FIGHTING IN INDOCHINA: REACTIONS AND OPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 2, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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2 January 1980
FIGHTING IN INDOCHINA: REACTIONS AND OPTIONS
This memorandum was prepared by East 25X1
Asia-Pacific Division, Office of Political Analysis, National
Foreign Assessment Center, at the request of Richard Holbrooke,
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs. It was based on contributions provided by analysts
in the East Asia-Pacific-and USSR Divisions of the Office of
Political Analysis and in the Office of Strategic Research.
Research was based on information available as of 19 December
1979. The memorandum has been coordinated with the Office
of Economic Research and the National Intelligence Officers
for China/East Asia/Pacific and USSR/Eastern Europe. Com-
ments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to
Chief, Southeast Asia Branch, Office of Political Ana
National Foreign Assessment Center, 25X1
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CFf RFT
The future actions of protagonists in the Indochina
arena will depend upon the outcome of the current dry-
season campaign in Kampuchea. The Vietnamese will be able
to reduce Kampuchean resistance to a tolerable level for
the time being at least, but, because of deeply felt anti-
Vietnamese animosities harbored by all Kampucheans, the in-
effectiveness of the Heng Samrin regime, and the continued
Chinese willingness to resupply the insurgents, resistance
in some form will continue and will probably require Viet-
nam to maintain a large occupying army for the foreseeable
future. Vietnam may invade Thailand to attack resistance
bases there and possibly "teach a lesson" to the Thai mili-
tary. Hanoi is determined to achieve hegemony over the whole
of Indochina regardless of economic cost and international
The Chinese will probably not try to salvage the exist-
ing fragmented Kampuchean resistance by mounting a second
invasion of Vietnam. They are likely to administer a "sec-
ond lesson" to Vietnam only in the event Hanoi attacks
Thailand in force and threatens the Bangkok regime. China
has other ways of bringing pressure to bear on Vietnam,
ranging from intensifying its present resupply and orga-
nizational efforts with the Kampuchean insurgents, through
increasing its diplomatic and economic activities, to sup-
i
port
ng or creating resistance in Laos.
The Soviets will take military action against China
only if Beijing mounts a sustained second invasion of
Vietnam that endangers Hanoi. Otherwise, the Soviets
will continue to supply Vietnam with large quantities of
military and economic aid in order to help Hanoi deter or
repel a second Chinese invasion. Most Soviet leaders wish
to avoid armed conflict with China for fear it would hamper
Soviet efforts elsewhere in the world and lead to a wider
conflict. Others, however, feel that Soviet prestige would
suffer if the USSR failed to respond militarily to another
Chinese invasion of Vietnam. If the Soviets decided mili-
tary action was appropriate, they could engage Beijing in
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4F.C'.RFT
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at
present is united in its opposition to Vietnamese control
over Kampuchea. Its unity may be put to the test, however,
because of Thailand's tilt toward China, which conflicts
with ASEAN nonalignment and the perception of some members
that is a long-term threat to regional security.
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Vietnam's dry-season campaign is entering a new phase.
An estimated 200,000 Vietnamese troops are preparing to
launch large-scale clearing operations to eliminate all
Kampuchean resistance, especially in the western provinces
The fighting is likely to spill over into Thailand. In-
deed, Hanoi believes that resistance guerrillas operate from
sanctuaries in Thailand. If it does not eliminate all Kam-
puchean resistance during the current dry season and faces a
protracted and costly guerrilla war, Hanoi might decide it
must destroy guerrillas in Thailand. Vietnam has ample air
and ground forces in Kampuchea that could be deployed for
this purpose. Accidental clashes, leading to a greater
degree of tension, could also occur along the ill-defined
Thai-Kampuchean border.
For their part, the forces of Pol Pot's Democratic
Kampuchea will avoid major military confrontations by
operating in small groups and sending larger units into
relatively safe areas in the mountains and rain forest.
They must also resolve problems of feeding themselves,
distributing Chinese-provided supplies to small, isolated
units, maintaining a communications network, and opening
new infiltration and resupply routes to and from Thailand.
Non-Communist anti-Vietnamese resistance groups report-
edly conduct reconnaissance and organizational operations
in western Kampuchea and have bases in refugee camps astride
the Thai border. Clashes have taken place in the past be-
tween these guerrillas and Pol Pot's forces in some areas,
although in others they now appear to have an understanding
that defines areas of operational responsibility. The non-
Communist resistance groups have neither a political front
nor a unified military command. Nevertheless, they see
themselves as potential flagbearers of Kampuchean resist-
ance if Pol Pot's forces should be eliminated, and thus they
represent a valuable long-term resource for the Chinese
and the Thais.
