NSSD 1-82 SUMMARY OF PART III-A: THREATS TO UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00275R000100200006-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 22, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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22 March 82
NSSD 1-82
Summary of Part III-A: Threats to
United States National Security
1. The key military threats to US national security continue to be posed
by the USSR and its allies and clients. Despite increasing pressures and
constraints on its economy and the growing political and military
vulnerabilities of its empire, the Soviet Union continues to expand and
modernize its strategic and conventional forces. Current Soviet leaders,
moreover, are probably prepared to accept the necessary sacrifices to sustain
the expansion of Soviet military power, which they see as the most important
element in the growth of Soviet political influence.
2. We do not believe, however, that the USSR is seeking to use its
military power directly against the United States or its allies, but rather
sees this power as the necessary backdrop for exerting pressure uoon US allies
and other states along the Soviet periphery and elsewhere. The Soviet; are
concerned about current US plans and programs for rapid military
modernization, but probably anticipate that US defense spending will be
tempered by domestic resistance and economic dilemmas.
3. Direct military conflict with the USSR is much less probable than
conflict resulting from regional tensions, that could again involve the US in
a war with a Soviet ally or client. In such a conflict, the risk of
escalation to a confrontation with the USSR would vary according to the
situation; but, as a result of their expanded strategic military power, the
Soviets are probably less averse than in the past to take the risks which
might lead to such a confrontation.
4. The Soviet military buildup, combined with the absence of effective
resistance, has also encouraged the Soviets to activities in the Third
World. Utilizing proxies and mobilizing a diversified arsenal of arms,
military and paramilitary training, logistical assistance, propaganda, and
economic aid, the USSR in opportunistic fashion, continues to exploit
indigenous unrest in the Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and Africa, in
order to undermine US influence, to bring Soviet sympathizers to power, and to
acquire additional military bases. A number of Soviet allies and friends act
as surrogates for the USSR in the Third World, and in the cases of Cuba,
Libya, the PLO, and Syria, as conduits for Soviet-bloc arms and training to
groups that undertake terrorism.
5. From a regional perspective, Europe and East Asia are the principal
Soviet military concerns. In both regions, the USSR continues to expand and
to modernize its theater nuclear and conventional forces. In Europe, the
Soviets are deeply concerned about unrest in Poland. They are deeply engaged
in exploiting and encouraging US-West European differences and the West
European "peace movement." In East and Southeast Asia, the major military
threats to US security interests stem from Soviet efforts to contain China,
the related Soviet effort to hedge against the possibility of a Washington-
Beijing-Tokyo military "axis" by the buildup of Soviet military might, and the
possibility of adventurism by North Korea of Vietnam.
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6. In the Middle East, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian
revolution, and the war between Iran and Iraq have combined to make the
Persian Gulf area the focus of significant US strategic concern. In addition,
acute Arab-Israeli tensions continue to threaten a war that would harm US
interests in the region.
7. The military threat environment in Latin America is dominated by the
Communist exploitation of social and political unrest in Central America, and
such exploitation constitutes the most serious challenge to US interests in
the hemisphere since Cuba became allied with the USSR.
8. Military threats to US interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are relatively
small, and involve mainly the possibility that local conflicts or domestic
instabilities might broaden and draw in the superpowers on the side of local
clients.
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NSSD 1-82
Part III-A
Threats To United States National Security
1. The growing military might of the USSR, its gradually increasing
capacity to operate far from its frontiers, and its willingness to provide
military advisers and arms to radical governments and insurgency movements in
the Third World pose growing challenges to the United States. The growth in
Soviet strategic nuclear power and conventional military capability along its
peripheries are especially striking. However, actual extensions of Soviet
power have depended on perceived opportunities around the world, opportunities
heightened by the absence of effective resistance. Moreover, it will become
increasingly difficult for the Soviets to sustain their military buildup as
their economic growth slows.
