SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY TRANSFERS TO NON-COMMUNIST LDCS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00283R000300040008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Soviet and East European
Military Transfers to
Non-Communist LDCs
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GI 83-10278
December 1983
463
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Soviet and East European
Military Transfers to
Non-Communist LDCs
This paper was prepared by the Communist
Activities Branch, Office of Global Issues. It was
coordinated with the Department of State and the
Defense Intelligence Agency.l
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Communist Activities Branch,
Secret
G183-10278
December 1983
25X1
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 Summary
Information available
as of l November 1983
was used in this report.
Soviet and East European
Military Transfers to
Non-Communist LDCsfl
After nearly three decades, arms transfers remain the Soviet Union's
primary and most effective means of gaining entry and extending its
influence in the Third World. As a result of the rapid growth and
commercialization of its military sales program in recent years, Moscow's
earnings from arms transfers now surpass all other Soviet commercial ties
with the non-Communist less developed countries (LDCs)-accounting for 25X1
The USSR concluded just over $9 billion worth of new military agreements
with non-Communist LDC governments in 1982-up sharply from the
year before-as Kremlin leaders took steps to recoup lost momentum and
prestige in the Middle East and to strengthen military ties with New Delhi.
As part of these initiatives, Moscow displayed an increased willingness to
extend concessionary credit terms on new purchases and to provide
preferred clients with a wider selection of some of its most up-to-date
weapons systems. Iraq, Syria, and India were the main beneficiaries,
accounting for nearly 90 percent of all Soviet arms accords signed in 1982.
Relatively smaller, but significant, new Soviet arms commitments also
were extended to Angola, Mozambique, Kuwait, Peru, and Nicaragua.
Eastern Bloc suppliers handling orders from both combatants.
East European military agreements in 1982 fell back from the record set in
1981, but still managed to top the $1 billion mark for the second
consecutive year. The Iran-Iraq war again was the major factor, with some
faced by some of Moscow's oil-exporting clients:
Preliminary results for 1983 indicate that the value of new Soviet arms
agreements will fall well below recent annual levels and are likely to total
only some $3-5 billion, with India, Angola, and possibly Libya the principal
customers. The drop appears to result from the need of major buyers to ab-
sorb large outstanding equipment orders and from financial constraints
Warsaw Pact deliveries of weapons, related material, and services re-
mained heavy in 1982 and are estimated to be worth at least $7.7 billion.
Following previous patterns, deliveries were concentrated in the Middle
East. Syria and Iraq, which restocked depleted inventories of air and
ground equipment, accounted for nearly half of all Warsaw Pact deliveries.
Military shipments to Angola, Mozambique, India, and Nicaragua also
showed large increases from the year before. 25X1
Secret
G183-10278
December 1983
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The provision of more sophisticated weapons to LDC armed forces has led
to an icnreased need for Soviet Bloc training and servicing. In 1982 a
record 20,000 Soviet and East European military specialists were stationed
in the non-Communist Third World-twice the number abroad just five
years before. The 1983 figure for Soviet military presence abroad will be
even higher as a result of the dispatch of several thousand additional air-
defense-related technicians to Syria
The precarious situations that threaten wider conflict in the Middle East
are likely to provide Moscow greater latitudes of action in the coming
months. This, along with the promise of new major arms deals with key So-
viet clients and the introduction of new Soviet weapons into Third World
inventories during 1983, signals continued success for Moscow's enduring
military transfer program.
Explanation of Terms
This annual report is based on data from a variety of sources, including
unclassified publications. It recounts Warsaw Pact military transfers to
non-Communist less developed countries. The term military transfers
includes both the sale and grant of military equipment and related
services, such as advisory support, training, and construction of military
facilities. Military transfers encompass signed agreements, commitments,
or accords which constitute aformal declaration of intent. The terms
deliveries and shipments are used to indicate the actual movement of
The data on military transfers reflect the latest information available and
supersede data in our previous publications. Values of military agree-
ments and deliveries are based on Soviet trade prices that are usually
The non-Communist less developed countries referred to in this report
include all countries of Africa except the Republic of South Africa; all
countries of East Asia. except Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand,
and the Communist states of Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam; Malta,
Portugal, and Spain in Europe; all countries in Latin America except
Cuba; and all countries in the Middle East and South Asia except Israel.
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i
A. Warsaw Pact Military Transfer Programs
in 1982: A Regional Analysis
B. Soviet Bloc Military Agreements With
LDCs: Agreements Concluded and
Equipment Delivered, 1955-82
27
 Figure 1 Figure 2
Soviet and East European Military Soviet and East European Military
Agreements and Deliveries, 1955-82' Deliveries, 1955-82
Percent
a Data for 1980-82 may understate actual deliveries by as much as
two billion because of increased Soviet efforts to conceal military
cargo shipments.
Middle East
75.0
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Military Transfers to
Non-Communist LDCs
Perspective
For nearly three decades the Soviet Union and its
Warsaw Pact allies have pressed to gain influence in
non-Communist Third World countries through mili-
tary assistance programs.' While experiencing some
reverses, such as in Indonesia, Egypt, Sudan, and
Somalia, the permanence and resolve of the Kremlin's
"penetration" strategy cannot be disputed. Indeed,
the growing instability and armed conflict in the
Third World since the early 1970s have provided not
only fertile ground for new Soviet successes (Angola,
Ethiopia, and Nicaragua) but the opportunity to earn
needed hard currency from LDC purchases of arms
Moscow found early on that arms transfers were the
most direct and fastest route to influence in the
LDCs. Newly independent Third World states often
could obtain economic aid from the West but not the
military assistance that many clamored for most.
Offering a wide assortment of weaponry, along with
rapid delivery, training, and generous repayment
terms, the USSR soon parlayed its initial arms deals
with Afghanistan and Egypt into a $500 million a
year program. The 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli con-
flicts spurred rapid growth in Soviet military transfers
and, together with the sharp rise in international oil
prices, led Moscow to concentrate on Middle Eastern
clients. By the mid-1970s the Soviet Union had
become the world's second-largest supplier of military
equipment. The soaring demand for new and better
armaments by oil-rich nations in the Middle East and
others with access to Arab wealth and Soviet willing-
ness to make available many modern weapons on
short notice set the stage for full-scale competition
with Western arms suppliers. Moscow temporarily
overtook the United States as the leading arms pro-
vider to the Third World in 1980-81, concluding
agreements worth more than $20 billion, or about a
Table 1
USSR: Military Agreements With LDCs
1970-72 (annual average)
1973
1974
The escalation of OPEC petroleum prices beginning
in 1973 coincided with a rapid rise in Soviet military
equipment prices, as Moscow capitalized on the new-
found Arab wealth. To boost its increasingly commer-
cially oriented arms sales campaign, the USSR added
more and larger carriers to its merchant fleet and in
1975-76 began a construction program that would
triple the size of its principal arms export facility in
the Black Sea. The results have been impressive: the
volume and value of Soviet arms deliveries more than
doubled in 1978-82, compared with the previous five-
year period. During this period almost three-fourths 25X1
of the arms delivered-valued at $23 billion-went to
Soviet Military Agreements: The Recent Record
Soviet arms agreements climbed to $9.1 billion in
1982, 40 percent higher than the year before and well
above the average for 1973-81 (table 1). Agreements
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 remained heavily concentrated among a few promi-
nent clients-Iraq, Syria, and India-who accounted
for nearly 90 percent of the new orders. Accords with
Libya, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Angola, and Peru ac-
counted for most of the remainder. For 1983, Soviet
arms commitments to non-Communist LDCs are
expected to drop back to $3-5 billion, as major Middle
Eastern buyers pause to absorb large military orders
placed in 1980-82. A large new arms pledge to Angola
and ongoing negotiations with India, Libya, and
Ethiopia for additional modern weapons are likely to
generate the bulk of Moscow's 1983 arms agreements.
