BALUCHISTAN: A PRIMER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100050001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 10, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
10 January 1980
Summary
Pakistan and Iran have long believed that the USSR
hopes someday to win control of Baluchistan and thereby
gain warm water ports. There is no evidence that the
Soviets have taken recent steps to support the Baluchis,
but the Baluchis themselves view the major Soviet presence
in Afghanistan as intimidating to Pakistan and as a way
of extracting concessions from the government in Islamabad.
The area in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan inhabited
by some three million Baluchi tribesmen is arid, with few
natural resources and is important primarily because of
its strategic location near oil routes from the Persian
Gulf. The society is tribal, and rivalries among its
many tribes tend to dominate its politics. The Baluchis
have always resented outside control, and if they believed
conditions favorable, many would support efforts to win
independence. Baluchistan has no good natural harbors
and there is only one modern road--in Iran--from the
USSR to the coast.
This memorandum was prepared by the office of
Political Anatysis and the Office of Geographic and
Cartographic Research. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Afghanistan
Task Force,
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The Area and Its People
Baluchistan is an ethnic region spanning the borders of
three countries: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Somewhat
over three million people, generally referred to as Baluchis
inhabit this area. Around 600,000 live in the Iranian pro-
vince of Sistan va Baluchistan. A few--perhaps around
25,000--live in scattered areas from the lower Helmand River
valley northward to Herat in Afghanistan. In Pakistan's
Baluchistan Province, there are more than one million Baluchi
speakers, and another 700,000 Brahui speaking tribesmen, who
differ from the Baluch in little except language. Almost a
million Baluchi speakers are significant minorities in ad-
joining areas of Sind and Punjab Provinces in Pakistan.
Most Baluchi are nomadic herdsmen, some raise fruits and
small grains in irrigated oases, and a few are traders or
Baluchistan has a feudal social structure, tribally
organized, that emphasizes allegiance to a paramount chief
(a sardar) in return for protection and the provision of
justice, the tenets of their Sunni Muslim faith, and a
tribal code that demands vengeance and retribution for
perceived wrongs. On the other hand obligatory hospitality--
under certain conditions--is extended to friend and foe
alike. These traditions are strongest among the larger,
more powerful Baluchi tribes in Pakistan, especially the
Marris, the Bugtis, and a related group, the Mengals. There
the feudal structure, particularly the leadership system
represented by the institution of the sardar has been under
attack by the Pakistani government as an obstacle to assimi-
lation of the tribesmen into the mainstream of Pakistani
political life.
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Ethnic frictions are part of the rebellious Pakistani
Baluchis attitudes. Tensions exist between Baluchis and
aggressive Pushtun tribal groups who inhabit the mountains
,north of Quetta, exacerbated by the influx during the past
year of large numbers of refugees from Afghanistan who are
also mostly Pushtuns. Baluchis resent the colonial-style
overlordship of the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani government,
and the massive presence of the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani
Army. The Baluchis blame the government--equated to Punjabis--
for the economic underdevelopment of Baluchistan, for the
dearth of water development projects benefitting Baluchis,
and for allowing Punjabi and Sindi settlers to migrate into
newly opened irrigation projects in Baluchistan. They also
resent the almost total exclusion of Baluchis (and the pre-
dominance of Punjabis) in the state government, the local
police force, and in other positions of authority. Baluchis
feel that the small but growing number of Baluchi college
graduates are qualified to fill many of these posts.
The economic factor has assumed greater importance in
recent years. As an ethnic minority in each of the countries,
a major Baluchi grievance has been the low level of economic
development in tribal territory compared to other areas in
each state. In Iran, the development programs of the Shah's
government included Baluchi territory, and the jobs created
by construction activity (primarily military-related)
produced a degree of prosperity that tended to mollify
Baluchi demands for autonomy there, though a small but
sometimes active expatriate undergorund movement occasionally
was heard from. In Pakistan, Baluchis see most development
funds benefitting the army. Quetta is a major Pakistani
Army post established by the British as a frontier fort, the
location of which controls the passes and routes from the
Afghanistan frontier that lead to the Indus plains. Other
Pakistani military posts at strategic sites monitor activities
of the frequently rebellious local tribesmen. The presence
of numerous military bases and installations aggravates
Baluchi sensitivities and underlines the role of the military
as an army of occupation and as enforcers of martial law.
Politics in Baluchistan
Political activity in Baluchistan has been confined
largely to Pakistani Baluchistan. The Iranian Baluchis,
poor, isolated, and with few educated leaders have seldom
been affected by the central government, and have depended
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on Tehran's economic aid. It was not until after the fall
of the Shah, when the central government appeared to be both
a threat to their way of life and vulnerable to Baluch
agitation, that the Iranian Baluchis formed their first
political party. The Afghan Baluchis, a small minority,
have never been politically significant.