2. Despite the growth in Soviet strength, a direct US-Soviet military
conflict is much less probable than conflict resulting from regional tensions,
especially in the Middle East, that could once again involve the United States
in a war with a Soviet ally or client. Still other dangers arise from local
conflicts in which the danger of a US-USSR confrontation will exist. Without
attributing to the Soviet leadership a propensity to assume high risks,
increased relative Soviet power suggests that the USSR might take bolder
action in lower-level crises than in the past.
3. There will be increasing terrorist threats to US military and
civilian personnel and facilities which up to now have stemmed from disparate
conditions, political causes, and groups. An increase in anti-American
terrorism is expected in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America
and, to a lesser extent, in southern Africa. In addition, nuclear
proliferation will become an increasingly serious problem in coming years as
more countries acquire the ability to make nuclear weapons and, in some
instances, actually do so.
4. The improved Soviet military posture may create a greater sense of
security on the part of Soviet leaders. The USSR continues to take advantage
of indigenous unrest in much of the developing world through proxies, the
provision of arms, advisers, and the deployment of its combat forces. It will
continue to do so wherever Moscow perceives that it can undermine pro-Western
governments, especially if this can be done without risking a confrontation
with the United States.
5. During the 1970s, the Soviets achieved their long sought-after goal
of superpower status alongside the United States. However, Moscow did not
regard "parity" or acceptance of "detente" as requiring adherence to a global
code of conduct acceptable to Washington. Moscow has perceived the US as
politically constrained not only by the trauma of Vietnam but by an inability
to achieve domestic consensus on foreign policy. In turn, the Soviets have
probed US resolve in the Third World, as witnessed by their military support
ventures in Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviets have also exploited detente to
promote divisions between the US and its NATO allies, and, most importantly,
to encourage neutralism in West Germany.
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6. The scale of Soviet investment in nuclear forces demonstrates their
importance in Moscow's strategy. They believe that in the present US-Soviet
strategic relationship each side possesses sufficient strategic capabilities
to devastate the other after absorbing an attack. Because the Soviets rely so
greatly on ICBMs, the increasing vulnerability of their ICBM silos to
improving US weapons will cause them to be concerned with the adequacy of
their strategic force capabilities. Even with ongoing improvements in their
strategic defenses, the Soviets will be unable to prevent massive damage to
the USSR from surviving US strategic forces. Soviet leaders state that
nuclear war with the US would be a catastrophe that must be avoided and that
they do not regard such a conflict as inevitable. Nevertheless, they regard
nuclear war as a continuing possibility and have not accepted mutual
vulnerability as as a desirable or permanent basis for the US-Soviet strategic
relationship. They have been willing to negotiate restraints on force
improvements and deployments when it serves their interests, but prefer
possession of superior capabilities and have been working to improve their
chances of prevailing in a conflict with the US. A tenet in their strategic
thinking appears to be that the better prepared the USSR is to fight in
various contingencies, the more likely it is that potential enemies will be
deterred from attacking the USSR and its allies and will be hesitant to
counter Soviet political and military actions.
7. The USSR will continue to improve the striking power and
survivability of its strategic intercontinental and intermediate range nuclear
offensive forces, overcome some of the weaknesses of its strategic defenses,
and improve their supporting command, control, and communications systems.
The Soviets are expanding the capabilities of their SLBM force, and developing
mobile ICBMs and a new swing-wing intercontinental bomber. Moreover, Soviet
efforts in non-acoustic sensors for ASW and directed energy weapons could have
profound consequences if major technological breakthroughs occur, although we
do not foresee such successes during at least the next ten years. Also,
Soviet military capabilities in space will continue to improve, especially in
the use of manned space platforms and in antisatellite capabilities. The
Soviets are also attempting to prepare their leaders and military forces for
the possibility of having to fight a nuclear war and are training to be able
to maintain control over increasingly complex conflict situations. Soviet
leaders are aware that the course of a nuclear conflict will probably not go
according to plans, but they have seriously addressed many of the problems of
conducting military operations in nuclear war, improving their ability to deal
with the many contingencies of such a conflict and raising the probability of
outcomes favorable to the USSR.
8. The Soviets have vigorously modernized and expanded their theater and
peripheral nuclear forces. They are now in a better position to escalate a
European conflict and have acquired increased capabilities to use peripheral
strike forces opposite China and throughout the Eurasian periphery.