Moscow Adjusts Program. Moscow adjusted its mili-
tary transfer practices in 1982 both to bolster its
flagging influence in the Middle East and to accom-
modate the worsening economic climate and increased
competition from Western arms suppliers. The great-
er willingness to offer more of its advanced weaponry
at more concessionary terms and with some debt
rescheduling were prominent features of agreements
negotiated in 1982. In fact, over the last two years
more new Soviet modern weapon systems have been
promised or sold to LDC clients than in any period
since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war (table 2). Moscow's
greater willingness to make available for export more
equipment from its current family of modern weapons
reflects the realization that arms offerings had to be
upgraded to meet LDC demands for more advanced
systems-even at the risk of compromising military
technology information. Although not conclusive,
there is evidence suggesting that the large recent-year
sales of late-model MIG fighters and armored vehi-
cles to cash-paying Middle Eastern customers have
caused some delays in promised exports to Eastern
The military resupply accords signed with Iraq and
Syria in 1982 underscored Moscow's desire not only
to recoup lost influence and prestige but, in the case of
Iraq, to prevent further erosion of its arms market to
France and other Western suppliers. The softer repay-
ment terms and inclusion of newer model tanks, more
sophisticated fighter aircraft, and air defense missile
systems contained in the latest Iraqi and Syrian
agreements represent a change of course for Moscow
in dealing with its major Arab clients F_~
Table 2
Advanced Soviet Weapons Systems
Recently Offered or Sold to LDCs
Angola
India
Kuwait
Libya
SA-8 antiaircraft missile system
Kresta-class guided missile cruisers
SS-21 surface-to-surface tactical missile systems
AT-5 antitank missile system
MIG-27, -29, -32 fighters
AN-32 transport aircraft
Helix ASW helicopters
T-72 tanks (improved models)
MIG-27 fighters
SA-8 antiaircraft missile system
MI-17 helicopters
Improved armor (T-72s, BMPs)
Improved radar and communications
SA-8 antiaircraft missile system
SA-8 antiaircraft missile system
MIG-27 fighters
Haze ASW helicopters
Improved armored vehicles
Improved electronic equipment
SA-5 and SA-8 antiaircraft missile systems
SS-21 surface-to-surface tactical missile systems
MIG-27 fighters
M-17 helicopters
Haze ASW helicopters
Improved armor, radar, and communications
New agreements with India last year showed yet
another advance in Soviet arms export policy-the
licensed sale of military production technology hereto-
fore not available to countries outside the Warsaw
Pact. About a third of the $3 billion in new Soviet-
Indian agreements last year will cover licenses to
produce MIG-27 aircraft in India. Although a follow-
on to the MIG-21 production program in India, the
MIG-27 represents a significant advance in Soviet
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technology transfer to a non-Communist country, The granting of softer financial arrangements to Iraq,
both in terms of hardware sophistication and fabrica- India, and Syria last year marked a shift, if not a
tion techniques. India will become the only other reversal, in the USSR's commercial arms sales policy
country to produce this swing-wing, high-performance instituted in the mid-1970s. Following OPEC's initial
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petroleum price hikes in 1973/74, Moscow progres-
sively instituted sharp increases in the prices charged
for its weapons and military services and furthermore
demanded repayment in hard currency from all but a
very few select clients. This was particularly the case
for arms transfers to the radical Middle Eastern oil-
producing states and those countries receiving Arab
financial assistance. Most of Syria's agreements with
the Soviet Union, for example, have been funded from
The apparent return to a more concessional policy on
arms sales not only underlines the political impor-
tance Moscow places on the program, but demon-
strates how quickly the program can be adjusted to
accommodate Soviet foreign policy initiatives and
changing economic conditions. The improved sales
terms awarded to Iraq and India almost certainly
were prompted in large part by those countries' recent
efforts to lessen their dependence on the USSR for
military support. Iraqi purchases of Western military
equipment since the start of its war against Iran now
amount to over $12 billion-about four times the
purchases of Soviet equipment-and includes much
more advanced weaponry than that previously sup-
plied by Moscow. The Soviet response of offering
comparable equipment at cheaper prices and at better
terms to key recipients illustrates Moscow's resolve to
maintain a competitive edge in arms sales and also
thwart Western inroads into strategically important
Arms Deliveries Also Surge. The volume of Soviet
military deliveries increased dramatically in 1982 and
remained at peak levels through the first six months
of 1983, spurred largely by record backlogs and heavy
resupply efforts to Iraq and Syria. The estimated
value of Soviet military deliveries in 1982, based on
observed shipments, amounted to just over $6 billion
(table 3). Increased efforts to conceal Soviet unload-
ings, including more nighttime deliveries, denied a full
accounting of transfers, especially to Iraq and Syria.
As a result, we believe the value of Soviet deliveries
may be understated perhaps by as much as $1-2
Syria and Iraq accounted for almost one-half of all
ground weapons, aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles
delivered by the USSR over the past 18 months.
Table 3 Million US$
USSR: Estimated Value of Military
Deliveries to Major Clients, 1982
6,080
840
Libya .685
Syria 1,800.
Other 950
Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua also experi-
enced sharp increases in Soviet military deliveries.
