MOSCOW AND THE NAMIBIA PEACE PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001500080006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 7, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of ~ ~ Secret
Central
Intelligence
Moscow and the Namibia
Peace Process
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Secret
NI IIM 82-10003
7 April 1982
223
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MOSCOW AND THE NAMIBIA
PEACE PROCESS
Information available as of 7 April 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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SCOPE NOTE
This paper examines the origins and current status of Moscow's
involvement in the Namibia question within a regional context. It
focuses on the Soviet response to the present Contact Group initiative, as
well as circumstances that might prompt new Soviet tactics over the
next six to 12 months. The paper then discusses the USSR's options, its
capabilities and constraints, and its probable reaction to a number of
scenarios that might follow a settlement.
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CONTENTS
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ iii
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 5
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 5
A. Context of the Namibia Problem .......................................................... 5
B. The Soviet Record on Namibia .............................................................. 5
Moscow and SWAPO .............................................................................. 7
II. MOSCOW AND THE PRESENT CONTACT GROUP INITIATIVE... 8
A. Angola ...................................................................................................... 8
B. Namibia ................................................................................................... 8
C. Broader Concerns .................................................................................... 8
III. INITIAL SOVIET COUNTERMOVES ..................................................... 9
A. Propaganda and Disinformation ............................................................ 9
B. Reinforcing Moscow's Position ............................................................... 10
Angola ....................................................................................................... 10
Mozambique ............................................................................................. 10
The Namibian Insurgents (SWAPO) ...................................................... 10
Cuba's Role ............................................................................................... 11
IV. CONSTRAINTS AND OPTIONS ............................................................... 11
A. African Interests and Priorities .............................................................. 11
B. Soviet Options .......................................................................................... 12
ANNEX: POSSIBLE SOVIET ACTIONS AFTER NAMIBIAN
INDEPENDENCE ................................................................................................. A-1
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Moscow will seek to influence any negotiations on Namibia by
pressuring the key African participants with whom it has close ties. If,
however, the Frontline States, South Africa, and the South-West Africa
People's Organization (SWAPO) were agreeable to a settlement, it is
unlikely that Moscow could succeed in blocking it.
Moscow has become apprehensive about the current Contact
Group initiative on Namibia, largely because of the potential repercus-
sions on Soviet geopolitical interests in southern Africa, particularly
Angola. Moscow views the US-backed initiative as an ill-disguised
attempt to reverse the events of the mid-1970s. It would strongly resist a
settlement that led to a major setback in Angola-particularly at the
hands of a US administration that it perceives as challenging its position
around the globe.
Moscow has to consider Angola and Namibia, however, not only in
the perspective of its concerns and objectives in southern Africa but also
in the context of its global interests. Thus, in making decisions about
how best to preserve its position in Angola or how it can most effectively
influence the outcome in Namibia, Moscow will have to weigh not only
the importance of its interests in southern Africa, but also the impact of
its moves on the USSR's worldwide concerns and particularly its
bilateral relations with the United States.
Recent Soviet efforts to stall the negotiation process were probably
prompted by continuing reports of a "package settlement" linking a
Cuban troop withdrawal f rom Angola to a settlement in Namibia. From
Moscow's viewpoint, such a withdrawal would presuppose a rapproche-
ment between the opposing Angolan groups, the ruling Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the insurgent National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Taken together,
these two developments would undermine the leverage and influence
Moscow currently enjoys irI Angola. We believe that a "package
settlement"-even if accepted by Angola's MPLA regime-would be
resisted by the USSR.
This memorandum was requested by the National Security Council and was produced under the
auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. It was coordinated at the working level with the
Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; and the Intelligence
organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.
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The Soviets have already taken steps to impede the Contact Group
initiative. These steps include propaganda and disinformation cam-
paigns, bilateral discr:cssions, and offers of military and economic
assistance designed to push the key African players to oppose the
negotiations. Moscow also is encouraging the Cubans to lobby on its
behalf. Such moves demonstrate Moscow's potential for influencing the
Namibia talks and its willingness to use its influence in defense of Soviet
interests in the region.
If, however, a prospective Namibia settlement did not pose a major
threat to their position in Angola, the Soviets would probably bend to
African preferences for an accord rather than risk their credibility and
equities by trying to destroy one. Even if the Soviets found an evolving
settlement tolerable, they would nonetheless seek to fuel tensions and
suspicions to ensure that the final accord was reached in an atmosphere
of antagonism and distrust. Moscow ~,vould hope that, in such an
environment, the new Namibian government would turn to the USSR
for support.
While Moscow would prefer a settlement that brings an unrestrict-
ed, pro-Soviet regime to power in Namibia, the Soviets would probably
accept considerably less in the belief that: the basic South African-black
African confrontation would continue t~o ensure the USSR of a major
role in the region. Even a constrained SWAPO regime in Namibia
might offer Mosco~~ enhanced prospects for influence, although this
would depend in large part on the broader environment.
In the event the Soviets perceived that a comprehensive "package
settlement" appeared imminent they would probably try to destroy the
prospective settlement. Moscow could pursue several courses of action-
most of which are mutually exclusive. All entail risks, would antagonize
the Frontline States, and might jeopardize Moscow's interests in the
region. They include:
- Trying to provoke South Africa in hopes that Pretoria would
react in ways that subsequently would scuttle a settlement. For
example, Moscow might enlarge the Cuban troop presence in
Mozambique.
- Promoting a regional crisis, such as a Shaba III-a new invasion
of Zaire by the Angola-based rebels of the Front for the
National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC).
- Threatening Angola with a significant reduction in military and
economic assistance if it agreed to the settlement package.
