SOMALIA: STABILITY OF THE REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100680002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 10, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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JLVI\L 1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
10 March 1980
MEMORANDUM
Somalia: Stability of the Regime
President Siad continues to dominate the Somali scene, and he
probably u~iZZ remain in power for at least the near term. The
crafty and durable Siad has managed to keep his opponents divided
and off balance and has proven adept at playing off factions
against each other. While Siad's position has improved since his
defeat in the Ogaden and a subsequent coup attempt in 1978, tribalism
and the poor state of the economy continue to pose problems for his
regime. If Siad allows these problems to fester, they r~iZZ offer
opportunities for exploitation by his opponents.
Tribalism Issue
After Siad came to power in a military coup in 1969, he launched a
campaign to eradicate tribalism in Somali society. Tribalism itself was
banned by law, and attempts were made to alter or end many tribal- ,
related customs. Siad, who was then attempting to consolidate his
position, believed that tribal divisions undercut the stability of his
regime and the basic principle of Somali policy--the integration into
the country of ethnic Somali-inhabited parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and
Djibouti.
His efforts succeeded only in pushing the issue to the background.
A number of clans, such as the Majertain, continued to resent the loss
of privileged positions they held under the civilian government. In
The author of this paper is Africa Division, Office of
Political Analysis. Research u~as comp e e on 6 March 1980. It was
.requested by Paul Henze, NSC Staff. It ryas coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations, the Offices of Strategic Research and Economic Research,
and the National InteZZigence Officer for Africa. Comments and queries
are raeZcome and may be addressed to Chief, Africa Division, Office of
Political Analysis,
DUP OF 005513877"
RIP
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April 1978, the Majertain moved to capitalize on 5iad's military defeat
by Ethiopian and Cuban forces in the Ogaden by mounting a coup; this was
easily defeated, Siad countered by purging hundreds of Majertain and
others of questionable loyalty from the armed forces and bureaucracy.
Ne replaced them with fellow Marahens and members of allied clans whom
he believed would be more loyal. Siad also attempted to isolate the
Majertains from their traditional allies and other disaffected elements
in Somali society.
Siad's reliance on the Mara hen, however, soon caused problems with
other clans who resented his favoritism and their exclusion from the
national scene. Some groups, such as the Issak, threatened to oppose
Siad and his policies openly unless they were given a greater share of
important posts. Siad has attempted to respond to their demands, especially
with the establishment over the past year of a number of "democratic
institutions." Seats in the new parliament, for example, were "unofficially"
proportioned among the key clan groupings, and non-Marahen have been
appointed to cabinet and high-level party posts. Through these methods,
Siad hopes to give the clans a feeling of prestige and a sense of participation
in the government and its decisionmaking process. Siad also has attempted
to rally disaffected Somali clans by emphasizing his support far the
ethnic Somali guerrillas in Ethiopia's Ogaden region. His aid to the
guerrillas is also intended in part to maintain the support of the
Ogadeni clans or at least prevent their alliance with his enemies.
Since 1918, Siad has generally been successful in his balancing
act. Ike has proven adept at playing off tribes against each other,
offering or appearing to offer concessions when necessary. As a result,
there is no organized opposition to his regime within Somalia, although
a small Majertain-dominated guerrilla force--the Somali Salvation Front--
based in Ethiopia has conducted limited operations within Somalia. The
group's acceptance of Ethiopian assistance and its narrow clan makeup
have weakened its appeal to the Somali populace. The continued existence
of tribalism, despite the 10-year campaign to eradicate it, however,
presents an area that could be exploited by anti-Siad elements. The
Majertain, for example, have been truing to recruit disaffected Issak
and Dulbahante to their cause.
The Economy
Since the mid-l9~Os, the Somali economy has declined as a result of
mismanagement, the lingering effects of a drought, stagnating exports,
and the rising cost of oil. The decline further accelerated last year,
and the nation faces greater financial problems than at any time since
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the 1969 revolution. Siad has failed in his frequent attempts to secure
sizable amounts of economic assistance from fellow members of the Arab
League, in part because of his support for the Camp David accords. The
continuing flood of refugees--over 600,000 from the Ogaden--also has
weakened the economy. Although international organizations have helped
Somalia cope with the refugee problem, the influx has put a further
drain on two scarce resources--food and petroleum. As the displaced
population continues to grow, Mogadishu will need greater amounts of
foreign assistance to provide the basic necessities
Economic ills have yet to generate significant opposition, but the
government is aware of the potential for greater popular discontent,
especially given the prospect of even larger shortages of food staples.
While continuing to advocate scientific socialism, Siad earlier this
year replaced ideologues in some key ministries--such as finance--with
more pragmatic ministers in an effort to slow the economic downturn and
forestall economically inspired unrest..Siad also hopes that his efforts
will generate Western investment and long-promised economic assistance
from Saudi Arabia; Riyadh has held up aid in the past because of its
unhappiness with Somalia's socialist ideology. In addition, the govern-
ment recently has sought advice and assistance from the International
Monetary Fund, but it may find some IMF conditions--a reduction in
government harrowing and expenditures--difficult to implement
The economy and government also suffer from the flight of educated
Somali technicians and managers. Because of extremely low pay--most
civil servants have not had a pay raise for years--high inflation, and
a lack of consumer goods, many educated Somalis take more lucrative
positions in the West or in the wealthier Arab states.~~
Out1 ook_
Although tribal and economic problems present potentially serious
dilemmas for Siad, there is little evidence that unrest has reached
troublesome proportions in the military, the main pillar of his regime.
There almost certainly are some anti-Siad elements in the military, but
many key military leaders have tribal ties to Siad and support his anti-
Soviet stance and his efforts to improve ties to the West. The government's
loyal and relatively competent security apparatus has also shown itself
capable of controlling dissent. Siad's success during 1979 in acquiring
large amounts of military equipment from Western and Arab sources--
enabling him to regain prewar inventories for his army--eliminated a
potential area of military unrest. There had been some feeling in the
military that Siad was the main obstacle to Western assistance and his
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SECRET
removal would be necessary before such ties could be established. The
growing prospect of solidifying Somali-US ties has worked to undercut
this criticism of his policies within the armed forces. Siad may once
again find himself in trouble with the military, however, if this relation-
ship fails to fulfill their expectations or if they begin to believe
they are carrying a disproportionate share of any economic belt-tightening
measures.
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SUBJECT: Somalia: Stability of the Regime
Distribution:
Original - NSC Staff
1 - D/NFAC
1 - NIO/AF
1 - D/OPA
3 - OPA/Production
6 - OPA/AF
3 - P&PG
NFAC/OPA/AF/
l OMa r80 )
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