Increased threats from South Africa led Moscow to
bolster the defenses of its southern African patrons
with record shipments to Angola that included the
country's first guided-missile patrol boats and T-62
medium tanks, as well as two more squadrons of
MIG-21 fighters. Capabilities have been bolstered
more recently by the arrival of MI-24 helicopter
gunships and SA-8 mobil air defense missile systems,
which presumably will be manned by Cuban person-
nel. Moreover, to better protect Mozambique's south-
ern flank, Moscow introduced several types of ground
equipment, including new armored personnel carriers,
tanks, and tracked bridging equipment
Soviet-sponsored deliveries to Nicaragua jumped
from $6 million in 1981 to $50 million last year in
response to intensified rebel activities. Following pre-
vious patterns, Soviet merchant ships delivered only
military support items, such as trucks, with lethal
Soviet hardware routed to Nicaraguan ports via Alge-
rian and Bulgarian arms carriers. Major items re-
ceived in 1982 included additional T-55 tanks, Mana-
gua's first BM-21 mobile rocket launchers, and
mobile radio intercept stations to locate guerrilla
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Table 4
Eastern Europe: Arms Agreements With LDCs
Annual
Average
1970-77
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Jan-Jun
1983
Total
337
518
827
2,399
1,222
521
Bulgaria
11
160
162
247
126
222
Czechoslovakia
189
82
94
385
268
80
East Germany
18
100
209
68
319
97
Hungary
46
39
78
347
141
45
communications sites' Cuba and East Germany pro-
vided antiaircraft guns and transport vehicles, respec-
tively, from their own stocks. The pace of overall
military deliveries quickened in the first half of 1983,
with the USSR supplying AN-26 transport aircraft,
MI-8 helicopters, and military trucks for the Nicara-
Cuba reportedly doubled the
security contingent during the
A Profitable Program. The financial returns derived
from military transfers surpass those from all other
Soviet commercial relations with Third World coun-
tries. Hard currency returns from military sales dur-
ing 1980-82 are estimated to have been about $7-8
billion per year, or about 15 percent of Moscow's total
hard currency earnings. These new totals are larger
than earlier estimates because of new findings that
indicate earnings from follow-on sales, support pack-
ages, military construction projects, and technical
services are much higher than earlier thought. The
huge backlog of orders for Soviet weaponry, together
with increased demand for costly new hardware and
military technical services, ensure steady if not grow-
Eastern Europe: Augmenting the Soviet
Arms Program
East European military transfers add an important
dimension to the USSR's arms export program,
generally complementing Soviet shipments of more
sophisticated fighter aircraft, naval combatants, and
surface-to-air missiles, by supplying large quantities
of older model ground weapons and combat/trainer
aircraft. The Eastern Bloc countries also serve as key
sources of military training and provide technical
Although the value of new agreements was down from
the 1981 peak, East European suppliers enjoyed an-
other good year in 1982 by capitalizing on the
continuing heavy demands generated by the Iran-Iraq
war (table 4). About one-half of the $1.2 billion in new
East European arms accords in 1982 were divided
between the two combatants, with Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, and Poland accepting orders from
both sides. Since the fighting erupted in September
1980, East European countries have garnered more
than $2 billion in arms contracts from Iran and Iraq.
With no prospect in the near term for a decrease in
the fighting between Iran and Iraq, East European
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Table 5
Eastern Europe: Military Deliveries
to Regions and Major Recipients
Annual
Average
1970-77
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Jan-Jun
Total
209
551
641
555
1,242
1,622
677
Middle East/North Africa
167
413
509
465
1,132
1,520
636
Algeria
0
25
25
25
25
0
3
Syria
Other
3
0
26
22
0
6
0
0
Mozambique
1
22 _
19
29
2
10
0
Tanzania
1
18
14
10
10
10
0
Other
5
5
3
12
31
13
0
East European arms deliveries reached a record $1.6
billion in 1982, $380 million higher than in 1981
(table 5). Iraq alone received materiel worth more
than $800 million, mostly expendable items, such as
artillery ammunition, small arms, and spare parts.
Preliminary data for the first six months of 1983
suggest that Libya was the largest recipient of East
European military equipment, some of which was
likely earmarked for Libyan-backed rebels in Chad.
Military Technical Servicei: Higher Level of Support
Technical services continue to be a key element of
Warsaw Pact military programs. Paralleling the
upswing in arms transfers, some 20,000 Warsaw
Pact-along with 38,000 to 45,000 Cuban-military
personnel were posted to 34 LDCs in 1982 (table 6).
This level was increased in 1983 by the addition of
several thousand Soviet personnel in Syria.
Most of the 25-percent increase in the Soviet overseas
presence during 1982 was directed to Middle Eastern
clients:
? Moscow sent about 500 more technicians and sol-
diers to Syria, primarily to man the new SA-5 25X1
missile installations. This augmentation raised Sovi-
et military presence to about 3,500-the largest
Soviet military advisory group in the non-Commu-
nist Third World community. Early this year, Mos-
cow dispatched another 3,500 military personnel,
mostly for air defense activities.
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Table 6
Military Technicians in LDCs, 1982
USSR
Eastern
Europe
Total a
57,780-64,980
17,450
2,630
37,700-44,900
Middle East-North Africa
11,800
10,435 b
1,365
NA '
Sub-Saharan Africa
41,385-48,585
4,440
1,250
35,695-42,895
Latin America
2,245
225
15
2,005
South Asia
2,350
a Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.
b In early 1983 an estimated 3,500 additional Soviet technicians
were dispatched to Syria in conjunction with the new SA-5 missile
installations.
? The Soviet presence in Iraq doubled to 1,000 follow-
ing the full-scale resumption of military deliveries
last summer.
? Another 500 Soviets went to North Yemen, raising
the number there to 1,200-a threefold increase
since 1981.
Large Soviet contingents also continued to provide
advice, technical support, and instruction in Algeria,
nearly half of total shipments, while transfers to
Libya,-India, Ethiopia, and Angola also should show
higher totals for 1983. Current deliveries continue to
be characterized by high proportions of late-model,
sophisticated weaponry for these high profile clients.
While arms deliveries should remain strong, the level
of new Soviet military commitments over the next few
years will be governed largely by political dynamics in
the Middle East and by the procurement cycles of
Looking Ahead
Arms transfer initiatives taken since the beginning of
1982 to bolster Moscow's position with key LDC
allies seem to be continuing in 1983. A prime example
of the Kremlin's increased willingness to provide top-
of-the-line weaponry was spotlighted in October with
the delivery of the Soviet's latest tactical missile
We expect Soviet arms deliveries to hit a new high in
1983 and remain heavy through 1985-driven largely
by the record order backlogs built up over the past
several years. Iraq and Syria continue to account for
Moscow's major arms recipients. As indicated earlier, 25X1
Soviet arms agreements for 1983 will probably show a
steep decline from the $9.1 billion recorded in 1982. 25X1
Angola has been the only recipi-
, 1 .1
f
ent
negotiating major purchases, but the discussions will
likely extend into 1984 before any agreements are
signed. Given the frequency of African and Middle
Eastern LDC military trade delegation visits to Mos-
cow and East European capitals during 1983, we
expect a number of modest follow-on arms accords
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In Central America, Soviet Bloc and Cuban efforts
.will remain focused on strenghening Nicaraguan mili-
tary capabilities. Although no new arms agreements
were reported during the first half of 1983, outstand-
ing military commitments, the continued shuttling of
Nicaraguan military delegations to Havana and Mos-
cow, and embarrassment over Grenada suggest that
additional military support will be forthcoming.
Stepped-up military actions by the anti-Sandinista
forces punctuated by the first air- strikes of the
conflict have triggered public statements by Managua
that it will seek to acquire combat aircraft to protect
its airspace. Such announcements have been antici-
pated for some time, given the improvements to
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Nicaraguan airfields and the training of Nicaraguan
pilots in Cuba and Eastern Europe since 1979. Be-
cause of their fears of further provoking the United
States, Havana and Moscow probably would accede
to such a request but only if the felt the regime were
in imminent danger of collapse.
