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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00283R000200100005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Sec-c`
Grain Crop in History
USSR: Fourth-Largest
GI 83-10257X
SOV 83-10193X
November 1983
COPY -Z f I
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 Intelligence
USSR: Fourth-Largest
Grain Crop in History
This paper was prepared by the Office of Global
Issues.and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to
the Chief, Agricultural Assessment Branch, OGI, on
Secret
GI 83-10257X
SOV 83-10193X
November 1983
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USSR: Fourth-Largest
Grain Crop in History[
Key Judgments With less than 5 percent of the 1983 Soviet grain crop to be cut, it still ap-
Information available pears likely that the harvest will total about 210 million metric tons-the
as of 25 October 1983 fourth largest ever, and the best showing since the 1978 record of 237
was used in this report.
million tons. A crop of this size, coupled with record forage production,
means that the USSR should need to buy little, if any, grain in excess of its
minimum commitment levels under agreements with exporters. Because of
the many variables determining Soviet grain requirements, however, we
cannot yet rule out larger imports in the current marketing year (1 July
1983-30 June 1984).
The good-to-excellent harvests and substantial level of meat imports now
expected will enable the USSR to significantly improve meat supplies this
year, thus underscoring the leadership's commitment to improve the Soviet
diet. Although Andropov will be able to claim initial success for the Food
Program, the question remains whether this year's progress will spur
further needed improvements to the agricultural sector or be used to argue
that additional readjustments are no longer necessary.
Secret
GI 83-10257X
SOV 83-10193X
November 1983
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Figure 1
Soviet Grain Procurements
Area of overfulfilled plan
Area of fulfilled plan
Economic region boundary
Oblast boundary in grain
growing region
Data as of 25 Oct. 1983
The United Stab. Government has not tecogn ied
the ncotponbo. of E.to a, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Othe, boundary
dap esantabon
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Sea of
Azov ,
Barents
Sea
Yimit of major grain
growing region
TRANS-\,
CAUCASUS
Caspian
Sea
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USSR: Fourth-Largest
Grain Crop in History[
Introduction
With the grain harvest in the USSR now virtually
complete, we continue to believe that Moscow is
headed for a grain crop of about 210 million tons this
year.' While a crop of this size would be far short of
the 238-million-ton target, it would be the fourth-
largest harvest in Soviet history and well above the
estimated annual average of 186 million tons for the
1978-82 period. Although the exact size of the harvest
is still subject to a few uncertainties, we believe it
unlikely-based on information available to date-
that the harvest will exceed 215 million tons or fall
below the 200-million-ton mark. During 1978-81, a
period when the USSR was still publishing the size of
its yearly grain harvest,' our point estimates of the
crop were within ? 8 percent of the reported totals.
The US Department of Agriculture-applying a .
slightly different methodology than our own-esti-
mates this year's crop to be 200 million tons.
Our 210-million-ton estimate has held firm since
early July. Despite a poor start last fall, when near-
drought conditions caused a major shortfall in winter
grain sowings, prospects for the 1983 Soviet grain
crop turned around this spring and have remained
bright ever since. Spring sowing progressed at a near-
record pace, weather conditions during the summer
were mostly favorable, and analysis
indicated that grain yields would reach record
eves in some areas.
More Evidence of a Good Grain Harvest
Information acquired during the past two months has
provided additional evidence that Moscow is headed
for a good grain crop this year. Specifically, we have
looked at the weather, straw dumps, grain procure-
ments
The Weather. With few exceptions, weather condi-
tions since mid-July benefited late-season develop-
ment and ripening of crops and permitted the grain
Table 1
USSR: Grain Production a
Average
Grain production
205.0
By type
99.7
90.2
98.2
81.0
83.0
86.0
95.1
81.4
80.7
68.0
73.0
110.0
Other d
10.2
7.6
10.2
9.0
9.0
14.0
By republic
RSFSR
113.9
91.8
105.1
80.0
90.0
120.0
Ukraine
43.1
34.0
38.1
36.0
39.0
43.0
Kazakhstan
27.5
34.5
27.5
24.0
18.0
25.0
Other
20.5
18.9
18.4
18.0
18.0
22.0
a Measured in bunker weight, that is, gross output from the
combine, which includes excess moisture, unripe and damaged
kernels, weed seeds, and other trash. For comparison with United
States or other countries' grain output, an average discount of 1'1
percent should be applied.
b Total grain production in 1981 was unofficially reported at 158
million tons. Grain figures by type and by republic represent our
estimates.
c Coarse grains include barley, rye, oats, corn, and millet.
d Other grains include rice, pulses, and buckwheat.
