PROSPECTS FOR IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001500190014-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: July 29, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of ecret
Intelligence
Secret
NI IIM 82-10007
29 July 1982
Prospects for Iran
261
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0 SECRET 41
PROSPECTS FOR IRAN
Information available as of 29 July 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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SCOPE NOTE
This Memorandum assesses the current situation in Iran and the
prospects for Iran over the next year. The Iran-Iraq war is dealt with
primarily as it affects internal developments in Iran. 25X1
25X11
The Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the Nation-
al Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. It was
coordinated at the working level with the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Department of
the Treasury, and the intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force.
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SFrRFT
CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ iii
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 5
The Current Situation ............................................................................................ 5
Consolidation ....................................................................................................... 5
The War: A Threat to the Regime? .................................................................. 6
Factionalism: Under Control ............................................................................. 6
Succession ............................................................................................................ 7
Goals of the Islamic Society ............................................................................... 7
Economic Restructuring ..................................................................................... 8
Foreign Policy Orientations ............................................................................... 8
The Role of the Military .................................................................................... 10
US Options .............................................................................................................. 12
The Soviet Factor ................................................................................................... 12
Bilateral Ties ....................................................................................................... 13
Covert Activity .................................................................................................... 14
Role of Tudeh ..................................................................................................... 15
Military Pressure ................................................................................................. 15
Soviet Options ..................................................................................................... 16
Military Intervention .......................................................................................... 16
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The ruling clerics in Iran have largely consolidated their control
and should be able to maintain power during the period of this estimate:
? Organized resistance in Iran has been weakened substantially,
although violence continues. The Islamic socialist Mujahedin,
leader of last summer's terrorist campaign, was crushed through
brutal regime repression. Other internal dissidents have been
similarly contained or forced into silence. Except for the Kurds,
ethnic minorities are quiescent, and even Kurdish fighters are on
the defensive.
? Even if the fractious Iranian exile leaders were willing to unite,
they would probably still lack adequate popular support inside
Iran to challenge the regime.
? The war has raised the status of the regular military, ensuring its
separate existence for the foreseeable future, but the regime
remains suspicious, and additional purges are likely. The Revolu-
tionary Guard, a power in its own right, provides the regime with
an effective counterbalance to the regular military.
The struggle for political power is now centered exclusively among
the ruling clerics. They seem well aware that controlling their differ-
ences is crucial for the survival of the Islamic Republic. Each faction
has supporters within the regular and paramilitary forces whose
loyalties could trigger violent confrontations if clerical rivalries slip out
of control after Khomeini's death.
? The struggle centers on the ruling Islamic Republic Party, on
activist clerics in Qom, and on several others whose personal ties
to Khomeini and power bases in revolutionary organizations
allow them to operate with some independence.
? The clerics know that arranging a smooth succession to Khomeini
will solidify their consolidation. They have yet to agree on a
nominal heir or heirs, but real power is likely to be held in any
event by the main factional leaders in the government and
revolutionary institutions.
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The ruling clerics are in agreement on the principle of clerical rule
and on broad policy goals. Their disagreements, centering on personal
rivalry and on differing interpretations of Shia doctrine, are not likely to
threaten the regime within the time frame of this estimate.
The clerics have moved on a broad front to ensure the continued
support of the urban lower classes, the core of Khomeini's power base.
? They have exploited and expanded extensive nationwide reli-
gious and revolutionary networks that provide essential goods
and services to the poor. Such networks also manage pervasive
propaganda and domestic intelligence-gathering programs, and
direct the activities of the ubiquitous Revolutionary Guard.
The clerics have advanced their program of fundamental social
reorganization of Iran. We expect that over the next year they will
quicken their efforts to impose strict Islamic law, eradicate Western
cultural influences, and create a more egalitarian society.
The clerics' ultimate success may depend largely on their manage-
ment of the economy, where severe problems remain. The regime
seems more attentive to these problems now and is stressing self-
sufficiency and diversified foreign trade. Still, given the regime's
ideological goals and clerical interference, we do not expect much
improvement over the next year. Unresolved. economic problems could
ultimately lead to a weakening of lower class support for the regime.
The war with Iraq has so far rallied support for the regime. Even if
Tehran's invasion of Iraq bogs down, the clerics will retain power.
There will, however, be an intensification of clerical infighting over
how to achieve the revolution's domestic and foreign goals.
Soviet-Iranian relations remain strained despite the increase in
economic and military dealings. Significant improvement in bilateral
relations over the next year is unlikely.
The Iran-Iraq war has complicated Soviet policy in the Persian
Gulf region. The Soviets have criticized the Iranian drive into Iraq but
realize they have very little leverage over the situation. Moscow is not
likely to take any steps in an attempt to halt the invasion that would risk
jeopardizing its chances for future gains in Iran. Moscow probably still
hopes to see a negotiated settlement that undermined Iraqi President
Saddam and led to his replacement by a pro-Soviet figure.
Soviet policy toward Iran acknowledges the preeminence of the
Khomeini regime inside Iran and gives priority to the improvement of
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bilateral relations, but the Soviets will continue to develop their covert
assets. Soviet ties to leftist elements among the minorities give the USSR
limited influence and some assets in place. Tudeh, the pro-Moscow
Communist party, lacks significant popular backing and has faced
growing government repression over the past year. Under these circum-
stances, Moscow almost certainly believes that Tudeh and its other
assets in Iran will be unable over the next year to mount a successful
challenge to the government.
The presence of substantial Soviet military forces on Iran's north-
ern border is a major asset; it gives the USSR the capability to influence
US policy decisions and to intervene. Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely
that the Soviets will intervene militarily in Iran in the next year. There
are circumstances, however, under which the Soviets might consider
introducing forces into Iran. These include: a perceived threat of a US
military move into Iran, a seizure of power by a leftist coalition that
sought their assistance, or a collapse of the government in Tehran with
no clear successor regime emerging. Short of actual use of force by
Moscow, the Khomeini regime's policies are not likely to be influenced
by Soviet military pressure.
Tehran's intense hostility toward the United States is likely to
continue through the next year and beyond. The Iranians' suspicions of
US intentions toward their regime are unlikely to ease. Demonstrations
of US resolve in the Persian Gulf region are unlikely to forestall Iranian
attempts to promote Islamic revolution in the Gulf, but could lead the
clerics to consider more cautiously direct military efforts to achieve
their aims. Tehran is likely, therefore, to pursue its objective of regional
predominance primarily through subversion, threats, and diplomacy.
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