RURAL CONTROL IN AN INSURGENCY: AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO GUATEMALA AND THE PHILIPPINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00283R000400010006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Sei i vF
Intelligence
Rural Control in an
Insurgency: An Analytic
Framework Applied to
Guatemala and the Philippines
A Research Paper
met
GI 84-10005
February 1984
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence _ 25X1
Rural Control in an
Insurgency: An Analytic
Framework Applied to
Guatemala and the Philippines
This paper was prepared b
Instability and Insurgency Center,
Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Instability and Insurgency Center, OGIJ
Secret
GI 84-10005
February 1984
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Overview
Information available
as of 1 November 1983
was used in this report.
Rural Control in an
Insurgency: An Analytic
Framework Applied to
Guatemala and the Philippines
The ability of national governments to gain or maintain control of rural
communities is a key factor in dealing with Third World insurgencies. On
the basis of comparative research on insurgency and counterinsurgency
throughout the Third World, we conclude that rural control by government
or insurgents hinges on three basic factors:
? Attitudinal. The capability to promote favorable attitudes among the
local population and elicit support.
? Organizational. The capability to establish and direct local organiza-
tions-such as village administrative and governing structures, agricul-
tural cooperatives, political parties and propaganda theater groups-for
mobilizing people politically and economically.
? Military. The capability to protect cadre and supporters from attacks
and provide the local population with security.
Insurgency movements typically place more weight on attitudinal and
organizational factors than do governments involved in counterinsurgency.
Moreover, governments frequently choose inappropriate programs to fight
rural insurgencies. To identify the range of programs used by governments,
we examined some 90 insurgency and counterinsurgency efforts since
World War II. From these cases, we have identified approximately nine
that governments may occasionally use. This record also shows which
programs were most successful and the conditions that contributed to their
success or failure. We have also formulated a system of indicators to
evaluate the effectiveness of an insurgency or counterinsurgency program.
We believe that the programs and the indicators we have identified
constitute a useful framework for analyzing rural insurgencies and coun-
terinsurgency. This framework and the record from which it was drawn are
described in section one of this paper. Section two applies the framework to
the insurgencies in the Western Highlands of Guatemala and in the
Philippines. On the basis of these case studies, we reached the following
judgments:
? Guatemalan Counterinsurgency Is Working. During the past 18 months
the government has regained or maintained control over much of the
Western Highlands. Although the insurgents continue hit-and-run am-
bushes, they have been routed in many localities and have suffered a
major loss of popular support. The government's control programs-most
notably the Civil Defense Forces, which involve the Indian communities
in armed self-defense of their villages-have successfully promoted
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GI 84-10005
February 1984
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favorable attitudes at the local level, in organizing local people, and in
providing them and government cadres with military security, despite
inadequate financing, personnel, and equipment. Some of the gains
achieved by the deposed Rios Montt, however, are being jeopardized by
the resurgence of death squads and Mejia's neglect of propaganda and
political measures to gain popular support.
? Government Control Is Gradually Deteriorating in the Philippines. The
Marcos government has failed to counter the growing Communist
insurgency despite its military campaigns and well-publicized develop-
ment programs. The Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's
Army controls 18 percent of the rural villages in the Philippines, a
substantial increase over the past 18 months. Manila's political, econom-
ic, and military programs look good on paper but are poorly implemented
in the countryside and receive insufficient political and material support.
Local officials are unable or unwilling to effect the changes necessary to
offset insurgent gains. Military abuses continue to alienate the rural
population. In addition, military officers-using tactics ill suited for
counterguerrilla operations-are unable to achieve a military victory.
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Programs for Rural Control
Political and Administrative I
Local Security 2
Village Relocation 3
Population and Resource Control 4
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 4
Military Operations 5
Public Welfare 6
Economic 7
Propaganda 7
Terror 8
Measuring Rural Control 11
Guatemala Case Study 15
Counterinsurgency Programs 15
Political and Administrative 15
Local Security 17
Village Self-Defense 17
Population and Resource Control 20
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20
Military Operations 20
Public Welfare 21
Economic 22
Propaganda 22
Terror 23
Indicators of Government and Insurgent Rural Control 23
Attitudinal 23
Favorable Attitudes Among the Local Population 23
Ability To Motivate Individuals To Take High Risks 24
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Organizational 24
Ability To Mobilize and Organize at the Local Level 24
Ability To Provide Material Benefits to Supporters 25
Ability To Exploit Local Resources 25
Ability To Protect Supporters and Local 25
Organizations
Military and Intelligence Effectiveness 26
Counterinsurgency Programs 27
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 31
Military Operations 31
Indicators of Government and Insurgent Rural Control 33
Favorable Attitudes Among the Local Population 34
Ability To Mobilize and Organize at the Local Level 35
Ability To Protect Supporters and Local 38
Organizations
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Preface
well as fieldwork by Agency analysts.
This study is one of a number of assessments done in the Directorate of
Intelligence on the issue of Third World insurgencies. Each of these reports
focuses on a key aspect in determining the success or failure of insurgent or
counterinsurgent efforts. This study on rural control draws on classified material,
unclassified external contracts commissioned by the Directorate of Intelligence, as
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Rural Control in an
Insurgency: An Analytic
Framework Applied to
Guatemala and the Philippines
Counterinsurgency specialists agree that insurgencies
are won or lost in the countryside. Even the strongest
urban guerrilla movements-from the Hungarian pa-
triots of 1956 to the Uruguayan Tupamaros of the
1970s-ultimately fail if they do'not spread effective-
ly to rural areas. Similarly, as Mao, Castro, and
others have shown, an insurgency can be won while all
major cities remain in government hands. Govern-
ments recognize this, and over the years they have
devised a number of surprisingly similar programs to
defeat rural insurgency. What proves successful under
one set of circumstances, however, may fail miserably
at another time and place. This paper attempts to
describe why this happens and to establish some
guidelines for effective rural control in an insurgency.
We also set up criteria for measuring the control
exercised by governments or insurgents, and we apply
both the guidelines and the measurement criteria to
ongoing insurgencies in Guatemala and the Philip-
pines.
An examination of some 90 examples since World
War II reveals that insurgencies in rural areas inev-
itably aim at undermining the perceived legitimacy of
the government through: -
? Reduction or elimination of government administra-
tion, security, and economic control.
? Establishment of insurgent administration, security,
and economic control alongside or in place of that of
the government.
? Competition with the government in providing or
promising services to the rural population.
Government counterinsurgency programs succeed or
fail to the extent that they thwart the guerrilla
strategy.
programs, local security programs, and population
and resources control programs aimed at maintaining
government presence in the countryside; intelligence,
military, and terror programs aimed at the insurgent's
shadow government and military organization; and
public welfare, economic, and propaganda programs
aimed at winning the "hearts and minds" of the rural
population.
Political and Administrative
Political and administrative programs that contribute
to rural control can be divided into two types: those
aimed at the entire nation, such as national elections
and timetables for independence, and those aimed at
specific rural areas such as the appointment of popu-
lar and honest local officials. Both types of programs
have had their share of successes and failures.
Nationwide Measures. The key to success with regard
to national measures is the perceived fairness and 25X1
effectiveness of the measures. National elections, for
example, are useful only if the population believes
that the range of choice represents its interests and
that its votes will be properly counted. Successful
counterinsurgencies have stressed the importance of
meeting popular calls for political reform. In Malaya,
for example, the British increased Chinese and Malay
participation in the colonial government and set a
timetable for independence, which undercut insurgent
demands for a war of national liberation. In- the
Philippines, Defense Minister Magsaysay turned pub-
lic opinion against the Huk insurgents by moving
decisively to ensure honest presidential elections in
1951 and to punish corrupt government officials and
abusive military personnel. He stationed teachers as
polling clerks, used ROTC cadets to. guard polling
places, and directed soldiers to protect voters and
ballot boxes.
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We have identified nine categories of programs that
governments consistently use in dealing with rural
insurgency. These include political and administrative
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The failure of government to meet local demands for
political reform fuels rural support for insurgent
movements. The French in Indochina were aware of
social tensions, inequalities, and a rising tide of
nationalism but reacted to demonstrations and upris-
ings with repression. Although Paris apparently rec-
ognized the need for reforms, it confined its actions to
the economic and social spheres and neglected the
political area. The outbreak of World War II further
curtailed political freedom, exacerbating all attempts
at reform. Algerian nationalist aspirations and de-
mands for political reform were stifled in a manner
similar to that in Indochina. Under the Vichy regime,
which came to power after the fall of France in 1940,
the Muslim community lost many of the small bene-
fits acquired over the years. French settlers, by com-
parison, were given a free hand
Local Measures. Government administrative and po-
litical programs aimed directly at individual rural
populations face a number of difficulties. One of the
ironies is that the insurgents and the government
frequently start on almost equal footing, at least in
some rural areas. In some instances, the central
government has never exercised firm control in these
areas, leaving a vacuum for the guerrillas to fill. Such
control as exists may be in the hands of tribal leaders,
local landlords, or underpaid and largely forgotten
public officials. These "administrators"-whether ap-
pointed or elected-often have little regard for the
interests of the local population and few resources to
deal with its problems even if they were so inclined.
They are easy targets for elimination or co-optation
by insurgents. In countries where the central govern-
ment's bureaucracy is well established in rural ar-
eas-even if it is not popular-no vacuum exists and
it is difficult for guerrillas to get started.F__1
In the early 1970s, guerrillas in the Western High-
lands of Guatemala were able to begin organizing the
Indian population because the national government
never had an effective permanent presence in most of
the region. A similar situation has occurred in rural
Columbia where many areas are isolated from Bogota
and effectively ruled by local landlords. In El Salva-
dor the insurgents at first concentrated their efforts in
areas weakly controlled by San Salvador, such as
Chalatenango and Morazan, but soon expanded their
areas of operation with appeals to the rural population
to call for distribution of land to the peasants and
removal of corrupt and abusive local officials. In
contrast, no such power vacuums existed in rural
Argentina and Uruguay, and consequently insurgent
groups were never able to gain a permanent foothold
in rural areas.
Local Security
Local security programs-those designed to protect
government supporters in a rural area without major
use of the central government's armed forces-gener-
ally rely either on the creation of civilian self-defense
forces or on relocation of rural populations to more
secure areas. Fortified villages can be an important
adjunct to either type of program. The first type has
generally been more effective than the second, if only
because it is attempted only by governments relatively
sure of the basic loyalty of their rural population. F_
Civilian Self-Defense. Civilian self-defense programs
have been most effective when they have been: super-
vised by on-the-scene military officers, adequately
equipped, representative of the entire able-bodied
male population of the village.on a part-time basis,
free of local political or economic influences unrelated
to counterinsurgency, and instrumental in bringing
some nonsecurity as well as security advantages to the
village.
Numerous counterinsurgencies have effectively used
local irregular self-defense forces for security. Such
forces provide a first line of defense against guerrilla
attacks, freeing regular military forces for offensive
operations. More importantly, they commit village
families conspicuously to the side of the government.
In Malaya, the British and Malayans recruited ap-
proximately 150,000 Home Guards to protect reset-
tled villages, thus forcing a commitment from their
Chinese inhabitants. Initially, unarmed and untrusted
by the police, the Home Guard evolved into the
primary government security force, protecting the
rural Chinese population from the guerrillas. Home
Guard units attached to neighboring Army units
greatly aided the latter through their familiarity with
the local terrain and society.
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The British also effectively used local defense forces
in Kenya to isolate the Mau Mau from its rural
Kikuyu supporters. In South Vietnam, self-defense
forces were effective only when adequately supported
by local Army commanders and when formed by the
villagers themselves. At times, the regular military
was unwilling to provide adequate weapons, training,
and backup forces to villagers it viewed as having
questionable loyalty to the government. This resulted
in morale-damaging losses by village defense forces in
encounters with better equipped local guerrillas, or
when they were overrun by regular insurgent forces
because of a lack of government force backup. In
Thailand, a successful village self-defense program
has been an important element in controlling the
Communist insurgency. Volunteer Defense Compa-
nies provide full-time auxiliaries, who patrol with the
provincial police, act as part-time militia in areas of
significant insurgent activity, and generally obtain the
commitment of local farmers to the government.
In contrast to these successes, the Burmese experience
shows that the government must closely supervise
village defense forces to maintain control. During the
1960s and early 1970s, the Burmese Government gave
militia status to several ethnic groups and to a few
warlords operating in the Shan states, a region always
weakly controlled by the Rangoon government. The
militia was to provide local security against the
Burmese Communist Party. Instead, these groups
used Rangoon's arms to fight for control of narcotics
smuggling routes and territory
Village Relocation. The success of relocation pro-
grams depends almost entirely on cooperation on the
part of the villagers being relocated. This, in turn,
depends upon: the perceived danger of staying where
they are, the adequacy of the new location, the
sensitivity to particular village concerns, and the
adequacy of logistic support. In general, programs of
village relocation to fortified villages or areas remote
from insurgent influence have seldom enhanced local
security. In Malaya, one of the few successful cases,
the British effort to relocate rural Chinese into several
hundred New Villages probably worked only because
they were superior to the squalid, squatter camps
where the Chinese had been living.