Soviet press reports
harvest to proceed at an unusually brisk pace. In
addition, timely summer rains boosted prospects for
the corn crop-about one-third of which remains to
be harvested-as evidenced by the excellent crop
vigor observed on LANDSAT imagery. In our judg-
ment only two weather events have caused minor
problems. A bout of hot, dry weather in mid-August
in northern Kazakhstan and West Siberia probably
cut grain yields somewhat. More recently, prolonged
rainfall in the northernmost parts of the grain region
is seriously hampering final harvest operations-espe-
cially in the Urals and West Siberia-according to
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Figure 2
USSR: Pace of Grain Harvesting
90
810
50
I i I I I I I I i I I I I
- 1978-82
average
- 1982
-1983
27 4 11 18 25 1 8 15 22 29 5 12 '19 26 3 10
Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct
been refined, no change in the total grain crop
estimate has yet been warranted by the straw dump
data. Additional information will be available during
the next several weeks, at which time we will make
further adjustments, if necessary, to our yield esti-
mates
Grain Procurements. Grain procurement data, or the
lack of it, as of the end of September also lend
credence to our current estimate of Soviet grain
production. Although the level of state procurements
does not necessarily relate directly to grain output, it
can indicate whether a region has experienced a
relatively good, average, or poor year. In areas where
we believe crop prospects to be good to excellent,
namely the northern European USSR (about one-
third of total production), every oblast already has
reported that sales plans have been fulfilled or over-
fulfilled. Conversely, the lack of reporting from the
Ukraine and lower Volga Valley-the areas hardest
hit by unfavorable weather this year-supports our
estimate that the harvest there will be no better than
average. East of the Ural Mountains, it is still too
early, as usual, to draw even preliminary conclusions
from the amount of data currently available.
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Other Reporting. Recent collateral reporting contin-
ues to support this year's favorable crop outlook as
well. In mid-August, the US agricultural attache
assessed the overall condition of the 1983 grain crop
as "much better than last year."' Moreover, Soviet
press reports have described the harvest in numerous
oblasts as "good," "rich," "not bad," or "successful."
By comparison, these descriptors rarely were used
during the poor harvests of the past four years. The
press also indicates that grain quality this year is
much improved over last
Remaining Uncertainties
Although there is now little doubt that Moscow will
harvest one of the largest grain crops in Soviet history,
there is still some uncertainty concerning its exact
size. Because of the prolonged wet harvest conditions
in the northern grain regions, minor losses in both
uantity and quality probably already have occurred.
The latest Soviet harvest progress data indicate
that only some 5-10 million tons of grain are still at
risk.
On the positive side, our estimate of the corn crop-
about 8 percent of this year's total grain production-
could turn out to be about 2-3 million tons too low.
Owing to early planting, a larger-than-normal portion
of the corn acreage intended for forage will likely be
harvested for grain. Depending on how much acreage
the Soviets choose to switch, corn production could
well reach a record level.
A final unknown is the total impact of increased
chemical fertilizer production this year. During
January-May 1983, fertilizer output exceeded plan
and was up 10 percent over the corresponding period
Because much of the Soviet
grain growing region-especially the northern Euro-
pean USSR-received adequate rainfall this summer,
' The attache's estimates for the 1982 and 1983 Soviet grain crops
are 180 million tons and 210 million tons, respectively. These
estimates are based largely on Soviet press and weather reports, and
on discussions with Soviet officials and other Western agricultural
attaches, who visited the grain growing region. Unlike many
previous years, however, crop inspection travel by the US attache
was denied by Moscow for nearly the entire 1983 crop season. F_
1978-82
Average
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Total
91.2
84.5
92.0
90.6
97.4
112.8
Hay
25.6
23.5
24.3
28.8
27.6
33.7
Haylage
21.6
19.0
23.7
19.3
21.3
23.3
Silage
39.4
37.7
39.2
37.7
43.8
50.6
Grass Meal
4.6
4.3
4.8
4.8
4.7
5.2
a As of 3 October.
b One feed unit contains the nutrient equivalent of 1 kilogram of
oats.
grain yields in several areas could surpass the record
and near-record levels we have already incorporated
into our estimate partly because of the increased
fertilizer availability.