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- Offering to increase dramatically Moscow's security commit-
ment and military involvement with the Frontline States in
order to encourage the black Africans to back SWAPO in a long
war and to assuage their fears of South African retaliation.
- Promoting a coup attempt by pro-Soviet elements within the
MPLA against those Angolan leaders who support the settle-
ment plan.
Other options may develop as the Namibia negotiations proceed.
Moscow, for example, might seek to turn to its own advantage any
differences that might emerge between Angola and SWAPO. Again, this
would depend on the nature of the disagreement and the circumstances
under which it arose.
Each of these Soviet options has inherent limitations and varying
degrees of risk. To the extent that they require African involvement or
acquiescence, Moscow does not enjoy unhindered freedom of action. A
move to transf er a large Cuban combat force to Mozambique, for
example, would require the approval of President Machel, who might
not view it as serving Maputo's interests; he might well fear that such a
move would prompt a signif icant military reaction from South Africa
that over the long term could transform Mozambique into the "new
Angola."
Similarly, if the MPLA had opted for a comprehensive Namibia
settlement, Luanda would not support a Shaba III effort. While the
Soviets could nonetheless attempt to instigate an FLNC invasion of
Zaire, such action would antagonize Luanda and the other Frontline
States and would not necessarily derail the prospective Namibian
settlement.
A Soviet move to force Luanda to reiect a settlement or face a sig-
nificant reduction in aid would carry serious risks. Apart from revealing
Moscow's complete disregard for Angolan sovereignty or priorities, an
ultimatum might even prompt Luanda to downgrade ties with the
USSR. Indeed, if the Angolans had taken the necessary "leap of faith" to
accept a package settlement, they presumably would have considered
the potential ramifications it would have for relations with Moscow.
Much would depend on Soviet-and Angolan-readings of US willing-
ness to assist Luanda after a settlement.
The Soviets might offer to increase substantially Moscow's security
commitments to one or more of the Frontline States. The Africans,
however, might view such an offer with some hesitation; the burdens of
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continuing the SWAPO insurgency and the potential South African
reaction to greater Soviet involvement could deter them from accepting
such an offer. The Frontline States, moreover, might question the Soviet
offer in terms of its usefulness, Soviet intentions, and implications for
the regional situation. The Soviets might even include an offer of
limited air and naval combat forces, but we believe this is unlikely since
it ~i~ould run a major risk of military conflict with South Africa.
The Soviets might consider the risky option of promoting a coup by
pro-Soviet elements within the MPLA. Such a move, however, would
require the existence of a group that Moscow could count on-and
which was willing to undertake a seizure of power. Recent reports of in-
creased infighting within the MPLA may reflect Soviet efforts to offset
the moderate policies of President dos Santos on such issues as Namibia
and relations with the West. Given the murky nature of MPLA politics,
and our limited, uncertain information about MPLA factionalism, it is
difficult to assess the probability of aSoviet-inspired coup attempt.
Should Moscow decide to pursue this option, a failed attempt could lead
to the removal of the Soviets.
Although all of these options carry :risks, the USSR may believe that
the threat to its regional, geopolitical interests posed by a package
settlement justifies taking them. The Soviets still see Angola as their
major entree into the region and as a point for further expansion of their
influence.
If the Contact Group initiative succeeds, US and other Western
influence would be enhanced as it was in the case of Zimbabwe. In the
short term, the settlement would undercut the Soviet goal of supplant-
ing that influence.
A settlement, however, could also .heighten black African expecta-
tions of the United Si:ates and the West generally, particularly in the
economic sphere. Washington, for example, might come under pressure
to push harder for changes in Pretoria's racial practices and to increase
its practical commitment to regional economic development. Following
a settlement, Moscow would work to increase its influence by wooing
the new Namibian government and by promoting regional tensions and
exploiting Frontline security- fears.
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DISCUSSION
1. The Namibian conflict dates back to the 1870s
when German and British interests clashed in this
area. In the late 1870s Great Britain annexed the
territory around Walvis Bay, which is a part of South
Africa's Cape Province. During the period 1884-92,
Germany expanded its portion of the territory to its
present boundaries. With the outbreak of World War
I, Germany's colonial empire was vulnerable, and
British and South African troops invaded the territory
in 1915. With the end of the war and the creation of
the League of Nations,.South-West Africa was award-
ed to South Africa in 1920 as a League of Nations
Class C mandate (to be administered as an integral
part of the governing state). The issue has been a
contentious one since 1946.
2. South Africa maintained that with the demise of
the League of Nations it had no obligation to the UN
Trusteeship Council although it continued to provide
"reports" on South-West Africa to that body in a spirit
of "good will." The controversy became more heated
when South Africa began to institute the system of
apartheid in the territory. The UN General Assembly's
1966 decision to revoke South Africa's mandate over
Namibia was decreed legally correct by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in 1971. The UN formally
adopted the name Namibia for the territory in 1972.
In 1973, the UN named a Commissioner for Namibia
and the General Assembly recognized SWAPO (South-
West Africa People's Organization) as the sole, legiti-
mate representative of the Namibian people.
3. Subsequent efforts to reach an internationally
acceptable settlement have been unsuccessful. In
1975-77 the South African Government concluded a
series of negotiations (the Turnhalle Conference) lead-
ing to a constitutional structure for Namibia. These
talks led to the 1978 elections which brought the
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) to a semblance
of power. This internal government has not been
recognized internationally.