9. Soviet leaders view their current strategic position as supporting
the conduct of an assertive foreign policy and the expansion of Soviet
influence abroad. However, the Soviets do not believe that they currently
enjoy significant strategic military advantages over the US, and do not wish a
major confrontation. But they are probably less fearful of this occurring
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than they were five years aqo. Thus, although the Soviets are unlikely to
initiate military hostilities in an area of central importance to the US like
the Persian Gulf, they may be prepared to seize opportunities offered by
instability in Iran or Pakistan. Nonetheless, although they fear the possible
consequences of US military modernization efforts--especially the deployment
of intermediate range missiles in Western Europe--, the Soviets seem willing
to wait for current US determination to wane as a result of domestic
opposition. None of the current contenders to succeed Brezhnev seems likely
to depart radically from established Soviet priorities. The military
establishment has great influence on current Soviet policy formulation and
that influence may increase during a succession struggle. As a result,
Brezhnev's successors are unlikely to change the present emphasis on defense
spending or decrease their efforts to project Soviet power and influence.
10. In the conventional realm, the Soviets have significantly modernized
their forces opposite Europe and China. Although they have not developed
forces specifically for overseas operations, they have developed an ability to
project forces on a modest scale into the Third World including airborne
forces suitable for such missions. For the most part, the Soviets will
continue to rely on surrogates in the Third World. The record shows that they
are most likely to use their power where they see clear military and
geopolitical advantages and the risk of direct confrontation is low.
11. Complementing other efforts is Moscow's involvement in support of
revolutionary violence worldwide and search for geopolitical advantages. Some
radical regimes have come to power with Moscow's aid, while others have done
so largely on their own--for instance in Nicaragua and Ethiopia--and later
turned to the USSR for support. The USSR also directly or indirectly supports
a number of national insurgencies and ethnic-separatist movements by providing
them with arms, advice, military training, and political backing. In
addition, the USSR and Eastern Europe support allied or friendly governments
and entities--notably Libya, certain Palestinian groups, South Yemen, Syria,
and Cuba--which in turn directly or indirectly aid the subversive or terrorist
activities of a broad spectrum of violent revolutionaries.
12. The Soviets are expected to attempt to increase hard-currency
earnings as well as promote political and strategic interests through arms
sales. Soviet and Soviet-bloc military sales, military technicians and
advisors, and military training are important sources of-political influence
in the Third World. The total value of Soviet and Soviet-bloc military sales
and assistance deliveries worldwide peaked in 1979 (approximately $12.4
billion) and has since been declining. There has been an influx of large
number of Soviet-bloc military technicians and civilian advisers in Third
World countries. In 1981 these totalled over 80,000 in the Middle East, about
10,000 in Sub-Saharan African, and 11,000 in Asia. The amount of influence
such assistance buys is arguable, but there is no question the arms sold
enable the buyers to engage in stronger military actions. Although recipients
of Soviet aid are capable of changing policies against Soviet interests--as
shown by Egypt--the Soviets have gained political leverage, a potential basis
for a greater military presence in the future, and, in some cases, actual
battlefield experience. And the military training of large numbers of Third
World nationals in the Soviet bloc provides Moscow with a potential cadre of
sympathizers when they return home.
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13. The Soviets have a number of military vulnerabilities in each of
their five services. At the highest level, there are serious questions about
the reliability of-their NSWP allies. Their strategic bomber force is old and
vulnerable to modern air defenses. Their SSBNs are relatively noisy, and
their passive acoustic sensors have limited range. In BMD, the Soviet ability
to discriminate incoming RVs adequately is poor. Their general purpose forces
also have deficiencies, for instance, in advancing under unforseen and quickly
changing circumstances. They also have logistical vulnerabilities, including
a heavy reliance on rail transportation.
14. The Soviets have a number of external problems. Turmoil along the
USSR's periphery (e.g., China, Poland, and Afghanistan) reinforces its
obsession with the need for order and friendly regimes alorg its frontiers.