Good Prospects for Other Crops
The current outlook for the major nongrain crops in
the Soviet Union-sunflowers, sugar beets, vegeta-
bles, potatoes, and cotton'-as well as prospects for
selected forages-hay, haylage, silage, and grass
meal-remains good to excellent. We continue to
estimate that these crops will show increases over
1982 production and exceed the average of the past
five years. In addition, according to the USSR Cen-
tral Statistical Administration, forage procurements
as of early October were about 15 percent higher than
last year's record. Although this gap may narrow
before the end of the season, we believe that a second
consecutive record forage harvest is certain. More-
over, because most of the harvesting to date has been
carried out under favorable weather conditions, for-
age quality this year will be up as well. Harvested
forages-in terms of nutrient content-comprise
about one-half of the livestock ration in the USSR
Grain Requirements and Imports
A grain crop of 210 million tons would still leave the
USSR short of .the amount of grain we believe
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Estimating Soviet Grain Requirements
Just as our estimate of Soviet grain production is
subject to error, so is our estimate of Soviet grain
requirements, particularly the amount of grain re-
quired for livestock feed. Moscow's requirements
beyond those implied in the annual and longer term
plans are difficult to predict. While plans for the
agriculture sector in 1983 are known, those for 1984
are not. To the extent that actual 1984 goals for
livestock product output d iffer from those implied in
the 1981-85 plan targets, our estimate of the amount
of grain required for feed in the first half of 1984 will
be biased accordingly. In addition, a number of
physical factors affect the USSR's need for grain.
Among these are the size of the yearly grain and
forage crops, weather conditions during the overwin-
tering period for livestock, the availability of high
protein feeds such as oilseed meal, and changes in
feeding efficiencies.
With the crop season coming to a close, we now have
a good handle on 1983 grain and harvested forage
production, two key variables in the grain require-
ments equation. Our grain crop estimate of 210
million tons has remained unchanged since early
summer, and it now appears certain that a second
consecutive record forage harvest is in the making. If
properly handled and stored, this year's additional
forage could be used to reduce the need for grain by
necessary to maintain current levels of seed, food, and
industrial use, as well as to achieve planned output
targets for meat, milk, and egg production.' Because
' The USSR records grain production in bunker weight, that is, as
the grain comes from the field before cleaning and drying. Our
production estimate is also in bunker weight. Uses of grain,
however, are recorded in standard weight: Our research has shown
that the bunker-weight measure must be reduced by an average of
I I percent to be comparable to the standard-weight measure. The
discount varies according to moisture conditions prior to and during
harvest, and to crop size, and thus can become either larger or
smaller than the I1-percent average as the season advances. This
year we are using a discount of only 10 percent because much of the
harvest was carried out in dry weather. Our current estimate
indicates a standard-weight grain crop of roughly 190 million tons,
some 5-15 million tons. We believe, however, that the
grain-forage balance in the ration will be roughly the
same as last year or, if feeding efficiencies of the past
few years remain unchanged, will shift slightly in
favor of grain for two reasons:
? The increase in grain supplies this year is larger
than the increase in supplies of harvested forage.
? Because Soviet livestock feed rations are currently
about 20 percent short of announced standards for
energy intake, animal productivity would increase
more by boosting total feed per animal than by
adjusting the grain-forage balance.
Weather conditions particularly temperatures-
during the winter and spring will also play a large
role in determining total livestock feed requirements.
Our current estimate assumes average temperatures,
but, if the winter is warmer or colder than normal,
feed requirements will change correspondingly. For
example, an unusually warm winter last year reduced
the need for feed by an estimated 17 million tons of
grain.a Similarly, the quantity of soybeans and soy-
bean meal imported will also affect grain needs.
