement. To break with the
Fund, he implied, would raise false expectations among a
hard-pressed population.
In the end, Manley joined the leftist campaign to
exploit growing disenchantment with the IMF across Jamaica's
political spectrum. Even moderates--including the JLP
leadership--apparently had backed Manley's efforts to negoti-
ate easier terms. They generally agree with Manley's earlier
warning to the radicals, however, that the country has no
reasonable alternative to the IMF to stave off virtual
economic collapse this year.
In an election year, Manley is trying to mobilize the
leftist, youth-oriented organization that helped him in past
elections and to distance himself from the policies that
have nearly ruined Jamaica's economy since he took office
in 1972. We doubt, however, that he believes that his
short-term political strategy will lead to a workable long-
term strategy of economic development for Jamaica.
4
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3
V iJV11IJi
Democracy r
Manley is personally more committed to fundamental
social and economic reform in Jamaica than to Western style
democracy. He has made no attempt in recent months to alter
the open support for socialism that has won him admiration
among local and foreign leftists.
Nonetheless, the Prime Minister made major concessions
to his majority-based opposition when he agreed to electoral
reforms and to an early election--a year before the end of
his constitutional mandate. This action has improved pros-
pects for democracy on the island and has lessened the
importance of Manley's static personal convictions.
Bell's resignation and the PNP's rejection of the IMF
probably will prompt demands for immediate elections among a
moderate majority that includes the private sector, powerful
unions, and the independent press. We believe that Manley,
recognizing his decreasing options, is probably looking
beyond an election defeat to an early return to power consti-
tutionally--in the manner of his friend, Canadian Prime
Minister Trudeau. Furthermore, we believe that the break
with the IMF probably will force him to advance the date of
the promised election.
Cuba and the Soviet Union
Manley is maintaining close and friendly relations with
Cuba and the Soviet Union, and he is allowing their more
vociferous local advocates to continue propagandizing on
their behalf. We expect Cuba to increase its clandestine
assistance to Manley in the months ahead and we believe that
the Soviets will stay in close contact with members of
the Prime Minister's party and government.
Nonetheless, the investment necessary to prop up Manley
is becoming increasingly costly for any outside force. We
doubt that either Cuba or the Soviet Union is now considering
any action to help Manley stay in power unconstitutionally--
although we do not rule out increased assistance to Manley
by either country. Moreover, Manley does not appear to be
5
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3
-7l:+1..211`i 1
following a long-term political strategy. His recent a.gtions
confirm his longstanding tendency to employ short-term
tactics in an increasingly difficult effort to hold together
his crumbling party and government.
r.
Prospects
The majority-based JLP is strongly favored to defeat
Manley in the election this year. A remote chance exists,
however, that the combination of the unprecedented radical
control of the ruling party and a growing potential both for
social unrest and violent political conflict could upset the
constitutional process.
The loss of IMF funds will intensify the island's
already severe economic problems, which include staggering
price increases,'widespread shortages, plant shutdowns,
unemployment--fast approaching 40 percent of the work force
--and increasing labor unrest. As chances for major social
and political violence increase, prospects for an orderly
transfer of power to the JLP will decline.
In,the event of major unrest, Manley, spurred by his
now dominant radical advisers, could attempt to impose a
State of Emergency that would ostensibly preserve law and
order but also would restrict the JLP's campaign efforts and
entrench the Prime Minister prior to the election. In this
scenario, the government might even seek large-scale Cuban
security assistance.
We believe, however, that the union-based JLP is now
powerful enough to block Manley even if he were to impose
a State of Emergency. We also believe that the Jamaican
security forces are currently demoralized and disinclined to
help Manley stay in power. Radical hopes for the near future,
therefore, appear to depend on a collapse of law and order
that would break the JLP's disciplined control of the anti-
government majority and would justify intervention by the
local security forces--and possibly by "friendly" foreign
governments--to preserve the government of the day. For
now, this is a worst-case scenario that is unlikely to
unfold.
6
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3
SUBJECT: Jamaica: Manley's Recent Performance
Distribution:
Orig - Zbigniew
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
DCI
DDCI
Exec Registry
D/NFAC
DD/NFAC
NFAC Registry
D/OPA
OPA/LA
NFAC/OPA/LA/JGannon:
(27Mar80)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100810001-3