(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100460002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 15, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
15 February 1980
MEMORANDUM
French Views on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan
Summary
Conflicting signals in French policy statements on the
Soviet invaOi.on of Afghanistan reflect France's effort to
reconcile its own evolving analysis of the Soviet threat, and
the appropriate response to it, with domestic public opinion
and the country's commitment to the Atlantic alliance. The US
and France have now publicly minimized their disagreement over
the abortive foreign ministers' meeting that was to be held
this month in Bonn, but they still analyze the Afghan crisis
differently and offer differing prescriptions for dealing with
it. At the same time, there has been considerable backing and
filling in French policy statements, as well as a tailoring of
communiques--such as the recent French-Indian communique--to
the needs of a special audience.
Implications of the Afghanistan Invasion
Some officials are now willing to admit that the initial French
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was "flabby," but the
French have never underestimated the gravity of the Soviet challenge.
They see serious implications in Africa, if--as some believe--all restraints
on Soviet behavior in that area are now lifted. The French view Chad
and the Central African Republic as particularly vulnerable and some
believe that the Soviets would welcome. a civil war in Rhodesia.
This memorandum was prepared by I I the western Europe
Division, Office of Political Analysis. The paper has been coordinated'
with the National Intelligence Officer'for Western Europe and the Office of
Economic Research. Research was completed on 15 February 1980. Questions
and comments may be a&lressed to the Chief, Western Europe Division, Office
of Political Analysis
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The impact of such officials on dacisionmaking in France probably
varies with the issue--French African policy,.for example, has always
been closely held by Giscard and a few key advisers. More generally,
the French political system gives the president a relatively free hand
to make policy decisions without consulting either parliament or his own
Foreign Ministry.
Yet comments from several high-level French government officials
appear to reveal a consensus that the invasion of Afghanistan is rooted
in Soviet "paranoia" and that the appropriate response is a graduated
one or, as Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet put it, one of "mounting
pressure."
Francois-Poncet believes the US violated an understanding this
month, when news of what was to have been an unpublicized informal
dinner meeting of foreign ministers appeared in the media, thus making
it impossible for France to attend. Some French officials have linked
other issues with their refusal to attend the proposed meeting, noting
pointedly that the US postponement of sanctions against Iran was made
without prior consultation with the West European capitals and followed
weeks of US pressure on European allies to join in sanctions.
ak
The USSR
Francois-Poncet's political director will visit Moscow later this
month, but his brief will be limited to pressing the Soviets on their
plans for withdrawal. According to the French Foreign Minister, military
contacts with the USSR have been broken off, and not much was expected from
the economic dommissioan that has just completed its mission in Moscow.
When asked by a US journalist what the French reaction would be if the
Soviets did nothing in the next two or three months, Francois-Poncet
said the bilateral dialogue would be reduced to "one subject" and trade
would ultimately be affected. French Foreign Ministry officials believe
that priority should be given to stepping up civilian and military aid
to vulnerable countries like Turkey, Pakistan, and the sheikhdoms on
the Persian Gulf, and that the West should aid the Afghan rebels.
3
At the same time, the French believe that the Soviet Union needs to
be offered a face-saving way to withdraw its troops. A presidQntial
adviser has told the US Embassy that the French are currently looking
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0 tut; 40
to the idea of a neutralization of Afghanistan along the lines of the J-.
Austrian state treaty. They think that the scheme should be confined to
Afghanistan in order to avoid giving the Soviets inspection rights over
The US
French policy since de Gaulle has emphasized a whole network of
"special relationships" that link France with the developed and developing
world. Gaullist theology requires France to claim a pivotal role in
East-West detente and to avoid following the lead of the US. There are
practical considerations as well. France has long lacked confidence in
the consistency of American resolve and fears that the American failure
to consult allies adequately could involve consequences for those allies
that would be more serious for them than for the US. There is a genuine
concern that a future US policy reversal could leave Paris out on a
limb. French officials are not convinced that the US will ultimately
boycott the Olympics, and they wonder if the strong US reaction to
Afghanistan is not at least partially motivated by domestic political
In addition, President Giscard has made de Gaulle's concept of
"anti-super bloc" policies his own. In his recent trip to India, Giscard
was careful to underline his support for genuine nonalignment (as opposed
to Castro's) and his wish to help insulate the nonaligned from superpower
rivalries. This reflects the French view that in South Asia the principal
threat posed by the Soviet Union is not in Afghanistan but in India. If
India falls under Soviet influence, the French argue, there will be no
saving Pakistan.