Politics in Pakistani Baluchistan is basically a
function of group rivalries at different levels. The Pathans
in the northern part of the province are against Baluchis in
the south; in the south, the Baluchi and the Brahui against
the minor ethnic groups and the immigrants from other parts
of Pakistan; and among the many Baluch and Brahui tribes and
sub-tribes. Besides the Pathans, Pakistani census reports
mention 42 Baluchi tribes, 15 Brahui tribes, and 62 belonging
to neither ethnic group. Within each tribe, of course,
there are also rivalries.
.Any political activity is often influenced by all of
these rivalries simultaneously. Rivalries within the province
have prevented any unified action in the past and outsiders
have always found allies among those who were more interested
in evening scores with local rivals than in issues of wider
concern.
Probably the two basic political issues in Baluchistan
are its relations of the tribes with the central government
and the role of the tribal chiefs.
Almost everyone in the province would agree that
Baluchistan has been the victim of exploitation by the
Punjabis and other outsiders. Most political leaders, if
given a free choice, would probably opt for independence--as
part of a greater Baluchistan--or an extreme form of autonomy
within Pakistan. Many of them have recognized, however,
that such goals are unrealistic and they have striven for
more modest objectives. With substantial outside help--for
example from the USSR--or conditions elsewhere that prevented
Islamabad from making an effort to hold Baluchistan, they
might well try to achieve independence.
The most important factor limiting Baluchi aspirations
has been the power of the central government in Islamabad,
particularly its willingness to use force if necessary to
control the Baluchis. Even were they united, the Baluchi
tribesmen would have little chance of winning independence
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SECRET
as long as Islamabad made a serious effort to hold the prov-
ince. Even during the most serious past tribal rebellions
only a small part of the Pakistani armed forces have been
required to contain the insurgents. The Pakistanis have
been able to control any part of the province they consider
important. The tribes have been able to hold out in remote
areas, partly because Islamabad has not thought it worth
the cost of going after them.
Although some may draw parallels between the success
of Afghan insurgents against the regular army there, such
parallels can be misleading. The Pakistani army is far more
professional, disciplined and better led than the Afghan army
was. Unlike the Afghan counterparts, Pakistani troops--
primarily Punjabis--have no reason to identify with the tribes-
men or sympathize with their causes. Moreover, some of the
most valuable parts of the province are in or near Pathan
areas, and so unlikely to be seriously affected by a Baluchi
revolt. (A Pathan rebellion, in conjunction with the Pathans
in the North-West Frontier Province, would be a far more
serious threat to Pakistan.)
Baluchi leaders have also been concerned about the
viability of an independent Baluchistan, and its vulnerability
to outside interference. Additionally, fears that independence
would lead to dominance by rival tribes, or by leftists who
would ultimately eliminate the tribal system have also tem-
pered the views of the politicians, most of them tribal chiefs.
Although they still seem to speak for Baluchistan, the
power of the traditional leaders has been eroding steadily.
Student and leftist organizations are becoming more influ-
ential. In local elections held last year, Bhutto's Pakistan
People's Party for the first time made significant gains in
Baluchistan, a vote many interpret as directed against the
tribal chiefs.
Although any final decision in Baluchistan is still
likely to be made by the tribal leaders, they will probably
be under growing pressure from the left and others to do
something to win more concessions from Islamabad, or even
independence for Baluchistan. The chiefs could react by
seeking to bolster their position with support from the central
government, but their past history makes it more likely that
they will seek help elsewhere. Moreover, their perception
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SECRET
of the difficulties of achieving independence is changing
rapidly, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan bringing
potential great power help closer and domestic turmoil in
Iran loosening Tehran's hold on its Baluchis.
The Pakistanis have long feared that Russia's age-old
interest in securing a warm water port would encourage the
Soviets to give all-out backing to an Afghan government
effort to secure "independence and freedom" for Pakistani
Pushtuns. The fears date back at least to 1956 when Moscow
did provide some diplomatic and propaganda backing to
Afghanistan when it chose to confront Pakistan on the
Pushtunistan issue. Moscow however, appears to have sup-
ported the Afghans primarily out of its desire to curry
.favor with the Afghan government and to intimidate an ally
of the US, not out of intrinsic interest in the issue itself.
