SOVIET ACTIVITIES AFFECTING US INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100380001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 15, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIREC'i vR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
L1 5 FEB 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Soviet Activities Affecting US
Interests
This is the third in a series of reports
that chart the USSR's actions to advance their
interests abroad. It gives special attention
to those activities that either seem deliber-
ately designed to counter US policy or have
the potential for developing into issues
inimical to US interests.
Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Attachment:
As stated
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
15 February 1980
MEMORANDUM
SOVIET ACTIVITIES AFFECTING US INTERESTS
Summary
The USSR's determination to contain the worldwide reaction to its
invasion of Afghanistan and to maintain its sizable ground force pres-
ence there has been accompanied by efforts to refute US criticism of
Moscow's actions and to place responsibility for the deterioration in
Soviet-American relations on Washington. The Soviets are trying to-
convince an international audience that the crisis atmosphere that
currently exists is due to deliberate US policies that are designed to
advance US hegemoniaZ interests and to influence domestic politics in an
election year in the US. With the deterioration of Soviet-American
relations capped by the Afghanistan crisis, Moscow is clearly stressing
propaganda confrontation with the Carter administration over US defense
policies. articularZ with regard to the Middle East and the Indian
Ocean.
Moscow's major effort has been one of damage limitation. The
Soviets are trying to avoid or dampen war scares. in Iran, Pakistan, and
Yugoslavia, and to deflect Islamic criticism of Soviet actions in
Afghanistan. The Soviets are aggressively countering charges that they
have designs on Iran or the Persian Gulf and are trying to refocus Arab
attention on the primary target, i.e., the US as the "enemy of Islam"
and the supporter of Israel. The Soviets are also trying to maintain
West European interest in detente and to divide the.US.from its West.
European allies.
This memorandum was prepared bra the USSR-East European Division of
the Office of Political Analysis.
PA M 80-10080C
Copy _JS o a O
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The USSR, Afghanistan, and the Middle East
The USSR is concerned, and possibly even surprised, over the Moslem
reaction to. its intervention in Afghanistan and as-a result has decided
to strengthen its ties with the only Arab states unwilling to attend
last month's Islamic conference in Islamabad--Syria and South Yemen. In
the wake of the conference, the Soviets mounted a public and private
effort to blunt criticism of Soviet policy in Afghanistan and to em-
phasize the danger the US represents for the Islamic community. Soviet
tactics suggested a decision in Moscow to write off the moderate Arabs
at least for the time being and to play to the more radical members of
the Steadfastness Front.
As a result, the Soviets have maneuvered to give at least qualified
support to the Syrian decision to redeploy forces in Lebanon, which the
Soviets may view as a device to increase Arab-Israeli tensions and thus
reduce Arab preoccupation with Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Gromyko
arrived in Damascus on 26 January. only three days after the first
movement of Syrian forces.
Current Soviet efforts for expanding influence in the Arabian
Peninsula hinge on the politics of unity of the two Yemens.
Within South Yemen, the Soviets are making intensive use of
facilities there and Soviet advisers are now at most levels of the South
Yemeni military.
Moscow has stepped up developmental aid, no doubt to
all the media in South Yemen are now under direct high-
the images of itself and the unpopular Ismail. Additionally,
In the weeks to come, the Soviets will certainly try to focus Arab
attention on the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, portraying critics of
Soviet action in Afghanistan as dupes of the US. The Soviets can be
expected to expedite arms deliveries to Syria and to reassure Syrian
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President Assad of Soviet backing in the event of an Israeli attack.
The USSR, Afghanistan, and Asia
In the wake of their invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets have
taken steps to improve relations with the most anti-US and anti-Chinese
states in the area--Vietnam and India--and have strengthened their naval
that were made to India during Premier Kosygin's visit in March.
forces in the Arabian and South China seas. Gromyko arrived in New
Delhi on 12 February to begin an intensive effort to tie India more
closely to the USSR and to affirm Moscow's "limited" objectives in
Afghanistan. Gromyko presumably discussed various offers of assistance
Gromyko probably played on Indian fears
of a new US armaments commitment to Pakistan in order to make sure that,
as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there is no improve-
ment in Indian ties with the US or China.
The Soviets may also have calculated that their decisive use of
force would convey to Beijing the limits to the value of closer Sino-US
ties in aiding China in any future Sino-Soviet military confrontation.
More specifically, they may have intended their invasion, in combination
with steps toward the strengthening of Soviet-Vie namese relations.
to deter Beijing from a second attack on Vietnam.
The vise s
to Vietnam by Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet navy ergey orshkov in
December and candidate politburo member Masherov in January also demon-
strated Soviet support for Vietnam in its dispute with China. In an
allusion to Moscow's now continuous naval presence in the South China
Sea, Gorshkov publicly implied that Soviet military forces would support
maintain close observation of US naval activity in the South China
Gorshkov's visit may have arranged greater Soviet military access
to Vietnamese facilities, which are already allowing the Soviets to
Hanoi in any new conflict with China.
