NARCOTICS CONTROL IN PAKISTAN: PROBLEMS PERSIST

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• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Problems Persist
Narcotics Control in Pakistan:
An Intelligence Assessment
GI 84-10053
April 1984
copy 395
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 Narcotics Control in Pakistan:
Problems Persist
This paper was prepared b~
Strategic Narcotics Branch, Office of Global Issues.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, International Security Issues
Division, OGI
Secret
GI 84-10053
April 1984
 Key Judgments Pakistan is playing an increasingly dominant role in the Southwest Asian
Information available narcotics trade. Although much less opium is produced in Pakistan than in
as of! March 1984 either Afghanistan or Iran, much of the Afghan opium that enters the
was used in this report.
international narcotics market passes through or is processed into heroin in
Pakistan. Because of this flow, Pakistan has emerged as a major heroin
processing center. Pakistani traffickers probably now handle 25 to 30
percent of the heroin entering the United States and possibly more than
half of the heroin going to Europe. Heroin use in Pakistan has grown
rapidly as well: the addict population-negligible just three years ago- 25X1
Stepped-up antinarcotics efforts by Pakistani authorities in recent years
were initially successful in helping to cut opium production in Pakistan.
Progress on all fronts, however, has since-been stymied:
? Opium production in Pakistan, down markedly from the levels reached
in the late 1970s, is now in the hands of the most intransigent growers,
who resist government efforts to get them to abandon cultivation.
? Afghan poppy growers appear to have increased opium production
substantially over the past two years, ensuring an ample opium supply for
Pakistani traffickers.
? Pakistani traffickers are able to operate heroin laboratories in Landi
Kotal, the key Pakistani processing center near the Afghanistan border,
despite a November 1982 government-inspired crackdown by tribal
leaders. Tensions remain high as tribal traffickers and government
authorities clash over the narcotics issue. 25X1
Rather than risk a politically costly confrontation with militant tribesmen
in the North-West Frontier Province-the center of narcotics production
and processing in Pakistan-we believe authorities will instead put greater
effort into cracking down on domestic heroin peddlers in the larger cities
and on traffickers shipping heroin to the West. These efforts are likely to
lead to increased arrests and seizures, especially if Pakistani authorities
have access to the training needed to improve their investigative skills and
intelligence collection capabilities. Nevertheless, substantial. headway
against the lucrative drug trade is unlikely as long as opium and heroin re-
Secret
GI 84-10053
April 1984
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Figure 1
Opium-Growing Areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1983
r
4
BAdghts
I~PIr~Ktuld?
~' ' ~ Illlliu
I'''''Fed.
AdminI Tribal/
IAreal/
Norfhefn Areas
Indian Calm
i",
 the pressure of international publicity about Paki-
stan's role in heroin trafficking have led some Paki-
stani officials to urge more forceful action against
drug traffickers. Others are concerned that such
action would spark widespread hostilities in the al-
heroin refineries. Pakistani traffickers in this region By our estimate, production was only some 50 to 75
now handle 25 to 30 percent of the heroin entering the tons in 1982 and 45 to 60 tons in 1983, near) all
United States and possibly more than half of the produced in the merged and tribal areas
heroin going to Europe. During the past 18 months, as well as collateral information, we
Pakistani authorities have taken some action against estimate that the area under cultivation fell from
opium and heroin producers in the NWFP, but the 30,000 hectares in 1979 to approximately 3,000 hec-
caution taken to avoid provoking the militant tribes- tares in 1983. The precipitous drop in area under
men has hampered the ability of government authori- cultivation and in production is the result of two
ties to retard this trade. Domestic concern, heightened factors:
by a rapidly escalating heroin addiction problem, and
region in Pakistan, the outlet for large amounts of where provincial and federal laws prevail.
Afghan-grown opium, and the location of several
The Southwest Asian narcotics trade is now centered share authority with the militant Pushtun tribesmen,
in those areas of Pakistan's North-West Frontier or in the tribal areas along the Afghanistan border,
Province (NWFP) that are dominated by Pushtun where the government exercises little or no control.