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The Vietnamese, with their superiority in numbers,
firepower, and mobility, will be able to deal heavy blows
to Kampuchean resistance during the current campaign and,
for the time being at least, will probably reduce it to
tolerable levels. In this instance, Hanoi will be able
to declare a victory; international recognition of Pol Pot
will decline rapidly, and, led by countries like India, many
states will accept the inevitable and recognize Heng Samrin.
Over the long haul, however, historic and deeply in-
grained anti-Vietnamese animosities, coupled with the
Chinese willingness to support all anti-Vietnamese guer-
rillas, should ensure that resistance in some form will
continue indefinitely. The repressive policies of the
Vietnamese, especially their unwillingness or inability
to feed people in many areas, and their reported contempt
for the Heng Samrin leadership will probably preclude the
early establishment of an effective puppet regime able to
administer the country and assume responsibility for in-
ternal security.
The major imponderable, along with the degree and
effectiveness of Chinese pressure, is the extent to which
Vietnam is willing to accept heavy political, economic,
and military sacrifices over a considerable period of
time to achieve hegemony over Indochina. Past experience
has shown that the stubborn, unified leadership--supported
by a population, in the north at least, inured to hardship
by more than three decades of war--will not easily crumble
or compromise on long-held goals. Continued support from
the Soviet Union will strengthen Hanoi's resolve. Adverse
international opinion, so far only a marginal factor, might
cause Vietnam to modify its tactics, but is unlikely to
force Hanoi to disavow its goal of a Vietnamese-dominated
At the end of the current dry-season campaign, Viet-
nam will probably take several short-term measures to con-
solidate its position:
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-- Embark on a major propaganda campaign stressing
the "reality" of Heng Samrin rule, at the same
time making serious attempts to strengthen it.
The population, weakened by malnutrition and
disease, will probably remain docile for the time
being.
-- Remove some Vietnamese troops, again in the
glare of maximum propaganda.
-- Carry out a reported plan to resettle persons
from overcrowded areas of Vietnam in Kampuchea.
If accomplished, this would further improve the
security situation for the time being--although
it would also fuel Kampuchean resentment of the
Vietnamese.
-- Try to influence world opinion, especially that
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN),* by promising that Hanoi will not in-
terfere in the internal affairs of other coun-
tries and claiming it has no territorial designs
elsewhere in the region. Hanoi is likely to be
tough minded in dealing with these states, and
may make demands on Thailand in particular to
modify its present pro-China policy.
Thereafter, Vietnamese actions will depend on the nature
of Kampuchean resistance and the ability of the guerrillas
to sustain a protracted struggle. Hanoi will have four
options, listed in descending order of probability:
-- Maintain a large occupying army for the foresee-
able future, possibly making token reductions
with maximum propaganda exposure. This option
would result in a war of attrition with a cyclical
pattern of intensity depending on the weather.
The Kampuchean people would be subjected to con-
tinuing violence, starvation, and disruption.
More than ever, they would tend to seek refuge
in Thailand.
* A group of non-Communist states comprising Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines.
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-- Withdraw the majority of Vietnamese troops and
seek to strengthen the Heng Samrin regime using
remaining forces as a prop, with the expectation
that some resistance is inevitable. The danger
to Hanoi is that the reduced troop level and the
ineffectiveness of the puppet government would
allow resistance to burgeon.
-- Negotiate a compromise settlement and withdraw
Vietnamese troops after a period of time. Hanoi
would find this difficult to accept: it has
stated publicly that the position of the Heng
Samrin regime is "irreversible." Furthermore,
because of across-the-board Kampuchean animosity,
Vietnamese influence with any successor govern-
ment would not be assured unless Hanoi maintained
a large military presence.
-- Withdraw Vietnamese troops completely and leave
the country in the unreliable hands of the Heng
Samrin regime. The danger here is that resist-
ance groups would be able to increase their
strength rapidly, threaten Phnom Penh, and
raise the specter for Hanoi of the installation
of a new, Chinese-influenced government. In-
deed, under these circumstances, the Heng Samrin
government itself might be tempted to make a deal
with China and/or Thailand.