Most other relocation programs failed. British reset-
tlement and village housing programs in Kenya were
inadequately supported, caused much suffering and
bitterness, and produced a substantial number of
recruits for the Mau Mau. During their occupation of
Malaya in World War II, Japanese troops forced one-
fourth of the Chinese population out of the towns and
cities and "settled" them along roads on the fringes of
the jungle. These "squatters" became the principal
supporters of the Malayan Communist Party in resist-
ance against the Japanese,. and, later, against the
British colonial government. In Manchuria such Japa-
nese tactics also failed to stem the insurgency. To
break up the close relationship between the Chinese
population and the Communist guerrillas, the Japa-
nese relocated the population into newly constructed
"collective hamlets." By 1937 there were more than
10,000 of these hamlets, accommodating 5.5 million
persons. The program succeeded in isolating the guer-
rillas, but the brutality with which the Japanese 25X1
troops executed the program increased popular sup-
port for the guerrillas.
In those rural parts of Algeria strongly influenced by
insurgents, the French resorted to resettlement. The
French Army forcibly uprooted and resettled hun-
dreds of thousands of Algerians in the Constantine
and Blida regions into more than 1,000 new villages.
The French Section Administrative Specialisee ad-
ministered these villages and provided security, edu-
cation, and training in self-defense. The French plan
called for the Algerians ultimately to form their own
administrations. In practice, however, many of the
villages were little better than concentration camps
imprisoning sullen and uncooperative Algerians and,
thus, on balance detracted from the French effort. In
South Vietnam the government relocated thousands
from areas under strong Vietcong influence, hoping to
deprive the enemy of its population base. The reloca-
tion camps were often on marginal land that provided
little chance for cultivation or other forms of employ-
ment. Embittered farmers frequently migrated back
to their ancestral lands and accepted Vietcong protec-
tion. Those who remained in the camps were a major
resource drain on the government and provided many
recruits to the enemy
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Population and Resource Control
Closely related to the local security programs are
programs designed specifically to deny insurgents any
cooperation-voluntary or forced-from the rural
population. These programs, although inconvenient
for the local population, are among the most success-
ful in combating insurgency. They include:
? Strict screening and documentation procedures.
? Cordon and search operations.
? Roadblocks and checkpoints.
? Curfews.
? Control of movement of both people and materiel.
? Rationing.
? Protection of the rural production from seizure or
taxation by insurgents.
These programs tend to fail when they are loosely and
haphazardly enforced and therefore easily avoided,
when they are exploited by soldiers or policemen, or
when they are so harshly enforced that loyal citizens
perceive them as unnecessary hardshipsF_~
The British perfected these control techniques in
Malaya and Kenya. Applied later in Cyprus and
Aden, such programs again succeeded in their narrow
objectives but could not compensate for widespread
popular support for the insurgents. The Indian Gov-
ernment has also succeeded in isolating guerrillas
from their base of support in its counterinsurgency
effort against the Mizo National Front (MNF), a
tribal separatist group. Villages in Mizo areas are
fortified and under Army control. Villagers are issued
identity cards and are counted twice a day by an
Army representative in each village; no one is allowed
to enter or leave the villages by night. Unable to
operate or hide in the villages, the MNF has been
forced to turn to towns and regional cities where it is
possible to avoid arrest by mixing with the generally
sympathetic local population. At times, MNF troops
have also sought sanctuary in adjoining areas of
poorly implemented; outlying security being insuffi-
cient could not prevent their being avoided by insur-
gent smugglers who could see them from a distance.
In some provinces, the government had better execut-
ed control programs, such as screening and document-
ing of the population. These too suffered, however,
because their effectiveness-for example, identifica-
tion of undocumented individuals-depended on the
quality of implementation of related programs, such
as checkpoints and intelligence recordkeeping, that
were not as effective.
Indigenous police organizations, if adequately staffed,
trained, equipped, and motivated, are best suited to
enforce population- and resource-control programs.
Police, unlike regular military units, whose members
are drawn from diverse parts of the country, are
frequently locals. They are more likely to understand
local conditions and be regarded by the population as
a government organization with enforcement powers.
They are often better trained than military forces in
the investigative skills required for these operations
because the procedures resemble anticrime proce-
dures.
Intelligence and Counterintelligence
To root out the insurgent cadre network and destroy
their shadow government, the central government
must develop effective local intelligence collection,
analysis, and exploitation programs. At the same
time, the government must uncover the often effective
intelligence systems of the guerrillas. Governments
often ignore this necessary task because they lack
adequate resources for the job or because they believe
such intelligence is trivial. Successful programs are
usually characterized by an effective village-level
intelligence collection effort against the insurgent
organization that provides security for government
supporters in villages and support for timely village-
level military operations against the insurgents
Bangladesh.
Vietnam is a good example of improperly implement-
ed population control. For example, checkpoints were
often used by Vietnamese Army and Regional Forces
units to extort goods from merchants carrying food or
other commodities to or between markets. In many
instances, the checkpoints were permanently located
and thus routinely avoided by Vietcong smugglers.
Even when checkpoints were mobile, they were often
and, as a consequence, one step
ahead of the insurgents militarily-during the deter-
minative years of the Huk rebellion. In Rhodesia, the
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Selous Scouts-trained to live undetected for extend-
ed periods in known areas of enemy activity and to
radio back intelligence-provided tactical military
intelligence on insurgency that was used successfully
to ambush and attack numerous insurgent bands.
They also used pseudoguerrilla tactics-scouts imper-
sonated guerrillas for extended periods-to gather
political intelligence in the villages. Such units dem-
onstrate an effective alternative to placing agents or
informers in villages when the local population is
unwilling to cooperate with the government.
Unsuccessful programs, in contrast, are characterized
by poor coordination and cooperation between govern-
ment intelligence collection agencies, overreliance on
single-source reporting, and often unfounded opti-
mism. For example, the French in Indochina had a
total force of about 500,000 troops, the security of
operating from firm bases, and complete mastery of
air operations. Yet their failure to match Vietminh
capabilities to develop or exploit intelligence in the
villages puts them at a fatal disadvantage. During
World War II the Vietminh organization had gradu-
ally supplanted the colonial government in many parts
of Vietnam, and the French were never able to
reestablish their internal security apparatus. Intelli-
gence estimates of Vietminh capabilities were poor
and frequently ignored by overconfident commanders.
While they were able to develop an effective infor-
mant network in Algiers, the French failed to develop
adequate intelligence in rural Algeria, impeding mili-
tary operations there. In the case of insurgencies
against British control, widespread popular support
for or fear of the insurgents obviated good political or
tactical intelligence in Cyprus, Aden, and Palestine.
The victorious National Organization of Cypriot
Fighters (EOKA) guerrillas in Cyprus were far more
effective than the British in collecting and exploiting
intelligence in remote villages; the insurgents usually
knew in advance the exact nature of British military
operations.
Military Operations
Military operations remain at the center of any
counterinsurgency effort not only to seek and destroy
insurgent military forces but also-and more impor-
tantly-to protect government supporters and the
general population. The secret of successful military
operations appears to be properly tailoring capabilities
to the particular threat. In the early stages of most
insurgencies, this means using small units deployed in
villages and aggressively seeking contact with the
enemy by day and by night. Small units that are
properly trained, highly motivated, supported by vil-
lagers, and familiar with local terrain generally have
not needed and have not sought artillery or airstrikes
that could injure the local population. Large-scale
operations are appropriate only in the later stages of
an insurgency when large insurgent units operate
conventionally to attack government-held areas or to
defend their own bases
Small units stationed in rural areas and backed by
quick-reaction battalions are the best means for pro-
viding security for government supporters and pro-
grams and impeding the insurgent political and mili-
tary organizing efforts. It was clear in almost every
insurgency studied that this is best accomplished by
an emphasis on mobile rather than a static defense-
patrolling the surrounding areas day and night, set-
ting ambushes, and reacting offensively to insurgent
sightings. In South Vietnam, the US Marine Corps
used small, well-trained platoons of volunteers from
regular Marine infantry units called "CAP Teams"
(combined action platoons) who lived in Vietnamese
villages and worked with local self-defense forces to
provide security. Stationed for months in the same
village, the members of these units knew the people
and the terrain well and were able to obtain detailed
and timely intelligence on the local insurgent organi-
zation. They were thus able to deny the insurgents
freedom to operate.
Village-level forces must be supported by large unit
reaction forces, particularly if the insurgents can mass
local forces or move larger forces from other areas to
attack villages. In the absence of such reaction forces,
villagers will be reluctant to take the risks inherent in
joining in village defense and in supporting forces
stationed in the village. In South Vietnam, hamlets
defended by small, government units were often locat-
ed in contested areas where reaction forces had
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difficulty supporting them. This made these hamlets
especially vulnerable to insurgent attacks. The insur-
gents were quick to exploit this lack of adequate
security by overrunning the settlements, thereby dem-
onstrating to peasants the futility of supporting gov-
ernment forces.
Defensive military tactics are seldom effective against
insurgencies in rural areas during the guerrilla-war-
fare stage. Initial Portuguese reaction to guerrilla
activity in their African colonies, for example, was
defensive-aimed at protecting key installations and
lines of communication with garrisons-and ceded
control of many rural areas to the insurgents. Troops
withdrew into defended outposts, relying upon air
attacks and only occasional patrolling. All initiative
lay with the insurgents. This tactic led to years of
virtually unimpeded insurgent political and military
organizing in rural villages. In Indochina, French
military efforts against the Vietminh for years relied
primarily on the defense of key positions.
Highly mobile regular units operating against insur-
gent strongholds are a necessary adjunct to village
defense measures, particularly if insurgents maintain
military base areas. Constant, aggressive strikes by
small, specially trained units can also be a partial
solution to the problem of insurgent-base areas. In
rural Algeria, the French sent carefully chosen units
of 60 to 80 men, known as commandos de chasse, into
the mountains moving on foot and at night, carrying
out surprise attacks, and unexpectedly arriving in
villages to run to earth the FLN guerrillas. During the
late 1960s, the US military in South Vietnam effec-
tively used similar strike teams-independent units of
from five to 18 men sent into enemy-controlled terri-
tory for several days at a time to harass and trail the
enemy. According to Vietcong who surrendered, guer-
rilla units greatly feared such tactics because-with
their ability to lay successful ambushes and call
airstrikes without warning-strike teams inflicted
heavy casualties and greatly impeded guerrilla opera-
tions.
Public Welfare
Public welfare programs are successful in combating
insurgency only when they are well designed, well
funded, maintained over an extended period, and
desired by the people they are to benefit. It is in this
last area that they most often fail. Programs to
improve living conditions in rural villages-for exam-
ple, providing schools, health clinics, clean water, and
electricity-have been important adjuncts to most
successful counterinsurgency campaigns. These ef-
forts demonstrate government concern over local con-
ditions and a capability to improve them. Such pro-
grams can effectively counter insurgent claims that
the government benefits only the rich by involving the
rural population in public works and self-help projects
that directly benefit them:
? During the 1960s, the Guatemalan Army, with US
backing, undertook a large-scale welfare program-
including the building of wells-in rural areas
affected by guerrilla activity. Even one of the
Army's leading critics admitted that this program
played an important role in the government's ability
to maintain rural control.
? In contrast, President Somoza's diversion of relief
funds to Somoza-controlled businesses following the
1972 earthquake in Nicaragua and his government's
failure to address the population's needs for housing
heightened resentment among the population for his
government and increased support for the Sandinis-
ta insurgents.
Typically, insurgents initially organize and operate in
rural areas neglected by the central government. Here
they can exploit longstanding government apathy, and
the weak government presence gives them free rein.
Public welfare projects that the villagers want, and in
which they voluntarily participate, emphasize govern-
ment concern and provide a means by which people
can be enticed into visibly committing themselves to
support the government. Such programs have been
effective in countering insurgencies in Cambodia,
Guatemala, Venezuela, and Thailand. In Thailand,
the government improved the administration of public
welfare projects by using local people to manage
them.
When public welfare programs flounder, they do so
because of a lack of extended commitment, because
they are ill conceived, or because they are not wanted.
25X1
25X1
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For example, the Vietnamese countryside was dotted
with poorly situated and unused marketplaces and the
remnants of other projects built by US and Vietnam-
ese military and civilian programs without sufficient
study or local inquiry about the need for such projects.
Many projects stood unfinished because of insuffi-
cient funds and diverted resources-a frequent corre-
late of Third World public works programs. Still other
projects, such as many schools and dispensaries, al-
though finished, lacked funding for routine mainte-
nance. Many of these shortcomings were avoided in
successful public works programs by involving local
residents in the planning, creation, maintenance, and
management of the project.