Opium Availability
Vast amounts of opium-much of which is converted
into heroin for Southwest Asian, European, and US
markets-are available in Pakistan's North-West
Frontier Province. Some of the opium comes from
Pakistan, where a decline in production, under way
since 1980, appears to have bottomed out. Most,
however, comes from Afghanistan, where production
has expanded considerably over the.past two years,
Opium Production in Pakistan. Pakistan once was
the leading opium producer in the Golden Crescent,
but the size of the opium harvest has dropped sharply
in recent years. Pakistan's opium is produced princi-
pally in the North-West Frontier Province, where a
record 700 to 800 metric tons of opium were
harvested in 1979. According to US Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) sources, approximately
60 to 65 percent of this crop was grown in the
province's merged areas, where the government must
Opium brokers, responding to the glutted market
occasioned by record production in the late 1970s,
dropped the price they were offering farmers from
$200 per kilogram in 1978 to $40 to $45 prior to the
planting of the 1980 crop. As a result, poppy
became less profitable than some competing crops,
causing growers to withdraw thousands of hectares
from poppy cultivation. The persistence of depressed
opium prices-dropping to as low as $30 per kilo-
gram before the planting of the 1983 crop-has
been important in keeping production levels in
Pakistan down.
President Zia banned opium production in 1979.
Even though there is little evidence that the ban was
aggressively enforced, the threat of government
action undoubtedly deterred many farmers from
planting poppy in the settled areas. Pakistani Gov-
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 Figure 2
Opium-Growing Areas in Northwestern Pakistan, 1983
Darr
Isha9am
~ Tnbal
South
Waziristan
Areas
Frontie)
Bannu
ISMAIL
KHAN ,
Northern .
Areas
AZAR
C(o'ey-e
Azad
Kashmir
Major opium-growing area (a- 25
fields per square kilometer)
Minor opium-growing area (leas
than 4 fields per square kilometer)
Suspected apwm-growing area unknown
density)
Settled area
Merged area
Tribal area
Province-level boundary
Division boundary
District/agency boundary
subdistrict boundary
 Figure 3
Opium Production in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, 1977-83
the past two years. Much of the increase is in the
traditional eastern growing areas near the border with
Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province:
? UN officials reported that Afghanistan's 1982 opi-
um crop may have reached 250 tons, a slight
increase over the estimated 1980 and 1981 harvests.
They added that production was possibly increasing
in the eastern provinces.
Opium Production in Afghanistan. The Southwest
Asian narcotics trade has continued to flourish despite
the decline in Pakistani production. Drug traffickers
initially countered the production drop by drawing on
stocks from the earlier bumper harvests; recently they
have been able to rely on opium from Afghanistan.
Reporting is sparse, but we believe Pakistani traffick-
ers are probably importing more than 200 tons of
Afghan opium a year in order to fill the gap created
by shrinking opium production in Pakistan and ex-
panding domestic and foreign narcotics markets. Ac-
cording to a US Embassy source, Afghan farmers are
willing to market their crop for as little as $25 a
kilogram. According to DEA sources, Afghan-pro-
duced opium is now available in 100-kilogram quanti-
ties at bargain prices in many of Pakistan's tribal-area
smuggling bazaars.
Afghan cultivators seem to have overcome any ad-
verse effects on production caused by the Soviet
areas of Afghanistan had increased by "threefold or
fourfold" in recent years.
? DEA sources who traveled through opium-produc-
ing areas of Afghanistan during the 1983 crop
season reported record poppy hectarage in several 25X1
key provinces. A DEA assessment based on such
reporting puts Afghanistan's 1983 opium harvest
Afghan opium is smuggled easily into Pakistan's
North-West Frontier Province. Pushtun tribesmen,
who live along both sides of the border, are traditional
smugglers eminently familiar with the opium trade,
having been involved long before the Soviet occupa-
tion in smuggling opium westward from Pakistan to
Iran. The border region's rugged and diverse terrain,
including more than 200 passes (and trails), clearly
works to their advantage.' These passes are extremely
difficult to patrol. Moreover, some trails, such as
those controlled by Shinwari tribesmen around the
Khyber Pass, cut through territory belonging to the
most militant o nents of narcotics control efforts.
25X1
The Current Situation. We believe opium will contin-
ue to be abundant in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
area during 1984. The 1984 crop will be harvested in 25X1
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x.a c.