Chinese Objectives. China's basic objectives are
definable in short- and long-range terms. Over the next
few months, China wishes to ensure that Kampuchean resist-
ance will survive the dry season, and to prevent the con-
flict from spilling over the border into Thailand. Over
the long haul, China wants to prevent Vietnam from con-
solidating its hold on Indochina, to impel Hanoi away from
its close relationship with the Soviet Union, to force
Vietnam to acknowledge China as a major power in Southeast
Asia with legitimate regional interests, and coincidentally
to demonstrate to the United States and the West that the
Soviet Union and Vietnam can be successfully confronted.
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Chinese Reactions So Far. At present, China is sup-
porting anti-Vietnamese resistance forces in Kampuchea,
including non-Communist groups to a limited extent. It
is also planning to support, and, where necessary, create
an anti-regime resistance in Laos.
The Chinese are applying psychological and military
pressure on Vietnam by maintaining tensions along the
Sino-Vietnam border, thereby compelling Hanoi to remain
in a state of general mobilization. This exacts a con-
siderable sacrifice in terms of men and resources and
inhibits Vietnam's reconstruction and development.
At the same time, China is attempting to isolate Viet-
nam diplomatically by playing on the themes of Vietnamese
expansionism and repression (that is, the refugee exodus
and famine in Kampuchea) in international forums. China
is also trying to discourage potential foreign investors
and aid donors from involvement in Hanoi's economy.
Beijing tries to demonstrate its own reasonableness by
maintaining the formality of border talks with the Viet-
Finally, China is trying to foster a split in the
Vietnamese leadership by applying a variety of pressures
intended to convince some in Hanoi to question present
Vietnamese policy.
Chinese Options in the Future. If Vietnam succeeds
in substantially weakening the Kampuchean resistance by
the end of the present dry season, China will be unlikely
to remain quiescent. Beijing's options will be limited,
however. It will do its utmost to ensure that the resist-
ance continues. It probably will also seek to use the
thousands of Kampuchean refugees in Thailand as a base
on which to organize new resistance. China will also con-
tinue its attempts to isolate Vietnam politically and
economically. It will probably move to strengthen its
relations with non-Communist Southeast Asian states and
try to persuade them to act in concert to defend them-
selves against a long-term Vietnamese threat to regional
security.
There are not many circumstances that might cause
Beijing to go beyond these activities and mount a second
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invasion of Vietnam. It might do so if it decided Viet-
namese military successes in Kampuchea were impugning
China's credibility as an "ally" and regional power. The
Chinese may, however, have concluded that the first in-
vasion was too costly and even so did not force a Viet-
namese withdrawal from Kampuchea; China probably also
realizes a second invasion would not save Pol Pot. It
may feel that even the collapse of anti-Vietnamese resist-
ance would not itself represent sufficient grounds for
a second lesson.
The Chinese might also feel a "second lesson" was
called for if Vietnam drove deep into Thailand, threat-
ened the Bangkok regime, caused heavy Thai casualties,
and occupied Thai territory. Recent public statements
by senior Chinese officials, including Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping, tend to link China's credibility to Thailand's
territorial integrity. China has been careful, however,
not to commit itself to any specific course of action,
in order both to avoid precipitous involvement from which
it would have trouble extricating itself and to keep the
Vietnamese off balance.
Should China decide a second lesson was required,
it need not necessarily repeat its large-scale offen-
sive along the length of the border.
Beijing's options in case of a second lesson
-- Mounting a heavy ground strike against one or
more major targets inside Vietnam, such as the
border city of Mong Cai, which suffered rela-
tively little damage during the February inva-
sion, or against specific economic targets
along Vietnam's northeast coast. After de-
stroying its objective, China could once again
withdraw.
-- Striking through Laos, a course that would have
the advantage of demonstrating Hanoi's weakness
as a protector but would accomplish little mili-
tarily because of the nonstrategic nature of
available targets. This would be particularly
true if China limited its strike to the northern
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provinces, over which Vientiane, and by exten-
sion Hanoi, has little control. Furthermore,
the difficult nature of the terrain and the
logistic difficulties involved make it unlikely
that China would find this an attractive target.
A strike into Laos might also incur adverse
world and regional reaction; many countries
would feel China was committing aggression
against a small and neutral third party.
-- Launching a major airstrike against selected
Vietnamese targets. This would have the ad-
vantage of being highly visible, over quickly,
and less costly than ground operations. It
would have little impact, however, on Viet-
namese actions in Kampuchea or Thailand; should
many aircraft be lost to Vietnam's effective
air defense system, it could be portrayed as
a Chinese defeat.