4. The present series of negotiations is an extension
of those begun in 1977. Among the current players are
the Western Five (the United States, the UK, the FRG,
France, and Canada) known as the Contact Group, the
South African Government, the internal political par-
ties in Namibia, SWAPO, and the Frontline States
(Angola, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana,
and, since 1980, Zimbabwe). The negotiations are
extremely complex and are divided into three phases,
each of which involves bilateral as well as multilateral
approaches. The first phase consists of defining an
acceptable group of constitutional principles, and a
system for electing delegates to a constituent assembly.
The current initiative proposes to model this assembly
on the West German system, with one-half chosen by
proportional representation of parties and the other
half elected directly. The objective of the constitution-
al principles is a free, democratic system in which the
rights and property of all will be protected. SWAPO
has reiected the proposed electoral system on the
grounds that it is too complex to be easily understood
by the electorate.
5. Some elements of Phase II are now being dis-
cussed; the issues may be more complex and more
difficult than those of Phase I. Chief among these are
the role of the UN and the composition and param-
eters of the UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance
Group), which would include civilian and military
personnel, led by a UN special representative who
would supervise preparations for and the conduct of
elections. The South African Government, which per-
ceives a UN bias toward SWAPO, has insisted that the
military component not exceed roughly 1,000 on the
grounds that a greater number would influence the
electorate in favor of SWAPO. Phase III would be the
implementation of the plan, culminating in elections.
6. Since at least the mid-1970s, the Soviets have
seen Namibian independence as an integral part of the
liberation struggle that they hope will eventually lead
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on~ Congo
~tv B AZZAVILLE
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to the establishment of black maiority rule and govern-
ments favorably disposed toward the USSR throughout
southern Africa. The Soviets have supported SWAPO
since the early 1960s and have intensified their efforts
since the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in 1974.
Not surprisingly, the Soviets supported the adoption of
UN Security Council Resolution 366 in December
1974 which gave South Africa six months to withdraw
from Namibia and relinquish power to the inhabitants
of Namibia under UN supervision. Until recently, this
has been the basis of the Soviet position toward
Namibia, and Moscow has pointed to it to support its
case against Pretoria and, ~by implication, the Western
Contact Group.
7. South Africa's refusal to abide by Resolution 366
and its military operations in Angola during late 1975
and early 1976 led the Security Council to set a new
deadline for withdrawal in August 1976. The Soviets
supported this, and as the deadline drew nigh the
Soviet media castigated Pretoria's efforts to use the
Turnhalle Conference, established in September 1975,
to legitimize South Africa's hold on Namibia.
8. In August 1976 the South Africans announced
their intention to form an interim government around
the Turnhalle group that would oversee a transition to
independence. During a subsequent visit to Moscow,
the Soviets apparently promised SWAPO President
Nuioma additional military aid in hopes of stiffening
his resistance to any negotiations. Despite SWAPO's
growing dependence upon Soviet military support,
Moscow's admonitions had little effect. In the spring
of 1977, Nuioma evidently reiected Soviet advice to
concentrate on a military solution of the Namibia
problem and entered into a yearlong round of discus-
sions with the Western Five which resulted in UN
Security Council Resolution 435 of July 1978.'
9. Moscow was openly critical of Resolution 435
and privately lobbied against passage arguing that it
did not transfer power to SWAPO. Moscow did not
vote against it, however. Rather, in deference to
African backing for the resolution, the USSR and
Czechoslovakia abstained in the Security Council vote.
Both the Soviets and Czechs made it clear, however,
that they would not help fund UNTAG, established to
' UN 435 calls for acease-fire, a phased withdrawal of South
African forces, and the establishment of a UN force to oversee
preparations for Namibian elections.
supervise the transfer of power from South Africa to
the new Namibian government. Instead the Soviets
argued that all costs be borne by those countries that
"propose maintaining South African forces in Nami-
bia," that is, the Western Contact Group.
10. For the next three years, the. Soviet position on
Namibia was fairly constant. While arguing that they
favored a peaceful settlement and would not stand in
the way of Western efforts to achieve one, the Soviets
repeatedly questioned 'the Western Five's willingness
to apply the necessary pressure on Pretoria to ensure a
settlement. At the same time, Moscow was quick to
note what it characterized as South African intransi-
gence and duplicity. Moscow's goal was to convince
the Frontline and SWAPO of the futility of the
Western plan in order to get them to withdraw their
cooperation. In the wake of the Rhodesian settlement
in 1980, Moscow redoubled its efforts on Namibia lest
the West be given another diplomatic victory.
11. The Soviet position began to shift after the
failure of the January 1981 Geneva conference. In
March the Soviets indicated that they might be willing
to support Resolution 435. Several factors probably
influenced Moscow's change of heart. The Soviets
evidently hoped that by supporting the resolution they
could embarrass the new US administration, which
had iust raised new reservations about UN 435. Thus,
if negotiations failed, Moscow would be squarely on
the side of the Africans and could lobby for sanctions
against Pretoria, which would put the United States in
an all-but-untenable position. Second, the Soviets no
doubt recognized that the Frontline States and
SWAPO were still interested in a settlement. They
may have calculated that adoption of UN 435 at least
meant UN and, thus, potential Soviet participation.
Third, Moscow may have become more confident than
earlier that SWAPO could win UN-sponsored elec-
tions. Finally, the Soviets may have been betting that
South Africa would wreck future negotiations. The
Soviets officially endorsed UN 435 in November 1981.
12. Since the mid-1970s, the USSR has been the
main supplier of arms for SWAPO. Soviet deliveries
have included small arms and ammunition, mortars,
rocket launchers, SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, and
some trucks and armored personnel vehicles. The
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equipment is passed to SWAPO through Angola. In
addition, the Soviets have provided advanced military
training to SWAPO cadres in the USSR, and some
Soviet: as well as Cuban and East Gerrnan advisers
apparently are assigned to SWAPO forces in Angola.
