POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY IN TUNISIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100700001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 10, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
10 March 1980
Political Uncertainty in Tunisia
Summary
The serious illness of Tunisian Prime Minister Nouira
and the attack in late January by .Libyan-backed Tunisian
exiles on the town of Qafsah increase the likelihood of near
term political instability in Tunisia. It is now uncertain
who will succeed President Bourguiba.
Political infighting is all but certain to grow among
the Tunisian elite whether or not Nouira recovers suffi-
ciently to resume political activity. Influential political
figures at present include Minister of Education Mohamed
MzaZi, recently designated "coordinator of governmental
affairs;" newly appointed Interior Minister Driss Guiga;
Destour Party Director Mohamed Sayah; and the President's
son and adviser, Habib Bourguiba, Jr.
The civilian opposition--religious or secular, in-
country or exile--appears not to have the capability to
unseat Bourguiba or a designated successor in the near term.
Opposition elements may be able to mount periodic cross-
border attacks, however, and probably will become more
This paper was prepared by the
Near East South Asia Division, Office of Political
Analysis. It was coordinated with the National InteZZi-
gence Officer for the Near East South Asia, the Directorate
of Operations, and the Offices of Central Reference,
Economic Research, Strategic Research, and Scientific
and Weapons Research. Questions and comments may be
addressed to the Chief, Near East South Asia Division,
PA M 80-10116
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sophisticated in their ability to focus and intensify
domestic opposition. All opposition groups can be expected
to demand a more liberal system in the post-Bourguiba
period. If the government reacts to these challenges with
repressive measures, its Zegi.timacy is likely to erode.
should occur, .there is a possibility that the military might
abandon its generally apolitical past and step in to ensure
an orderly transfer of power. Any extended use of the
military for internal security purposes will also run the
risk of politicizing its ranks.
Libyan leader Qadhafi is likely to continue efforts to
subvert any Tunisian regime that does not loosen that
country's close ties to France and adopt policies more
compatible with those of Libya. Tunisia's military capa-
bilities are inferior to those of both Libya and Algeria,
and the other Arab states appear unlikely to provide Tunis
the substantial political, financial, and military support
necessary to construct a credible defensive capability.
Current Political Situation
Nouira,
If political unrest or a succession crisis
may be unable to resume his duties for
at least several months. There appears to be a good chance
that Bourguiba will decide to replace Nouira with a younger
and more vigorous successor even if he does ultimately
recover. Such speculation has been fueled by the Presi-
dent's action early this month in replacing Tunisia's
interior minister, discredited following the attack on
Qafsah, with Driss Guiga, former director-general of the
national security service and a personal foe of Nouira's.
For the present, however, Nouira officially remains prime
minister and successor-designate to the aging President
Bourguiba,
Minister of Education Mohamed Mzali on 1 March was
named by President Bourguiba to "coordinate governmental
affairs." Mzali may be given broad authority to act for
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the President in administering day-to-day matters, as did
Nouira, but he has not been formally designated acting
prime minister, and he of course does not have the great
political strength of being designated successor to Bour-
guiba. By virtue of his new status, however, Mzali seems
likely eventually to be named prime minister if he performs
well in his current assignment.
Mzali is in a strong position to compete in the political
infighting among the Tunisian political elite that is all
but certain to develop in the present circumstances. Like
Bourguiba and Nouira, he was born in the central Tunisian
town of Monastir, and he is a distant relative of the
President. Mzali derives strength from his relative youth
(he is 54), his lack of identification with either of the
factions that clashed during the Destour Party Congress in
September 1979, and his broad support within the party. The
majority of party officials throughout Tunisia are teachers--
they look to Minister of Education Mzali as their protector.
In this capacity, Mzadi has established valuable credentials
as a proponent of Arabization, which is an increasingly
important issue in the current climate of resurgent Islam
and Arab cultural pride.
Other principal actors in the near term are likely to
include Destour Party Director Mohamed Sayah and the Presi-
dent's son, Habib Bourguiba, Jr. Sayah is widely dis-
liked for his blatant opportunism and manipulation of the
party machinery, but he obviously derives substantial
political power from his position and can be expected to
attempt to eclipse Mzali. Bourguiba, Jr's. poor health and
limited political abilities make it somewhat less likely
that he will be a contender for the prime minister's job,
but he is likely to be more active in his current position
as special adviser to the President, as suggested by his
recent visit to Washington.
Were Bourguiba to be succeeded in the near term by any
of these persons--or by National Assembly President Sadok
Mokaddem, who would be interim president if Bourguiba died
with no prime minister in office--we would expect no dramatic
alteration of government policy, domestic or foreign. With
the possible exception of Sayah, all of these leaders are
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well disposed toward the West, including France and the US;
all are suspicious of Tunisia's larger and more radical
neighbors, Libya and Algeria; and all are conservatives of
the Bourguiba mod on matters of domestic economic and
social policy.