Economic
Government economic programs, such as land reform,
can encourage villagers to maintain the status quo.
They must, however, be established early and imple-
mented vigorously. Any redistributive economic re-
forms can create enemies as well as friends for the
government. The redistribution of church lands by the
Shah of Iran, for example, was a major factor in
alienating the powerful Shiite clergy. Other govern-
ments have found that measures taken to benefit the
rural economy, such as crop support prices, may
Despite the potential benefits, government economic
development programs are frequently underempha-
sized-or ignored-as a counterinsurgency strategy
until it is too late. By the time the Portuguese
initiated a massive effort to enhance Mozambique's
agrarian economy through farm improvements and
roadbuilding, the insurgents had already gained the
upper hand. In contrast, the British in Kenya elimi-
nated popular support for the Mau Mau by coupling
the introduction of black majority rule with agrarian
reform and the establishment of a minimum wage. All
these programs encouraged villagers to maintain the
status quo.
As with public-welfare programs, effective security
must precede economic programs, which generally
lead to improvements in physical infrastructure.
Without adequate security, improved facilities would
be destroyed or used by the insurgents. Economic
programs were effective in Venezuela and Malaya in
increasing popular support for the counterinsurgency:
? The Venezuelan Government defeated rural insur-
gents in the 1960s partially with progressive eco-
nomic programs begun in 1958-land reform and
crop subsidies-financed by revenues from petro-
leum. These programs, even though predating the
insurgency, played a key role in undercutting the
propaganda of the extreme left that claimed govern-
ment indifference and a lack of rural benefits from
oil.
? In Malaya government prestige rose as a variety of
measures improved the standard of living: farm.
loans and other agricultural-support measures; reg-,
ulation of poor working conditions, work hours, and
moneylending practices; the encouragement of con-
sumer and producer cooperatives; and the growth of
labor unions.
The Cubans in Ethiopia have used a limited economic
program to gain popular support for the status quo.
According to a Western Somali Liberation Front
guerrilla, they have allowed the local population to
use the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railroad which they
protect without charge. This has given the local 25X1
residents a stake in its operation, making attacking it
more difficult. 25X1
Propaganda
Government propaganda is most successful when it is
based on truth and addresses real concerns of the
rural population. It can be as vital as armed action in
determining who wins:
? The Thai Government has had considerable success
depicting the Communist insurgents as outsiders,
foreign to Thai customs and culture. This image,
coupled with publicity concerning the foreign sup-
port the insurgents receive, has diminished their 25X1
appeal to the Thai population.
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? In contrast, the isolated and repressive Somoza
government in the latter stages of the insurgency
was easy prey for the highly effective Sandinista
propagandists who successfully exploited domestic
and international antipathy for the Somoza dicta-
torship. The Sandinistas were especially adept in
associating, in the popular mind, their guerrilla
movement with Cesar Agusto Sandino's original
guerrilla war against the US Marines.
At the local level, propaganda programs may be
directed at the insurgents, at the civilian population,
or at government employees. Propaganda directed at
the insurgents is intended to create dissension, dis-
organization, low morale, subversion, and defection.
Directed at the civilian population, it attempts to gain,
preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the gov-
ernment. Propaganda directed at government cadre
and supporters is designed to build and maintain
morale. Although effective propaganda programs
must be tailored to local conditions, and because these
conditions may vary widely, they are most effective
when coordinated at the national level. Coordination
at this level helps avoid conflicting themes and pro-
grams in different areas and maintains consistency
with internationally targeted propaganda.
Government propaganda efforts aimed at encouraging
civilian support for the government have played an
important role in most successful rural counterinsur-
gencies. The most successful programs address local
grievances while avoiding themes that conflict with
programs elsewhere:
? Magsaysay convincingly addressed the longstanding
grievances of the peasants of Central Luzon in the
Philippines through propaganda that promised more
than was ever delivered. His well-coordinated pro-
paganda program stressed the need for agrarian
reform, an end to military abuses of peasants, and
the evils of Communist rule in Asian agrarian
societies.
? In the late 1950s the Cameroon Government-with
French assistance-undermined the popular base of
support for the Cameroon People's Union (UPC)
insurgency through a well-focused psychological
and propaganda effort that was more effective than
military operations. Progovernment literature was
widely distributed in insurgent areas, and both
important government officials and former rebel
leaders, who had turned to the government, made
tours addressing village groups and promising par-
dons to insurgents and their supporters.
? In South Vietnam, however, the size of the Ameri-
can-run propaganda effort, the constant turnover in
American personnel, and the lack of time for sys-
tematic planning led to numerous "psychological"
operations programs with overlapping and some-
times contradictory objectives and responsibilities.
The plethora of such programs-often hastily
planned by Vietnamese and Americans unfamiliar
with local grievances-limited the effectiveness of
the propaganda.
Where propaganda themes are not at least partially
based in truth, the rural population is unlikely to rally
to the side of the government. In Cuba and later in
Nicaragua, government propaganda programs were
no match for those of the insurgents because the
realities or perceptions of government behavior, as
compared with government promises, were too con-
trary to government . promises to be believable. The
brutality of the Batista government and economic
inequities within the society offset government propa-
ganda promising the Cuban peasants relief. Sandinis-
ta propaganda-particularly that accusing President
Somoza of stealing from the poor of Managua and
from foreign relief funds intended for the victims of
the 1972 earthquake-was believed by most Nicara-
guans, despite much government propaganda to the
contrary.
Terror
Terror is most effective when used selectively. Al-
though both governments and insurgents have used
terror successfully, insurgents have often done so,
more effectively. Government-sponsored terror has
most often failed to coerce popular rural support for
counterinsurgent forces because it has been indis-
criminate-killing the innocents as well as the insur-
gent supporters-excessive, too public, and poorly
planned and executed. In contrast, insurgents have
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been successful more often in using terror because
they have been selective and publicized it only to the
extent necessary to affect a target population. They
usually use it only against clear allies of the govern-
ment to attain specific political and military psycho=
logical objectives such as demoralization of a particu-
lar sector of government.
Successful insurgents clearly attenuate and control
terror so as not to drive the general population or
international community to support the government.
The Vietcong used terror selectively to undermine the
morale of government organizations and to force
people to support the National Liberation Front. To
do this, the Vietcong carefully compiled blacklists of
government personnel and supporters who were tar-
geted for assassination or, after the Communists
gained control of an area, for punishment. In Commu-
nist-controlled and in contested areas, public execu-
tions were preceded by trials in "People's Courts"
that demonstrated the "justice" and the power of the
Vietcong. In all of these cases, the Communists were
discriminate and maintained an appearance of justice.
Government-sponsored terror has failed, or even dam-
aged counterinsurgent efforts in Algeria, Afghani-
stan, Cuba, Nicaragua, East Pakistan, and Rhodesia:
? In Algeria, the scorched earth policy of French
paratroopers was well publicized and skillfully ex-
ploited by insurgent propaganda.
? The brutal actions of shortsighted Pakistani military
men in East Pakistan during 1971 drove even pro-
Pakistani Bengalis to the Mukti Bihani guerrillas.
? In Cuba, the middle and upper classes eventually
abandoned Batista's regime and reluctantly sup-
ported Castro as the wave of murder and repression
spread to their families.
? In Afghanistan, Soviet scorched earth tactics have
still proved counterproductive. An Afghan
officer reported in early 1983 that Soviet and
government efforts to win the allegiance of rural
civilians continue to be undermined by indiscrimi-
nate attacks on villages.
? The harsh treatment of Miskito Indians in Nicara-
gua-including forced evacuation and possible air-
strikes against remote villages suspected of aiding
insurgents-has recently driven many previously
indifferent Indians to join anti-Sandinista insurgent
groups.
? In Zimbabwe government-sanctioned killings
among the rural civilian population in Matabeleland
have strengthened resentment among the Ndebele
minority and have persuaded former ZAPU guerril-
las incorporated into the national Army to join the
insurgents.
Of the various examples of successful government-
sponsored terror, Guatemala and Argentina are nota-
ble for their thoroughness in killing most insurgents
and their supporters. In the late 1960s, the Guatema-
lan Army established, or at least tacitly supported,
several terrorist death squads that engaged in relative-
ly indiscriminate killing. These irregular forces exter-
minated anyone they suspected of supporting the
guerrillas. Similarly, the Argentine paramilitary tor-
tured and killed anyone remotely suspected of sup-
porting the Montoneros and the People's Revolution-
ary Army (ERP), thereby decimating the
insurgent-support network. In both cases, the govern-
ment maintained some distance from the terrorism by
using death squads or by operating covertly and
suppressing press reports. Also, in both cases much of
the population was indifferent to the plight of those
victimized by the government.
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The ability to measure or assess change in govern-
ment or insurgent control of rural areas is an impor-
tant element in counterinsurgency efforts. Without
reliable assessments the appropriate counterinsurgent
strategy or tactics may not be adopted in time.
Beyond this, it is important for analysts following an
individual insurgency to be able to monitor insurgent
or counterinsurgent progress.
Quantitative indicators such as the number of govern-
ment public works projects or the number of guerrillas
killed in action are frequently proposed for measuring
rural control. Such quantitative indicators, however,
can signify very different things and, when considered
by themselves, may be very misleading. To some
analysts, increasing numbers of insurgent combat
casualties may reflect growing guerrilla strength and
greater willingness to engage in sustained battles
using larger units; to others it may reflect insurgent
weakness and greater vulnerability to government
military operations.
Nonquantitative data have been used and criticized
for being overly subjective and anecdotal. For in-
stance, the friendly greeting of soldiers to a rural
village may be motivated by genuine support for the
government, or by fear of Army reprisals and the
desire to appear cooperative to avoid repression. Only
an observer who understands the local community
well could accurately determine which of these moti-
vations predominates.
Weaknesses in intelligence collection further compli-
cate the analytic problem. In general, the Third
World nations-as well as Western nations observing
them-do not have an apparatus for systematically
gathering data at the local level in countries experi-
encing rural insurgencies. This is particularly true
with the attitudes of peasants toward governments
and guerrillas and the status of insurgent organization
in specific areas. The lack of analytic understanding
or suitable data to assess insurgent and government
control has led to numerous errors in tracking past
insurgencies (figure 1)
We have identified seven basic indicators to deter-
mine who controls a rural area in, an insurgency-the
government or the insurgents. The accompanying
sample questions help measure the strength and direc-
tion of the indicator. Which questions should be asked
to measure each indicator will depend on local condi-
tions and available data. These indicators focus exclu-
sively on the local rural level, that is, on villages, or, in
the case of a dispersed settlement pattern, on group-
ings of peasants who consider themselves residents of
a specific rural locality. The indicators exclude factors
at the national level that may have a major influence
on government or insurgent capability to acquire rural
control. Such factors include foreign assistance to the
government or the insurgents, the strength of nation-
al-level leadership, national economic trends, and
unrest in the capital city. In keeping with our view of
the interrelated determinants of control, we attempt
no ordering of indicators by relative importance. The
relationship of these indicators and determinants to
the government programs discussed above is shown in
figure 2.
25X1
:ZbA1
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Figure 1
Conflicting Views of French Control in Northern Viet-Nam, 1953
Military View
Less than 30%
0 50%
0 More than 50%
Official military intelligence
provided an optimistic assessment
of French-controlled areas.
Real Situation
F-I Less than 30%
50%
Administrative information shows
the absence of French civilian control
over villages and towns south
of the battle line.
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Favorable attitudes among the local populace:
? Is the rural population highly receptive to govern-
ment/insurgent propaganda?
? Are acts of government repression/guerrilla terror-
ism perceived locally as indiscriminate or
discriminate?
? Do government/guerrilla combat operations have
exclusively military goals? Or, do combat opera-
tions consider the psychological and political im-
pact on the local population?
? Are there government/insurgent policies that the
peasants feel are particularly unfair?
Ability to motivate individuals to take high risks:
? Are local government officials/guerrilla leaders
drawn mainly from the local population?
Are civilian militias/guerrilla bands composed
mainly of local residents?
? What percentage of households in a community
have members in the local civilian militia?
Ability of organizations to mobilize and organize
people locally:
? Do the villagers participate in government/insur-
gent-sponsored civilian activities? Is participation
voluntary?
? Are local government/insurgent leaders dynamic
personalities capable of injecting vigor into their
organizations?
Ability of organizations to provide material benefits
to supporters at the local level:
? Does membership in government/insurgent organi-
zations provide an opportunity for upward mobility
or economic reward?
? Do government programs or guerrilla recruitment
significantly improve employment opportunities at
the local level?
? Are government services perceived locally as ade-
quate? Or, are there generalized complaints con-
demning bureaucratic incompetence, redtape, or
corruption?
? Is the rural population supportive of government/in-
surgent programs designed for its benefit (such as
land reform, rent control, cooperatives, and credit)?