The Pushtuns of the Afghan-Pakistani
Borderlands
The Pushtuns (Pathan) constitute one of the largest
remaining tribal societies in the world. An estimated
15 million-6 million in Afghanistan and 9 million in
Pakistan-they inhabit the southern and eastern
slopes of the Hindu Kush, a strategic area that
includes the fabled Khyber Pass. Pushtun tribal
lands are arid, lacking in resources, and overpopulat-
ed. Herding and the cultivation of crops, the two
traditional Pathan pursuits, no longer sustain the
tribal economies; remittances of tribesmen employed
elsewhere, government subsidies, and income from
the production and smuggling of opium, heroin, and
By tradition, Pushtuns have a fierce spirit of inde-
pendence, both personal and tribal, and they cling
strongly to their tribal identities. Their lives are
governed by pushtunwali, the traditional Pushtun
code of honor that influences most aspects of tribal
life. The code calls for blood vengeance, regardless of
cost, for a perceived wrong; asylum to all fugitives;
and generous hospitality to all guests. To transgress
the code risks disgrace and ostracism and retribution
by fellow tribesmen. The tribes find an outlet for
their individuality in continuous feuding. Vendettas
often exist between tribal subgroups and family
groups. Frequently they begin in innocence when a
member of one group acts against a member of
The Pakistani control system in tribal territory is a
legacy of British Indian policy developed to deal with
aggressive, militant, and frequently hostile Push sun
tribes. The British used various means to monitor the
frontier: they established forts and outposts, built
roads to connect and supply their military garrisons,
engaged in periodic shows of force in the tribal areas,
and subsidized tribal leaders. Present government
policy toward the tribal territories stresses gradual
assimilation, avoiding the use of force or confronta-
tion. Government control is spread through the mech-
anism of development: schools, hospitals, electric
lines, tube wells and irrigation projects, and especial-
April and May; there is no indication that the area
under cultivation in Pakistan or Afghanistan will
The sharp decline in Pakistani opium production, in
our view, has bottomed out; additional success in
diverting farmers from planting opium is unlikely.
Even those authorities who attribute the decrease in
Pakistan's opium production largely to the govern-
ment's actions are pragmatic enough to recognize the
limits to enforcing the ban. These same authorities
were reluctant to use force against defiant poppy
growers in the merged and tribal areas and often
expressed sympathy for farmers who were dependent
on opium for a cash income. In September 1982, three
years after proclaiming the ban, President Zia told
the media that poppies were being grown in tribal
areas and that cultivation would not be eliminated
until developed countries helped Pakistan address the
economic needs of these farmers. Authorities recog-
nize that a major crackdown on the well-armed
Pushtun growers could trigger widespread disturb-
ances in the NWFP. US officials visiting Pakistan
have often been told by high-level authorities, such as
NWFP Governor Fazle Haq, that narcotics enforce-
ment in the province had to be balanced against the
government's relations with the tribesmen, whose
good will was needed to sustain the Afghan resistance.
an analysis of the 1982
and 1983 crops shows that in many areas of Paki-
stan-especially those where government control is
the weakest-the area under cultivation has remained
essentially unchanged or has increased slightly:
? In Dir, a sprawling, isolated, and rugged district
along the Afghanistan border, we estimate approxi-
mately 400 hectares were cultivated in 1983. The
number of fields declined insignificantly from 5,300
in 1982 to 5,200 in 1983. This remote area, inhabit-
ed by some of the most aggressive tribesmen in
Pakistan, has been largely ignored by enforcement
authorities.
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Figure 4
Opium Prices at the Farmgate in
Pakistan's North-West Frontier
Province, 1977-83
US $ per kilogram
Even less is known about production prospects in
Afghanistan. There appear, however, to be no mean-
ingful constraints to maintaining production levels. As
noted, the Soviet invasion has had little impact in the
poppy-growing areas. Moreover, because farmers
have few alternative cash crops, they are less sensitive
Beyond 1984. In the long run, of course, a substantial
resurgence in opium production is possible, although
we view prospects for such an expansion limited.
Should prices for opium increase significantly, howev-
er, many Pakistani growers-at least those in the
merged and tribal areas-would presumably return to
poppy as their cash crop. Farmers in these areas
produced some 400 to 500 tons in the late 1970s. The
production limits in Afghanistan are unknown. Tribal
leaders in Pakistan presumably understand that wide-
I I , spread planting would be an affront the Pakistani
0 1977 78 79 80 81 82 83 authorities could not ignore, prompting efforts to
knore extensive cultiva-
estimate that the cultivated area was at least 160
hectares,
? Cultivation also may have increased in the Mala-
kand Agency in spite of considerable deterrence
efforts. In an area where the United States is
funding a development project
satellite imagery reveals a slight increase in the
number of fields under cultivation.