Over the longer term, we believe the changes in Soviet
arms transfers policies seen recently have positioned
the Soviet Union to better react to new opportunities
to supply military hardware and technical services to
Third World requesters. The recent export of more
sophisticated Soviet weapons on attractive terms
should mute longstanding LDC complaints about
receiving outmoded Soviet equipment. In addition, the
further expansion of Nikolayev South-the main
Soviet arms export terminal in the Black Sea-will
improve Moscow's capability to deliver larger volumes
of heavy weapons and equipment on short notice.
These and other refinements, including high-level
personnel changes in its foreign-assistance apparatus,
underline the continued priority the Kremlin places on
arms transfers as a viable instrument of foreign
East European arms suppliers should also be able to
capitalize on their recent successes in the coming
years. Aggressive marketing tactics, along with at-
tractive prices and quick turnaround on orders have
contributed to a reputation of being a reliable alterna-
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Appendix A
Warsaw Pact Military Transfer Programs
in 1982: A Regional Analysis
Table A-1
Middle East-North Africa: Soviet Bloc
Military Agreements and Deliveries Concluded and
Military Presence During 1982
Eastern Europe
Soviet and East
European Military
Agreements Deliveries
Agreements Deliveries
Agreements Deliveries
Presence b
Total
6,839
5,971
5,706
4,451
1,133
1,520
11,800
Algeria
3
840
0
840
3
0
1,515
Iran
218
160
11
100
207
60
250
Iraq
3,388
1,660
3,003
838
385
?822
1,100
Jordan
1
85
1
85
0
0
35
Kuwait
258
NA
258
NA
NA
0
0
North Yemen
.58
130
35
39
23
91
1,200
South Yemen
NA
53
0
53
NA
NA
1,100
? Values of military agreements and deliveries are based on Com-
munist donor export prices and are adjusted for changes in the-
dollar value of the currencies denominated in foreign trade transac-
tions. In cases where actual values are not known, Soviet export
prices of similar equipment are used as surrogates.
b Presence figures are rounded to nearest five and represent the
number of persons present for a period of one month or more.
The Middle East-North Africa:
The Major Soviet Target
The Middle East continued to be the focus of Soviet
Bloc military transfers in 1982, accounting for two-
thirds of all new arms accords (table A-1). The
stalemated war in the Persian Gulf and the crisis in
Lebanon last year presented opportunities for Moscow
and its allies not only to recoup prestige and influence
lost over the last three years but also to play a more
active role in regional affairs. New Warsaw Pact
arms agreements with Middle Eastern countries
reached a near-record $6.8 billion and promised an
array of weapon systems never before sent to LDCs:
? Iraq was promised at least $3 billion worth of
updated armaments, including MIG-27 ground
attack aircraft, more advanced air defense equip-
ment, and late model T-72 tanks.
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? Syria received an additional $2 billion in military
equipment credits to replenish and upgrade its
inventories depleted during the Lebanon debacle,
replacements to include the first Soviet export of
MIG-23 Flogger G interceptors, SA-5 surface-to-
air missiles, and MI-17 helicopters.
? Libya purchased $750 million in military equip-
ment, despite some problems over past-due
payments.
East European arms suppliers enjoyed another profit-
able year in the Middle East, even though orders were
only half the 1981 record of $2.4 billion. Iran and
Iraq again were the major buyers, with a combined
total of almost $600 million in new contracts, mostly
for high expenditure items such as munitions, small
arms, spares, and transport vehicles. East Germany's
$200 million agreement to supply military spare parts
and support equipment to Iran was the largest single
transaction. Elsewhere, Libya authorized Czechoslo-
vakia to proceed with construction of a $200 million
tank repair facility, and the new socialist government
in'Greece signed its first military accord with a
Communist state-Romania-in seven years.
The volume of Soviet and East European arms deliv-
eries to the region reached new highs in 1982, spurred
by heavy resupply efforts to Iraq and Syria. Algeria
received near-record shipments of Soviet equipment,
the result of the $3 billion purchase agreement signed
Soviet military transfers to the Middle East proceeded
apace in 1983. Indeed, based on deliveries monitored
through June, arms and related equipment transfers
for the year should top last year's total. Overall arms
commitments to the region, however, may drop in
value. Ongoing negotiations with Libya over another
multibillion-dollar purchase may be finalized this
year if Colonel Qadhafi shows some restraint in
support of the Chadian rebels. Improved Soviet rela-
tions with Syria and Iraq could tempt Moscow to
expand its military commitments in the face of the
growing threats against both regimes. Even so, it is
doubtful that 1983 Soviet arms pledges will come
close to matching the emergency relief seen the year
before.
Country Highlights
Algeria. Algeria signed no new arms accords in 1982
with Moscow, underscoring its determination to diver-
sify its arms sources and reduce its dependence on the
USSR for military equipment. The absence of new
accords may also reflect Algerian concern with the
disappointing performance of Soviet MIG fighters
and SAM batteries in the Lebanese war. Neverthe-
less, some $840 million in deliveries were received
under the $3 billion 1980 accord. First-time deliveries
to Algeria in 1982 included:
? SA-8 mobile surface-to-air missile batteries.
? SA-3 missile batteries that will improve medium-
altitude air defense capabilities.
? 152-mm self-propelled guns.
? MIG-23 Flogger B fighters equipped with a better
engine, avionics, and armaments than the stripped-
down model normally exported to LDCs.
Iran. While Tehran has come to depend on the supply
of Soviet-type weaponry from North Korea and radi-
cal Arab countries, Moscow continues to maintain a
significant but low-keyed arms supply relationship
with Iran. We believe that some $100 million worth of
spare parts, munitions, and ordnance were shipped
overland from the USSR last year. A new $11 million
contract for additional Soviet equipment was signed
Cut off from its traditional sources of major weapons
by an embargo, Iran experienced more success last
year with alternate suppliers-North Korea, Libya,
Syria, and several East European countries-in filling
its essential war needs:
? East Germany agreed to supply $200 million worth
of nonlethal equipment.
? North Korea signed $65 million worth of new
military contracts and shipped $360 million in arms
to Iran, including T-62 tanks, BM-10 rocket launch-
ers, artillery pieces and mortars, and large quanti-
ties of AT-3 antitank and SA-7 surface-to-air mis-
siles.
25X1
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? Libya and Syria both increased their support last
year, providing Soviet-model tanks, artillery, infan-
try weapons, and other equipment worth over $350
Iraq. The estimated $3 billion in new Iraqi military
agreements with the USSR in 1982 represented a
substantial paring down of a $10 billion wish list
submitted to Moscow earlier in the year. Following
several exchanges of high-level delegations, Moscow
agreed in April to sell an estimated $2 billion worth of
advanced MIGs, new air defense systems and ground
equipment. After the Iranian summer offensive,
Baghdad requested additional military assistance; the
USSR eventually agreed in December to supply an-
other $1 billion in arms, including MIG-27 ground
attack aircraft and large numbers.of advanced model
T-72 tanks. The latest accord also included an easing
of payment terms, underscoring the shift in Moscow's
military transfer program from the hard commercial
terms of past years. Eastern Europe supplemented
Soviet support with $385 million worth of new mili-
tary agreements, including 25 used MIG-21s from
The Warsaw Pact accounted for the majority of war-
related deliveries to Iraq last year, even though
shipments from Western countries continued to
mount. The lifting of the Soviet embargo caused
Soviet arms transfers to triple in volume in 1982.