13. As a result of its military assistance; Moscow has
gained considerable-but not dominant-influence
within SWAPO. As its attempts to dissuade SWAPO
from participating in negotiations show, the Soviets
have had little success in dictating policy to SWAPO.
Not surprisingly, the Soviets and their allies have
developed close ties to SWAPO's military leaders.
Cubans and Soviets advise SWAPO on strategy for
conducting cross-border operations in Namibia. They
do not, however, appear involved in actual combat
operations.
14. Over the last two years, the Soviets may have
gained additional influence with SWAPO's political
leadership. The Soviets have provided ideological and
political training for SWAPO cadres
--Anew US initiative and a new US administration
that may be capable of bringing Pretoria into a
settlement.
A. Angola
16. Moscow's greatest concern at this time is the
potential impact of a settlement on Soviet interests in
Angola. US efforts to include the Cuban troop issue
and an MPLA-UNITA reconciliation into a broad
package have convinced Moscow that the Contact
Group initiative is aimed at diminishing Soviet influ-
ence in Angola. Soviet sensitivity on this point has
been manifested in both public and private comments
condemning attempts to link a Namibia solution to the
internal affairs of Angola. Even a Namibia settlement
not linked to a Cuban troop withdrawal makes Mos-
cow uneasy; Angola's improved security situation fol-
lowing asettlement might diminish Luanda's depend-
ence on Soviet aid.
II. MOSCOW AND THE PRESENT CONTACT
GROUP INITIATIVE
15. The present Contact Group initiative has
heightened Soviet suspicions because of continuing
reports that a "settlement package," which includes
the removal of Cuban troops from Angola and a
reconciliation between the ruling MPLA and the
UNITA insurgents there, is being seriously considered.
The onset of a US-Angolan dialogue and the apparent
reluctance of SWAPO and other Frontline States to
divulge all the details of the negotiations have rein-
forced Moscow's suspicions. While some of their con-
cerns may be exaggerated, the Soviets are worried
about what they perceive as:
-Anew willingness on the part of Angola's MPLA
;regime to discuss Angolan issues in the frame-
work of a Namibia settlement.
- Sustained SWAPO and Frontline interest in a
negotiated settlement.
- SWAPO's weakened capability to conduct an
effective insurgency following the stepped-up
South African military activity.
1'7. Moscow recognizes that any settlement accept-
able to Pretoria will probably require guarantees that
Namibia not be transformed into astalking-horse for
the Soviets, the Cubans, or the African National
Congress (ANC). If such guarantees were implemented
and observed, the Soviet objective of establishing a
pro-Soviet regime in Namibia would not be immedi-
ately realized. Nonetheless, the Soviets would view the
establishment of aSWAPO-dominated government-
even if "neutralized"-and the removal of South
African forces from Namibia as steps that would
enhance their influence in the region.
18. Moscow is also apprehensive that a Namibia
settlement could provide an opportunity for US and
broader Western interests to be advanced in southern
Africa at the expense of the USSR. A Western-
brokered settlement could enhance US/Western pres-
tige. As in the case of Zimbabwe, where Western-
sponsored negotiations excluded the USSR, a
settlement would highlight the usefulness of patient
negotiations for the resolution of complex regional
problems.
1!a. Although change in South Africa itself will
remain an important issue on the regional agenda,
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Moscow may believe that the Frontline States will shift
their focus to problems of domestic economic develop-
ment after Namibia is resolved. The Soviets may
suspect that Frontline support of the South African
insurgent movements will be tempered by the com-
plex, long-term nature of the "final struggle" over
apartheid in South Africa and the centrality of Pretor-
ia to the region's overall economic well-being. Such
constraints, as well as their serious economic problems,
may make the Frontline States less susceptible to
Soviet exploitation of "security fears" although much
will depend on Pretoria's actions toward its neighbors.
Given Moscow's poor track record in the area of
economic assistance and development, the Soviets may
see an African shift to economic priorities as a maior
opportunity for Western involvement and influence in
the region.
20. The Soviets want to protect their geopolitical
interests in southern Africa. Angola is central to those
interests, serving as the main Soviet entree to the
region and as a point for further expansion of Mos-
cow's influence. Soviet naval ships call frequently in
Luanda, where the Soviets station a support ship and
maintain a naval communications facility. Access to
naval air facilities in Angola also permits the USSR to
use TU-95 Bear D maritime reconnaissance aircraft to
monitor US naval traffic to and from the Indian
Ocean.
21. Angola, moreover, is also a useful symbol of
Moscow's superpower status and of its capability to
protect power and influence to distant shores. The
Soviets view the US-backed initiative on Namibia as
an ill-disguised attempt to reverse the events of the
mid-1970s in Angola. In view of the heightened US-
Soviet competition, Moscow would strongly resist a
setback in Angola.
22. In the broader, global context of Soviet foreign
policy interests, southern Africa has a lower priority
than areas of more direct security concern, such as
southwest Asia, Europe, or China. While Moscow
would no doubt like to see a staunchly pro-Soviet
regime in Namibia, it probably is willing to settle for
considerably less on the grounds that Namibia is but a
part of the larger southern African struggle and that
the basic black African-South African confrontation
will continue. The problem for Moscow is maintaining
its influence in Angola and with the rest of the
Frontline States, whatever happens in Namibia, so as
to be in a position to pursue its long-term regional
objective of toppling the minority regime in Pretoria.
From Moscow's perspective, this is a relatively low-
risk proposition in the near term, since East-West
military confrontation over southern Africa, let alone
Namibia, is unlikely.