Ability of organizations to exploit local resources:
? How successful are government officials/insurgents
in collecting taxes and receiving services and re-
cruits from the local population?
? Do government officials/insurgent leaders imple-
ment national government/insurgent directives in-
flexibly or do they adapt them to local conditions?
Ability to protect supporters and local population:
? Do government/guerrilla forces adequately protect
local supporters on a 24-hour basis?
? Do national army "reaction forces" respond quickly
and effectively to reports of guerrilla attacks on
local civilian militias or progovernment
communities?
? Do local government officials/insurgent cadre sleep
in villages or do they seek protection of armed
camps?
? Are national army troops/guerrillas viewed locally
as threatening outsiders or as helpful allies?
? Is the local militia seen as a source of protection by
the rural population or seen merely as another,
distrusted police force?
Local military effectiveness:
? Are local civilian militias aggressive in small-unit,
day and night patrolling? Or, do they avoid contact
with the enemy?
? Do government/guerrilla forces have an effective
intelligence network at the local level?
? How disciplined are government/insurgent forces in
combat? Do they usually recover the weapons and
bodies of fallen comrades before retreating?
? Are local government/insurgent forces capable of
executing coordinated attacks against nearby ene-
my strongpoints?
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Figure 2
Relation of Government Counterinsurgency
Programs to Rural Control
Attitudes
-Favorable attitudes
?Ability to motivate
Organization Military
?Ability to mobilize ?Ability to protect
?Ability to provide benefits -Effectiveness
-Ability to exploit resources
Programs to
increase control
r r r
Political and Local Population and
administrative security resource control
Intelligence and Military
counterintelligence operations
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Guatemala's national government-both under Gen-
eral Rios Montt and his successor General Mejia
Victores-has maintained or regained control over
much of the Western Highlands. For several years
before the intensified and innovative government
counterinsurgency campaign was initiated in 1982,
the predominantly Indian Western Highlands had
been the scene of a growing guerrilla movement,
stepped-up attacks on the Army, and expanding insur-
gent control over population and territory (figure 3).
Since the summer of 1982, however, the insurgents
have been routed in many localities and have suffered
a major loss of popular support; they retain only a few
isolated strongholds. Some of the gains achieved by
the deposed Rios Montt, however, are being jeopard-
ized by Mejia's reluctance to crack down on the
resurgence of death squads and by his neglect of
propaganda and political measures to gain popular
support. The effectiveness of the government's coun-
terinsurgency programs is summarized in figure 4.F-
Counterinsurgency Programs
Political and Administrative
When Guatemala City began to systematically rees-
tablish control over extensive, contested areas in the
Western Highlands, it set out not only to reestablish
security but also to forge new political links with rural
communities. Rios Montt's reformist officers believed
that the historically low level of Indian participation
in national political institutions had created a political
vacuum filled by insurgent organizations. National-
government neglect also was considered a major
factor. Guerrilla assassinations or intimidation of
local authorities complicated the control task, but the
reformist officers were perceptive enough not to
blame the abandonment of local governments solely
on guerrilla violence.
As the first step in creating new political institutions
and modifying old ones, the Rios Montt regime
created local subcoordinadora councils in contested
areas, incorporating some of the personnel and func-
tions of traditional municipal councils. Chaired by the-
local military commander, the subcoordinadoras con-
sisted of appointed or elected representatives of all
Figure 3
Guatemala:
Counterinsurgent Rural Control Programs
0 Generally effective
Effective in limited aspects/areas
Generally ineffective
Program
Political and administrative
Local security
Population and resource control
Intelligence
Military operations
Public welfare
Economic
Propaganda
Terror
important interest groups in the community, ranging
from agricultural cooperatives to religious associa-
tions. Local CDF leaders were included, as were
representatives of government agencies active in the
community. The councils dealt with diverse issues
concerning the community and with requests for
outside assistance. The latter were ultimately chan-
neled to a national council that was also chaired by
the military.
On the basis of interviews we conducted in Quiche
Department, we believe this new network successfully
bypassed the redtape and delays of the traditional
bureaucracy. It appeared that technical, financial,
and material aid from Guatemala City to rural
communities was disbursed with relative speed and
efficiency. We do not know, however, whether the
subcoordinadoras functioned throughout the Western
Highlands. Moreover, it is unclear whether or not the
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Figure 4
Major Areas of Guerrilla Activity
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)
in Arms (ORPA)
FAR/ORPA
Guerrilla control is confined to relatively
small areas and is not shown.
Boundary ropro'senioiiun. is
nut neceesanily thudttai~a
ft, VaIrs
Secret
North
Pacific Ocean
Belize
Honduras Caribbean
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Mejia regime intends to maintain this administrative
innovation or return to the traditional municipal
system. The creation of Army civic-action companies
suggests that the new government intends to uphold
the previous commitment to public-welfare improve-
ments in the Highlands, but the government's deterio-
rating financial capabilities-worsened by the recent
US aid suspension-constitute major obstacles.
In addition, Rios Montt created a National Council of
State partly to further the impression that the local
population had a voice in the capital city and partici-
pated in the national decisionmaking process. This 30-
member consultative body included representatives-
approved by the national government-of the agricul-
tural, industrial, academic, and labor sectors, as well
as of the Western Highlands Indians. Ten members
were Indians elected primarily because of their high
standing within their communities. Their presence in
Guatemala City and statements to the media gave
greater visibility to Indians in the national govern-
ment than ever before. Indian council members pub-
licly expressed concern when the newly installed
Mejia regime began to consider abolishing the council
in response to rightist political party pressure.
When Mejia did abolish the council, however, there
were no widespread Indian protests. Nonetheless, we
believe that this measure was a major blow to the
national government's efforts to establish political
links with Indian communities. Indian leaders them-
selves have stated repeatedly that the political party
system that Mejia intends to reinstate has never
served as an adequate vehicle for Indian aspirations.
Given Rios Montt's extensive propaganda efforts
highlighting Indian participation in the National
Council of State, it is reasonable to assume that
Mejia's elimination of that body will result in less
credibility for future national-government initiatives
of this type.
Some Indian activists are attempting to accommodate
themselves to these recent political changes by allying
themselves with the Social Christian Party-and cer-
tain other newly formed parties. In terms of rural
control, however, this development is far less favor-
able to the government than the previous situation
where the government-sponsored Council of State
served as the principal forum for the expression of
Indian grievances. Should assassinations against So-
cial Christians and other opposition parties resume-
as under Lucas-the result most probably will be
heightened polarization.
Local Security
Village Self-Defense. During the latter part of the
Lucas administration (1978-82), the Army concluded 25X1
that it lacked the manpower and logistic support
necessary to continuously protect the dispersed popu-
lation of the Western Highlands. Turning to the
historic tradition of civilian militias, the Army began
to arm and train progovernment civilians in certain
communities. However, this remained a small-scale
undertaking, limited by the mutual distrust of the
authorities and the rural population in contested areas
and the Army's fear that guns distributed in isolated
communities could fall into guerrilla hands.
Rios Montt succeeded in overcoming much mutual
distrust by curbing Army abuses of civilians, provid-
ing benefits to rural communities and incorporating
local men into the counterinsurgency campaign. In
contrast`to the situation under the Lucas regime, the
civilian militias-the CDF-became a key aspect of
the counterinsurgency program, expanding rapidly
throughout the Western Highlands, to include about
350,000 local men. The new regime of General Mejia
has announced that it will strengthen the program,
now estimated to include about 500,000 men. Guerril-
la reprisals against communities collaborating with
the Army in organizing the CDF have not deterred
the growth of this local self-defense program. On the
contrary, guerrilla attacks against CDF men and their
families apparently have fostered popular antipathy
for the insurgents.
The organization and activities of local CDF units
vary greatly depending on their isolation, the guerrilla
threat, and the degree of popular support for the 25X1
national government in their communities. In the Ixil
towns, for example, these units are relatively well
armed and have fought periodically with guerrilla
units.
most of the fighting against the EGP guerrillas in
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Figure 5. Guatemala: Army
training village self-defense
certain areas involves the CDF, not regular Army
troops. In contrast, the CDF in many other towns
patrol with machetes and have never fought the
guerrillas.
CDF functions include:
u Protecting rural communities and towns through
patrols day and night.
e Deterring infiltration of insurgents into
communities.
c Gathering intelligence for the Army on guerrilla
activities.
c Controlling movement of civilians by identifying
and questioning strangers.
e Participating in joint military operations with regu-
lar Army units pursuing guerrillas in the
countryside.
c Accompanying civilians to fields and other work-
places outside towns to protect them from guerrilla
reprisals and proselytizing.
The CDF program has been so successful that some
military officers state that the Army is merely sup-
porting these groups in winning the counterinsur-
gency. They argue that the CDF advantage lies in the
militiamen's knowledge of the local terrain, trails and
populace, and in their personal stake in protecting
their own communities.
Despite the success of the past year, various problems
threaten CDF effectiveness. US Embassy reporting
indicates that the CDF has become involved in a few
local disputes between communities or individuals
over land boundaries or other issues unrelated to
counterinsurgency. Abuses of power by some CDF
members have also been reported, and it is evident
that in some areas local men are coerced into joining
the CDF. Certain leaders of peasant and labor unions
have complained to the US Embassy of CDF persecu-
tion, raising the possibility, that the CDF may become
simply another government-sponsored paramilitary
group to suppress agitators. Recently, members of a
CDF unit admitted to a US diplomat that they killed
a number of suspected subversives.
These problems could jeopardize CDF effectiveness
should they become widespread. Given Guatemala's
experience with civilian militias, the CDF command-
ers could become local strongmen. This possibility, as
well as potential CDF participation in political party
struggles, could create antipathy in the local popula-
tion toward the government, as occurred under the
corrupt administration of General Lucas. The Rios
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Figure 6. Guatemala: Armed
Civilian Defense Forces provide
Montt government recognized these problems and
intended, through the reorganization of the armed
forces, to exert greater control over the military and
political activities of the local CDF. We have no
evidence, however, that this has been accomplished,
and it appears that Army control over the CDF is no
greater now than it was under Rios Montt.
Relocation. The government faces another security
problem-the displacement of people in the High-
lands because of guerrilla warfare and military efforts
to suppress it. In the Ixil territory and certain other
areas, the Army during the Rios Montt regime relo-
cated people to government-controlled towns as a
partial solution to the problem of guerrilla control
over isolated areas. The Army preferred voluntary
resettlement but, during the height of the fighting in
the summer of 1982, reportedly used coercion includ-
ing the burning of villages. At the same time, the
guerrillas coerced villagers to abandon their villages
and relocate in more remote insurgent strongholds. .
Most Indian refugees interviewed indicated that they
preferred to seek government protection because the
insurgents could not adequately feed and shelter
masses of people in their strongholds. As a result,
large refugee camps developed in Nebaj, Choatalum,
and Chisec, with smaller concentrations of refugees
scattered throughout the rest of the Highlands. Dur-
ing 1983, estimates of the total number of displaced
persons in the Western Highlands ranged from 50,000
to 300,000.
Although the government achieved its short-term goal
of removing people from insurgent control, it incurred
a heavy financial burden and, because of the steady
deterioration of the national economy, had increasing
difficulty sustaining the relocated people. Moreover,
the influx of families to progovernment communities
placed a serious economic and demographic strain on
those localities. In Choatalum, for example, an esti-
mated 5,000 Indians threatened by starvation de-
scended on that small village from the surrounding
mountains; only rapid Army relief efforts averted a
crisis. Because of the financial and logistic problems
in feeding and sheltering masses of refugees, Guate-
mala City's strategy has been to return them to their
homes as soon as possible after the area has been
cleared of guerrillas. According to the US Ambassa-
dor, resettlement has been accomplished in Choata-
lum and Chisec. Although the national government
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apparently has avoided a potentially major crisis, if The amnesty program led to many insurgent defec-
fighting escalates, masses of Indians will again de- tions, and these defectors greatly increased the mili-
scend on Highland towns and Guatemala City will not tary's pool of information on the enemy. Amnesty was
care for them. part of a broad government effort to reduce repression
Population and Resource Control
The CDF is one of the national government's princi-
pal instruments for controlling local population and
resources. CDF patrols and checkpoints monitor the
movements of community residents and strangers, and
the registration for CDF duty is a check on the
whereabouts of the militiamen. Moreover, giving
prominence to local men in policing the community-
thus downplaying the role of the regular Army-helps
reduce local resentment against the authorities. The
CDF also plays a key role in keeping the roads open
and discouraging guerrilla roadblocks or attacks on
traffic. Journalists and State Department personnel
traveling through the Western Highlands have been
impressed by the frequency of CDF checkpoints.