More than 100 Soviet merchant ships deposited more
than 150,000 metric tons of military cargo at Kuwaiti
to a record $820 million as a result of orders placed in
1981. Equipment delivered by the East Europeans
consisted largely of older, less sophisticated weapons
a minimum value of $840 million, with the
actual amount believed to be much higher. Soviet
deliveries included Iraq's initial receipt of MIG-25s,
some 65 other fighter aircraft, and more than 200
T-72 tanks. Deliveries from Eastern Europe climbed
Libya. Libyan difficulties in meeting its repayment
obligations to the Soviet Union apparently were not
serious enough to damage the mutually beneficial
arms relationship. Moscow sold $385 million worth of
military equipment to Libya in 1982, raising total
agreements signed since the 1973 Middle East war to
more than $15 billion. Pending large new agreements 25X1
together'with a $7 billion backlog of undelivered
orders, ensures large-scale deliveries of Soviet weap-
ons well into the middle of the decade. Much of the
equipment is intended to upgrade Libya's already
overstocked arsenal, but some is also earmarked for
Third World dissident groups and governments
friendly to Libya. The $685 million in Soviet deliver-
ies in 1982 included Libya's first SA-8 surface-to-air
missile systems. 25X1
Large purchases of Soviet equipment continue to be
supplemented with contracts from Eastern Europe. In
1982 Libya placed $360 million in new orders with
East European countries, some of which was designat-
ed to further implement ambitious Libyan plans for a
domestic military production capability. (A $650 mil-
lion deal with Yugoslavia for an explosives factory is
Syria. Moscow eased the considerable strain in
USSR-Syrian relations caused by its limited arms
support during Israel's drive into Lebanon by rapidly
replenishing Syrian equipment losses and significantly
upgrading Syrian defenses with better quality Soviet
weapons. The new defense pact, worth at least $2
billion, provides for the introduction of:
? The USSR's most advanced version of its MIG-23
interceptor (Flogger G), making Syria the first LDC
to receive this fighter.
? The first SA-5 surface-to-air missile systems outside
the Soviet Union (construction for the sites at
Dumayr and Horns began in December 1982; the
facilities are to be manned by Soviet technicians).
? MI-17 helicopters (advanced version of the MI-8
with more speed and a larger payload) to provide
heliborne support to commando operations.
? Additional SA-8 and SA-9 surface-to-air missile
batteries.
? More sophisticated command and control systems 25X1
and electronic countermeasure equipment to jam
 Moscow more than doubled its military advisory
presence in 1982 to about 3,800 and further under-
scored its increased support of the Assad regime with
a greater show of Soviet naval units off the Syrian and
Lebanese coasts. Late in the year, the USSR report-
edly agreed to ease terms for the arms ordered in the
aftermath of the fighting with Israel by deferring
Soviet efforts to mend fences showed signs of success
by yearend. Syrian officials changed the tone of their
public comments, putting Soviet-Syrian relations on a
he USSR, meanwhile, refused to sign a
more explicit mutual defense pact with Syria for fear
of being drawn into a military confrontation with
New East European arms accords with Damascus
consisted of a $36 million contract with Bulgaria for
military support materials and a small contract with
Czechoslovakia for military trucks. Prague delivered
$130 million in arms ordered under contracts conclud-
ed in the late 1970s, including L-39 trainer aircraft,
BMP armored vehicles, and a large number of sup-
Jordan. Moscow followed up its 1981 arms break-
through in Jordan with prompt delivery of most of the
air defense equipment ordered and the deputation of
the first Soviet military technicians to Jordan]
I We expect King Hussein
to continue to fend off Soviet offers to expand military
supply relations. Follow-on orders to supplement the
SA-8 purchase are expected, but these are likely to
remain small.
Kuwait. Kuwaiti relations with the USSR were bol-
stered by a $260 million arms deal in 1982-the first
in five years. The March agreement, which calls for
the introduction of the SA-8 air defense missile
system and additional heavy artillery, is viewed as a
continuation of Kuwait's policy to appear relatively
independent of any one superpower for arms, rather
than an attempt to reduce its reliance on Western
sources. According to the US Embassy in Kuwait,
Kuwaiti military officers opposed the SA-8 purchase.
Western arms continue to flow into the country at the
rate of $100 million or more annually and remain the
In anticipation of the delivery of the new SA-8
system, Moscow also received approval to train
Kuwaiti air defense personnel in the USSR. Kuwait
apparently also agreed to permit a small contingent of
Soviet military technicians to enter the country to
instruct Kuwaiti units on the SA-8 system. Until now,
Kuwait has relied on Soviet-trained Arab allies, such
as Iraq, for technical assistance. =
Morocco. The Polisario's use of advanced Soviet
equipment against Moroccan forces and Moscow's
heavy military support to Algeria and Libya kept
political relations with the USSR cool. Relations with
East European countries, however, showed improve-
ment with the signing of a $40 million military
agreement with Romania-Rabat's largest arms
accord with a Communist country. The pact, an
outgrowth of a close relationship that has developed
over the past 20 years, calls for delivery of 122-mm
rocket launchers, ZPU-2 antiaircraft guns, grenade
launchers, and 7.62-mm machineguns.
North Yemen. North Yemen's dependence on Soviet
military equipment continued to deepen as the USSR
agreed to provide Sana $35 million in additional
military assistance early in 1982. The accord calls for
MI-8 helicopters, and unconfirmed reports indicate
that additional SU-22 fighters and Sana's first T-72
tanks may also be included. Although down in volume
from the year before, Soviet arms deliveries in 1982
substantially upgraded South Yemen's military capa-
bilities with the receipt of its first Osa-II missile
attack craft, Yevgenya-class minesweepers, and 50
new BMP infantry combat vehicles. Sana obtained
another deferment of its arms payments to the Soviet
Union last year, complementing the rollover granted
25X1
25X1
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Secret
East European countries continued to supplement
Soviet agreements with new accords:
? $10 million from Czechoslovakia for four L-39 jet
trainers.
? $12 million from East Germany for vehicles and
unidentified materials.
? $1 million from Romania for uniforms.
Poland and East Germany were responsible for most
of the $90 million of East European arms shipped to
South Yemen. No new military agreements were
concluded with Moscow, and Soviet arms deliveries
dropped to their lowest level in five years ($53 million)
as shipments under earlier arms orders wound down.