The potential for ideological contamination of its allies and friends, due to
recent events in Poland and Afghanistan, also gives them cause for concern.
Moreover, internal unrest and insurgency have come to plague'a number of
Soviet clients; these countries continue to consume scarce resources.
15. Parallel to Moscow's military effort, the Soviets will try to pursue
an arms control dialogue with the West. The strategic arms control process in
particular remains important as a means of constraining military competition
with the US. A major Soviet motivation in this dialogue has been to reduce
the possibility of a US technological breakthrough that might jeopardize
Moscow's strategic nuclear status.
16. So far the Soviets have continued to constrain their strategic force
programs in accordance with the SALT I Interim Agreement and the key
provisions of the unratified SALT II Treaty. If the Soviets conclude there is
no prospect in the near term for meaningful results from renewed SALT, they
may decide to go beyond the SALT II constraints. They could increase the
number of MIRVed ICBMs (thus increasing the threat to US silo- and shelter-
based ICBMs), continue SSBN production without any SSBN dismantlement,
increase Backfire production, and test and deploy new strategic systems. The
Soviets probably want to preserve the ABM treaty without amendments, and are
concerned that the US could eventually deploy effective ABM systems.
17. Soviet leaders are likely to maintain the pace of military
expenditures in the next few years in order to cope with instability within
the Bloc and along the Soviet frontier and to buttress insecure friends and
allies elsewhere. To sum up, it is doubtful that Soviet leaders perceive a
"window of opportunity" in the next several years, but they probably believe
that schisms in the West and domestic inhibitions in the US provide them some
latitude for action. During the next 3-5 years, Moscow may attempt to secure
political advantage from its military arsenal in anticipation of US force
modernization programs. From the perspective of the present and probable
future of Soviet leadership, there will remain important deterrents to major
military actions. These include the dangers seen in a direct conflict with
the US, doubts about the reliability of their Eastern European allies, worries
about Chinese exploitation of any Soviet losses, and an awareness of the
greater Western economic capacity to support extended wartime operations.
These concerns clearly do not preclude action abroad, but they constrain them.
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.Europe
18. It is a Soviet objective to acquire and maintain forces capable of
winning a war in Europe whether conventional or nuclear, and the Soviets have
kept a clear numerical edge over NATO. NATO's strength and instability in
Eastern Europe makes them very unlikely to initiate military hostilities
against NATO, but they may use their military advantages to exert political
pressure on NATO members and to.encourage US-West European differences. This
effort has been especially strong against the key NATO ally, West Germany,
which remains susceptible to Soviet influence on the unique issue of East
Germany.
19. The Soviets intend any European conflict to take place on Western,
not Eastern, territory and stress the need for large, combat-ready forces to
be in place at the outset of hostilities. They prefer to achieve theater
objectives without using nuclear weapons. They apparently believe that a
theater nuclear war would arise either if NATO used nuclear weapons to avoid
losing a conventional war--circumstances in which the Soviets would plan on
preemptive use of their nuclear weapons--or, less likely, if the Warsaw Pact
had to use nuclear weapons to halt a NATO break-through. In such a conflict
the Soviets would use, in addition to tactical nuclear weapons, peripheral and
some intercontinental range missiles and aircraft against NATO's forward-
based nuclear forces.
20. The military balance in Europe poses a problem for Soviet policy.
The Soviets know that, if they appear too threatening, they risk galvanizing
NATO sentiment in favor of renewed defense efforts. Thus, Moscow has pursued
a dual policy: improving its military strength--includ;ng SS-20 deployments
and procurement of Backfire bombers--while engaging in arms control talks,
attempting to improve trade and diplomatic relations, and undertaking a
massive propaganda campaign--supplemented by covert activities--designed to
undermine public support for NATO's defense effort, particularly INF. Such
Soviet efforts concentrate on the key NATO countries of West Germany,
Netherlands, and Belgium.
21. Potentially the most threatening problem for the USSR is the
questionable reliability of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in a war with
the West, and recent events in Poland have made it more pressing.