Before the expansion of the CDF program, the guer-
rillas had closed some roads and had made travel
unsafe in the Western Highlands. These breaks in the
transportation system disrupted local commerce and
aroused considerable popular antagonism toward the
insurgents. Although insurgents can still close traffic
in certain areas, government efforts in keeping the
roads open are gaining local good will. The few men
at each checkpoint cannot stop a determined guerrilla
assault, but they can provide surveillance and, if
nothing else, give an impression of government pres-
ence in isolated rural areas.
Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Increased intelligence from the local population of the
Western Highlands paralleled Rios Montt's improve-
ments in military relations with local Indians and
government efforts to curb abuses of the civilian
population. In general, the Rios Montt regime created
a trust between the military and the civilian popula-
tion that was absent during the Lucas regime. This
was possible partly because of Guatemala City's
demonstrated determination to maintain a permanent
political and military presence in Highland communi-
ties and its integration of local men into its security
apparatus through the CDF. These actions led many
Indians to the government side
and use voluntary inducements to support the govern-
ment. The government also improved intelligence by
emphasizing more humane interrogation of captured
guerrillas and by other efforts to gain their long-term
cooperation. The situation under Mejia is similar, but
the resurgence of death squads may jeopardize the
trust established by Rios Montt between the authori-
ties and the people.
linstitutional rivalry will
probably continue to hamper coordination at both the
national and local level
Military Operations
In the last year of the Lucas regime, the Army
responded to increasing insurgent strength in the
Western Highlands by'htghly mobile, large sweeps in
areas where guerrillas were believed to be concentrat-
ed. However, the guerrillas generally did not stand
and fight. These tactics resulted in death for large
numbers of civilians, and their effectiveness is diffi-
cult to judge. Rios Montt made important modifica-
tions in tactics by focusing on the following main
points:
? Military units were stationed in the principal popu-
lation centers to end guerrilla occupations, execu-
tions of government supporters, and propaganda
rallies.
? Small-unit tactics were emphasized using patrol
bases in the mountains and aggressive patrolling by
soldiers.
? Large-scale sweeps were undertaken in areas where
there were reports of guerrilla camps or concentra-
tions of guerrillas.
? Defense of towns when the garrison was out operat-
ing, or standing down, was increasingly left to the
local residents through the CDF, thus freeing the
regular units to pursue guerrillas in the mountains.
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Figure 7. Guatemala: Army of-
ficer reassures an isolated Indi-
an community that the govern-
ment will provide aid and
We believe this strategy was successful in protecting
government supporters, while destroying or harassing
guerrilla bands. Once bold enough to attack and
overrun departmental capitals and military garrisons,
the guerrillas scaled down their operations significant-
ly and largely confined themselves to hit-and-run
ambushes of military vehicles and to attacks on
isolated communities protected only by the smaller
CDF forces. After the August coup against Rios
Montt, counterinsurgency operations initially slowed
down, but Mejia seems to be following the basic
strategy of his predecessor. The military advantage
.clearly remains in the hands of the government, but
the guerrillas are gradually increasing their attacks.
The success of the Rios Montt military strategy was
facilitated in part by the mobilization of 5,000 addi-
tional soldiers on short notice for an emergency six-
month tour of duty. The government intended to
restrict this group to veteran reservists, but, in prac-
tice, it also accepted new volunteers, who often proved
to be unexpectedly effective. In each of the three
major Ixil towns, for example, a full company of local
Indians was recruited, trained, and armed. These
companies proved to be very capable because, like the
CDF, the local men knew the local terrain and people
much better than regular troops brought in from other
regions. The salaries paid and the Army's trust shown
by providing them with weapons normally used only
by regulars apparently greatly increased Ixil good will
for the government.
To preserve the gains of the Rios Montt counterinsur-
gency campaign, the armed forces are undergoing a
fundamental reorganization geared toward increasing
effectiveness in local military operations. For exam-
ple, the government has divided eight military zones
into 22 zones. Although we believe that the reorgani-
zation ultimately will benefit counterinsurgency at the _
local level, it probably will seriously strain military 25X1
manpower and logistic resources over the short term.
Public Welfare
The government has focused its public-welfare pro-
grams in the Western Highlands on two sectors of the
population: the residents of the major population
centers and the refugees or defectors from insurgent-
controlled areas. Following Rios Montt's admonition
that victory in counterinsurgency consists not in kill-
ing guerrillas but in killing the hunger of the peasants,
the subcoordinadora councils accelerated public
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works and facilitated outside help to rural communi-
ties. By building and staffing health clinics, construct-
ing roads and wells, and completing other types of
public works projects, the national government sought
to demonstrate that it could effectively provide bene-
fits at the local level
In dealing with the refugee population, we believe
that the Rios Montt regime demonstrated willingness
and effectiveness in meeting the food, housing, health,
and employment needs of the refugees. General Mejia
apparently intends to maintain the effort. We see such
government actions as a key in the loss of popular
support for the insurgency and in the Indian migra-
tion to government towns. The present national eco-
nomic deterioration, however, threatens the govern-
ment's financial capability to sustain relief efforts,
and some observers conclude that public-welfare pro-
grams-both under Rios Montt and Mejia-have
been effective only in some localities, not throughout
the Highlands. Moreover, the recent suspension of US
assistance-to protest the murders of Guatemalan
AID employees-further hampers the ability of the
Mejia regime to implement public-welfare programs.
Economic
Compared with programs having a more immediate
and direct impact on counterinsurgency, the Mejia
regime has assigned a low priority to economic devel-
opment. The national economic downturn in Guate-
mala necessitates defining strict priorities in allocat-
ing scarce resources. Although counterinsurgency
planners recognize the potential link between econom-
ic development and support for government, Guate-
mala City does not have the resources to systematical-
ly implement an economic development program in
the Western Highlands. However, by organizing and
financing diverse public works projects, the govern-
ment itself has become a major employer in some
Highland communities and a major source of income.
Propaganda
Guatemala City's domestic propaganda efforts be-
came more effective after the military coup that
brought Rios Montt to power. Rios Montt himself was
a boon to government propaganda because he project-
ed an image of honesty, reform, and nationalism. His
image contrasted greatly with the brutal and corrupt
reputation of Lucas and his clique. The major themes
in the new propaganda campaigns were:
? The national government and the Army express
solidarity with the Maya Indian heritage.
? The Army protects the Guatemalan people and
plays a positive, key role in local and national
development.
? Guatemalan guerrillas commit atrocities and do not
represent popular aspirations.
? The government is fighting alone and thus is more
genuinely nationalistic than the Guatemalan guer-
rillas who are supported and manipulated by
foreigners.
? The best way to further local economic and political
aspirations is to support the national government.
In contrast to Rios Montt, Mejia has not given a high
priority to public relations. Mejia does not enjoy the
popular image Rios Montt enjoyed, nor is Mejia likely
to emulate his predecessor's personal involvement in
propaganda. Although we expect official propaganda
to follow nationalistic lines similar to those of the
previous regime, we believe that the various measures
by the present administration will seriously undercut
the potential appeal of populist propaganda. The
elimination of the National Council of State-with its
highly publicized Indian participation-has not been
followed by any credible countermeasures conveying
government desire to forge links with Indian commu-
nities. In their public statements, the top authorities
of the new government are not employing the populist
rhetoric that enhanced Rios Montt's propaganda pro-
grams
Government propaganda efforts, moreover, are seri-
ously hampered by the lack of trained personnel,
financing, organization, and planning for systematic
dissemination of propaganda in the countryside. Fre-
quently, Indians living in isolated villages hear the
progovernment message only when a periodic patrol
arrives and the commanding officer gives a speech
translated into the local dialect. The government does
not have a permanent cadre of propagandists living or
traveling in the countryside; the CDF fulfills that role
only in certain areas.
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Terror
We believe that the Rios Montt regime's use of terror
at the local level discouraged support for the insurgen-
cy without alienating masses of people. Indiscriminate
terror by the Lucas regime was one of the main
reasons for the 1982 coup, as well as for the growing
antipathy for the authorities in the Western High-
lands civilian population. Although Rios Montt re-
nounced the blatant human rights abuses characteris-
tic of his predecessor, terror was a successful-albeit
decreasing-element of his counterinsurgency cam-
paign, particularly during the summer of 1982. Terror
clearly hurt Guatemala City's international relations
and seriously complicated its efforts to obtain foreign
aid. Nonetheless, our judgment is that local people in
the Western Highlands came to view the wrath of the
security forces as being directed primarily at the
guerrillas themselves or those guilty of supporting the
guerrillas. The key to this change in popular percep-
tion apparently was the regime's concern to sharply
focus terrorist repression. The use of terror, moreover,
was counterbalanced with blandishments and induce-
ments to voluntarily support the government. During
1982, for example, the same Army that burned
villages to convey to the local population the high cost
of supporting the insurgency also offered protection
and a guarantee of livelihood to those who relocated
to a government-held town. This carrot and stick
strategy effectively countered the guerrillas' own use
of terror.
Because the guerrillas and soldiers both used terror,
terror was not a distinguishing factor between the two
adversaries in the eyes of the local populace. What
distinguished them were other behavior and pro-
grams; these differences were the central failure of
the insurgency. The peasants perceived the Army as
increasingly willing and able to provide security and
material benefits; the guerrillas provided neither.
Immediately after the military coup against Rios
Montt, the military's use of terror remained low.
However, recent US Embassy and press reporting
indicates that terrorism controlled or tolerated by the
Mejia regime is on the upswing. Rural and urban
victims are "disappearing" again, including US AID
bilingual program employees. Press reports indicate
that the monthly death toll is gradually rising since
Mejia took power. Embassy reports of conversations
with rural inhabitants reveal a growing fear that a
major escalation of indiscriminate repression is in the
offing. We have no evidence to suggest that this will
occur, but the fear itself will not help the government
cause.
Indicators of Government and Insurgent Rural Control
Guatemala's rural control programs generally have
furthered the goals of the government's counterinsur-
gency campaign. Although the guerrillas continue
successful hit-and-run ambushes, our attitudinal, or-
ganizational, and military indicators suggest that the
national government has far greater capabilities for
exerting local control than the insurgents. The rela-
tively enlightened reforms and goals of the counterin-
surgency campaign initiated by Rios Montt could be
undermined, however, if current budgetary pressures
force Guatemala City to draw back from projecting a
strong presence, particularly in the remote areas of
the Western Highlands.
Attitudinal
Favorable Attitudes Among the Local Population. We
believe that most Western Highlands Indians feel
they were badly treated and deceived by the guerrillas
and that they are being better treated by the govern-
ment. Our conclusions are based on interviews with
Indians who had formerly supported the insurgents or
had lived under insurgent control-accounts con-
firmed by more recent interviews by journalists as
well as by US Embassy reporting. Having fruitlessly
suffered for supporting the insurgency, many Indians
have developed a strong antipathy for the insurgents
and their propaganda-a striking change from the
situation in 1981-82 when the insurgent cause seemed
to enjoy greater popularity than the government's.
The population's attitude changed rapidly because the
insurgents failed to deliver promised security and
material benefits to followers. Moreover, as govern-
ment pressure intensified, the insurgents increased
demands for food and services from the local popula-
tion, thus promoting the perception that the insur-
gents' program was unfair and unreasonable.
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The Rios Montt government increased good will by
putting emphasis on avoiding indiscriminate repres-
sion and on local psychological and political consider-
ations in planning combat operations. Although iso-
lated repression continued, press and US Embassy
reports suggested that most Indians came to view the
Army as more discriminative in its use of force. We
do not know of any government program that is
viewed by the Highlands Indians today as particularly
unfair to them. Our judgments on the attitudes of
Highlands Indians, however, are based on fragmen-
tary evidence; we lack systematic attitudinal surveys
or regular reports from informed local observers.
Furthermore, the recent increase in political violence
may jeopardize the generally favorable attitudes to-
ward the government.
Ability To Motivate Individuals To Take High Risks.
Active, highly motivated insurgents are much less in
evidence today in the Western Highlands than during
the height of the insurgency in 1981-82. During that
period they made themselves felt not only in the
greater effectiveness of military operations against
government forces but also in gains in recruiting and
organizing local people. Their activity and effective-
ness against the government has significantly de-
clined. We do not know, however, the number of
cadre that existed then or how many were subsequent-
ly killed, fled, or simply ceased revolutionary activity.
We assume decreased activity reflects decreased num-
bers, but there is a chance that the insurgents could
be still strong and lying low awaiting a change in the
political climate.
According to a variety of sources, the Guerrilla Army
of the Poor (EGP) made a major effort in past years to
recruit and train local leaders and combatants; conse-
quently, we assume that surviving EGP bands include
a majority of local people. By contrast, the other two
guerrilla organizations, the Revolutionary Organiza-
tion of the People in Arms (ORPA) and the Rebel
Armed Forces (FAR), do not seem to be following a
strategy of community-based guerrilla bands.