The weather is currently drier than normal, and crop
development is subsequently some two weeks late,
according to US Embassy officials. This may lower
average yields somewhat, but we do not foresee a drop
in yield severe enough to greatly affect production.
establish a government presence in the merged and
tribal areas that would interfere with tribal authority
in a broader sense. Moreover, with Afghan producers
willing to maintain production at high levels despite
currently low prices, prospects for a price increase
Heroin Trafficking: On the Rise
During the past three years, rising heroin production
has surpassed poppy cultivation as the most serious
narcotics problem in Pakistan. Once content to merely
provide opium to the West, where it was converted
into heroin, Pakistani traffickers are now prominent
heroin suppliers, producing 6 metric tons annually,
according to recent US Embassy estimates. Most of
the opium processed in Pakistan comes from Afghani-
stan. Late in 1982, President Zia tried to end this
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trade by ordering a crackdown on processing labora.25X1
tories near the Khyber Pass. This effort has not
significantly reduced the activity. Moreover, the re- 25X1
sulting countermeasures taken by traffickers and ten-
sions between Pakistani authorities and tribesmen
 The Heroin Trade. Although Pakistani traffickers
have had the capability to convert opium into mor-
phine and morphine sulfate since the early 1970s, they
did not begin manufacturing heroin on a large scale
for the international market until 1981. By then, the
fall in opium prices plus the government's 1979 ban
on opium production encouraged traffickers to deal in
the more lucrative heroin trade. As a result, in 1981
authorities in Europe and the United States began
arresting more Pakistani traffickers with multikilo-
gram quantities of heroin worth millions of dollars on
the wholesale market. By early 1982 Pakistani narcot-
ics officials were publicly reporting that as many as
30 laboratories, collectively capable of producing tons
of heroin, were operating in Landi Kotal, an ancient
smuggling city on the Afghanistan border
The Government Reacts. President Zia ordered a
crackdown on tribal laboratories in November 1982,
perhaps prompted by widely publicized evidence that
a heroin epidemic was spreading throughout Pakistan
as well as by pressure from US authorities. The
government was reluctant, however, to confront the
laboratory operators directly. A February 1982 lab-
oratory raid in Darra, near the Khyber Pass, had
resulted in a tense standoff between thousands of
heavily armed tribesmen and government forces, an
event that we believe led authorities to decide to
transfer the risks and onus of enforcement to the
tribal leaders. Even so, when tribal elders-under the
direction of government agents in Khyber-ordered
laboratory operators to surrender their equipment or
face severe fines, riots broke out in Landi Kotal.
Fighting between Afridi tribesmen, who were willing
to comply with the order, and defiant Shinwaris
resulted in several casualties. Eventually, however,
Pakistani authorities reported that traffickers had
been persuaded to surrender the hardware from 27
laboratories and that heroin production had ceased in
the Khyber area
The Trade Continues. Heroin trafficking from Paki-
stan continued to be heavy throughout 1983, a sign
that the crackdown on laboratories had little lasting
effect. In the 12 months following the operation,
Pakistani authorities claimed to have seized a record
2,600 kilograms of heroin, over 200 kilograms more
than the amount confiscated in 1982. Despite these
seizures, Pakistani heroin trafficking organizations
remained intact because Pakistani authorities failed
to arrest and immobilize the major smugglers identi-
fied by DEA officials. During 1983 government au-
thorities in several large European drug markets
indicated to US officials that Pakistani heroin was
still available in large quantities. According to the
press, British customs officials, for instance, reported
that 80 percent of the heroin in the United Kingdom
was still coming from Pakistan. DEA officials report-
ed that the availability of Pakistani heroin in the
United States, especially in the northeast, increased
Many of the processors in Landi Kotal and its
environs apparently moved their small, mobile labora-
tories "underground," as a ranking Khyber official 25X1
had predicted would happen following the raids, or
they simply reestablished their operations in nearby
Afghanistan, beyond the reach of Pakistani officials:
? According to Pakistani authorities, a raid on a
Landi Kotal heroin laboratory in April 1983 netted
three traffickers, including a ringleader who alleg-
edly was responsible for operating six of the seven
laboratories that officials believed had been reestab-
lished in the city.