23. Moscow was initially buoyed by the Reagan
administration's enunciation of a policy of "construc-
tive engagement" with South Africa. Black African
criticism of that policy and the subsequent US effort to
link a Namibia settlement to maior change in Angola
apparently convinced the Soviets that the present
Contact Group initiative had little chance of succeed-
ing. By late 1981, however, Soviet officials were saying
that US policy in Namibia had become "more
effective. "
24. Soviet anxiety over the progress in the Namibia
talks has prompted a variety of moves aimed at fueling
African suspicions of the Contact Group-particularly
the United States-and reinforcing Moscow's position
in southern Africa. More specifically, these moves
include stepped-up propaganda, disinformation,
strengthening bilateral ties in the region, and lobbying
key actors to back out of the negotiations. In addition,
the Soviets had a hand in recent Cuban diplomatic
activities designed to buttress the Cuban and Soviet
position in southern Africa.
A. Propaganda and Disinforma4ion
25. The noticeable increase in Soviet propaganda
alleging US-South African "collusion" and "shared
objectives" is aimed at diminishing Washington's
credibility in Africa and as an objective broker in
Namibia. Soviet propaganda linking the United States
to the abortive coup in Seychelles, as well as to the
South African-backed National Resistance Movement
(NRM) in Mozambique serves to reinforce the theme
of US-South African collaboration.
26. Moscow has made its most serious disinforma-
tion efforts on issues that directly impinge on key
actors in the Namibia talks. For example, the disinfor-
mation operation alleging US training of UNITA
forces in Zaire was clearly intended to raise doubts in
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Luanda about US trustworthiness and to reemphasize
Angola's dependence upon Soviet military assistance.
Soviet-inspired disinformation also may have contrib-
uted to the decline in US-Zambian relations; Moscow
probably hopes that Zambian fears of US subversion
attempts will translate into greater skepticism of US
negotiation efforts in Namibia.
B. Reinforcing Moscow's Position
27. In a more direct approach to counter the Con-
tact Group initiative, Moscow has reasserted its posi-
tion in the region by buttressing its bilateral relation-
ships and by pressing its clients to back away from the
Western-backed talks on Namibia. Moscow has of-
fered Angola additional military and economic assist-
ance in hopes of inducing Luanda to resist Western
pressure to accept the current Namibia proposal In
7ambia, and Botswana as well, the Soviets are at-
temptirig to strengthen new military asst>tance rela-
tionships in hopes of gaining further support for their
position.
Angola
38. Since Angola is a key actor in any Namibia
proposal-and one over which the Soviets have some
leverage-Moscow has focused its efforts on dissuad-
ing Luanda from serious consideration of the Contact
Croup initiative. In an apparent effort to influence
Angola~s position on issues related to Namibia-in-
cluding the diplomatic dialogue with the United
States-the Soviets invited a high-level Angolan dele-
?9. During the Angolan delegation's visit, Tikhonov
made a vague pledge of additional security assistance.
~~s.n~? significant, however, was the signing of an
uusn~r~r~~r~df~nted economic package, which stipulates
~x~~~jeets worth as much as $2 billion over the nest 10
1 ears. 7f hr accord, as announced, does not specify how
m~~~;:, if any, new Soviet aid is involved. The timing
and sire of the offer strongly suggest that Moscow is
tr;~ing to preempt any possible move to the West. A
maior economic commitment at this time would not
urrly strengthen the position of pro-Soviet elements
within the MPLA, but would undermine those leaders
who .have criticized Moscow's perennially poor record
in providing economic support. The Soviet offer may
also be a carrot; complete fulfillment may depend on
Angolan pursuit of foreign and domestic policies ac-
ceptable to Moscow.
30. In another effort to strengthen their hand, the
Soviets used the Angolan visit to play up the delegation
head, Lucio Lara, a reputed hardliner and number-
two man in the MPLA. The publicity accorded Lara
underscored the importance of the visit and seemed
designed to signal Moscow's dissatisfaction with mod-
erate elements within the MPLA
may reflect additional Sovi-
,Mozambique
31. Moscow also is attempting to enlist Maputo in
32. These Soviet overtures were preceded by a
number of high-level visits to Maputo: Soviet Politburo
candidate Rashidov (mid-November 1981) and Yev-
geniy Samoteykin, President Brezhnev's personal aide
for Third World issues (mid-January 1982). During
this time period, the Soviets also hosted Mozambican
Defense Minister Chipande and organized ship visits
to Mozambique.
33. The Soviets probably believe that Mozam-
bique's need for military support against the South
African-backed NRM insurgency will strengthen their
hand with the Machel regime. While President Ma-
chel thus far has eschewed a disruptive role in Front-
line discussions on Namibia, he may be compelled to
promote Moscow's position on this issue if NRM
activities force him to increase his dependence on
Soviet military aid.
The Namibian Insurgents (SWAPO)
34. Moscow is also trying to exploit its position as
SWA:PO's main arms supplier in its efforts to under-
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35. Such urgings may be designed to strengthen
those SWAPO leaders who question the efficacy of a
diplomatic solution.
The Soviets may believe that such conces-
sions portend a nonaligned posture that would limit
Soviet influence in an independent Namibia.
36. Moscow's uncertainty over SWAPO's exact posi-
tion in the Namibia talks stems in part from the
diversity of opinion that exists within the SWAPO
leadership itself. While Moscow has considerable in-
fluence within SWAPO-particularly with the mili-
tary commanders-there is a significant element in
SWAPO that is not pro-Soviet and most likely sees
relations with the USSR as a necessary evil. Nujoma
himself enjoys friendly relations with the Soviets and
has leaned increasingly to the left in recent years, but
he is probably more an opportunist than a committed
Marxist.
the Cubans probably proffered support for intelli-
gence gathering, in hopes of gaining such access.