These high protein feeds help improve the balance of
livestock feed rations and thus increase feeding effi-
ciency.
of the record forage crop and already committed grain
imports, however, the USSR has increased flexibility
in management of the livestock sector. Moscow could
choose either to reduce the need for grain by continu-
ing to substitute harvested forages for grain in feed
rations or to increase total feed supplies by maintain-
ing the quantities of grain fed at current levels.
Although the former would allow additions to grain
stocks, we believe the Soviets will emphasize the
latter. Such action would further raise animal produc-
tivity (more meat per animal), thus underscoring the
leadership's commitment to improving meat supplies
in the near term.
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Figure 4
USSR: Cumulative Grain Purchasesa
of grain. Even so, it is still too early to accurately
forecast likely Soviet grain imports for the current
marketing year. Depending on weather conditions
during the winter and early spring, the need for grain
could swing substantially. In addition, imports in
excess of the minimum commitment levels most likely
will be determined by Soviet policy choices that pit
the hard currency costs of additional imports and the
aversion to becoming dependent on Western produc-
ers against the leadership's commitment to expand
meat production and thereby improve the quality of
the Soviet diet.
I I I I I I I I I
cent dealings with supplier countries suggest that the
USSR will buy little, if any, grain in excess of its
minimum commitment levels. The US Embassy in
Moscow reports that:
? In early September, the Soviets turned down a 2-
million-ton grain offer by Australian grain
merchants.
? Both Argentina and Canada attempted unsuccess-
fully to increase the minimum amount of grain sales
under their Long-Term Grain Agreements (LTA)
with the USSR.
? The French agricultural attache expects French
grain sales to the Soviet Union during MY 1984 to
fall well below last year's level.
Other evidence indicates that Moscow may buy up-
ward of 30 million tons of grain this market year. In
particular,
e This chart represents grain contracts signed by the Soviets during the
marketing year. It does not include grain purchased before 1 July but shipped
to the USSR during the marketing year.
By virtue of agreements with various grain exporters,
Moscow is committed to purchase about 22 million
tons of grain during the marketing year (MY), which
began on 1 July 1983.6 So far during MY 1984 (1 July
1983-30 June 1984), the Soviets have bought 11
million tons of grain from all sources, including nearly
5 million tons from the United States. Canada has
chalked up 3.7 million tons of the total, with Argenti-
na and the European Community accounting for 1
million and 1.5 million tons, respectively. The USSR
has additional commitments through bilateral agree-
ments and protocols for about 10.5 million tons of
grain, including 3 million tons from the United States.
Unless we have substantially overestimated this year's
grain harvest, we believe that the USSR will have
little need to import more than the minimum amount
" It is impossible to estimate precisely the quantity of grain the
Soviets are committed to buy during this period because of
differences between crop years in the northern and southern
hemispheres, market years, and LTA years. This amount, however,
is not likely to vary by more than a few million'tons in any given 12-
the USSR intends to buy slightly more
than the 29 million tons currently estimated by the
US Department of Agriculture.
We cannot rule out imports of this magnitude at this
point in the marketing year. Poor weather conditions
in the winter and spring, in particular, could boost
import demand. In addition, Moscow could choose to
import more than the 22-million-ton minimum in
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order to add to its grain reserves. Although lower
world grain prices are expected next year, Moscow
cannot bank on another good harvest in 1984 and thus.
may not want to pass up an opportunity to stockpile
grain this year. Moreover, by spreading purchases out
over two or more years, Moscow would be able to
minimize price runups caused by its own heavy
buying activity.
Implications for the United States
With good-to-excellent Soviet grain and forage crops
now virtually assured, prospects for US grain sales to
the USSR in MY 1984 would have been poor were it
not for the signing of the new US-USSR LTA in
August of this year.-Under terms of the agreement,
the USSR is committed to purchasing a minimum of
9 million tons of US grain (or 8 million tons if it buys
500,000 tons of soybeans or meal as now appears
likely) during the period from October 1983 to Sep-
tember 1984.' An additional 3 million tons of grain
may be bought without further US Government ap-
proval.
the next round of
buying from the United States is likely to occur in
November and December, at which time they think
the Soviets will have bought the required amount of
US grain. Once that obligation has been satisfied,
he Soviets will
want to make a final assessment of their own crop
production, their hard currency situation, and condi-
tions in the international grain market before addi-
tonal purchases, if any, are made.