The current political uncertainty in Tunisia may have
the effect, however, of slowing even the limited recent
progress that has been made toward political liberalization.
Although he is no political liberal, Nouira did seek to
strengthen his own following over the past year by releasing
a number of political detainees and introducing innovations
in the November 1979 legislative elections that included an
element of popular choice and permission for opposition
candidates to run. The apparent lack of interest by other
high-level leaders in such measures, coupled with Tunisia's
heightened security problems, is likely to preclude near
term progress toward political liberalization. Bourguiba
may seek to rejuvenate the government and undercut the
opposition by bringing new faces into important posts,
but he is unlikely to change the fundamental structure of
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the present authoritarian system.
Potential for Instabilj~ty
There is no substance to the continuing charges by
Libyan information media that the recent raid on Qafsah
stimulated widespread civil disorder within Tunisia. There
does exist in the country, however, a growing potential for
social and political instability resulting primarily from
frustrated economic expectations and the cultural dislo-
cation borne of rapid social change. These forces manifested
themselves in early 1978 in a violent general strike and a
subsequent government crackdown on organized labor, and more
recently in student and labor strikes and in the Arabization
issue and heightened Islamic consciousness.
Ironically, economic discontent in Tunisia is in large
part a function of the strength of the economy and the edu-
cational system over the past several years. A high rate of
domestic growth, the education of a substantial proportion
of school-age youths, and the export of unskilled labor to
Europe and Libya have created high expectations among all
classes of Tunisians. Recent developments have served to
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frustrate these expectations, however. The reduction of
employment opportunities in Western Europe during the mid-
1970s and the failure of the domestic economy to create
enough jobs to match the growing labor force resulted in
growing unemployment, especially among the quarter of the
population between the ages of 16?and 25. The current
crisis with Libya has forced the return to Tunisia of a
portion of the 70 to 100 thousand workers in that country,
and presumably will reduce worker remittances substantially
from the estimated $80 million received in 1979. If the
government implements plans to increase its defense spending--
now running at approximately $170 million per year, or 6
percent of the budget--at the expense of other programs.
this too will erode the general standard of living.
The potential for domestic unrest is increased also by
the growth over the past year of feelings of cultural,.
linguistic, and religious pride. Tunisia is among the most
Westernized of the Arab states, President Bourguiba has
promoted avowedly secular policies since independence, and
almost all Tunisians follow a relatively liberal school of
Sunni Islam. Even in this climate, however, the example of
the Islamic revolution in Iran has had an impact. Tunisian
fundamentalists share with those in Iran a need to reaffirm
native cultural values at the expense of Western ideals
superimposed in the process of modernization. The Islamic
revival seems to have had the greatest appeal to the urban
middle class, and especially to the politically conscious
young. The latter apparently believe that they have found
in the resurgence of Islam a politically acceptable way to
vent their unhappiness with economic, social, and political
The religious leader in contemporary Tunisia known to
have capitalized most effectively on the resurgence of
Islamic consciousness is Abdelfatah Moro, a young attorney.
His following, which may number from several hundreds to
several thousands, consists largely of educated youth who--
until security services intervened--met in small groups to
hear him speak. Moro calls for a return to the more con-
servative doctrines of Islam, and contends that the govern-
ment must be composed of religious men subject to the guidance
of religious leaders. The government has taken steps to
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limit Moro's political activities, believing that the
clandestine nature of his activities poses a serious
potential threat. The government also monitors the
activities of the proliferating Islamic student groups in
high schools and at the University of Tunis, and has taken
some symbolic steps, such as the construction of mosques, to
forestall the emergence of a politically significant funda-
mentalist movement.
Organized opposition groups within Tunisia are generally
weak, and they have made no attempt to capitalize on the
country's current political uncertainty or security con-
cerns. The group with the widest following, primarily from
the professional middle. class, is the Social Democrats led
by Ahmed Mestiri. It''is a loyalist offshoot of the Destour
Party that has demonstrated no capacity to mobilize the
disaffected young. Mestiri's outlook is in fact so much
like that of the present regime that there has been recent
speculation in Tunisia that Bourguiba might attempt to bring
him into the government.' Former foreign minister Mohamed
Masmoudi, discredited for his involvement with the abortive
unity agreement with Libya in 1974, retains. ties to the
radical Arabs, including Libya, but he has no significant
domestic following. The Labor Confederation is now ine-.
ffectual with its leader, Habib Achour, still under loose
house arrest, although it represents a source of great
potential political power. The small Communist and Baathist
groups have little following and no known capacity to raise
a political challenge to the regime.