The Afghans, not necessarily
with Soviet encouragement, have been involved for years with
separatists across the border, and some separatist leaders
who fled to Afghanistan in the early 1970s are still in
There is no evidence in the aftermath of the Soviet
interventions in Afghanistan that either the Soviets or
Afghans have been in contact with the Baluchis or that they
have otherwise provided them support. Pakistan is aware,
however, that Soviet troops in the Qandahar area are only
200 kilometers from Quetta in the heart of Pakistani Baluchistan.
some Baluchi leaders see the 25X1
nearby Soviet presence as intimidating to the Pakistanis and
thus providing them an opportunity to press Pakistan for
much greater autonomy. 25X1
The Soviet military movement into Afghanistan revives
speculation concerning the century-old Russian quest for a
warm-water port. Although the Baluchi coastline, extending
for nearly 1,000 kilometers, lacks good natural harbors, it
does have several small ports currently used by local fishing
boats and by sea-going dhows that serve points in the Persian
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vuya~L i
The best port for development along the Baluchistan
coast is at Chah Bahar in the Iranian province of Baluchistan
va Sistan. The former Shah had envisioned a small naval
facility there from which shipping in the Gulf of Oman could
be monitored and that would augment Iran's major naval base
at Bandar Abaas on the Strait of Hormuz. Although the naval
installations and port improvements necessary for it never
got beyond the planning stage, considerable work was completed
on the airbase. The approximately 3,000-meter runways are
operable, though only limited support facilities had been
completed.
The major advantage of Chah Bahar over other ports on
the Baluchi coast is that during the summer monsoon the sea
approaches to Chah Bahar experience more subdued sea conditions.
Nevertheless, much of the embayment at Chah Bahar is open to
onshore surf, and heavy surf is typical of the northern
shore of the bay. Some protection for anchorages is afforded
by headlands on either side of the bay, at the small town of
Chah Bahar on the east side, and at Konarak on the west side
where the naval facility was to have been constructed.
Depths in the bay range up to six. fathoms. 25X1
The Baluchi ports in Pakistan, principally at Gwadar
and Pasni, are less promising for development. only small
fishing settlements are located there, they lack good road
access, and heavy sea conditions frequently preclude their
use during the southwest monsoon months. The ferry supply
ship between Karachi and Gwadar, for example, does not
operate during the summer months.
Access to the Baluchistan coast from Afghanistan is
limited to an eastern and western route separated by several
hundred kilometers of difficult and largely uninhabited
country possessing no through north-to-south roads. The
eastern route from southeastern Afghanistan connects Qandahar,
via Quetta, to Karachi; the western route leads from Herat
in western Afghanistan to Mashhad in Iran, then southward to
Chah Bahar.
The best road access from southeastern Afghanistan to
the Indian Ocean is the paved all-weather route from Qandahar
via Chaman to Quetta in Pakistan, and thence to Karachi.
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A railroad parallels the route within Pakistan. This is a
principal route for Afghanistan's imports and exports.
The western route from Afghanistan to Chah Bahar runs
from Herat to Mashhad in Iran along a segment of the Pan-
Asian highway (Istanbul to Dacca in Bangladesh), thence
southward over an all-weather road to Chah Bahar via Zahedan
and Iranshahr. The section of the road between Chah Bahar
and Zahedan in Baluchistan via Nikshahr, Iranshahr, and
Kash--a distance of about 845 kilomenters--was completed
several years ago. Thus, all-weather roads provide a
connection with the rail terminus at Kushka in the Soviet
Union by a relatively direct route to the limited capacity
port at Chah Bahar on the Indian Ocean overlooking the Gulf
of Oman.
An alternate route branches from the main road north of
Zahedan. From here to the border town of Zabol, a distance
of about 128 kilometers, the road was being improved. Some
sections have been upgraded to two lanes, with a bituminous
surface, but the remainder is still under construction. In
Afghanistan, the first 20 kilometers of the road between
the Iran border and Delaram is one-lane, but has been
improved by bituminous surface treatment. The carrying
capacity of the route in Afghanistan is low.
Between the two major routes no through north-to-south
roads exist. This is the heart of Baluchistan where the
terrain alternates between sandy to salt-baked clay basins
and low east-west trending mountain ranges that generally
parallel the coast. Lack of water and searing heat and
high-velocity winds in summer added to its moonscape appear-
ance have deterred development in spite of its location as
a historic bridge between the Middle East and the sub-
continent of India. There is, however, one modern east-
west route. A road and a railroad traverse the region between
Quetta and the Iranian border, where the road continues into
the Iranian portion of Baluchistan at the transport junction
at Zahedan.
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Distribution;
Original DCI
1 D/NFAC
1 DDCI
1
1 N I O/NvISA
1 NIO/USSR
1 D/OSR
1 D/OPA
1 C/BESA
1 OGCR
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