? Pakistani authorities also reported that heroin shops
in Bara and Jamrud Fort, both within 35 kilometers
of Landi Kotal, were raided in June 1983 and
several traffickers were arrested.
? In November, Khyber authorities told DEA officials
that they suspected two laboratories were operating
in the Khyber Agency. 25X1
Shinwari tribesmen had accepted an invitation from
Afghan officials to reestablish their laboratories in
Afghanistan. 25X1
? A DEA source recently claimed that newly estab-
lished laboratories are operating in Nangarhar
Province, Afghanistan, possibly in the town of Tor
Khan, just across the border from Landi Kotal.
 In the meantime, Khyber traffickers have publicly
objected to the narcotics ban and subsequent enforce-
ment operations, viewing both as an infringement on
their tribal sovereignty as well as a threat to their
narcotics trade. Authorities have had to move cau-
tiously as periodic rallies by tribesmen in defense of
arrested drug traffickers have kept tension in the
Khyber area high:
? In May a Pakistani authority reported to American
officials that he was calling upon the Khyber Rifles
almost daily to control antienforcement demonstra-
tions organized by the United Federation of Tribes-
men, a small but vocal group of agitators whose
membership reportedly includes heroin traffickers.
? Hundreds of Shinwari tribesmen, demonstrating in
December against the arrest of several alleged
traffickers and their sympathizers, repeatedly
blocked the road connecting Landi Kotal with Tor
Khan, a principal trade route with Afghanistan.
? A Khyber official recently told DEA authorities
that laboratory operators had become the most
troublesome traffickers in Khyber. In a statement
that probably reflects his concerns about the volatil-
ity of the area, he said that, before carrying out an
operation against a laboratory, he would have to be
"absolutely sure" that his information was cor-
rect-a nearly impossible requirement considering
the remote and hostile nature of the tribal areas.fl
Addiction in Pakistan. A vast number of Pakistanis
are becoming victims of the NWFP heroin trade.
Although Pakistani officials have no comprehensive
data on drug addiction, the increase they report in
overdose deaths and the number of patients seeking
treatment in drug rehabilitation centers leads them to
believe that heroin addicts in Pakistan have increased
from hardly any in 1980 to probably 70,000 to
100,000 by late 1983. This is in addition to an
estimated 150,000 opium abusers in the country.
Drug abuse surveys have found that most of the
heroin addicts are young skilled and unskilled laborers
living in the squalor of Pakistan's crowded, volatile
urban slums such as Karachi's Layari district. Some
officials fear that students and middle- and upper-
class youths are also becoming addicts. Many of these
addicts were not previous opium users, and health
officials have found them difficult to treat. There is
consensus among Pakistani officials that the addiction
problem has spread to all parts of the country and
Enforcement-The Government's Dilemma
Pakistani authorities now face a difficult enforcement
dilemma. The government is coming under increasing
pressure, as a result of Pakistan's growing importance
in the international heroin trade as well as the
spreading heroin epidemic at home, to take more
stringent measures against drug traffickers. Forceful
action in the drug-producing areas, however, is likely
to cause confrontations with tribesmen that could
have destabilizing consequences in the NWFP
Much of the domestic pressure on the government is
from the Pakistani people, who are becoming increas-
ingly aware of Pakistan's growing drug abuse
problem:
? Extensive media coverage is being devoted to the
narcotics problem. A September 1982 narcotics
conference in Quetta, which brought together drug
abuse experts from Pakistan and the West, was well
covered in the press. In October 1983 the Pakistani
Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) sponsored a mass
media narcotics workshop in Islamabad.
? By the end of 1983, several public drug-awareness
groups had been formed in different parts of the
country. In Peshawar, doctors, journalists, educa-
tors, and social workers formed an organization to
combat the increasing use of heroin and provide
treatment to addicts. The NWFP branch of the
Pakistani Medical Association has called for a
nationwide attack on drug trafficking, even recom-
mending the death sentence for convicted heroin
traffickers. In Karachi, men and women demon-
strated peacefully for several days, protesting sever-
al heroin overdose deaths in the city. They called for
a stronger police crackdown on heroin traffickers.
 Figure 6
Heroin Addicts in Pakistan, 1981-83?
a By month.
b First reported in February 1991.