Although the state of US-USSR political relations
could play an important role in determining Soviet
purchases of US grain, we believe the Soviets are
unlikely to buy more than the minimum stipulated in
the US-USSR LTA.
the head of the Soviet grain-buying agency,
V. I. Pershin, indicated in mid-September that Mos-
cow will not exceed its minimum purchase obligation
under the US-USSR LTA because of its own good
grain crop and the availability of grain from other
suppliers.
purchases of US grain totaled only 6.2 million tons.
Domestic Impact of the Good Crop Year a
The improved Soviet grain harvest this year will
benefit both the population-by improving the quality
of the average Soviet diet through an increased supply
of domestically produced livestock products, especial-
ly meat-and the leadership-by permitting Andro-
pov to claim initial success for the Food Program. F_
Benefits to the Soviet Consumer. The taut food supply
situation of recent years-manifested in shortages
and rationing of quality foods-should be eased in the
coming months. Domestic meat production, stimulat-
ed in part by the good crop year, could reach a record
16.3 million tons in 1983, and it appears that meat
imports will be about 800,000 tons, near last year's
level of 940,000 tons. Given these conditions, per
capita meat availability would be up by 6 percent
from the 1982 level and would be about 2 kilograms
per capita higher than the previous peak in 1981. We
believe that such an increase is large enough to be
perceived by consumers as a real improvement in their
welfare.
Implications for the Leadership. General Secretary
Andropov's first year in power coincides with the
USSR's first good grain harvest since 1978. Although
the improvement is principally the result of better
weather, it will enable the leadership to claim initial
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success for the highly touted Food Program and thus 25X1
demonstrate its support for the consumer. It also frees
Moscow from having to choose between stagnation in
meat production and continued heavy dependence on
Western grain this year. The good crop year also 25X1
carries with it some favorable economic implications,
most notably, the potential of a 30-percent reduction
in grain imports from a year ago. Such a cutback will
save the USSR nearly $2 billion in hard currency
outlays. These savings could in turn be used to
increase purchases of badly needed high-technology
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The longer term implications. of. this year's good
harvests on the progress of the Food Program are
uncertain. Under both Brezhnev and Andropov, a few
adjustments affecting resources allocated to other
sectors (including defense) have been made in order to
keep the Food Program on track. In addition, Soviet
programs to improve the quality and quantity of the
forage crop and to provide material incentives directly
to those involved in grain production were partially
responsible for this year's successes. The question
remains, however, whether these favorable results will
increase the leadership's resolve to push for even more
improvements in agricultural efficiency or be used as
an argument that no further readjustments are neces-
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Appendix
USSR: Late-Season Outlook
for Major Nongrain Crops
As of early October, the outlook for the major
nongrain crops in the Soviet Union-sunflowers, sug-
ar beets, vegetables, potatoes, and cotton-remains
good.' We estimate that these crops will show in-
creases over 1982 production and exceed the average
of 1978-82. If this forecast holds and normal weather
prevails through harvest, output of sunflowers, sugar
beets, and potatoes would be up for the second
straight year, vegetable production would match last
year's record crop, and the harvest of cotton would
return to a near-record level. The Soviets were able to
start the harvest five to 14 days sooner than usual
because of the early planting this past spring and a
warm summer.
Sunflowers
Our estimate of sunflower production this year re-
mains at 5.5-6.0 million tons above last year's output
of 5.3 million tons but well below the 6.6-million-ton
plan. The above-normal precipitation received in the
sunflower growing region from mid-July to mid-
September bodes well for an above-average crop. By
early October, 3.4 million hectares, about 80 percent
of the crop, had been harvested
Sugar Beets
Our estimate of sugar beet production has been raised
to the 85-to-90-million-ton range, substantially better
than last year's harvest of 71 million tons but short of
the 96-million-ton plan. Weather conditions since
midsummer have been mostly favorable, and several
press reports described this year's crop as having
weightier roots and higher sugar content than last
year's crop. In the Ukraine, the principal sugar beet
region, more than half of the crop is described by
Soviet agricultural officials as being in good condition
and another third as being satisfactory. By 3 October
workers had lifted sugar beets from nearly 70 percent
of the fields throughout the USSR.