22. The military balance in Europe and NATO will be affected by
developments in Western Europe. Strains within NATO and the potential
estrangement of some West European neutrals from some US policies are likely
to make US relations with these countries more contentious. The West European
allies will seek increasingly to coordinate their policies in order to present
the US with agreed alternatives to disputed US positions. This tendency
toward divergence within the Alliance may increasingly hinder NATO as a
mechanism for determining and coordinating security policy.
East and Southeast Asia
23. The Far East is second only to Europe in strategic importance for
Soviet military policy. In contrast with Europe, the USSR directly borders
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its major potential enemy. Furthermore, the Soviet supply line, the Trans-
Siberian Railroad, is dangerously close to a hostile China.
24. Soviet military power in East Asia is intended to contain or reduce
China's influence, decrease American and Japanese influence, discourage anti-
Soviet policies on the part of Asian governments, and encourage the evolution
of a Soviet-sponsored Asian collective security system. A Sino-Soviet
conflict would sorely test the evolving US-Chinese relationship, forcing the
United States to decide whether it wished to be involved and, if so, how.
25. The most immediate threat to peace in Asia that could involve US
forces is in Korea. North Korea is dedicated to reunifying the Peninsula on
its own terms, and the decade-long North Korean military buildup is aimed at
promoting a military option. The US security commitment and US military
presence, the strength of South Korea's military forces, the stability of its
government, and the desire of the Chinese and the Soviets to maintain the
status quo are substantial deterrents to a North Korean move. These factors
may not be sufficient to prevent a North Korean attack, however irrational.
26. Moscow's principal concerns in Southeast Asia are to contain China
and diminish US influence. For their sizeable economic investment in support
of Vietnamese policy, the Soviets have already realized substantial returns.
They have a highly visible advisory presence throughout Indochina, and have
gained access to Vietnamese air and naval facilities. These facilities enable
the Soviets better to support Indian Ocean deployments and to expand
intelligence collection capabilities in the region. Even though Vietnam is a
major drain on Soviet economic resources, Moscow probably will seek greater
influence in Southeast Asia.
27. Action by Vietnam against Thailand is the most likely cause of
expanded regional conflict in Southeast Asia. Vietnamese forces might strike
into Thailand if Hanoi concluded that it could no longer tolerate Thai support
of anti-Vietnamese guerrilla forces in Kampuchea. A Vietnamese attack would
have severe consequences, especially in view of US and Chinese security ties
to Thailand and the USSR's commitment to Hanoi. China might initiate a second
border war with Vietnam to tie down Vietnamese forces. Soviet forces might
then apply pressure on China.
28. Although the Soviet military position in the Far East is reasonably
secure, the Soviets probably expect no change in China's hostile posture
toward the USSR, and, at the same time, expect intensified US pressure on
Japan to assume a greater security role in Northeast Asia, evolving Sino-
Japanese trade and political ties inimical to Soviet goals, and an evolving
US-Chinese military relationship directed specifically against the USSR. They
have also seen a reaffirmation by the United States of its commitment to
maintain sizeable forces in South Korea.
29. Whether the Far East would be a defensive theater for the Soviets in
a global war or whether they would attempt to seize and hold major portions of
Chinese territory would depend on their political objectives, and the military
situation in other theaters. In general, the Soviets would want to avoid a
"two-front" war. In a strictly Sino-Soviet war, the Soviets would probably
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seize portions of North China and establish new buffer zones along the
frontier. In a NATO-Warsaw Pact war the United States would be faced with
coercive theats or military operations designed to prevent the use of Japanese
bases.
The Near East, South and Southwest Asia
30. The Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the
war between Iran and Iraq have made the Persian Gulf area the dominant US
strategic concern in the Middle East. The most severe dangers are that Iran
might succumb to increased Soviet influence and possibly large-scale military
intervention; that friendly states may be attacked by other local states--most
immediately that the end game of the Iran-Iraq war might increase the
intensity and scope of the fighting and threaten other Gulf Arabs--; and that
friendly governments may be toppled by internal insurrections, possibly
stimulated or exploited by the Soviets. However it might happen, Soviet
political or military control of the oil lifelines vital to our West European
allies and Japan could cause the dissolutici of our alliance system as US
allies succumbed to Soviet pressure.