? Partially in response to international and domestic
pressure, President Zia signed last December a
long-promised law intended to deter drug traffick-
ing and make narcotics enforcement easier. It im-
poses mandatory and harsher sentences on convicted
drug traffickers and extends the opium production
A number of Pakistani authorities have argued that
the government needs to abandon its cautious and
ineffective policy of relying on threats and the influ-
ence of tribal leaders. Comments by officials who
have candidly reported to US Embassy personnel on
the Khyber laboratories suggest that tribal justice has
been slow, uneven, and ineffective. In August the
Khyber Political Agent told Embassy officials that
wealthy and influential Khyber traffickers are able to
disregard with impunity the commitments to drug
control made by their tribal leaders. Several Pakistani
officials have stressed that sustained enforcement
efforts beyond those provided by tribal leaders and
greater enforcement elsewhere in Pakistan will be
needed to end the Pakistani trade. The NWFP Home
Secretary expressed the opinion that stronger enforce-
ment against processors rather than. negotiated settle-
ments with tribal leaders would be required to slow
the trade; the chairman of the PNCB has stated that 25X1
the time has come to arrest major traffickers and try
them in military courts; and in December the Khyber
Political Agent told DEA officials that cracking down
on the laboratories could not succeed unless enforce-
ment against heroin traffickers and users was carried
out in the rest of the country.
The most decisive action-yet against poppy growers
was taken recently by the Malakand Commissioner.
Last October, in a surprise move, possibly without
authorization from higher levels, he ordered the arrest
of several prominent poppy growers and warned other
cultivators that, if they did not voluntarily destroy
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their newly planted fields, government agents would
plow them under. The arrests sparked several days of
protests, and in a shootout with police one demonstra-
tor was killed and several were wounded. Neverthe-
less, the provincial government backed the Commis-
sioner's threat-calling in several hundred troops to
maintain order-and more than 175 hectares of pop-
pies were destroyed by the local militia. Although this
was equivalent to only about 5 percent of the 1983
crop, it constituted the largest eradication effort to
Other influential narcotics officials, however, caution
that narcotics enforcement in the drug-producing
areas of the NWFP must be balanced against the
risks of upsetting the region's stability. We believe
authorities are reluctant to order the enforcement
measures that could jeopardize their relationship with
the tribesmen. According to Governor Haq and Presi-
dent Zia's Chief of Staff, General Arif, the tribes-
men's good will is needed in order for the government
to sustain the Afghan resistance and maintain order
among the 2 million Afghan refugees settled in the
NWFP. Consequently, the preservation of public or-
der-not the control of narcotics trafficking-is the
greatest concern of government officials in these
Outlook
With Pakistan now suffering from a serious and
widely recognized heroin epidemic, the government
will not be able to turn its back on the narcotics
problem. Despite crop control measures, a crackdown
on heroin refineries, and new antinarcotics legislation,
Pakistan still faces a decidedly uphill battle in bring-
We doubt that the government will put aside its
concerns with security in the border area and make
full use of the. new narcotics laws to pursue NWFP
drug producers. Although these laws should facilitate
enforcement, there are limitations to what they can
accomplish in areas where the government's control is
weak. Governor Haq recently advised US officials
that the laws will be implemented in phases and only
where tribal leaders have granted permission to gov-
ernment authorities to operate. Moreover, Pakistani
enforcement officials told DEA personnel that the
impact of extending Federal laws to the tribal areas
would be diminished because officers would probably
conduct their raids and investigations from govern-
ment-controlled areas closer to Islamabad rather than
from the tribal areas
Stymied by their inability to discourage opium pro-
duction by intransigent growers and to close down the
heroin laboratories, we believe Pakistani authorities
will redirect their efforts toward investigation of
major international traffickers operating from such
brokering centers as Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpin-
di. Authorities are also likely to go after the heroin
peddlers who often have been the objects of protest in
the antinarcotics demonstrations in large cities. By
cracking down on drug peddlers, the government will
be responsive to pressure from the metropolitan cen-
ters to deal with the heroin epidemic; and, by target-
ing major narcotics brokers; it will be contributing to
the control of the international drug trade. Problems
posed by the lack of coordination among Pakistani
enforcement agencies and insufficient manpower, in-
telligence, and investigative skills will, however, still
have to be resolved. Moreover, the government's
success is likely to be only temporary as long as the
root of the problem-opium and heroin production in
areas where the government has little or no control-
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