US Embassy reporting indicates that both the eco-
nomic and military debts owed to the USSR (estimat-
ed at $1 to $1.5 billion) were deferred by Moscow for
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Table A-2
Asia: Soviet Bloc
Military Agreements and Deliveries Concluded and
Military Presence During 1982
Eastern Europe -
Soviet and East
Euro
ean Militar
Agreements
Deliveries
p
y
Presence b
Total
3,162
1,142
3,131
1,120
31
22
2,350
Afghanistan
175
160
169
154
6
6
2,000 r
Bangladesh
8
. 0
8
0
0
0
0
India
2,979
982
2,954
966
25
16
350
Pakistan
NEGL
0
0
0
NEGL
0
0
a Values of military agreements and deliveries are based on Com-
munist donor export prices and are adjusted for changes in the
dollar value of the currencies denominated in foreign trade transac-
tions. In cases where actual values are not known, Soviet export
prices of similar equipment are used as surrogates.
b Presence figures are rounded to nearest five and represent the
number of persons present for a period of one month or more.
r Number directly associated with the Afghan armed forces.
The USSR committed $3.1 billion in new military
support to South Asian countries in 1982, nearly 95
percent of which was earmarked for across-the-board
upgrading of the Indian defense establishment (table
A-2). Moscow again emphasized its special relation-
ship with New Dehli by offering to provide some of its
most sophisticated conventional weapons and by
agreeing to provide advanced weapons production
technology to improve India's growing domestic
Country Highlights
Afghanistan. Despite some slippage in 1982, the
USSR moved forward with its plan to expand and
upgrade the Afghan defense establishment. The
Afghan Air'Force continues to receive the most
attention. In 1982 the USSR transferred 14 SU-22
fighter-bombers and 15 MI-8 helicopters to the
Afghan Government. Only a few of these aircraft
represented replacements for battle losses. Moscow
also agreed last year to supply the Afghan Air Force
with two squadrons of MI-24/25 helicopter gunships,
which reportedly will be used to support combined
Soviet-Afghan troop operations against the rebels
located around the capital.
Along with the infusion of new and better aircraft, the
USSR is investing heavily in improving Afghanistan's
military infrastructure. Soviet building projects ear-
marked for the Afghans include several NCO and
officer training schools, new barracks, a military
vehicle.repair shop, and a large medical treatment
More evidence of East European military cooperation
surfaced last year. For the first time, Hungary was
noted as a supplier of military equipment, although no
details were available on the types of goods being
supplied. Bulgaria delivered substantial amounts of
quartermaster goods, and Czechoslovakia reportedly
accepted 100 Afghan officers and enlisted personnel
for instruction in the repair of tanks and heavy
11
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secret
Figure 5. Soviet Military Delegation to New
Delhi
Indian Defense Minister Venkataraman wel-
comes his Soviet counterpart General Ustinov
and Admiral Gorshkov to Nov Delhi in March
1982. Minister of Defense Ustinov headed, a 140-
man Soviet military trade delegation-the larg-
est and most prestigious to visit a non-Bloc
India Apparently alarmed over India's recent arms
diversification efforts with Western suppliers, Mos-
cow took unprecedented steps in 1982 to revitalize its
military-assistance relationship. In March, Soviet De-
fense Minister Ustinov visited New Delhi as head of
the largest and highest ranking Soviet military dele-
gation ever sent to a non-Communist country.
According to the Indian press, the delegation of 83
members (including the Army and Navy Chiefs of
Staff) offered to sell the Indians some of Moscow's
most advanced weapon systems at concessional prices
and terms. Moreover, the Soviet arms proposals
included advanced military production technology
and licenses to produce a range of Soviet hardware in
India-Moscow's first substantial offer to export
sophisticated military technology outside the Warsaw
? The Army will receive hundreds of "improved"
versions of T-72 tanks and BMP armored fighting
vehicles (and probably production technology for
both).
? The Air Force will receive several hundred domesti-
cally produced MIG-27 ground attack fighters, the
India's equipment orders this year raised the value of
Soviet arms accords signed since Prime Minister
Gandhi's return to power in 1980 to almost $6 billion,
50 percent more than the value recorded over the
previous two decades. In contrast, highly publicized
purchases from Western suppliers during the same
period have amounted to just over $2 billion. The
commitments already made by Moscow since 1980,
coupled with large, new agreements we expect to be
signed over the next few years, will effectively ensure
the continued dominance of the USSR in India's
military modernization and expansion program. By
playing Moscow against its Western competitors,
New Delhi has garnered not only modern weapons
and production technology from both the Soviets and
the West but also substantial price and financing
Follow-on discussions resulted in the signing of a
series of new arms accords worth an estimated $3
billion. Each of the three Indian armed services will
benefit over the next five years:
? The Navy will add at least nine surface combatants
and four F-class submarines over the next five years
to its Indian Ocean fleet.
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Table A-3
Latin America: Soviet Bloc and Cuban
Military Agreements and Deliveries Concluded
and Military Presence during 1982
Soviet, East
European,
and Cuban
Military
Agreements
Deliveries
Agreements
Deliveries
Presence b
Total
167
176
141
140
Argentina
NA
0
0
0
Nicaragua
61
86
35
50
24
26
2
10
2,090 (2,000)
Peru
106
90
106
90
0
0
0
0
ISO
Suriname
NA
NEGL
0
0
0
0
NA
NA
NA
a Values of military agreements and deliveries are based on Com-
munist donor export prices and are adjusted for changes in the
dollar value of the currencies denominated in foreign trade transac-
tions. In cases where actual values are not known, Soviet export
prices of'similar equipment are used as surrogates.
b Presence figures are rounded to the nearest five and represent the
number of persons present for a period of one month or more. The
figures in parentheses refer to the number of Cuban military
personnel included in the total.
The Caribbean and Central America: Expanded
Commitments
Soviet Bloc efforts to support radical regimes in the
Caribbean and Central America led to some $60
million in new regional military agreements in 1982,
backstopping the $105 million in accords signed the
previous year (table A-3). Nicaragua accounted for
virtually all these accords, pushing arms deliveries to
a record level last. year ($50 million worth) and
expanding foreign advisory and technical support:
Although small by contrast, Cuban assistance to
Grenada-highlighted by a new arms delivery and
further progress on military-related construction-
kept Havana's close relationship with that leftist
government intact until the assassination of Prime
Minister Bishop in October 1983. Suriname, a coun-
try Castro had unsuccessfully courted in the past,
received its first Communist-supplied materiel in
Country Highlights
Grenada. Cuba continued to support the leftist regime
with arms and construction assistance until its demise
in October 1983. Just prior to the downfall, Havana
delivered:
? At least five armored personnel carriers.
? Sixty to 100 army trucks.
? Field artillery.
? Small arms and ammunition.
Cuba also stepped up the pace of construction at Point
Salines International Airport scheduled for comple-
tion in 1983. Although ostensibly a commercial facili-
ty, it also could accommodate jet fighters and military
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transport aircraft. Cuba also neared completion on a
large military camp at Calivigny, for use by the
Cubans to train Grenadian troops. In contrast, the
USSR maintained its low profile rovidin only a
small. police training program
Nicaragua. In the face of the increased threat to the
Sandinista regime, Cuba and the Soviet Bloc pledged
additional military support in 1982, including agree-
ments for arms and the dispatch of additional military
personnel to Nicaragua. Valued at about $60 million,
these accords reflect:
? Soviet commitments (an estimated $35 million) for
tanks, other ground force weapons, and MI-8
helicopters.