In contrast to the insurgents' declining ability to
motivate people, the government has made rapid and
extensive gains in developing committed local cadre
and supporters. The government is deliberately seek-
ing to develop a core of reliable local leaders to carry
out Guatemala City's directives, and, with the excep-
tion of regular Army officers, most of the authorities
in a locality are men from that same locality or
region. This reliance on local leadership has enhanced
efforts to mobilize and organize people. The unprece-
dented expansion of the locally based Civilian Defense
Forces-now encompassing an estimated 500,000
men-signifies that a relatively high percentage of the
male population of the Western Highlands is openly
committed to the government. Notwithstanding re-
ported CDF frustration over lack of significant Army
tactical or logistic support in certain areas, various
CDF units have repeatedly shown their commitment
to the government by aggressively pursuing and at-
tacking guerrillas.
Organizational
Ability To Mobilize and Organize People at the
Local Level. Although scattered EGP guerrilla bands
remain active in the Western Highlands, the govern-
ment's counterinsurgency campaign has destroyed the
greater part of EGP ca acit to mobilize and organize
the rural population.
l in
certain areas the EGP had earlier succeeded in mobi-
lizing and organizing people through the establish-
ment of Local Clandestine Committees (CCL). These
committees generally functioned in the numerous,
isolated communities where there was no government
presence or where government representatives lacked
effective administrative or coercive power. The insur-
gents often used coercion to organize local people, and
many Indians mobilized by the CCL were forced into
the cause. When the government counterinsurgency
campaign weakened the insurgents' coercive power,
this involuntary organization of the Indian peasantry
unraveled in most localities. Now the EGP is severely
limited in its ability to mobilize and organize people.
(ORPA and FAR are not as affected because tradi-
tionally their reliance on a local support base has been
far less than the EGP.)
Through the CDF and enhancement of local govern-
ment effectiveness, Guatemala City has successfully
mobilized Indians in communities formerly dominat-
ed by the EGP. The Mejia regime is attempting to
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replicate this success throughout the Western High-
lands; however, we do not know how much hidden
resentment remains among Indians who have experi-
enced government coercion, or the threat of it. None-
theless, we believe, on the basis of observations, as
well as US Embassy reporting, that the majority of
the Indians participating in government programs see
benefits in doing so and that, overall in the Western
Highlands, far greater willingness exists to participate
voluntarily in government programs than in those of
the insurgents
Ability To Provide Material Bents to Supporters.
Membership in insurgent organizations, whether as
an armed militant or a supporter, seems to provide
little or no benefits; nonetheless, some militants may
continue to believe that time is on their side and that
the insurgency will regain momentum. We have re-
ports that some guerrilla units receive salaries, but
this information has not been corroborated. Given the
low fortunes of the guerrilla bands at present, we
doubt that they have the resources to offer regular
salaries. The insurgents clearly failed to fulfill their
promises of material benefits to local communities;
rather, the guerrillas disrupted the transportation and
commerce that the Highland Indians depend on for
their livelihood. The guerrillas also proved unable to
fulfill their promises to protect their Indian followers
from violent government reprisals.
Although Guatemala City also is strapped for finan-
cial resources, it has implemented public works and
the CDF programs that benefit the Indians. The
public works programs directly benefit local workers
by providing them with salaries or food. These pro-
grams have evidently gained good will for the govern-
ment in the Ixil Triangle and probably in other areas.
The CDF program that encompasses most of the
Western Highlands does not include the payment of
salaries. However, by keeping roads open and protect-
ing residents and visitors in Highland communities,
the CDF militiamen have played a key role in reviving
local and regional commerce. The economic impact of
the CDF is even more direct in those communities
where the CDF has allowed workers to return to the
fields safe from guerrilla kidnapings or assaults. In
interviews with CDF members, some dissatisfaction
was displayed over certain delays in Guatemala City's
response to community requests for assistance. The
majority of Indians, however, believe Guatemala City
is better able than the insurgents to provide benefits to
its supporters
Ability To Exploit Local Resources. In early 1982,
the EGP controlled manpower, agriculture, and other
resources in several large areas, but now the EGP only
controls the resources of a few, remote strongholds.
ORPA and FAR have acquired large but undeter-
mined sums of money through extortion, but they
exert little control over resources in the countryside.
Guatemala City, on the other hand, has undisputed
control over resources in most of the Western High-
lands-a capability it has reinforced by the large-
scale mobilization of local manpower through the
CDF, administrative reforms, and a greater military
presence in previously isolated communities. Both
local, military, and civil authorities seem flexible in
implementing the directives of the national govern-
ment and are adapting them to local conditions. The
guerrillas, however, also are flexible in implementing
orders at the local areas.
Military
Ability To Protect Supporters and Local Organiza-
tions. The failure of the guerrillas to protect their own
supporters-admitted in captured documents and cor-
roborated by interviews with former supporters-is a
key factor in the widespread loss of support for the
insurgency in the Western Highlands. The guerrillas'
campaign of increasing ambushes of Army troops was
premature because they overestimated their political
and military abilities. As a result, we believe that
active insurgent cadre now live primarily in a few
insurgent strongholds in the mountains where they
can better protect supporters. We have virtually no
reliable information on the number of insurgent cadre
residing or operating in local communities outside
these strongholds, but we assume that it is small.
Guerrilla bands now appear to be viewed in most
Indian communities as unwelcome troublemakers. F_
The government has generally protected its support-
ers. An important indicator of security is that local
officials usually sleep in their own communities or in
those communities where they are assigned. The
population in general views the CDF as an effective
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source of protection from insurgents, a perception
fostered partly by the fact that CDF duty usually is a
rotational assignment served by all able-bodied men
of the locality. However, the guerrillas have killed
CDF members and their families. While these massa-
cres certainly have not promoted support for the
insurgency, they have impressed upon the rural popu-
lation, that the insurgents remain a force to be reck-
oned with, notwithstanding government successes.
Regular Army forces, in contrast, are overcoming
their reputation for indiscriminate repression. A lack
of helicopters and the transportation and communica-
tions problems caused by the rugged mountains and
equipment shortages sometimes prevent national
Army "reaction forces" from responding quickly to
guerrilla attacks on local CDF or progovernment
communities]
Military and Intelligence Effectiveness. The insur-
gents' military and intelligence capabilities have de-
clined considerably, compared with the government
security forces. At the height of their power, the
guerrillas had an extensive and effective intelligence
network at the local level. In light of the drastic loss of
support among the populace and the government's
success in establishing control over Highland commu-
nities, we believe that this intelligence network has
been seriously damaged.
Government intelligence, on the other hand, has
improved considerably, owing to the emphasis placed
on improving relations between the Army and civil-
ians and on incorporating local people into the strug-
gle against the guerrillas. Militarily, both the regular
Army and the CDF stress small-unit tactics and are
aggressive in day and night patrolling. The level of
military training received by the CDF typically is
rudimentary, and consequently we would not expect
them to perform proficiently in combat. We have no
reports of major problems with CDF performance,
however; the forces have only abandoned their weap-
ons or casualties when overwhelmed by vastly superior
enemy forces. Some CDF units occasionally join
regular Army forces in coordinated attacks on insur-
gent strongpoints. Army officers praise CDF partici-
pation in these operations because of their superior
knowledge of local terrain. In contrast, insurgent
forces have lost the ability to overrun provincial
capitals, although small units continue successful
ambushes and usually withdraw in good order with
equipment and casualties.
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Philippines Case Study '
Philippine military officers have repeatedly warned
US Embassy officials that, unless the civilian govern-
ment combats social problems and eliminates *graft
and corruption, the armed forces will never be able to
eliminate the Communist Party of the Philippines/
New People's Army (CPP/NPA). Manila's widely
publicized political, economic, and military programs
have been ineffective, and local officials-beneficia-
ries of a well-entrenched system of political patronage
based in Manila-are either unable or unwilling to
effect any real change (see figure 8). Consequently,
the government's civil and military rural control
programs have failed to arrest, let alone reverse, the
growth of the Communist insurgency, and the
CPP/NPA now controls 18 percent of the rural
villages in the Philippines. In addition, the Commu-
nists have increased by about 60 percent the number
of rural barangays-the lowest level in the adminis-
trative hierarchy of government-fully under their
influence (see figures 9 and 10)
Counterinsurgency Programs
Political and Administrative
During its 18-year tenure, the Marcos regime has
become excessively bureaucratic, inefficient, and
largely incapable of exerting political and administra-
tive influence in many areas of the Philippines, partic-
ularly those where it is seriously challenged by the
CPP/NPA. Although political change is needed, the
regime seems intent on preventing any important
sharing of either its political or economic monopoly.
Despite his rhetoric, Marcos is relying principally on a
military approach for defeating the Communists.
Figure 8
Philippines:
Counterinsurgent Rural Control Programs
O Generally effective
Q Effective in limited aspects/areas
Generally ineffective
Program
Political and administrative
Local security
Population and resource control
Intelligence
Military operations
Public welfare
Economic
Propaganda
Terror
officials often will not visit villages under their juris-
diction. The legal system does not work. A regional
judge from northern Mindanao told a US Embassy
officer that few murder cases ever reach his court;
most are blamed on the NPA, even though the NPA
is responsible for only a fraction. Even where the
government functions, it is often corrupt and ineffec-
tive. The Philippine Constabulary is strongly disliked
because of its abusive behavior, public works officials
are renowned for diverting funds from local projects,
and postal workers steal money orders and food
mailed to rural residents.
According to a reliable US Embassy source, in many
of the most active insurgent areas-parts of Samar,
Northern Luzon, the Bicol region, and Mindanao-
civil government administration has ceased. Local
'This discussion addresses only the current Communist insurgency
in the Philippines, directed by the Communist Party of the
Philippines and its military faction, the New People's Army
(CPP/NPA). The Muslim insurgency of the Moro National Libera-
tion Front and its armed faction, the Bangsa Moro Army
(MNLF/BMA) is confined to the southern Philippines (see figure 6)
and does not seriously threaten the stability of the Philippine
Government]
The well-publicized "Katatagan" National Security
Campaign-the principal political program designed
to contain and eliminate the CPP/NPA insurgency-
has also foundered. Devised by the armed forces in
early 1983, the strategy calls for a four-stage coordi-
nated military and civilian effort. First, the military
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Figure 9
Major Areas of Insurgent Activity
Communist operational area
Communist expansion area
Muslim operational area
Muslim expansion area
Selected province boundary
0 150 Kilometers
P
.e
If
BABUYAN
ISLANDS
South
China
Sea
Island m
op ~pG
,APE
aVt'J r
Philippine
Sea
Pulau Karawelong
Indonesia
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clears the insurgent-affected areas of enemy armed
groups through combined combat and civil-military
operations. Next, the civil government agencies enter
the area and deliver essential services. Then, the
courts work toward redressing popular grievances.
Finally, the civilian agencies establish a permanent
sense of security and implement self-sufficient eco-
nomic projects to improve living standards. According
to the US defense attache, this plan has failed because
of the inability and unwillingness of civilian govern-
ment agencies to support a strategy designed by the
military.
Local Security
Village Self-Defense. Village self-defense forces have
played an important role in Philippine counterinsur-
gency efforts ever since the 1950 campaign against
the Huks, and they have evolved into an integral part
of the government's current counterinsurgency cam-
paign. In the early 1970s the Constabulary armed
these units and assigned them locally to work with
five-man Constabulary detachments permanently sta-
tioned in villages. The self-defense units protected the
village against insurgent attacks and, more important-
ly, detected and prevented attempts by insurgents to
contact the village population. In 1974 the govern-
ment amalgamated these local defense forces into a
national Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF)
The CHDF now comprises at least 47,000 men-
lightly armed civilians organized along military
lines-who often operate jointly with regular Army or
Constabulary units and serve as a buffer between
local villagers and members of the armed forces
drawn from other regions. The force, which sustained
nearly as many combat casualties in 1982 as the
regular armed forces, has allowed the Army in the
south to redeploy battalions that have been fighting
guerrillas for many years.
Training and utilization of CHDF personnel varies
markedly from region to region, and thus it is difficult
to assess the overall effectiveness of the program. In
Mindanao and Leyte, for example, the government
has systematically developed local CHDF units, and
they have increasingly assumed responsibility for
counterinsurgency operations against both Muslim
and Communist guerrillas. In these areas, CHDF
groups are under special counterinsurgency unified
commands and are trained by Special Warfare Bri-
gade Teams. This frees regular Army and police units
for rapid-reaction and civic-action roles. Elsewhere in
the Philippines, however, many CHDF units led by
the Army Reserve Command suffer from a lack of
support from local Army commanders and have repu-
tations for poor discipline and abuse of their author-
ity. Some CHDF personnel sell their guns to the
highest bidder, reportedly often the NPA
Relocation. For several years Philippine security
forces have attempted to protect the population of
strongly contested areas from the insurgents by pres-
suring villagers to relocate in heavily guarded settle-
ments.' Military commanders inform residents in
targeted villages suspected of supporting the NPA
that they will be considered NPA sympathizers if they
refuse to move into garrisoned and fortified areas.