39. Public statements issued throughout the Cuban
trip indicate that Namibia was the main topic of
discussion. In addition, Cuban Foreign Minister Mal-
mierca visited Luanda. An Angolan-Cuban joint com-
munique was subsequently released outlining their
position on the question of Cuban troops in Angola.
TASS immediately published the statement with
elaboration by Soviet analysts.
40. The communique stressed the lack of linkage
between the Cuban troops in Angola and a Namibia
settlement. It did, however, acknowledge that removal
of the Cubans would be considered in the event that
Namibia were independent, South African forces were
south of the Orange River, and that threats/military
aggression against Angola were ended.
41. Soviet comment on the communique stressed
that the Cuban presence was necessary to protect
Angolan internal as well as external security-a point
not highlighted in the communique itself. This differ-
ence in emphasis is indicative of Moscow's concern
that a Cuban withdrawal would presuppose a UNITA-
MPLA reconciliation and would weaken the Soviet
position. The difference in emphasis may also portend
Soviet-Angolan friction on this issue.
37. Nor is the USSR the only foreign influence on
SWAPO. Most of SWAPO's financial and humanitar-
ian support comes from international organizations
like the UN, World Council of Churches, Lutheran
World Federation, the OAU Liberation Committee,
and a number of European countries, especially
Sweden.
38. Cuba regards Angola as an important compo-
nent of its Africa policy and therefore would oppose
any Namibia settlement that would reduce its influ-
ence in Angola and elsewhere in the region. Ahigh-
level Cuban delegation toured the Frontline States in
January and February 1982 after an unpublicized
stopover in Moscow, where both sides presumably
worked out a joint position on Namibia. The Cubans
sought to strengthen their-and Moscow's-position
among the Frontline States, apparently through new
offers of assistance. Given Moscow's apparent desire
for greater access to Frontline thinking on Namibia,
A. African Interests and Priorities
42. Inasmuch as Moscow's position in southern Afri-
ca rests on its ties to the Frontline States, future Soviet
moves on the Namibia issue will be shaped, in part, by
the priorities of the black Africans, as well as those of
South Africa, the predominant economic and military
power in the region. The Frontline States have a strong
desire to resolve the various pressures associated with
the Namibian insurgency stemming from Pretoria's
continued willingness to use military raids, economic
leverage, propaganda, and covert operations against
them. The burdens are probably most severe for states
closest to Namibia, particularly Angola, and to a lesser
extent Zambia, which have suffered from South Afri-
can cross-border military incursions against SWAPO
base camps.
43. Pretoria is motivated by a desire to preserve its
preeminent position in the region and to counter
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Soviet influence. In pursuing those interests, its aggres-
sive tactics have fostered an unwillingness on the part
of Frontline States to engage in activity likely to
provoke a strong South African reaction; the Soviets,
for example, have had little success in persuading
Frontline leaders to provide greater and more visible
support to the ANC.
44. Some Frontline leaders are also reluctant to
alienate the West. Aside from the need for Western
economic assistance, they realize the necessity of
retaining Western, especially American, cooperation if
the current Namibian negotiations are to succeed. This
Belief is reinforced by their perception that the United
States exercises such leverage over South Africa that it
can ultimately "deliver" Pretoria on the Namibian
issue.
that in such an environment, the Namibian govern-
ment would be likely to turn to the USSR for support.
48. On the other hand, we believe that a compre-
hensive settlement package that leads to a Cuban
troop withdrawal and an MPLA-UNITA reconcili-
ation--even if accepted by the MPLA-would be
resisted by the USSR and Cuba. The Soviet effort over
the past few months to impede the Namibia peace
process was probably prompted by discussion of a
Cuban withdrawal from Angola-a move which the
Soviets believe would not be undertaken unless there
was an impending MPLA-UNITA reconciliation. Tak-
en together, a Cuban troop withdrawal and an MPLA-
UI~TITA rapprochement would undermine substantial-
ly the leverage and influence Moscow and Havana
now enjoy in Luanda.
B. Soviet Options
45. Moscow will carefully consider the risk to its
current interests and equities before taking any signifi-
cant steps to endorse or undermine a prospective
Namibia settlement. We believe that future Soviet
moves on the Namibia question will depend in large
part on any Angola-related provisions of a proposed
settlement plan.
46. Having clearly expressed their reservations
about the Contact Group initiative and their position
on the Cuban troop issue, the Soviets will closely
monitor how the Frontline States, particularly Angola,
and SWAPO proceed from here. If the Namibia talks
move on to a position which Moscow views as non-
threatening-that is, a Namibia settlement not linked
to Angola-and which is acceptable to the Frontline
Slates, the Soviets would probably bend to African
preferences rather than jeopardize their credibility-
and equities-in the region. Some Soviet writers have
argued ithat South African intransigence will ultimate-
ly derail the settlement efforts, that Soviet: moves to
that end are, therefore, unnecessary, and that Mos-
cow's interests would be best served by adopting a low
profile.
47. E',ven if the Soviets find the evolving settlement
tolerable, they will nevertheless seek to fuel tensions
and suspicions to ensure that the final accord is
reached in an atmosphere of antagonism and distrust
rather than reconciliation. The Soviets would hope
49. In the event that the Soviets perceived a com-
prehensive "package settlement" to be imminent, the
Soviets would probably try to destroy the prospective
settlement. Moscow could pursue several courses of
action-most of which are not mutually exclusive. All
of these entail risks, would antagonize the Frontline
States, and might jeopardize Moscow's interests in the
region. They include:
- Trying to provoke South Africa in hopes that
Pretoria would react in ways that subsequently
scuttled a settlement. For example, Moscow
might enlarge the Cuban troop presence in
1`/Iozambique.