31. The most immediate threats to US interests in the Gulf region are
from Islamic revolutionaries in Iran and the potential of direct Iranian
military attacks on Gulf regimes, or more likely, acceleration of Iranian
sponsored subversion. Pakistan, in particular, may be subjected to increase
Soviet pressure and possibly military action in retaliation for its support of
the Afghan insurgents. The Soviets already have sought to intimidate
Islamabad b;; diplomatic warnings, by condoning, if not provoking a number of
attacks by Afghan helicopters on Pakistani border outposts, and by supporting
anti-government terrorist elements.
32. The tensions around the Gulf have sharply reduced for the present
the number of Arab forces that could be arrayed against Israel. Even without
this advantage, Israel will maintain its wide margin of military superiority
over the Arab states. Although this superiority would serve to deter a
premeditated Arab attack, actions in Lebanon or elsewhere could lead to a
wider conflict in which the possibility of Soviet intervention must be
considered.
33. Another threat is posed by Libya, with its sizeable equipment
inventories, interventions in Africa, and support for subversion and
terrorism. Although Qadhafi may from time to time modify his activities, his
efforts to undermine moderate regimes and Western influence in the area will
continue. Nevertheless, the Libyan military will remain ineffective in
exploiting its plethora of weapons in conventional combat.
34. Like Libya's military adventures and support for subversion, the war
in the Western Sahara and developments in Morocco and Algeria will remain a
lesser threat to US interests than the conditions around the Persian Gulf and
the threat of Arab-Israeli hostilities.
35. Tensions between Pakistan and India will remain, fed in part by
Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear program aimed primarily at the development of
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a nuclear weapons production capability. India will become increasingly
concerned and might undertake either a military strike against Pakistan's
nuclear facilities or the production of its own nuclear weapons as, in New
Delhi's calculation, Pakistan begins to acquire significant quantities of
weapons-usable fissile material. Any Indian attack could rapidly escalate
into a full-scale war.
Latin America
36. The threat environment in Latin America is dominated by the
Communist exploitation of social and political trends in Central America.
However, it is most unlikely that the USSR would be prepared to engage in a
major confrontation with the United States in the Caribbean or Central
America.
37. Cuba is capable of taking independent action as well as operating in
concert with the USSR--or in response to its wishes. Perceiving a weakening
of US influence and capability and opportunities to undermine US prestige,
Castro since 1978 has increased assistance to revolutionaries in the region.
The Soviet Union, while allowing Cuba to take the lead, has gradually expanded
its involvement--efforts complemented by some East European nations, some
Communist and Arab states, and the PLO. Unless faced with important new costs
or inducements, Moscow is unlikely to abandon this tack.
38. Soviet-Cuban military ties have led to a continuous Soviet upgrading
of the capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces, have enabled the USSR to make
extensive use of Cuban facilities, and have resulted in Soviet-Cuban
collaboration abroad. By now, the principal objectives of Cuba and the USSR
in Central America are to consolidate the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua,
and to use Nicaragua as a base for spreading leftist insurgency elsewhere in
the region. External support has enabled the Sandinistas to build the
region's largest standing army, and this buildup is intimidating governments
in the region and will give the Sandinistas added confidence to expand their
export of revolution.
39. The threats to US security interests from Cuba are compounded by its
capability for effective military action within the Caribbean region. While
there is little likelihood of Cuban offensive military action against the US,
there are a number of US targets vulnerable to Cuban actions such as
harassment of various sea and air routes. It is, however, unlikely that Cuba
would undertake such drastic action unless it felt directly threatened by US
activity. Cuba might act, however, at the insistence of the Soviets during a_
time of general war.
40. A continuation of present trends could result in victory for the
extreme left in El Salvador, and such a victory would heighten prospects for
revolutionaries in Guatemala and elsewhere in the region. It may be that
those Communist and radical Arab forces providing external support and
management help to the insurgencies intend to make Central America a
battleground over the next few years which would distract, weaken, and
undermine the United States in other parts of the world. These scenarios
could bring revolution to Mexico's border and to Panama. Prospects appear dim
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for reversing Central America's slide toward increasing instability within the
next 18 months.