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The exiled leader who may retain a wide latent following
inside Tunisia is Ahmed Ben Salah, Bourguiba's former economic
czar who lives in France. He has no effective organization,
but because of his identification with Tunisia's "collectivist"
economic experiment in the late 1960s is widely seen as
a symbolic alternative to Bourguiba's conservative economic
and social policies. Ben Salah and followers pose no real
threat to the regime, but are conceivable beneficiaries if
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fundamental political changes should occur.
the known civilian
opponents of the regime--re ig3.ous or secular, in-country
or exile--do not now have the capability to unseat Bourguiba
or to seize control during a succession period if the Presi-
dent should die in the near term. Opposition elements may
have the capacity to mount periodic cross-border attacks,
however, and probably will become more sophisticated in
their ability to focus and intensify domestic oppositon.
This opposition presumably will coalesce more quickly if the
current regime takes increasingly authoritarian measures at
home to counter the currently perceived security threat, or
if succession uncertainties should lead to extended political
maneuvering.among the elite following Bourguiba's death.
Repression over an extended period almost certainly would
cause the regime to lose much of its legitimacy and serve to
politicize the armed forces.
Attitudes of the Military
If political unrest or a succession crisis should occur
in the near term, there is a possibility that the Tunisian
military might abandon its generally apolitical past and
step in to ensure an orderly transfer of power. We have
no evidence of widespread, anti-government activity within
the military, or of serious disaffection among the officer
corps or in enlisted ranks. Neither have we seen the
. in process tested in Tunisia,
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Senior officers of the 29,000--man military are drawn
in large part from the same ranks of the Tunisian establish-
ment as now form the government and party elite. If these
officers were to seize power in their own right.or to control
a nominally civilian successor regime, we might see established
either a reformist regime determined to pursue a limited
liberalization or--probably more likely--a continued authoritar-
ian system not unlike that of Bourguiba. In either case, the
broad outlines of Tunisian foreign policy probably would
remain unchanged.
Our knowledge of the backgrounds and attitudes of
middle-ranking and junior officers is so limited that we
cannot confidently predict what policies might be followed
if they were to come to power. In all likelihood, however,
a regime controlled by such officers would be much more
attuned to the Arab and Islamic cultural values increasingly
endorsed by Tunisia's young, disposed to orient policy toward
the'other Arabs rather than toward France or the US, and
inclined--at a minimum--toward a vigorous and genuine non-
alignment. A small number of these officers, especially
those coming from less developed southern Tunisia, may espouse
radical Arab views.
Regional Securi
The chief concern of Tunisian foreign policy--protecting
the country from its larger and-more rad' nei hbors--has
been heightened anew by the Qafsah raid, 7
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Tunisia's sense of insecurity in the region is of
course based in large part on its military inferiority vis-
a-vis Libya and Algeria. The dramatic buildup of Libya's
and-Algeria's armed forces since the mid-1970s has spurred
Tunisia to modernize its forces, but Tunis lacks the resources
to keep pace with its wealthier neighbors. With little hope
of reversing its military inferiority, Tunisia has adopted
its
li
ze on
a defense strategy that is designed to capita
limited assets. The Tunisians are seeking to develop a
ground capability sufficient to conduct a delaying action
against invading Algerian or Libyan forces, so that the
government could-call for international intervention. At
the same-time, Tunis wants its forces to be stron enou h
not to invite aggression by bordering states.
.Despite the attention the Tunisians have paid to
improving their conventional forces., the government realizes
that the greater immediate threat may lie in continued
foreign sponsored subversive activities.,. The recent commando
assualt on Qafsah points up the difficulties of defending
against such meddling, but Tunisian security forces are on
guard for any evidence of infiltration subversion, partic-
ularly involving the Libyans.
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Largely because of financial constraints, the moderni-
zation program initiated in 1975 has made uneven progress,
failing to correct several serious deficiencies in the
military. Tunisia's air defenses, for example, are generally
ineffective. All F-86 fighters are grounded, no early
warning radar system exists, the Army has a small number of
antiaircraft artillery guns, and the few Chaparral SAMs
could defend only a limited area. Ground and air transport
capabilities are weak; the Air Force has no fixed-wing
transport aircraft and the Army can move a fraction of its
tanks on transporters. The Army has few field artillery
guns, limited antitank weapons, and a small armored force.
Much of the military's equipment is obsolescent, and combat
readiness is adversely affected by civic action programs and
the short tour of duty for conscripts.