? East German accords ($25 million) for trucks and
other nonlethal materiel.
The value of military deliveries from Soviet Bloc and
Cuban sources spiraled to an estimated $85 million in
1982. Key deliveries included:
? A dozen BM-21 rocket launchers (Nicaragua's first)
provided by the USSR via Algeria in April.
? About 25 additional T-55 tanks from the USSR,
doubling the size of the armor inventory.
Two AN-26 transport aircraft, purchased under a
December 1981 agreement to help establish a trans-
port capability, arrived in Cuba in late November but
were not transshipped to Nicaragua until early 1983.
Nicaragua remains highly dependent on foreign tech-
nicians and advisers. The Cubans, whose military
presence rose to as many as 2,000 during 1982, train
Nicaraguan troops, advise Nicaraguan officers in
counterinsurgency operations, and construct airfields
Despite Managua's past denials that it plans to
acquire combat aircraft, airfield construction in Nica-
ragua and pilot training in Cuba and Eastern Europe
suggest that fighter planes eventually will be based in
Nicaragua. At least six airfields are being constructed
or improved to handle jet fighters, and the first
25X1
25X1
based m u a. The recent aerial strikes against 25X1
Nicaraguan targets by antigovernment rebels may
provide Managua and its Soviet-Cuban supporters
with the justification to speed up delivery of combat
25X1
25X1
ened relations with Cuba in 1982 as part of his often-
stated policy to reorient the country away from total
dependence on the West. As a result, Suriname
received small arms from Cuba-the first such deliv-. 25X1
cry from a Communist country-and sent at least 10
South America-Limited Gains for Moscow
The USSR's longstanding efforts to expand military
supply relationships in South America again met with
little success in 1982. Soviet efforts to exploit the
Falklands-induced rift between Argentina and some
major Western suppliers by offering to sell Buenos
Aires military equipment were unsuccessful. Peru
remained the Soviets' only arms client on the southern
continent, signing new agreements last year worth
more than $105 million. 25X1
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 Country Highlights
Argentina. The USSR attempted to capitalize on the
Falklands conflict to add Argentina to its list of arms
clients. Despite repeated offers, however, Buenos
Aires refused to buy Soviet weapons for political and
technical reasons. East European suppliers fared little
better: only Romania has signed a military accord
with Argentina, and that was a minor agreement
concluded in January 1982 for artillery tubes.
25X1
Peru. The USSR's role as an aircraft supplier to Peru
and its involvement in the maintenance of Soviet-
supplied armaments remained the basic bond between
the two countries in 1982. Moscow won another $105
million in contracts for MI-8 helicopters, land arma-
ments, some munitions, spare parts, and technical
support. Arms deliveries in 1982-which included
additional SU-22 fighter/trainers and MI-8 helicop-
ters-were worth about $90 million, pushing total
Soviet military shipments to Peru since 1975 to more
than $1.1 billion. Lima, nonetheless, has persistently.
resisted Soviet efforts to gain influence through mili-
tary assistance by emphasizing the commercial nature
of the relationship and limiting the presence and
activities of Soviet advisers. Moscow's desire to main-
tain its position in Peru was reflected in its willingness
in mid-1983 to refinance Lima's military debt.
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I
Table A-4
Sub-Saharan Africa: Soviet Bloc and Cuban
Military Agreements and Deliveries Concluded
and Military Presence During 1982
Total ?
USSR
Eastern Europe
Soviet, East European,
and Cuban Military
Agreements
Deliveries
Agreements
Deliveries
Agreements
Deliveries
Presence s
172
420
138
366
34
54
41,340-
48,540
(35,695-
42,895)
Angola
119
201
100 -
180
19
21
1
26,700-
31,700
(25,000-
30,000)
Cape Verde
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
(NA)
Congo
0
0
0
0
0
0
810
(700)?
Equatorial Guinea
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
(NA)
Ethiopia
10
110
10
110
0
0
11,300-
13,300
(9,000-
11,000)
Guinea
19
0
19
0
0
0
65
(15)
Guinea Bissau
NA
9
0
9
NA
NA
115 '
(50)
Madagascar
0
0
0
0
0
0
160
(NA)
Mali
I
I
1
1
0
0
150
60
10
10
1,600-
1,800
(800-
1,000)
Sao Tame/Principe
0
0
0
0
0
0
50
(50)
Seychelles
0
1
0
1
0
0
10
(50)
Sierra Leone
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
(10)
Sudan
5
0
0
0
5
0
0
Tanzania
0
12
0
2
0
10
Zambia ?
NA
13
0
0
NA
13
? Presence figures are rounded to nearest five and represent the
number of persons present for a period of one month or more. The
figures in parentheses refer to the number of Cuban military
personnel included in the total.
n Most of the Cubans are located in Cabinda and support the
Cuban military forces in Angola.
c We believe a new large military agreement was concluded in
1982, however, details are not yet known.
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Focus on Established Clients
Although Warsaw Pact military agreements with
Sub-Saharan clients identified in 1982 totaled only
$170 million-less than 10 percent of the value of
1981 accords-we believe actual commitments were
much greater because of new, but undefined, Soviet
arms agreements with Angola and Mozambique
(table A-4). Moscow's military assistance relationships
in Sub-Saharan Africa continued to be focused on a
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 narrow range of countries notable for their strategic
locations and radical politics. Angola, Ethiopia,
Mozambique, and Guinea accounted for virtually all
observed military accords concluded last year.
Soviet Bloc military deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa
in 1982 amounted to $420 million, down considerably
from the levels of the late 1970s. Reduced transfers to
Ethiopia-Moscow's largest regional client-account-
ed for much of the decline. In southern Africa, the
growing threat from UNITA guerrillas and South
Africa sent arms deliveries to Angola and Mozam-
bique sharply higher. Cuba sent more troops to
Angola for the same reason. The Cuban augmenta-
tion, coupled with more East European arrivals,
raised the regional presence of Warsaw Pact and
Cuban troops, technicians, and advisers to at least
Despite Moscow's dominant position in the Sub-
Saharan arms market, the Soviets failed to obtain
more strategic concessions. Congo, Guinea, and Mad-
agascar continue to withhold access to naval and air
facilities that Moscow desires for reconnaissance ac-
tivities. Ethiopia, although allowing the USSR limited
use of a Soviet-built facility on Dahlak Island, again
refused Soviet requests for full control over the island.
