(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100340001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 11, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
11 February 1980
MEMORANDUM
CURRENT TRENDS IN SOVIET-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS
Summary
The USSR almost certainly hopes that its paramount
position in Ethiopia will facilitate the spread of
Soviet influence elsewhere in Africa and the Middle
East. Moscow thus sees Ethiopia as a valuable, although
not necessarily vital,' strategic asset that partially
offsets its losses in Egypt and Somalia.
Moscow has sought to insure the survival of the
Mengistu regime and extend Soviet influence over it
by supplying Addis Ababa with advisers and selected
military equipment and helping the Ethiopians against
the Eritreans--including the planning and overseeing,
and perhaps even the direction of Ethiopian tactical
operations.
A major. political aim of Soviet policy in Ethiopia
has been to create a vanguard Marxist party through
which Moscow could institutionalize the role of
political elements favorably inclined toward Moscow
and insure the permanence of its own influence in
Addis. Mengistu, however, has only grudgingly moved
This memorandum was written by
USSR-EE Division, Office of Political Analysis. It
was requested by Paul Henze, NSC Staff and was co-
ordinated with the Office of Strategic Research Office
of Economic Research and the National Intelligence
Officer for Africa. Research was completed on 8 February
Z980. Questions and comments are welcome and should be
directed to Chief, Soviet External Branch, OPA/USSR-EE
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in this direction. Other strains in Soviet-Ethiopian
relations include Soviet urgings that Addis find a
political solution to the Eritrean war and friction
over the adequacy of Soviet military and economic aid.
Soviet, Cuban, and East German objectives in
Ethiopia are closely complementary. The Soviets
underwrite the costs of the Cuban military commitment.
The East Germans provide technical assistance
For the foreseeable future, Moscow will continue
to provide military support for Ethiopia in Eritrea and
the Ogaden, despite its reservations over some of Addis'
tactics. Moscow will continue to try to tighten the
Mengistu regime's political hold on the country. In
doing so, it will also try to strengthen its influence
over the government.
Moscow probably sees closer ties with Ethiopia as
a useful counter to an expanded US presedence in the
Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean. Closer Soviet
relations with Addis can also be an important source of
pressure on other nations in the region, especially the
Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti.
The USSR and Ethiopia: An Update
Despite occasional differences between Moscow and Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia remains the focus of Soviet policy in East
Africa. Moscow hopes to consolidate the Mengistu regime's
hold on power and insure that the USSR remains the dominant
foreign influence in Ethiopia. In the longer term, the
Soviets probably see their position in Ethiopia as a key
element in their efforts to enhance their position in the
Red Sea region and sub-Saharan Africa.
Over the last two years the general thrust of Soviet
policy has been to insure that the Mengistu regime and
a unified Ethiopia survive. At the same time, the Soviets
have attempted to transform what could best be called a
marriage of convenience into a more lasting relationship
through the institutionalization of Moscow's role in Ethiopian
military and political affairs.
SECRET
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Expanding Soviet Military Role
Much of Moscow's energy has been directed at supporting
Ethiopia's military campaigns in the Ogaden and Eritrea.
Although scattered fighting persists in the Ogaden and
apparently still requires the presence of large numbers of
Cuban troops, Soviet attention has centered on Eritrea for
more than a year. To a great degree this has been the
result of Addis' refusal to accept anything less than a
military solution to the Eritrean problem. For some time
the Soviets have urged the Ethiopians to seek a negotiated
settlement and have advocated a vaguely defined federation
in which Eritrea would presumably enjoy considerable autonomy.
Given Addis' resistance to a political settlement, the
Soviets have had little choice but to aid Ethiopian efforts
to achieve a military solution. This, in turn, has led to
a growing Soviet advisory role in the fighting.
Soviet Efforts to Consolidate the Revolution
The Soviets and their East German allies have encouraged
Mengistu to channel the Ethiopian revolution along increasingly
Marxist lines. Moscow's goal is to formalize Ethiopia's
ideological identification with the USSR and to institu-
tionalize those political elements oriented toward Moscow.
Moscow's primary interest is the establishment of a
Marxist-Leninist political party in Ethiopia. Such a party
would broaden the base of the Provisional Military Administrative
Council (PMAC) beyond the military. and help perpetuate
Moscow's influence. Moscow has long been uncomfortable with
its reliance on a military junta and has for some time urged
creation of such a party.
As early as the fall of 1978, there were indications
that the USSR was impatient with Ethiopian foot dragging on
this issue.
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No progress was seen until Kosygin's trip to Ethiopia in
September 1979. At that time, Mengistu stated that a
commission to study the creation of a party would soon be
formed; its establishment was finally announced in December.
According to a US Embassy source, the formation of such
a commission was Moscow's price for further military assistance
in Eritrea. The Soviets are still apparently unhappy with
the pace of progress, however; as recently as 19 January, a
Soviet broadcast reiterated the need for creating a "vanguard
party" in Ethiopia.
Ethiopian reluctance to move quickly on this issue is
probably the result of PMAC fears of losing power to a
civilian establishment. Ethiopian leaders, including Mengistu,
may also be suspicious of Soviet intentions. The Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan may have sharpened Mengistu's con-
cerns about the risks entailed in a close Soviet embrace
(the Ethiopians, however, have supported the Soviet action
in international forums).