-- Sending volunteers to fight in Kampuchea or
Thailand. This seems unlikely; China prob-
ably feels it is too late to deploy troops
to Kampuchea; and even if China were willing
to send troops to Thailand, Bangkok would
probably reject the offer.
-- Attacking Vietnamese forces in the Spratly
Islands. This would be difficult because
of equipment and support limitations; it would
also probably have little deterrent effect on
the Vietnamese and might involve political
repercussions because the Philippine Govern-
ment also claims several of the Spratly
Islands.
China and a Second Invasion. A number of deterrents
inhibit China from administering a large-scale "second
lesson":
-- The formidable buildup of Vietnamese forces,
increasingly equipped with modern Soviet weap-
ons, along the Sino-Vietnamese border, making
a second invasion even more costly than the
first.
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-- Possible divisions within the Chinese leader-
ship. The first invasion apparently caused
much debate before and after the event, al-
though it may also have been used by opponents
of Deng Xiaoping as a tactic, rather than an
issue of substance, to attack him. The poor
state of military equipment, reservations over
the effects of the first invasion on China's
diplomatic standing, and, above all, the costs
to other sectors of China's economy were is-
sues in the debate over tactics used against
Vietnam and would become so again in the
absence of a major Vietnamese attack on China.
-- Possible Soviet retaliation. Although the Soviets
did not respond militarily after the first inva-
sion, Chinese leaders may believe that Moscow would
be forced to do so next time because of intense
pressure from Vietnam. Fear of Soviet reprisals
alone, however, probably would not deter China.
-- Adverse world opinion. Another invasion by
China might create sympathy for Vietnam as the
underdog and also reinforce fears of the ASEAN
states--especially Indonesia and Malaysia--of
Chinese expansionism.
Indications and Warning. We are likely to detect
Chinese preparations for a major assault--either an at-
tack with limited objectives or a full-scale invasion--
against Vietnam or Laos. Chinese forces near the border
with Vietnam number between 150,000 and 200,000 men, and,
in view of the major Vietnamese buildup of forces north of
Hanoi since March, this number would not be adequate to
launch a successful major campaign. Any large Chinese
reinforcement effort, however, would take less time than
that for the February invasion because of experience
gained and because some logistic equipment was left near
We would be less likely to receive advance warning
if the Chinese chose to make a small thrust against a
single specific target because troops already in the
border area are probably enough to mount a localized as-
sault with a minimum of preparation.
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We would be unlikely to detect preparations for
small-scale operations in Laos. The Chinese maintain
limited defense troops along the border and a main force
division within 100 kilometers; these forces would be
enough to conduct shallow, small-scale harassment attacks
inside Laos.
The Chinese can easily and without warning, increase
the number of incidents along the Sino-Vietnamese border,
such as shallow ground penetrations or overflight of Viet-
namese territory by combat aircraft. China's naval presence
in the South China Sea could also be strengthened quickly.
The Soviets will not take military action against
China if China does not reinvade Vietnam. This section
discusses the options available to the Soviets in this
event and the factors that will influence their decision.
We emphasize, however, that the probability that Moscow
will need to exercise any of these options is as low as
the prospects for a second Chinese invasion of Vietnam.
Should the Chinese not invade, the Soviets will carry
on as they are doing at present--that is, sending mili-
tary equipment and a limited number of advisers to Viet-
nam, using Soviet aircraft to ferry troops and supplies
to Kampuchea, and supplying large amounts of economic aid,
including food, to ease the burden on Vietnam.
Current Soviet Assessmet. Publicly, the Soviets sup-
port Vietnam's contention that the victory of the Heng
Samrin regime in Kam uchea is "irreversible," but 0
some Soviet leaders privately doubt
that Vietnam will succeed in eliminating all Kampuchean
resistance during the current dry season and have predicted
that Vietnam may eventually be forced to negotiate a com-
promise.
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Moscow provides large amounts of military and eco-
nomic aid to Hanoi, hoping that a strong Vietnam will
deter or repel a second Chinese invasion and thus fore-
stall the need for a direct Sino-Soviet confrontation.
Since the February invasion, Moscow has reportedly de-
livered at least $500 million in military aid to Vietnam--
an amount that represents a tenfold increase over 1978
and is some 25 percent higher than all Soviet military
aid over the five preceding years. So far in 1979 the
Soviets have sent Vietnam more aircraft than in any single
year since 1954, plus some 200 tanks and 24 naval vessels.
Soviet Options If Chinese Reinvade Vietnam. The
Soviets could of course choose not to take military action
against the Chinese and instead intensify their present
efforts. Should Moscow decide to intervene militarily,
however, it could act against the Chinese either in Indo-
china or along the Sino-Soviet border.