Country Highlights
Angola. Military setbacks and heavy government
casualties stemming from more aggressive actions by
UNITA guerrillas and South African troops precipi-
tated sharp increases in Soviet and Cuban support to
Angola last year. Moscow delivered a record $180
million worth of identified military equipment in
1982, more than twice the level of recent years. This
increase largely reflects the arrival of more advanced,
higher cost weapons, including Angola's first Osa-II
missile attack craft, T-62 tanks, and BMP armored
reconnaissance vehicles, as well as two more squad-
rons of MIG-21 fighters and various early warning
radar stations. Additional T-55 tanks, armored per-
sonnel carriers; artillery, and hundreds of military
transport vehicles rounded out Soviet equipment
deliveries for the year. Cuba delivered its first weap-
ons to Angola in five years, including tanks and
artillery, to replace some of the losses sustained by
Cuban forces in skirmishes with UNITA insurgents. 25X1
Havana also raised the number of Cuban troops to an
estimated 25,000 to 30,000 to stiffen southern
defenses and man some advanced equipment provided
Ethiopia. Ethiopia's nearly $2 billion in backlogged
military orders from the USSR was largely responsi-
ble for the lack of new agreements. Only one accord
with Moscow-a $10 million deal for 300 military
trucks-was signed in 1982. Moreover, the estimated
$110 million in new Soviet equipment deliveries,
which included tanks, APCs, artillery, heavy trans-
port vehicles, and additional coast patrol craft,
Mutual concessions by Ethiopia and the USSR during
Chairman Mengistu's October 1982 visit to Moscow
appear to have strengthened the bonds between the
two countries and paved the way for additional assist-
ance. In return for Mengistu's agreement to move
forward with the establishment of an Ethiopian Com-
munist party, the USSR promised further relief of
Ethiopia's large military debt (estimated at $2-3
billion) and pledged additional arms. Specific agree-
ments apparently were not concluded. The Ethiopian
Guinea. Moscow continued to provide the bulk of
Guinea's military equipment in 1982, signing a $20
million agreement for improved versions of the MIG-
21 fighter and pilot training. Elements in Guinea's
military would like to shift some purchases to West-
ern suppliers, but financial and political constraints
25X1
25X1
25X1
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Mozambique. Mozambican's expanding ties with
Western powers apparently did not adversely affect
its relationships with Communist countries in 1982.
Although some Mozambican officials questioned the
wisdom of relying on Communist countries for mili-
tary equipment and services, these reservations have
not yet become serious enough to damage the ties
forged during Frelimo's long liberation struggle. Mos-
cow and Maputo concluded a large, new arms accord
in the first half of 1982. Although no information on
the size and scope of the agreement is available,
subsequent deliveries of light armored vehicles and
bridging equipment suggest that it is tailored to help
the Mozambican armed forces cope with the South
African-supported insurgents. Hungary also conclud-
ed a $10 million military accord last year, bringing
identified alltime military agreements with Warsaw
Zambia. The good will generated by Moscow's sale of
$250 million worth of military equipment in the mid-
1970s is being eroded by Lusaka's difficulty in meet-
ing scheduled payments. The USSR has accepted
cobalt in partial settlement, but Zambia was still in
arrears at yearend. No new military agreements were
signed with the USSR in 1982, and no new equipment
1 25 Secret
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~ secret
Soviet Bloc Military Agreements With
LDCs: Agreements Concluded and
Equipment Delivered, 1955-82 a
Concluded
Delivered
Concluded
Equipment
Delivered
USSR Eastern
USSR Eastern
USSR Eastern
USSR
Eastern
Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe
Total
78,477
9,357
56,820.. 7,018
Sudan
100
18
100
II
Africa-Sub-Saharan
7,475
686
5,463 607
Tanzania
340
93
337
75
Angola b
782
222
774 204
Togo -
0
0
0
0
251
41
244
41
Zimbabwe
0
0
0
0
Cape Verde
65
- 0
58 0
Asia-East
890
223
884
223
Central African
8
0
3 0
Burma
NEGL
I
NEGL
I
Republic
Indonesia
878
217
872
' 217
Kampuchea c
12
2
12
2
Philippines
0
1
0
1
Equatorial Guinea
25
0
21 0
South Korea
0
2
0
2
Ethiopia
3,942
109
2,252 109
Thailand
0
0
0
0
Gabon
0
NA
0 0
Asia-South
12,937
439
7,032
376
Gambia
NEGL
0
NEGL 0
Afghanistan d
2,887
90
1,271
42
Bangladesh
75
NEGL
67
NEGL
India
9,912
314
5,631
299
Maldive Islands
NEGL
0
NEGL
0
Nepal
2
0
2
0
Liberia
0
0
0 0
Pakistan
48
35
48
35
Madagascar
110
5
98 5
Sri Lanka
13
0
13
0
Mali -
161
0
132 0
Europe
28
0
0
0
Mozambique
318
123
290 93
Spain
28
0
0
0
Nigeria
214
22
186 19
Latin America
1,535
39
1,185
11
Rwanda
0
0
0 0
Argentina
0
NA
0
0
Sao Tome and Principe
2
0
2 0
Colombia
1
7
1
7
Senegal
0
NA
0 NA
Grenada
1
0
1
0
Seychelles
8
0
8 0
Honduras
0
NEGL
0
NEGL
Sierra Leone
2
NEGL
2 NEGL
Nicaragua
137
31
56
3
Somalia
402
16
402 16
Peru
1,396
1
1,127
1
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secret
Soviet Bloc Military Agreements With
LDCs: Agreements Concluded and
Equipment Delivered, 1955-82 ? (continued)
Agreements
Concluded
Equipment
Delivered
Agreements
Concluded
Equipment
Delivered
USSR
Eastern
Europe
USSR
Eastern
Europe
USSR
Eastern
Europe
USSR
Eastern
Europe
Middle East/
55,612
7,969
42,256
5,801
Libya f
North Africa
Mauritania
0
4
0
4
Morocco
74
73
43
33
Cyprust
18
34
18
4
North Yemen
982
329
897
310
Egypt
4,141
929
4,141
510
Oman
0
0
0
0
Greece
I
84
1
84
South Yemen
1
157
24-
1
089
24
Iran
1,955
260
1,820
67
Syria
,
13,766
1,040
,
j,417
I
1,039
Iraq
12,890
2,621
9,452
2,146
Tunisia
0
0
,
0
0
Jordan
226
0
85
0
Turkey
7
0
7
0
Kuwait
309
NA
52
0
United Arab Emirates
0
2
0
2
Lebanon
12
12
12
10
? Values of military agreements and deliveries are based on Com-
munist donor export prices and are adjusted for changes in the
dollar value of the currencies denominated in foreign trade transac-
tions. In cases where actual values are not known, Soviet export
prices of similar equipment are used as surrogates. Because of
rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
b Excludes $151 million worth of Soviet commitments and $1
million worth of Romanian commitments to Angola made before
independence in November 1975. The USSR recommitted $59
million of the original amount in March 1976 when the Neto
regime assumed power.
Aid transactions prior to formation of the Communist government
in 1975.
d Excludes Soviet equipment transfers used exclusively by Soviet
troops.
Outstanding orders for most equipment were canceled when the
program became inactive.
rOf the East European delivery total of $1,463 million, $68 million
was delivered on Soviet account under the Soviet-Libyan arms
accord of 1974.
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secret