- Promoting a regional crisis such as a Shaba III-a
riew invasion of the Shaba region of Zaire by the
Angolan-based Front for the National Liberation
of the Congo (FLNC) rebels.
- Threatening Angola with a significant reduction
in military and economic assistance if it agreed to
the settlement package.
-Offering to increase dramatically Moscow's secu-
rity commitment and military involvement with
the Frontline States in order to encourage the
Flack Africans to back SWAPO in a long war and
to assuage their fears of South African retaliation.
- Promoting a coup attempt by pro-Soviet ele-
ments within the MPLA against those leaders
who supported the settlement plan.
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Other options may develop as the Namibia negotia-
tions proceed. Moscow, for example, could certainly
exploit any differences that might emerge between
Angola and SWAPO.
50. Some specific indicators could be expected if
Moscow proceeded to implement any of these options.
The most difficult to recognize or anticipate is a coup
attempt in Luanda,
Mozambique would be more easily detected, as would
FLNC preparations for a major invasion of Shaba. A
flurry of high-level official visits to southern Africa by
Soviet or Cuban officials would also point to possible
shifts in policy or activity.
51. Each of the Soviet options has inherent limita-
tions and varying degrees of risk. To the extent that
they require African involvement or acquiescence,
Moscow does not enjoy unhindered freedom of action.
A move to transfer a large Cuban combat force to
Mozambique, for example, presumes the approval of
President Machel, who might not view it as serving
Maputo's interests; he might well fear that such a
move would prompt a significant military reaction
from South Africa that over the long term could
transform Mozambique into the "new Angola."
52. Similarly, if the MPLA has opted fora compre-
hensive Namibia settlement, Luanda would not sup-
port aShaba III effort. In addition to undermining the
settlement, Angolan support for a Shaba III could
jeopardize Luanda's expanding ties to the West and
could prompt Zairian President Mobutu and his West-
ern supporters to respond by aiding UNITA insur-
gents. Although the Soviets could try to instigate an
invasion of Zaire by the FLNC, despite Angolan
opposition, such action would antagonize Luanda and
the other Frontline States and would not necessarily
derail a settlement.
53. A Soviet move to force Luanda to reject a
settlement or face a significant reduction of aid and
assistance would carry serious risks. Apart from reveal-
ing Moscow's complete disregard for Angolan sover-
eignty or priorities, an ultimatum might even prompt
Luanda to downgrade ties with the USSR. Indeed, if
the Angolans had taken the necessary "leap of faith"
to accept a package settlement, they presumably
would have considered the potential ramifications it
would have for relations with Moscow. Much would
depend on Soviet-and Angolan-readings of US will-
ingness to assist Luanda after a settlement.
54. The Soviets might offer to increase substantially
Moscow's security commitments to one or more of the
Frontline States. The Africans, however, might view
such an offer with some reticence; the burdens of
continuing the SWAPO insurgency and the potential
South African reaction to greater Soviet involvement
could deter them from accepting such an offer. The
Frontline States, moreover, might have differing opin-
ions about the Soviet offer, for example, its usefulness,
Soviet intentions, and implications for the regional
situation; such differences would diminish the impact
of Moscow's move. The Soviets might even include an
offer of limited air and naval combat forces, but we
believe this is unlikely since it would run a risk of
military conflict with South Africa.
55. The Soviets might consider the option of pro-
moting a coup by pro-Soviet elements within the
MPLA. Such a move, however, would require the
existence of a group that Moscow could count on and
that was willing to undertake a seizure of power.
Given the murky nature of MPLA politics-and our
limited, uncertain information about MPLA factional-
ism-it is difficult to assess the probability of a Soviet-
inspired coup attempt. Should Moscow decide to
pursue this option, an unsuccessful effort could lead to
the removal of the Soviets.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
56. If the present initiative collapses, or is indefi-
nitely dragged out by Pretoria, the Soviets will be
quick to remind the black Africans that their warnings
and suspicions were correct and justified. US "hypocri-
sy" and "collusion" with South Africa will be high-
lighted in major propaganda campaigns aimed at
further discrediting US intentions in the Third World.
Moscow may also decide to renew the push for
sanctions in the United Nations, thereby forcing the
United States into the difficult position of defending
Pretoria's intransigence or supporting sanctions against
South Africa.
57. If the Contact Group settlement is achieved,
US/Western influence would be enhanced as it was in
the case of Zimbabwe. In the short term, such a
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settlement would undercut the Soviet long-term goal
of supplanting that influence in the region.
58. A successful settlement could heighten black
African expectations of the United Stales and the
West; Washington, for example, may come under
pressure to push harder for changes in Pretoria's racial
practices and to increase its practical corrimitment to
regional economic development The failure by Wash-
ington to meet these expectations, or the failure of a
process of peaceful settlement to lead to regional
economic and political development, would provide
the Soviets with a new opportunity to reassert their
influence.
59. In any event, the Soviets would move to culti-
vate close ties to a SWAPO regime in Namibia,
recognizing that such ties will contribute to new
tensions with Pretoria. In sum, the Soviets would
continue their practice of exploiting the regional insta-
bilih' which creates a need for Soviet arms assistance,
presence, and therefore influence.
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POSSIBLE SOVIET ACTIONS
AFTER NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE
1. Inasmuch as we cannot know how long the
negotiations will go on, the compromises that may
develop, and the conditions under which a final
settlement is hammered out-if at all-discussion of
postsettlement developments is by definition highly
speculative. Assuming that a settlement has been
achieved and that SWAPO dominates the government
of an independent Namibia, the following scenarios
are possible.