41. Elsewhere in the hemisphere, there is little direct military threat
to the US, but other troubles for US security interests. There has been a
trend over the last 15 years away from close traditional ties with the US
which has been reflected in a reluctance on the part of many Latin American
governments to accept US leadership or to cooperate with the US on a number of
political, economic, and security issues. A neutral or hostile position on
the part of Latin American nations could have significant negative
consequences for the US, particularly in the case of the larger, more
important countries like Brazil and Argentina which have the military
potential to contribute to US defense objectives or will have the potential to
develop nuclear weapons during this decade.
42. There is a potential threat to the Panama Canal and its facilities
which are vulnerable to a variety of actions that could disrupt operations or
close the Canal for varying lengths of time. In addition, traditional
antagonisms between countries such as Argentina and Chile, although unlikely
to lead to major or sustained armed conflict, could produce border clashes and
short-term hostilities. Political and economic instability in Latin America
will continue to provide opportunities for direct or indirect Soviet
involvement in the future.
Sub-Saharan Africa
43. Military threats to US interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are
relatively small and involve mainly the possibility that local conflicts or
domestic instabilities might broaden and draw in the superpowers on the side
of local clients. These for the most part are the consequences of indigenous
factors including racial animosities, ethnic and tribal communalism,
44. Of the many problems Soviet and Soviet proxy actions in Africa may
create for the United States in the next several years, the most acute could
be:
Extension of the USSR's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa by
providing military assistance--either directly or through the
Cubans--to Soviet clients in the event of internal instability in
Zaire, Zambia, or Zimbabwe, or by collaborating with the Libyans to
exploit instability in Chad or Sudan.
Soviet provision of significantly larger numbers of advisers and
equipment, or more support for the Cubans, in order to prop up
Moscow's "own" regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia if
threatened with internal collapse.
Military conflict between a Soviet client regime and a third
country--with or without Soviet encouragement.
Soviet acquisition of a new foothold in West Africa.
An increased Soviet naval. and air presence in the region.
Stepped up Cuban and Soviet involvement with southern African
states which may increasingly rely on Moscow and Havana to counter
South Africa's military posture.
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45. Soviet behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is unlikely to
endanger Western access to strategic metals or oil. In Zaire, however, a
prolonged internal conflict could disrupt the market for some strategic
minerals. The Soviets would not be able to seize Sub-Saharan strategic metals
for themselves, or--barring a collapse of political order in South Africa--to
impose a prolonged denial of them to the West. Rather, the USSR seeks to
promote political objectives and to enhance the USSR's future strategic
capabilities in the area.
46. Increased Soviet activity in Sub-Saharan Africa will not necessarily
assure heightened future Soviet influence. The Soviets are probably worried
by the possibility of a peaceful Western-sponsored Namibian settlement, by
their failure to back the right horse in Zimbabwe, by US success in winning a
grant of military facilities from Kenya, by the pro-Western stance of Nigeria,
and by the tendency even for clients like Angola and Mozambique to seek
economic ties with the West. And in the 1980s the Soviets will be vulnerable
to Western counteraction in areas of current Soviet influence.
Issues
47. The following are key issues of continuing significance:
-- Would the Soviets continue to remain with SALT limits for their
strategic forces once existing agreements expire?
-- Are the Soviets likely to break out from the ABM treaty?
-- Is it likely that the Soviet Union would significantly reduce
defense spending in response to domestic economic problems? How
severe will these problems be? Will there be any radical change in
the policy objectives in the current and post-Brezhnev leaders?
-- Is any major change likely in the current situation in the Far
East, to include Sino-Soviet relations, Sino-Soviet-Japanese-US
relations, and the Korean Peninsula?
-- Is it likely that the USSR will exploit opportunities or weaknesses
in Iran, Pakistan, or elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region by means
of direct military intervention?
-- Will the Soviets react to INF deployments in Western Europe with
similar deployments in Cuba?
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