The Economic Factor
French hopes of increasing econcmic ties with the Soviet Union are
an important but not determining factor in French reluctance to move against
Moscow. French imports from and exports to the Soviet Union each total
about $1.5 billion annually, 2 percent of total French trade. Although f
this percentage is small, some specific trade dependencies cause concern.
France buys 5 percent of its coal and crude oil imports from the USSR
and 20 percent of its petroleum product imports. Perhaps most significant
are growing French purchases of natural gas, which now account for 14
percent of France's natural gas imports. 25X1
On the export side, around 10 percent of French foreign sales of
heating and cooling equipment and metalworking machinery go to the USSR.
The Soviets also buy a relatively large share (more than 5 percent) of
French steel and chemical exports., Faris has been hoping to become a
leading supplier to the Soviet Union of high technology items such as
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over the slightly longer term, clearly hopes to be in a better competitive
position vis-a-vis US suppliers--or other major countries that follow
sales of these products and to push to replace US suppliers. At a
minimum, we believe the French will maintain a low profile and will
almost certainly not sign any splash' new contracts. Paris, however,
will probably try discreetly to maintain negotiations on new sales and
.her, telecommunications, and oil exploration equipment--in many
as es precisely the types of goods the US is trying to limit or oroscriha
his Gaullist flank. Chirac knows that if he is to have even the shadow
of a chance at the presidency, he must be careful in confronting Giscard
The Domestic Factor
1981 is a presidential election year in France, and a president as
meticulous as Giscard is in plotting every detail of his campaign is
unlikely to overlook the boon that foreign policy initiatives can be to
an incumbent president. Yet Giscard is not in such a tough race (although
he would like to win with a healthy margin) and electoral considerations
are not so paramount that domestic considerations can be view d as
overriding or even critical--at least at the moment.
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I
..._Giscard's rightist rival for the presidency--Gaullist leader Jacques
Chirac--gave a prudent and moderate speech on 12 February, his first
major speech in eight months. In it he indicated a wide range of agreement
with Giscard on foreign policy--a tribute to Giscard's success in covering
on sensitive foreign policy issues which are viewed as a presidential preserve 3
in France. The irascible official Gaullist newsletter, which had criticized
Giscard initially for not speaking out forcefully enough on the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, has recently been grumbling about Giscard's neglect of
French independence and alleged collusion with West Germany, as evidenced
in the recent French-German communique. Chirac's speech, however, indicates
that moderation will probably be the Gaullist leadership's tactics for
the time being. 25X1
The French Communists, unwavering in their effort to portray themselves
as the sole representative on the left of French national interest and hoping
to capitalize on latent anti-German sentiment in France, have predictably
joined in the anti-German chorus. The Socialists, for their part, have
given qualified support to the French-German communique while continuing
to criticize Giscard for not speaking out sooner and more forcefully
against Soviet moves in Afghanistan. 25X1
Thus, as the US Embassy in Paris, observes, foreign policy issues
are looming larger than usual in the French domestic political debate,
with the question of French independence and relations with West Germany
once again dividing political parties across traditional majority-
opposition lines. The fiercely nationalist Gaullists and Communists are
attacking the Giscardians and Socialists for not sufficiently respecting
the independence of French foreign policy. Whether this is a transient
phenomenon depends in large part on events outside French control. 25X1
rr"RET
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7stribution: French Views on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan
1 - Mr. Robert Blackwell - NSC
1''- Mr James Rentschler - NSC
1 - Mr. George Vest - State
1 - Ms. Jenonne Walker - State
1 - Mr. Anton De Porte - State
1 - Mr. James V. Siena
1 - Mr. Reginald Bartholemew - State
1 - Ms. Ruth Whiteside - State
1 - Mr. Richard Cooper - State
1 - Mr. Stephen J. Ledogar - State
1 - Dr Wynfred Joshua
1 - Mr. Ken Steins
2 - D/NFAC
1 - NFAC Registry
1 - NI0/WE
1 - Secretary of Production Board
1 - OER/Registry
1 - NFAC Senior Review Panel
1 - NFAC Coordination Staff
1 - Presidential Briefing Coordinator
2 - D/OPA
2 - OPA Production Staff
3 - P&PG
1 - DC/WE
1 - Branch files
1 - Author
___
NFAC/0PA/WE/CM~
(15Feb80)
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SUBJECT : Delinquent Sourced Memos and 3492s
Just a reminder that I still need from you the 3492 and/or
the sourced memo for the following memo:
Title: J A-W ~
J
PA # : 86- IDO2 9 05 Ae-a-)
Please return the above to me as soon as possible. Thanks.
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