' Estimates are based on local press articles reports from US
agricultural attaches
In addition, a weather regression yield
model, consisting of a time trend term and a departure from trend
due to weather effects term. is employed for all major nongrain
Vegetables
Our estimate of vegetable production is 29-31 million
tons, up slightly from our earlier forecast of 28-30
million tons. If this estimate holds, a new record
would be established. The USSR Central Statistical
Administration reports that fieldwork this year was
carried out earlier than in 1982 and with high labor
productivity. Procurements are 300,000 tons ahead of
last year's pace, and the plan for the sale of early
vegetables to the state has been considerably overful-
filled. An official also noted that losses this year
should be substantially lower than usual because there
are more refrigerated trucks and refrigerated units on
river vessels transporting vegetables. By 3 October 25X1
vegetables had been picked on three-fourths of the
sown area in the socialized sector," which accounts
for 65 percent of the total vegetable acreage
Potatoes
We continue to estimate potato production at 80-85
million tons, an increase over the 78 million tons
produced in 1982 and slightly above the recent five-
year average of 79 million tons. Despite optimum
weather conditions throughout the summer in the
major potato growing regions, there have been numer-
ous reports of localized crop damage caused by the
Colorado beetle. Thus far, however, no reports have
surfaced indicating greater beetle damage this year
than last. Mass potato lifting began in late August in
the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Central Chernozem
Region. As of early October, harvesting in the social-
ized sector, which comprises slightly less than half the
total area sown to potatoes, was about 90 percent
complete, according to the Soviet press.
10 Soviet agriculture is comprised of a socialized sector-state and
collective farms-and a private sector-small plots of land farmed
by individuals. Harvesting statistics for the private sector are not
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Table 3
USSR: Production of Nongrain Crops
Area
(million
hectares)
Yield
(quintals/
hectare)
Production
(million
tons)
1978-82 average
4.3
11.6
5.0
1981
4.2
11.0
4.6
1982 plan
6.54
1982
4.2
12.6
5.3
1983 plan
6.6
1983 July estimated
4.2
13.1-14.3
5.5-6.0
1983 Sept estimated
4.2
13.1-14.3
5.5-6.0
Sugar Beets
1978-82 average
3.7
206.8
76.5
1981
3.6
167.0
60.6
1982 plan
98.2
1982
3.5
203.0
71.0
1983 plan
96.1
1983 July estimated
3.5
228.6-242.9
80.0-85.0
1983 Sept estimated
3.5
242.9-257.1
85.0-90.0
Vegetables
1978-82 average
1.7
161.1
27.4
1981
1.7
147.0
25.6
1982 plan
1982
1.7
175.3
29.0
1983 plan
29.8
1983 July estimated
1.7
164.7-176.5
28.0-30.0
1983 Sept estimated
1.7
170.6-182.4
29.0-31.0
Potatoes
1978-82 average
6.9
114.2
78.8
1981
6.9
105.0
72.0
1982 plan
88.4
1982
6.9
113.0
78.0
1983 plan
89.0
1983 July estimated
6.9
115.9-123.2
80.0-85.0
1983 Sept estimated
6.9
115.9-123.2
80.0-85.0
Cotton
1978-82 average
3.1
30.0
9.3
1981
3.2
30.4
9.6
1982 plan
9.33
1982
3.2
29.1
9.3
1983 plan
9.2
1983 July estimated
3.2
29.7-31.2
9.5-10.0
1983 Sept estimated
3.2
30.3-31.6
9.7-10.1
Cotton
Ideal weather since mid-July has improved the out-
look for the 1983 cotton crop. We now estimate
production at 9.7-10.1 million tons, up from our
previous forecast of 9.5-10.0 million tons. A crop of
this size would exceed last year's 9.3-million-ton
harvest and the 1983 plan of 9.2 million tons. The
record output of 10 million tons was achieved in 1980.
Cotton harvesting began in late.August in Central
Asia and by 29 September more than 3.0 million tons
had been picked.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00283R000200100005-0
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00283R000200100005-0
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00283R000200100005-0