US-SENEGALESE RELATIONS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T00287R000100780001-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 11, 2010
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 25, 1980
Content Type:
MEMO
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CIA-RDP85T00287R000100780001-7.pdf | 217.92 KB |
Body:
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
25 March 1980
MEMORANDUM
US-SENEGALESE RELATIONS
V
The US has traditionally maintained warm relations with
Senegal under the moderate, pro-Western leadership of President
Leopold Senghor, who has governed since independence in 1960.
Dakar's moderate foreign'policies, which frequently support US
interests, stem mainly from Senghor's fear of Soviet intervention
in Africa and elsewhere. Senghor, who supports the Camp David
accords and US human rights policies, would like to develop closer
economic and military ties with the US, but not at the expense of
jeopardizing relations with France, Senegal's principal bonefz:,tor.
Senegal's most pressing problems are a burgeoning populatiorn,
a stagnant economy, and weathering Senghor'c planned retirement
prior to the next election in 1983. Although the succession to
Senghor may be marked by some political conflict, on balance
Senegal's institutional stability should prevail. Senghor's
successor almost certainly will not be as forceful a proponent of
Western views on the international scene, but probably will con-
tinue to follow moderate, democratic principles.
This memorandum, re uested by the National Intelligence Officer for
Africa, was prepared by Africa Division, Office of
Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate for Opera-
tions, the Office of Economic Research and the NIO. Research for this
paper was completed on 25 March 1980. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be addressed to Chief, Africa Division, OPA,
PA M 80-10143
SEi t tt
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Sene ag l's Policies Under Senghor
Senghor's stature as an elder statesman and as a renowned poet-
philosopher, his vigorous personal diplomacy, and his long-established
relationship with world political and intellectual leaders give Senegal
influence far out of proportion to the country's limited economic and
military resources.
Senghor earnestly opposes Soviet influence in Africa and elsewhere
in the nonaligned world, and his suspicion of Soviet intentions colors
many aspects of Senegalese foreign policy. His diplomatic and moral
support for Morocco in the Western Sahara dispute, for example, is
motivated in part by his fear that the Algerians--by backing the Pola-
sario--are acting as the Soviet surrogate to destabilize West Africa.
Senegal is one of the few OAU members that still refuse to recognize the
Soviet-backed government in Angola., and Senghor continues to support
Angolan opposition leader Jonas Savimbi. Senghor views events in the
Horn as further evidence of Soviet intentions to establish a predominant
position in Africa.
Senghor has been mildly critical of what he sees as US reluctance
to help friendly countries resist Soviet-Cuban intervention. The US
decision to sell arms to Morocco and Washington's.strong reaction to the
Afghanistan invasion however, have reassured him. Senegal took a
leading role in the United Nations debate on Afghanistan with a searing
attack on the Soviet interventioq. Last-summer, Senegal agreed to US
urgings to attend the Nonaligned Summit in Havana and openly criticized
Cuban manipulation of the meeting's procedures and voting.
Senegal is one of a handful of African countries with a commendable
human rights record. Senghor is using his influence to pressure the OAU
into agreeing that human rights guarantees are as applicable to black
Africa as they are to white-ruled South Africa
In another reflection of his pro-Western orientation, Senghor has
granted the US informal access to facilities at Dakar. American mili-
tary aircraft have been allowed to use Dakar airport, for example during
the airlift of men and material to Zaire's Shaba province in 1978. More
recently, the Senegalese Government has permitted US naval reconnais-
sance aircraft to use the airport as a staging base for following Soviet
ship movements.
A few of Senghor's policies conflict with US interests. Although
he promotes dialogue between Israel and Arab states and probably would
like to restore Senegal's relations with Israel, Senghor believes the
Israelis should be more generous in negotiations with the Arabs and that
the Palestinians must be given a greater voice in any negotiated settle-
ment. In the North-South dialogue, Senegal is a vigorous proponent of
more assistance from developed countries to the Third World.
25X1
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Economic and Political Issues Affecting US Interests
Senegal's economy, plagued by unfavorable climatic conditions,
depressed markets for its major exports--peanuts and phosphates--
and a rapidly growing population, registered little overall growth in
the last decade. Burdened with continual budgetary deficits, the
country is dependent for survival on the largesse of France--the former
colonial power--and international organizations. An ambitious economic
plan launched last December aims to restructure the existing economic
system by shrinking the government sector, opening Senegal to foreign
investment, granting farmers more benefits, and removing price subsidies
for urban consumers. Some of its more austere measures could lead to
unrest, especially among the urban population.
Government officials are preoccupied with the succession issue.
Senghor, who has dominated the country since independence in 1960,
reportedly plans to step down before his term ends in 1983. He believes
that this will enable his chosen successor, Prime Minister Diouf, to
establish himself before the next presidential election. Diouf, who
reflects Senghor's moderate, pro-Western views,. has assumed the major
share of day-to-day government responsibilities over the last few years.
A reform-minded technocrat, the Prime Minister has not gained the
complete confidence of leaders in the ruling party and the military and
lacks a strong grass-roots base. He could face a serious challenge for
the office from the more conservative old guard'of Senghor's dominant
Socialist Party or from the leader of the principal opposition party.
Neither of these elements, however, would be likely to impose policies
inimical to US interests. Moreover, the country's institutional stabi-
lity and the general respect for constitutional procedures should help
reduce chances for major disruptions.-'Senegal without Senghor probably
will play a diminished role on the African and international scene, as
any new leader will be preoccupied with domestic economic and social
problems. As a result, the US may have to,work harder to obtain
Senegal's support on controversial international issues.
US Goals and Objectives
The bulk of the modest level of US assistance to Senegal--almost
$20 million in fiscal year 1979--is designed to promote economic
development. Long- and short-term assistance is geared to increase food
production, promote Senegalese efforts to reform the sagging agricultural
sector, and upgrade the quality of rural life. The US also participates
in multilateral projects such as the Senegal River Development Organi-
zation and the Sahel Development Program and trains a small number of
Senegalese military officers.
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The US is Senegal's second largest trading partner, exporting about
$40 million in goods per year to Dakar. US investment in Senegal also
is modest--about $25 million, with fixed asset investment mainly limited
to petroleum marketing and phosphate mining. France remains Senegal's
largest financial and military donor, foreign investor, and trading
partner, although President Senghor has expressed a desire to expand
economic and military relations with the US.
A.l
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SUBJECT: US-SENEGALESE RELATIONS
DISTRIBUTION:
Original & 2 - NIO/Africa
1 - D/NFAC
1 - OER/D/NE
1 - DDO/AF
1 - D/OPA
3 - OPA/Production
5 - OPA/AF
3 - P&PG
NFAC/OPA/AF/I I(25Mar80)
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