If the Soviets chose to intervene in Indochina,
they could:
-- Deploy additional naval units to patrol the
coast off Vietnam.
-- Increase their military involvement, currently
limited to advisory roles and some combat sup-
port functions. They might step up their
activity either in Vietnam itself to support
Vietnamese troops in the Sino-Vietnamese border
area, or in Kampuchea to free Vietnamese troops
for combat against the Chinese. They could,
for instance, supply antiaircraft and ground
attack helicopter and fighter-bomber units.
-- Send to Vietnam a light division-size task
force, consisting of two airborne regiments
plus antitank and antiaircraft units. This
force could be sent rapidly, within a week,
and might be suitable for bolstering Viet-
namese positions against Chinese attacks.
-- Deploy to Vietnam a force equal to a Soviet
combined-arms army--a force of three to five
divisions plus supporting units totaling
around 50,000 to 60,000 men. This would take
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one or two months and would require a large,
unprecedented air and sea lift along a long
and vulnerable supply line. If there was suf-
ficient time, however, the force could de-
cisively influence the military situation.
Moscow could exercise a number of options along the
Sino-Soviet border in case of a second Chinese invasion
of Vietnam. Initially the Soviets could:
-- Launch a psychological campaign threatening
the use of force against China, including
propaganda and diplomatic warnings going be-
yond Soviet statements last February. At
that time, the Soviets merely warned China to
stop before it was too late and leaked to the
press a story that all Soviet troops had been
placed on alert.
-- Mount conspicuous military exercises along the
Sino-Soviet border. These would probably not
affect the situation in Vietnam but would
represent a powerful reminder of Soviet mili-
tary supremacy in the border area and also
would increase Soviet combat readiness.
If these measures were not successful, the Soviets
could:
-- Mount small-scale offensive operations--for
instance, reoccupy disputed riverine islands
or harass Chinese border guards--using some of
the approximately 60,000 well-armed KGB border
forces.
-- Launch punitive air attacks against military
and industrial targets throughout northern China.
The Soviets have air supremacy along the border;
there would be little immediate risk of major
Chinese retaliation in kind although a token
retaliatory strike is possible.
-- Launch regimental-size raids with relative
impunity against Chinese light infantry and
cavalry units in the border area. None of the
23 or 24 active Soviet divisions within 200
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kilometers of the border is manned at full war-
time strength, but most could field at least
one regimental-size unit within 24 hours and
could be brought up to strength within 48 hours
by mobilizing local reservists.
-- Launch a full-scale coordinated conventional
assault into northern Manchuria to destroy
selected military and industrial targets and
to seize Chinese territory. Moscow could then
try to exchange such territory for Vietnamese
land occupied by the Chinese.
How the Soviets Would Choose. Soviet decisionmaking
is based on a complex worldwide and long-term calculus of
interests. Policy toward Indochina does not proceed in a
regional vacuum: the possibility that Soviet military
action against China might bring about a long-range anti-
Soviet alliance between the United States and China, as
well as the implications of events like the invasion of
Afghanistan, need to be balanced against specific objec-
tives in Indochina.
There are few clues about what options the Soviets
would choose in the event of a second Chinese invasion
of Vietnam. Moscow's response would depend on the se-
verity of the Chinese action and the threat it posed to
the Vietnamese regime. If the Chinese military action
was more sustained than the first invasion, but did not
pose a direct threat to Hanoi, Moscow might adopt a more
threatening propaganda tone but would probably limit its
actions to intensifying the type of support it is already
providing.
Soviet decisionmaking would become immeasurably more
difficult if a Chinese invasion appeared open-ended. Most
Soviet leaders probably oppose multidivision operations
into China because of the danger of involvement in a pro-
longed ground war and escalation into a more widespread
conflict. These leaders, aware of the uncertainties in-
volved in a military move against the Chinese, especially
the United States' reaction thereto, would be anxious not
to impair important Soviet interests elsewhere in the
world and would also wish to keep open the possibility
of improving Sino-Soviet relations. They would probably
point out that Moscow's treaty commitments do not require
the USSR to come to the defense of the Vietnamese and in
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fact were phrased precisely to prevent Vietnam from em-
broiling the USSR in a wider war. They would question
whether any of the military options along the Sino-Soviet
border would necessarily compel a Chinese withdrawal from
Vietnam.