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The USSR, Afghanistan, and Europe
The Soviets have begun to cancel or postpone long-scheduled ex-
changes between East and West in order to signal West European govern-
ments that they cannot expect to conduct business as usual with Eastern
Europe while taking punitive measures against the USSR for its invasion
of Afghanistan. On 23 January, Czechoslovakia--in obvious deference to
the Kremlin's wishes--indefinitely postponed a visit this month by West
German Foreign Minister Genscher, and East Germany postponed without
explanation a preparatory meeting to settle details for a summit between
East German leader Honecker and Chancellor Schmidt. In previous nego-
tiations with the West Germans on other issues, East Germany had seemed
willing to insulate inter-German relations from the worsening inter-
national climate.
Exactly one week later, the East Germans postponed the Honecker-
Schmidt meeting until later this year and Hungary abruptly postponed the
visit to the US of Politburo member Antal Apro only hours after Apro's
aide had discussed details of the visit with US officials. The Hun-
garians al oned Foreign Minister Pu'a's trip to West Germany in
Fphrijarv_ ~""
oscow c ear y wan s to convey
the impression that its Warsaw ac a lies strongly support Soviet
policy and that any effort by the West to split Moscow from its allies
will not be tolerated.
Soviet party secretary Suslov's speech to the Polish party congress
and Gromyko's hastily arranged visit to Bucharest pointed to Moscow's
concern for solidarity within the Warsaw Pact on Afghanistan.
the talks with Gromyko were "difficult" and s raine ,
and various- Romanian statements indicated that,Gromvko failed to silence
Bucharest's criticism of the Soviet invasion.
Meanwhile, the Soviets have adopted an ambiguous stance toward the
Schmidt-Giscard summit. They have warned that the Europeans cannot
support US actions against the USSR and have detente in Europe, but at
the same time they have blamed the US--rather than France and West
Germany--for the continuing international tension over Afghanistan. The
Soviets are claiming that the meeting demonstrated Schmidt's and Giscard's
commitment to detente, while the US was deliberately jeopardizing it.
Moscow clearly wants to divide the US from its allies in West Europe and
is particularly concerned not to burden its relations with key West
European states more than necessary.
With their relations with the US at low ebb and the SALT process in
limbo, the Soviets may eventually decide to turn to West Europe rather
than to Washington in an effort to develop a disarmament posture that
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will help the USSR live down its invasion of Afghanistan. Continuing
West European doubts about NATO's TNF decision provide some fertile
ground for Soviet diplomacy and propaganda. But for their "European
card" to be effective, the Soviets may find that they will have to
reach compromises with West European preferences on security issues.
A test of whether this approach will be adopted will take place-next
month, when Gromyko is scheduled to visit Paris. Gromyko may be more
accommodating than he has been in the past to the French proposal for a
separate conference on disarmament in Europe subsequent to the CSCE
session scheduled for Madrid later this year.
The USSR, Afghanistan, and the Nonaligned
The Soviets have lost some standing in Latin America and Africa
over the invasion of Afghanistan, but they have gained from the refusal
of Argentina and Brazil.to join US efforts to restrict grain sales to
the USSR and from Zambia's willingness to conclude a significant arms
deal. Both Argentina and Brazil criticized the Soviet action, but trade
considerations and a desire to show independence from the US outweighed
any interest in joining a common international effort to isolate the
Soviets. Jamaica condemned the Soviet move, but immediately indicated
that it anticipated no long-term change in its policy of friendliness
toward the Soviets; Nicaragua muted the issue in local media and went
ahead with arrangements to set up a Soviet mission in Managua. The
invasion will probably dampen the development of Soviet ties with both
Panama and Columbia, but the Soviets probably anticipated an even sharper
reaction in Latin America than actually occurred.
Zambia's willingness to conclude a new arms agreement with the
Soviets in the wake of their invasion of Afghanistan is in strong
contrast to President Kaunda's previous efforts to keep the Soviets at a
distance and particularly to criticize what he considered aggressive
behavior. The military accord reportedly involves as much as $75
million worth of equipment, including MIG-21 fighter aircraft and SA-3
surface-to-air missiles. The deal represents Moscow's ability to ex-
ploit Kaunda's fear of continuing instability in the region, including
possible border penetrations by both South Africans and Zimbabweans.
The deal could also lead to an increase in the Soviet an East European
advisory presence in Zambia
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SUBJECT: Soviet Activities Affecting US Interests
Distribution:
Copy #1 - The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
#2 - DCI
#3 - DDCI
#4 - Executive Registry
#5 - NSC/Presidential Briefing Coordinator
#6 - D/NFAC
#7 - DD/NFAC
#8 - Exec. Secy, NFAC Production Board
#9 - NFAC/SRP
#10 - NFAC Registry
#11 - NI0/USSR-EE
#12 - D/OPA
#13 - D/OPA
#14 - OPA/PS
#15 - OPA/PS
#16 OPA/PS
#17 - PPG
#18 - PPG
#19 - PPG
#20 - OPA/USSR-EE (Chrono)
NFAC/0PA/USSR-EE (15Feb80)
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