Soviet Relations With aSWAPO-Ruled Namibia
2. Should the Contact Group initiative succeed,
Soviet policy in a postsettlement Namibia would de-
pend on the specific terms of a settlement, the condi-
tions under which it is achieved, and the outcome of
the elections. Moscow's options will depend largely on
the disposition of the SWAPO government. SWAPO's
outlook, in turn, will be influenced by a number of
important considerations:
- Namibia's economic dependence on South Af-
rica. Pretoria will retain Walvis Bay, the princi-
pal port in Namibia and the transit point for
most of Namibia's exports and imports, until
such time as its status is negotiated with an
independent Namibia. South Africa provides Na-
mibia with a significant amount of skilled labor,
investment capital, and consumer goods, and it
manages most of the country's essential mining
economy. Namibia is also dependent upon South
Africa's transportation and communication
networks.
South Africa as the region's predominant mili-
tary power. The ever-present military threat
posed by proximity to South Africa could be used
to support divergent policies in a SWAPO gov-
ernment. Moderates may caution restraint to
avoid provoking military responses while others
might argue for a military buildup-which
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would presumably mean asking the Soviet Bloc
for military advisers and assistance.
- The Namibian population. SWAPO would be
governing a population that is conservative in
ideological terms and that has developed consid-
erable political sophistication. The Ovambo
tribe-that 47 percent of the population to which
SWAPO looks for its main support-is funda-
mentally conservative and is influenced by the
Lutheran Church. To run the country effectively
SWAPO must also enjoy the support-or at least
the acquiescence-of the small, powerful white
community-those whites who choose to stay-
that drives the key sectors of the economy, as
well as the other black tribal groups which fear
Ovambo domination.
- Divisions within SWAPO. SWAPO's external
branch is currently dominated by a small clique
of self-professed Marxists who must contend with
a central committee and a rank and file that does
not necessarily share the more radical views of
the organization's leadership. SWAPO, in fact, is
composed of a variety of competing factions that
break down along tribal and ideological lines.
Inner party tensions, which have flared up sig-
nificantly in the past, could do so again under
conditions of independence, something the
SWAPO leadership will seek to avoid. SWAPO
also has an apparently moribund internal wing
that is clearly less radical than the dominant
external wing; revived, it could prove to be a
moderating force in a SWAPO government.
- South African and Western receptiveness to a
SWAPO government. SWAPO's outlook will be
influenced by the response it receives in Pretoria
and the West in general. If Pretoria opts to
maintain its economic relationship and various
Western states grant economic assistance-as
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they did in Zimbabwe-SWAPO might decide to
balance its ties to Moscow in order to avoid
jeopardizing other essential economic ties to the
West. If a bellicose Pretoria minimized or sev-
ered economic links and if only negligible eco-
nomic aid were forthcoming from the West,
Namibia might have to pursue a much closer
re]'.ationship with the Soviets.
Moscow and a Pragmatic SWAPO
3. Given these considerations, we believe that
SWAPC>, at least initially, would pursue a pragmatic
course of moderation, for example, balancing its ties to
the major powers while seeking commitments of in-
vestments and economic assistance. While Moscow
would have few immediate returns to show for its
long-term investment in SWAPO, the Soviets and their
East European allies would certainly have bilateral ties
with Windhoek and would presumably cultivate the
pro-Soviet elements within the government and in the
military-many of whose officers have had Soviet
training. Moscow probably believes that aNamibia-
South Africa "detente" would be short lived, and that
SWAPO would subsequently turn to the USSR for
arms acid military assistance. Similarly, a severe eco-
nomic decline, coupled with a loss of investment and
white emigration might prompt a move toward Mos-
cow, particularly if SWAPO became preoccupied with
internal and external security threats.
Moscow and a Radical SWAPO
4. Should SWAPO eschew the pragmatic approach
and seek to implement radical domestic policies to-
gether with close affiliation to Moscow, the Soviets
would quickly exploit the opportunity for influence
with the new regime. Moscow would offer arms and
military assistance, including advisers, to meet Wind-
hoek's security needs. Such moves would undoubtedly
elicit a strong military response from Pretoria. Wind-
hoek's close relationship with Moscow, moreover,
might discourage Western investment and economic
assistance, and thereby add to Namibia's economic
woes. The security threats posed by South Africa, as
well as potential domestic discontent over the econo-
my, would probably make the SWAPO radicals even
more dependent upon the USSR for their position and
military survival.
Moscow and a Neutralized SWAPO
5. SWAPO might initially find itself compelled to
act moderately either because it was forced to share
power with a more conservative political party or
because of agreements made before independence that
mandated that Namibia follow, in effect, a moderate
course in foreign and domestic policy. In either case,
these circumstances would represent a setback for
Soviet policy. If SWAPO chose to acquiesce to these
restraints, Moscow would likely maintain a low profile
in Namibia and quietly encourage the regime's
radicalization.
6. If, however, SWAPO quickly sought to override
formal preindependence agreements or sought to sub-
vert political power sharing arrangements-actions
which probably would precipitate a hostile South
African response-SWAPO might soon turn to the
Soviet Bloc for assistance in order to sustain its posi-
tion. Although Moscow would probably prefer more
cautious steps to attain power, the Soviets would feel
compelled to support SWAPO moves. In such a case,
the Soviets would argue that the UN had previously
recognized SWAPO as the sole, legitimate representa-
tive of the Namibian people, and that the settlement
was a sham. Moscow would support a SWAPO call for
guerrilla warfare if a non-SWAPO group came to
power after a settlement.
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