The Tunisians hope to secure funds from
conservative Arab oil producing states to finance
the equipment purchases necessary to strengthen their
The Arabs in general have provided Tunisia only limited
political backing in its current dispute with Libya. The
meeting of Arab League foreign ministers that was held in
late February to consider the Tunisian complaints did reaffirm
the provisions.. in the League charter that call for non-
interference in the domestic affairs of member states. it
balanced this, however, with a clear if indirect criticism
of Tunisia's hasty action in calling for French and American
assistance. Of the Arab states, only Egypt is capable and
inclined to assist Tunisia if it should become embroiled in
a military clash with Libya. The possibility of Egyptian military
involvement in such a dispute on Tunisia's side almost
certainly will be a restraining factor on the future actions
of Libyan leader Qadhafi.
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The French Role
France under President Giscard has intervened militarily
in the Western Sahara, Mauritania, Chad, the Central African
Republic and Zaire-sometimes to protect a large economic
stake, sometimes to fulfill a commitment to defend a former
colony or preserve an historic legacy of influence, sometimes
to deny influence to some other power. There is no doubt
that France would do as much if not more for Tunisia if it
were seriously threatened by Libyan-backed destabilization.
France feels a special moral commitment to Tunisia. in.
addition to its concern about the security of its southern
borders and its desire to maintain political stability and
the present strategic balance in the Mediterranean. France
also believes that instability in northern Africa invites
Soviet interference. France would prefer, of course, that
regional tensions be reduced through quiet bilateral diplomacy.
Giscard is proud of France's record in Africa and
rarely lets pass an occasion.to indicate that he would not
hesitate again to counteract--alone and by military means if
necessary--destabilization attempts there. France willingly
accepts its role in the "division of labor" among the Western
allies in maintain stability in the Third World and has
shown itself willing to take the lead for the West to preserve
the status quo. in. Africa against the Libyans, Cuban/Soviets
or Algerians.
The French Government last month reiterated Giscard's
statement of support for Tunisia that he made during his
official visit to Tunis in 1978; "France remains profoundly
attached to political stability in the Mediterranean, to the
independence and security.of its states and notably, that of
Tunisia." The rapidity with which France responded by a
naval show of force to Tunisia's request for help, following
the Libyan-backed raid in southern Tunisia in late January,
indicates that France is willing to back up its assurances.
At the same time France is keenly aware of Tunisian and
Algerian sensitivities, its own role as a friend of the
Arabs, the position of strength Libya holds in the area
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and France's own commercial interests in Libya. France's
logistical support to Tunisia following the Qafsah raid
consisting of two helicopters and two aircraft, was with-
drawn on 12 February, and France decided to postpone a
French naval visit to Tunisia scheduled for late February in
order to reduce French military visibility in the area.
French military support for a Tunisia beleagured by its
neighbors would be popular in France among all but the
French communists and others on the left who would predictably
charge "neocolonialism" and "imperialism." Much would
depend on the circumstances of the French involvement, and
Giscard would.have to be cautious in a presidential election
year. However, his popularity was never higher than following
the rapid, successful French intervention in Shaba. We
believe the French will be willing to increase tcheir economic
aid to Tunisia but will probably move more slowly on military
aid because of its visibility.
The Soviets share with Libya an interest in undermining
Western influence in northern Africa and in fostering the
emergence of radical elements there, including in Tunisia.
They prefer, however, not to become directly involved in the
subversive or aggressive aspects of such a policy; remaining
one step removed from such activities enables them to avoid
alienating regional states with which they are simultaneously
pursuing good bilateral relations.
The Soviets have adopted a high-tone, balanced public
position toward recent events in Tunisia, appealing to both
Libya and Tunisia to settle their problems through negotia-
tions. While thus seeking to maintain a respectable distance
from the incident, they may also, in this instance, view the
Libyan action with some skepticism and consider it counter-
productive. A Moscow radio broadcast in French on 4 February
warned that the Qafsah incident could give the "imperialists"
a pretext to interfere in the. area; the broadcast mentioned
the arrival of French warships on the Tunisian coast and the
announced willingness of the US to provide military aid to
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Despite this public position on the Qafsah incident,
the Soviets would only benefit by increased instability in
Tunisia and the possible demise of Bourguiba, who has aligned
Tunisia with the West and consistently'criticized the Soviet
Union. Tunisia's willingness to support the US in the UN
Security Council on recent resolutions relating to Iran and
Afghanistan, its vigorous public denunciation of the USSR's
invasion of Afghanistan, and its role at the Islamic Con-
ference in pushing for a harsh anti-Soviet resolution fueled
Moscow's antipathy for Bourguiba. In general, the Soviets
would undoubtedly concur in Libyan efforts to weaken his
government in the hope that his successors would prove more
amenable to Soviet interests in the area.
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