Some elements in the leadership, however, might wish
to teach China a lesson. They would argue for military
action along the Sino-Soviet border or for some degree
of Soviet military involvement in Indochina itself. In
their view, Moscow would pay a heavy political price if
it failed to come to the aid of its Vietnamese ally.
Furthermore, they would reason that the Soviets have
military supremacy and could deal with any possible
mediately detect the deployment of small numbers of Soviet
combat support units, pilots, or additional advisers to
either Vietnam or Kampuchea.
If the Soviets chose to move along the Sino-Soviet
border, they could launch small-scale ground attacks up
to regimental size or a large-scale air assault within
hours, and neither the United States nor China would be
able to detect preparations. A large-scale conventional
invasion of China would require several weeks' prepara-
tion and the mobilization of all forces along the border;
we would be able to detect such preparations soon after
they were under way.
Current Policy. The collective foreign policy of
the
Association of Southeast
Asia Nations since 1971
has
been based on the concept
of "Zone of Peace, Freedom,
and
Neutrality," which seeks
to accommodate the interests
of
the United States, China,
and the Soviet Union in the
region and thereby obtain their assurances that they
will not intervene militarily. To this end ASEAN mem-
bers are publicly committed to nonalignment. This
policy, and indeed the unity of ASEAN itself, may be
put to the test because of events in Indochina.
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Before the emergence of a powerful Vietnam, most
ASEAN states saw China as the major external threat.
All are now concerned that Vietnam in future may try to
export revolution. Several states, however, still fear
China's long-term intentions and may in time come to be-
lieve that a strong Indochina under Vietnamese control
would represent a useful counterweight to China. In the
meantime, because they see Thailand as their frontline
state on Indochina, they give prime weight to Bangkok's
policy recommendations. Some ASEAN members, however--
particularly Malaysia and Indonesia--fear that Thailand's
obvious tilt toward China could upset ASEAN neutralism,
increase Vietnam's animosity toward ASEAN, and encourage
Vietnam as well as the two Communist superpowers to in-
terfere in ASEAN's internal politics.
Thailand. Bangkok's policy at present is conver-
gent with that of China--that is, to try to bring about
a neutral Kampuchea (and Laos) free of Vietnamese con-
trol. It is increasingly concerned, however, at the
possibility of a Vietnamese retaliatory strike into Thai-
land and if this occurs would probably seek aid from the
Thailand is unlikely to encourage a negotiated set-
tlement in Kampuchea until military options based on re-
sistance guerrillas are exhausted. It might, however,
welcome a Vietnamese initiative for a compromise solu-
tion at the end of the dry-season campaign, believing that
this would constitute a defeat for Vietnam and signal
Hanoi's realization of its inability to eliminate Kam-
puchean resistance.
On the other hand, Thailand might change its pro-
resistance policy to one of recognition of the Heng
Samrin regime if:
-- A major Vietnamese cross-border attack on Thai
forces took place without a strong reaction--
that is, more than a verbal protest--from either
the United States or China; or
-- Vietnam eliminated all organized resistance
during the dry-season campaign.
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Other ASEAN States. Malaysia and Indonesia fear
China as a long-term threat because of domestic con-
siderations: Malaysia has a large (35 percent) ethnic
Chinese minority and a Communist insurgency controlled
by ethnic Chinese, and Indonesia believes that China
aided the Indonesian Communist Party's attempt to gain
control of the government in 1965. Both countries adopt
a cautious and nonconfrontational approach to Vietnam.
If Vietnamese troops effectively eliminated Kampuchean
resistance over the next few months, Malaysia and In-
donesia might press for a modification of the present
hardline policy in order to accommodate the new
reality.
Singapore, an island nation dependent upon free
sea lanes for its survival, sees the Soviet Union as the
major external threat, and is unhappy at Vietnam's re-
liance on Moscow. It believes that attempts at com-
promise with Vietnam will fail, and takes the strongest
anti-Vietnamese posture in ASEAN. Singapore urges the
establishment of an ASEAN security grouping or at least
increased cooperation on security matters within the
ASEAN framework. This is opposed by other ASEAN states,
especially Malaysia and Indonesia, for fear it might
Manila seems content to defer to the rest of ASEAN
and has made few public statements other than those gen-
erally in support of ASEAN policy. Because of its rela-
tive geographical isolation from the Indochina arena, its
security is least threatened--with the exception of its
dispute with Vietnam over ownership of part of the
Spratly Islands. Manila is unlikely to mount any initia-
tive that might undermine ASEAN unity and will probably
support the majority position, whatever the outcome in
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