The garrison imposes curfews at night and treats the
surrounding countryside as a free-fire zone. It fre-
quently requires relocated families to contribute "vol-
unteer guards" and to provide food for military
detachments posted in the village. Catholic human
rights investigators-linked by reliable US Embassy
sources to the CPP/NPA but probably accurate in
their assessment-report that by 1979 the govern-
ment had forcibly relocated more than 50,000 persons
in Samar, and by 1982 more than 200,000 had been
relocated in seven Mindanao provinces.
The current relocation policy has, in our judgment,
failed primarily because the military has not been
able to provide these transplanted Filipinos with many
of the basic necessities of life. Because of poor
conditions in relocation sites and the lack of adequate
logistic support, malnutrition, disease, and inadequate
housing are common complaints. These difficulties
provide ready-made propaganda for the insurgents.
Although publicity surrounding this Vietnam-style
"strategic hamlet" policy led Defense Minister Enrile
to order. an end to the practice in March 1982, recent
US Embassy reports indicate that local commanders
continue to confine thousands of families in tempo-
rary hamlets in Mindanao
2 This tactic was first used at the turn of the century by US forces
in the Philippines to successfully isolate insurgents led by Emilio
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Figure 10
Increase in Communist- Controlled Villages
a
Northern Luzon
331/340
Western Mindanao
9/27
? Communist-controlled villages
? Villages targeted for control
? Uncontested villages
9/27 Number of villages under Communist
control, July 1981/February 1983
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Population and Resource Control
In our. estimation, the Philippine security forces have
the apparatus to effectively control the population and
to protect and control resources, but are thwarted in
these endeavors by poor implementation and wide-
spread corruption. Military checkpoints, for example,
are common throughout the Philippines but are badly
administered, easily avoided, and frequently serve as
extortion points for the military and police. The
Constabulary and Integrated National Police, who
should implement population- and resource-control
programs, have a poor reputation and can elicit little
cooperation. in tracking insurgency. Local military
units have imposed a protective curfew in many areas,
particularly where they have relocated villagers, but
the restriction irritates farmers who complain that
there is not enough time to reach distant fields and
markets. Should the insurgents alter their present
avoidance strategy and begin to attack elements of the
Philippine economy, the government's already defi-
cient security apparatus will be severely taxed.
Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Given the success of Philippine intelligence in captur-
ing high-level insurgent leaders, the government prob-
ably has an accurate view of the growth of the
CPP/NPA organization. The government has identi-
fied most of the CPP/NPA's national and regional
leadership, and well-placed agents provide a continu-
ing flow of information concerning its key decisions
and strategic thinking. In 1982, 16 regional and
national CPP/NPA leaders were captured or killed,
and two surrendered. This record compares favorably
with that of past insurgencies worldwide.
The government has a serious problem, however,
obtaining timely intelligence information at the vil-
lage level. According to US Embassy reporting from
Northern Luzon and Mindanao, the NPA quickly
finds and executes government informers, causing
village populations to refrain from. passing tactical
intelligence to local security forces. The military
believes that in many rural areas the insurgents have
established an efficient intelligence network to moni-
tor the movements of government forces.
President Marcos has
criticized his intelligence chiefs for their failures at
the grass-roots level and has complained that 60 to 70
percent of the intelligence budget has been going into
the pockets of military commanders instead of those
of village-level agents and informers.
The government is moving on several fronts to deal
with these village-level problems, but two of their
major initiatives suffer from serious flaws. A plan
calling for a minimum of two paid intelligence officers
in each of the 43,000 barangays using the Ministry of
Human Settlements as cover is overly ambitious and
may never occur because of a lack of funding. The
1984 intelligence operations budget for the Constabu-
lary-the principal collectors of intelligence on the
insurgency-has been cut by 30 percent. The Army is
organizing Regional Intelligence Coordinating Cen-
ters (RICC) intended to facilitate the collection, coor-
dination, and integration of intelligence in support of
tactical operations, but military intelligence units
consider themselves in competition, and commanders
fear being upstaged by rival units.
Military Operations
The Philippine Army and the Constabulary are inef-
fective in their approach to counterinsurgency mili-
tary tactics:
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ulary units often establish fixed positions rather
than conduct patrols and travel only on safe routes
to avoid contact with the insurgents. Although they
are expected to live off the land while searching for
the guerrillas, members of the Constabulary fre-
quently steal what they need. This confiscation of
supplies alienates the populace.
? The Army conducts large unit sweeps using block-
ing forces to prevent guerrilla escape. Because such
operations are difficult to organize secretly, the
insurgents often have warning of the Army's activi-
ties, which allows them to avoid contact during the
sweep and to return to swept areas after the Army
has withdrawn to garrison. Most military units also
avoid night operations thereby granting the insur-
gents a free hand for activities after dark.
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In April 1983 the armed forces began a major
reorganization designed to improve military opera-
tions against the insurgents, but subsequent attache
reporting shows that only superficial bureaucratic
changes are being made. The 13 Regional Com-
mands-formerly commanded by Constabulary offi-
cers-are reorganizing into Regional Unified Com-
mands (RUCs), ostensibly to improve command and
control in each region. A new, highly trained elite
reaction force-composed of approximately 21,000
Army scout rangers, Navy seals, Marine quick reac-
tion forces, Air Force special warfare troops, and
Constabulary forces retrained as scout rangers-is to
provide support for the Unified Commands. In fact,
however, both the Army and the Constabulary are
only redesignating existing units as elite forces with
minimal retraining. This eliminates one of the most
important characteristics of such units-the selection
of highly trained, motivated, and disciplined person-
nel.
Public Welfare
The government has achieved few successes in its
efforts to improve rural public welfare. In many areas
government presence is lacking and only NPA person-
nel and missionaries serve the local residents. Projects
aided by foreign governments, such as the Australian
Government's roadbuilding program in Samar and
the US-aided Bicol River Basin Project, may eventu-
ally improve the lot of some villagers, but they will
have only a slight impact given the massive needs.
Military civic-action units have made limited at-
tempts to fill the void created by the lack of welfare
services in many remote villages.
an unarmed military medical team
operating from 1979 to 1982 in NPA-controlled areas
in the mountains of Northern Luzon, Samar, Leyte,
and Northern Mindanao was successful in gaining the
respect and gratitude of much of the population. Press
reporting indicates that during 1982, Army medical
and dental teams treated nearly 6,000 villagers in the
Bicol region as part of the military's psychological
campaign. Information on the extent of similar pro-
grams elsewhere in the Philippines is unavailable.
Economic
The National Livelihood and Development (KKK)
Program-announced with much fanfare in mid-1981
as Manila's answer to poverty and Communist sub-
version-holds almost no promise of addressing the
economic needs of the rural Philippines. Although the
program is intended to spur economic and social
development nationwide and help every village, town,
and city attain economic self-sufficiency, the US
Embassy feels that it is too modest in design to create
sufficient change. Furthermore, the program is
plagued by an overly centralized administration better
known for politically attractive ideas than for results.
The program operates through subsidized loans for
small, labor-intensive agricultural, manufacturing,
and service projects. The central government assists
further by finding domestic and international markets
for goods produced. Priority beneficiaries are sup-
posed to be those considered most susceptible to
CPP/NPA propaganda-landless workers, upland
farmers, ethnic minorities, and urban slumdwellers-
but they have received little benefit.
Propaganda
For years the Philippine armed forces have singled out
the large number of insurgents and their supporters
who have supposedly surrendered as evidence of prog-
ress in defeatine enc .
high-ranking Constabulary officers often arrange for
large numbers of villagers to "surrender" to impress
their superiors in Manila. Many of those who surren-
der are farmers merely suspected of being sympathet-
ic with the NPA, who receive a monetary reward for
participating in the ploy. The officers who arrange the
mass surrenders often receive commendations and,
according to newspaper reports, may receive kick-
backs from the villagers. Such shams are part of the
reason the Marcos government is losing the psycho-
logical war to the CPP/NPA in many rural areas of
the Philippines. Cardinal Sin, leading spokesman for
the Philippine Catholic Church, believes the govern-
ment has no credibility with the people, and 62
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percent of Manila's top business leaders surveyed in a
recent opinion poll rated the national government's
credibility as poor.
The government's credibility is further weakened by
the fact that development of the rural countryside-
frequently touted as a cornerstone of the Marcos
government's policy-remains an unfulfilled promise
nearly everywhere. The Communists are quick to
exploit this failure for its propaganda value; coconut
farmers are shown Manila newspapers. with the latest
commodity market quotations and asked to judge for
themselves who benefits from the wide disparity
between what they earn and the prices shown in the
paper. A Philippine officer assigned to the Davao area
recently told our Ambassador that many local offi-
cials in Mindanao believe Communist propaganda
that accuses Marcos's cronies of exploiting local
farmers in their foreign-financed agribusiness ven-
tures. In other areas, NPA-armed propaganda teams
visit villages and turn the government's public rela-
tions efforts to their advantage; a government-distrib-
uted picture showing a newly built road is displayed to
make the point that only the rich and middle class can
afford the luxury of riding in the cars shown on the
given offenders-reassignment or dismissal. A prison
sentence for military offenders is rare. We believe the
government's counterproductive use of terror is one of
the principal reasons for the growth of the Communist
insurgency.
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road.
Terror
There is no systematic program to employ terror as a
counterinsurgent tactic at the local level, but govern-
ment military and paramilitary units frequently resort
to arbitrary and indiscriminate intimidation of the
rural population. Arbitrary arrests, disappearances,
torture, and summary executions attributable to the
government are common.' Senior officers recognize
that such terrorism is counterproductive and plays
into the hands of insurgent propagandists but are
either unable or unwilling to stop it. Government
claims that military wrongdoers are increasingly be-
ing punished are contradicted by the light punishment
reports that during a 15-month period ending March 1983 there
were 1,516 arbitrary arrests, 146 summary executions, and 42
disappearances attributable to government forces. Such reports,
whether true or inflated, are widely read and given much credence
throughout the Philippine
The government's reputation has been further tar-
nished by rumors and international press reports
linking senior government officials with the deliberate
creation of paramilitary terror groups. Reliable US
Embassy sources state that senior Constabulary offi-
cials recruited armed forces officers and enlisted
personnel for such a group-The Lost Command-in
February 1973. The original concept was a small,
hard-hitting commando group that could operate se-
cretly and with minimal command and control to
neutralize Muslim and Communist insurgent groups
in Northern Mindanao and Samar. However, these
commandos soon became accustomed to the absence
of constraints. In September 1981, 35 civilians, in-
cluding women and children, were massacred by The
Lost Command operating jointly with local CHDF
forces in Barrio Sag-od in Northern Samar in retalia-
tion for an NPA attack on a logging company owned
by Defense Minister Enrile. Today, The Lost Com-
mand has several subordinate units, with estimates of 25X1
overall strength ranging from 50 to 500 men. The
units are augmented occasionally by CHDF and
armed forces personnel. The command operates in an
area from Samar and Leyte to Agusan and Surigao
Provinces and has entered the Davao and Cotabato
areas of Mindanao
Attitudinal, organizational, and military indicators all
suggest to us that the Philippine Government is
making little progress with a seriously escalating
insurgency. The CPP/NPA is gradually expanding its
control over much of the rural Philippines
the CPP/NPA is
organizing villagers in 39 guerrilla fronts nation-
wide-while the government's military campaigns
and well-publicized development programs are failing
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because of poor leadership and inadequate implemen-
tation. In those villages they control, the insurgents'
political organizations are functioning effectively.
Most of the people are sympathetic toward the insur-
gents, provide them with material support, and can be
mobilized against the government for mass actions. In
many of these villages, a guerrilla 'militia has been
organized to support the NPA and protect cadre and
supporters.
Attitudinal
Favorable Attitudes Among the Local Population.
The Philippine public is skeptical of Manila's efforts
to improve local standards of living. Years of highly
publicized development programs have yielded few
concrete results. An opinion poll taken in 1983 shows
that nearly one-third of the population feels living
standards are deteriorating, a significant increase
compared with the number of Filipinos who shared
this feeling when the same question was asked in
1981. In addition, the 1983 poll shows a majority of
Filipinos have no confidence that the government will
find solutions to their problems
The military-particularly the Philippine Constabu-
lary-has acquired a well-deserved reputation for
abusing the rural civilian population, which discounts
any claim by the military leadership that abuse is no
longer tolerated. Local military and paramilitary
forces confiscate farmers' food supplies, arbitrarily
arrest and detain suspected subversives, physically
abuse people, and summarily execute suspects. Com-
munist Party propaganda exaggerates and publicizes
the military's poor reputation
In contrast with their attitudes toward the govern-
ment, a significant number of rural Filipinos are
favorably disposed toward both the Communist Party
of the Philippines and the New People's Army. A
captured member of the Central Committee of the
CPP claims-and his military interrogators agree-
that 35 to 45 percent of the population of Northern
Luzon can be relied upon to support the CPP/NPA.