East German and Cuban Cooperation
East German and Cuban activity in Ethiopia continues
o supplement that of the USSR.
cpcppm
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The East Germans may also have helped the Ethiopians
frame their "voluntary" agricultural collectivization program.
The Ethiopian Government probably will press to insure the
program's success, primarily through land reform and the
granting of aid to collectives in an effort to make them
more attractive than private operations.
Prospects for continued close cooperation between Addis
and Havana are good. Over the next few years Cuba, in
conjunction with its Soviet allies, will try to safeguard
its investment in the future of Marxism in Ethiopia. In
mid-December 1979, Cuba and Ethiopia signed a protocol on
economic cooperation in which Cuba agreed to help reorganize
Ethiopia's Ministry of Mines as well as provide assistance
in energy and water resource ro'ects.
We estimate that approximately 13,000 Cuban combat
troops are currently stationed in Ethiopia. They are mainly
located in the Ogaden and near the Somali border. A sig-
nificant reduction is unlikely in the near future. Cuba
also aids Ethiopia in health, agriculture, intelligence,
and a variety of other areas, including the provision of
training for 2,300. Ethiopian students in Cuba.
Friction Over Military and Economic Assistance
Like many other Third World recipients of Soviet military
aid, the Ethiopians have complained of the cost of maintenance
and the scarcity of spare parts.
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 z .t?m
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Differences have also arisen over economic aid.
During Kosygin's September visit, Moscow reportedly promised
aid for a number of projects including a cement plant near
Dire Dawa. Soviet aid promises, however, apparently fell
far short of what the Ethiopians sought. Moscow, for
example, refused to help construct an oil refinery at
Mojo, arguing that present refinery capacity was more than
adequate to meet Ethiopia's needs. Although the Soviets
have taken over a European Community agricultural project,
they have refused to finance several other projects that had
been under consideration by various West European governments.
In addition, the Ethiopians have claimed the Soviets
are buying Ethiopian coffee well below the market price.
For its part Moscow has publicly described Ethiopian economic
planning as inadequate.
While they are reluctant to commit many rubles to
economic development, the Soviets have enthusiastically
pursued other activities designed to strengthen ties with
Ethiopia. Hardly a week has gone by in which a Soviet,
Cuban, or East European delegation has not visited Addis.
The visit last November of East German party chief Honecker,
for example, resulted in the signing of a treaty of friend-
ship and cooperation. With the exception of its accords
with Mozambique and India, East Germany has signed such
agreements only with socialist bloc countries. In addition,
from 27 October to 25 November, no less than 33 cultural,
sport, technical, and economic cooperation visits were
conducted, including the dispatch of a group of Ethiopian
students to Cuba.
Prospects
For the foreseeable future, much of the Soviet effort
in Ethiopia will be directed at insuring the Mengistu regime's
hold on the country. While the Soviets may still seek some
sort of negotiated settlement to the Eritrean problem, they
will almost certainly continue to provide the central
government with the means to pursue a military solution.
There are currently 1,000 Soviet Military Advisers in Ethiopia;
given continued fighting in Eritrea, there is little chance
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this number will decline. Should the Ogaden or Tigre
situation heat up, the Soviet advisory mission might be
expanded.
If a Marxist political party is formed, Moscow probably
will try to increase its influence in the civilian side of
the government as well.
Fthe Soviets will
probably try to place additional advisers in the ministries
much as it did in Somalia, Angola, and Afghanistan.
The Soviets will continue to view their relations with
Ethiopia in the context of broader strategic and regional
considerations. They probably are pleased with the success
of their efforts to create an interlocking network of friendship
and cooperation treaties between the USSR, East Germany, Ethiopia,
and South Yemen. They must be further gratified by their
success in securing a presence on the eastern end of the Red
Should the US increase its presence in the Red Sea and
Indian Ocean in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
the Soviets will probably seek greater use of ports both in
Ethiopia and South Yemen. The harbor on Dahlak Island which
the Soviets have improved and used for occasional naval port
calls, could be particularly useful. In any case, Moscow's
stake in Ethiopia is bound to grow. Ultimately, the Soviets
probably see their ties to Ethiopia as a means of influencing
or exerting leverage on other states in the region, particularly
the Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti. Should Somali President
Siad succeed in gaining significant US support, Moscow would
probably encourage Ethiopia to increase pressure on his
regime through the training and infiltration of Somali
dissidents. Similarly, increased US naval use of Djibouti
could lead Moscow and Addis to increase their contacts with
anti-US elements there.
In the longer term, Moscow may view Ethiopia as a
valuable asset not only in the Horn but throughout sub-
Saharan Africa as well. Given Mengistu's revolutionary
pretensions and traditional Ethiopian foreign policy aims,
Addis would be a willing ally and partner. Ethiopia has
already trained Rhodesian Patriotic Front guerrillas and
suggested that it sees a larger role for itself in southern
Africa. Any such entrance onto a larger stage, however,
will have to await pacification at home.
SECRET
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SUBJECT: Current Issues and Trends in Soviet-Ethiopian
Relations
Original - Paul Henze (NSC)
1 - D/NFAC
1 - DD/NFAC
1 - NFAC/Registry
1 - SA/DCI/PB
1 - NFAC/SRP
2 - OPA/PS
3 - P&PG
1 - OPA/AF
1 - OPA/USSR-EE Chrone
1 - OPA/USSR-EE/E
1 - NIO/AF
1 - NIO/USSR-EE
NFAC/OPA/USSR-EE~
kFebruary 1980 25X1
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