A recent opinion poll-confined to areas not under
CPP/NPA control-disclosed that of those willing to
express an opinion concerning the Communist Party,
83 percent in Mindanao, 50 percent in the Visayas,
and 18 percent in Luzon expressed a positive opinion.'
The CPP/NPA generally uses persuasion to promote
and maintain favorable attitudes among the people;
cadre resort to intimidation and coercion sparingly.
The NPA does not tax excessively and uses force only
after repeated warnings. The insurgents work hard to
demonstrate that their victims are guilty of a serious
crime against the people and indeed, in most cases,
those chosen for punishment are already notorious for
corruption or abuse
Ability To Motivate Individuals To Take High Risks.
The Philippine Government-for nearly two decades
firmly controlled by Marcos's ruling KBL Party-has
little ability to motivate people in rural areas. The
government demands little from most of the popula-
tion and, in turn, provides few benefits. Rural barrio
residents generally view the government as distant
and avoid interacting with officials because such
occasions yield abuse, frustration, or-even when
some benefit is derived-humiliation. The Civilian
Home Defense Forces-increasingly responsible for
counterinsurgent operations against Muslim and
Communist guerrillas-apparently vary widely in
their capability and willingness to fight. In some areas
they are effective while in others they sell their guns
to the highest bidder.
even many local KBL
motivated to run for office in 1982.
In contrast, although its numbers represent less than 1
percent of the total national population, the
CPP/NPA has steadily grown in committed support-
ers since its founding in 1969. Morale within the party
and the NPA appears to be high: there are few
defectors-most of those who defect are villagers who
receive a monetary reward for "surrendering"-and
the CPP/NPA continues to attract adherents despite
the increased risk they will be involved in combat.
Philippine intelligence estimates CPP/NPA support-
ers at 7,500 NPA regulars, more than 13,000 militia
and self-defense forces, and 150,000 civilians in its
village organizations. At a recent party meeting, the
CPP Central Committee claimed to have 15,000 NPA
regulars and an additional 10,000 militia. We esti-
mate the party to have about 8,000 political organiz-
ers and other types of cadre, many of whom are
probably not included in the numbers above.
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Captured party leaders say that they have had their
most success in organizing the religious sector
through united front activities. Priests, nuns, and lay
leaders are highly respected by peasants and motivate
many to join the revolution. Additionally, other NPA
leaders, many of whom are locally born middle class
youth who were radicalized while university students,
gain the respect of poor farmers by their willingness to
forgo seemingly lucrative careers and endure the
hardships of life in the hills.
Organizational
Ability To Mobilize and Organize People at the
Local Level. The Philippine Government has been
ineffective in organizing and mobilizing people at the
local level. Eighteen years of KBL Party control of
government have resulted in local political systems
frequently characterized by favoritism and en-
trenched sinecures more responsive to the demands of
Manila than to those of the local population. Loyalty
to the president and the KBL is repaid by opportuni-
ties to gain money and power, but these benefits do
not trickle down to the rural poor, most of whom are
untouched by their government.
in many cases only local officials
benefit from economic development funds allocated
for private-sector projects.
The insurgents, by comparison, have steadily im-
proved their ability to organize cadre and the local
population in most rural areas.
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approximately 18 percent
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(7,800) of all rural barangays are now effectively
controlled by the CPP/NPA. The CPP/NPA is ac-
tively organizing barrio populations in 39 guerrilla
fronts nationwide. The CPP/NPA has gained
strength and support, even in those provinces where
the government's military presence is the strongest.
The government's military campaign to rid the Bicol
of NPA in 1982 was not only unsuccessful, but,
according to US Embassy reports, the region has a
much greater NPA presence today than it did a year
ago.
As CPP/NPA control is consolidated in one area,
military and organizing activities are transferred to
contiguous areas. Party strategy dictates-in line with 25X1
the Chinese and Vietnamese model-that political
organizations of the rural population is the key to
political victory. Military action is considered less
important at this time and attempts to permanently
control. territory are considered counterproductive
(figure 12
Ability To Provide Material Benefits To Supporters.
The Communists provide their cadre and supporters
with only limited material benefits. The CPP/NPA
platform rests on promises of advantages to the poor
in a new Philippines "where the rich and the foreign 25X1
exploiters won't take all the wealth of the people."
Captured guerrilla leaders reveal that CPP/NPA
cadre and guerrillas receive no regular compensa-
tion-although their families receive a small sti-
pend-and that the guerrillas lead a spartan exist-
ence, often lacking food. Party cadre emphasize to
their followers that those who join the struggle are
part of a long Filipino tradition of revolutionary
For rural villagers who support the CPP/NPA, cadre
emphasize the party's land reform program and stress
that their ability to achieve land reform should be
interpreted as a key measure of the success of their
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The Communist Strategy for Organizing a Village
The CPP/NPA uses a classic strategy-modeled on
the teachings of Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh-to
win control of rural barrios. Armed propaganda
teams visit barrios in areas targeted for expansion
and may spend more than a year slowly weaning the
villagers away from the government. The strategy,
spelled out in captured documents, consists of four
stages:
Infiltration. Cadre and party sympathizers, often
nuns and lay Catholic Church workers, visit the
barrio, frequently using the cover of legitimate activi-
ties. Their tasks are to evaluate the local security
and political situation and to identify both sympa-
thetic and hostile residents. A barrio liaison group is
formed among sympathetic residents. This stage may
last from a week to a month.
Preparatory. Armed propaganda teams visit the bar-
rio, showing residents that the NPA has the military
muscle to come and go at will without government
interference. They provide the residents with their
view of the political situation and may reinforce their
message by publicly threatening locally unpopular
individuals with 'people's justice" if they fail to
reform. Although public executions are infrequent-
most individuals comply by the third and final
warning-it is generally understood that NPA justice
is swift and uncompromising. During this phase,
which may last three to four months, village associa-
tions representing peasants, women, and youth are
formed.
Consolidation. Cadre consolidate the party's hold on
the barrio by setting up an organizing committee as
the lawmaking body of the already established peas-
ant's association. A self-defense force, the first step in
organizing armed groups, is also formed. By the end'
of this stage-which may last from six months to a
year-a barrio branch of the Communist Party has
been organized 25X1
Mass Organization. CPP/NPA usually takes at least
a year to complete its control of the barrio. During
this final phase, representatives of the various barrios
form a barrio association. The insurgents have by
then effectively neutralized government presence in
the village probably never very strong-and are in
control.
The government generally does nothing until reports
are received that a barangay is fully politicized. A
typical response includes the preparation of a report
and a one-day visit to the village by a team of civilian,
and military officials. During this visit a caucus is
held with the people to determine their problems,
needs, and grievances probably the same ones pre-
sented to a similar group that visited them two years
ago. Free medical and dental care is also adminis-
tered and progovernment propaganda distributed.
promises of officials and frequently react with disbe-
lief and passivity. In contrast with the CPP/NPA who
visit for months and befriend the villagers, govern-
ment and military officials rarely visit the villages
and are considered strangers, neither to be trusted
nor believed.
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local organizing efforts. In the CPP Central Commit-
tee newsletter, Ang Bayan, the party claims some
success in forcing landlords to reduce rents and in
stopping absentee landlords from collecting rents in
the Cagayan Valley, Samar, the Bicol, and Minda-
nao. In some areas the party has helped limit local
banditry, land grabbing, corruption, and brutality by
local officials. Party members also give villagers
practical advice about farming matters and health.
Like China's "barefoot doctors," they stress herbal
medicine and acupuncture.
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Figure 12
How Political-Oriented Insurgencies
Establish Village Control
Government
control of village
Insurgent
control of village
Recognition of __+ Adaptation to - _p, Disruption of traditional _? Domination over All activities under
exploitable conditions recognized conditions pattern of activities village environment direction of insurgents
Manila's ability to provide material benefits to gov-
ernment supporters in a nation of 53 million is
limited. The National Livelihood and Development
(KKK) Program is the government's primary local
economic program and is directly controlled by
Imelda Marcos. It is aimed at benefiting the rural
population and thereby countering insurgent claims
that the government serves only the rich. In the two
years since it was proclaimed as the economic center-
piece of a "New Society," however, the program has
directly aided less than 1 percent of the Philippine
population. According to US Embassy sources, critics
contend that the KKK is another of the First Lady's
public relations gimmicks, which, although politically
attractive, lacks substance. Local intelligence officials
frequently report graft and misappropriation of KKK
funds by local officials, but there is no evidence that
Manila dissuades such action or punishes guilty offi-
cials.
Ability To Exploit Local Resources. The survival and
growth of the CPP/NPA nationwide suggest its abili-
ty to exploit local resources. Each of the 16 regional
Consolidation Phase
(6-12 months]
Party Committees in the country is responsible for
financing its own revolutionary activities with no
known dependence on foreign sources for funds. Re-
cently captured NPA tax collectors in Davao del
Norte-one of 39 active rural guerrilla fronts-have
estimated monthly Communist collections in that
province alone at $100,000. In areas under some
degree of Communist influence, the CPP/NPA levies
taxes on a progressive basis. Poor families pay little,
but more prosperous families, including those of
schoolteachers and owners of small shops, are expect-
ed to pay more. Business taxes are assessed according
to the size of the company's operations and its ability
to pay. Although the CPP/NPA has exhibited flexi-
bility in collecting taxes, the threat of force is ever
present.
The insurgency has not diminished the government's.
ability to exploit resources in rural areas. The Com-
munist guerrillas have not targeted agriculture, agri-
business, forest products, or mining operations for
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85T00283R000400010006-7
Figure 13. Philippines: Armed
propaganda team conducts po-
litical meetingfor villagers.
destruction because these resources provide needed
funds for the CPP/NPA through taxation as well as
incomes to otherwise unemployed families. In addi-
tion, many of these corporations have reputations for
treating their employees fairly.
We do not know the effect of the insurgency on the
government's ability to collect local taxes nationwide.
The Philippine Bureau of Internal Revenue is notori-
ously inefficient and corrupt, and few people have
ever met their tax obligation. US Embassy travelers in
the Bicol report that wealthy landlords who have
stopped collecting rents from their tenants under
NPA pressure have also stopped paying taxes to the
government
Military
Ability To Protect Supporters and Local Organiza-
tions. The government is increasingly unable to pro-
tect its supporters from NPA reprisals in areas where
the NPA is active. In most of these areas government
security forces may appear in control by day, but the
NPA rules at night. More government workers-96
local officials and development program specialists-
and civilians were assassinated last year than ever
before; two NPA defectors were assassinated in a
well-guarded Constabulary mess hall. In Central Lu-
zon, Negros, and the Bicol, many fearful landlords
have opted to avoid rural areas, and, in Negros,
according to the US Consulate, 12 of the 33 munici-
pal mayors now reside in Bacolod, the capital city. A
very reliable US Embassy source describes the Caga-
yan populace as demoralized and afraid and believes
it supports the NPA, primarily as a means of survival.
Mistreatment and abuse of the local population.by
government soldiers is random, NPA contact is more
predictable. NPA violence is more focused and specif-
ic, leaving little doubt in people's minds which behav-
ior will bring retribution and which is needed to earn
a degree of protection.
Military Effectiveness. Low morale, a disillusioned
officer corps, inadequate training, and poor disci-
pline-a major reason for abusive behavior toward
the rural populace-are growing problems for the
counterinsurgency efforts of the Philippine armed
forces. In June a senior officer in Northern Luzon
admitted that the campaign there is foundering under
the weight of these problems, growing CPP/NPA
strength, and a population that distrusts the govern-
ment and is sympathetic to the Communists. Most
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Secret
Figure 14. Philippines: NPA
guerrillas lead a spartan exist-
ence in the boondocks and are
feared less than the military by
government units avoid combat and patrolling, and
refuse to return fire when ambushed by the guerrillas.
The Army General in charge of Mindanao operations
recently acknowledged that "paper patrolling"-when
units avoid combat but report completed patrols to
headquarters-is common
In spite of the military's shortcomings, the govern-
ment continues to recruit enough soldiers. A military
career provides opportunities for young men who
would not otherwise find employment in the stagnant
Philippine economy. Many of these recruits are not,
however, of high caliber and are cashiered at the end
of their two-year training period.
The aggressive advantage belongs to the NPA, which,
according to Philippine intelligence, now initiates 60
percent of all armed encounters. Consistent with Mao
Zedong's emphasis on controlling the population, not
the land, the NPA does not attempt to permanently
control rural territory and immediately disengages to
minimize losses when faced with superior government
forces.
he NPA frequently succeeds in obtain-
ing weapons from government troops through well-
executed ambushes. Because of a lack of external
material support, the weapons procurement tactic has
become a key objective of current NPA military
strategy.
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Secret
Secret
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