IMPLICATIONS OF THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT FOR TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001300020043-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2007
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: August 10, 1982
• Content Type: SNIE

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Direc f Secret
Centr 25X
Intelligence
Implications of the Falklands Conflict
for Territorial Disputes
in Latin America
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Secret
SNIE 90/91-3-825
10 August 1982
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S N I E 90/91-3-82S
IMPLICATIONS OF THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT
FOR TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
IN LATIN AMERICA
Information available as of 10 August 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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? CFCPFT
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
1. IMPACT OF THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT ........................................ 3
In the Southern Cone ................................................................................... 3
On Other Territorial Disputes in the Hemisphere ..................................... 3
II. POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT OVER THE BEAGLE CHANNEL...... 4
Background of the Dispute .......................................................................... 4
Stakes and Objectives ................................................................................... 4
The Situation in Buenos Aires ...................................................................... 6
... and in Santiago ........................................................................................ 6
Military Factors ............................................................................................ 7
III. IMPACT OF A BEAGLE CHANNEL CONFLICT ON NEIGHBOR-
ING STATES ............................................................................................ 8
Peru ................................................................................................................ 8
Ecuador ......................................................................................................... 9
Bolivia ............................................................................................................ 9
Brazil .............................................................................................................. 9
IV. POTENTIAL SOVIET ROLE AND INVOLVEMENT ........................... 10
Arms Sales Potential ..................................................................................... 10
Political Considerations ................................................................................ 11
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES ....................................... 11
Mediating Role .............................................................................................. 12
Arms Sales and Military Assistance ............................................................. 12
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0-
Latin America: Territorial Disputes
Managua'1:t,,',\ Panama ! c Z r"a`' aI Trinidari
/ Canal ~~ r_.,,.,.... a d .a.i ~: /..
Jamaica Antigua and Ilarduaa
oDominica
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Dominican
Cuba HaitkRepublic .
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
South Georgia
(Falkland Islands)
Falkland Islands
(Islas Malvinas)
[Administered by U.K.,
claimeArgentina]
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Argentina's use of military force in an effort to impose its claim on
the Falkland Islands has raised concern that force might be used by oth-
er governments in the hemisphere to settle their territorial and mari-
time disputes. The Falklands conflict has heightened irredentist rhetoric
in some Latin American countries; but, on balance, we believe it has
had a dampening effect on prospects for an outbreak of hostilities
elsewhere in the region.
Argentina's defeat in the Falklands has made it even more
imperative to avoid an unfavorable settlement of its Beagle Channel
dispute with Chile. Argentina, however, is not likely to initiate military
action during the period of this Estimate-the next year or so-and
probably will continue the delaying tactics that have thus far frustrated
papal mediation. We believe the Argentine military will be preoccupied
with replacing its losses, obtaining more sophisticated equipment, and
revamping its strategy, tactics, and force structure. The process of
political transition and economic reconstruction will pose additional
constraints.
We believe Chile has no intention of initiating conflict. Chile has
significantly improved its overall military capabilities over the past few
years, but the Argentine military retains a numerical edge over the
Chileans despite recent losses. If conflict broke out as a result of
unplanned escalation, Chilean forces would offer stiff resistance, but
eventually would succumb to a determined Argentine assault.
Neither Peru nor Bolivia is likely to attack Chile, even if it is
embroiled in a conflict with Argentina. The current Peruvian Govern-
ment has shown little interest in pursuing its century-old territorial
claim, and the military would have serious logistic problems supporting
a major assault. Bolivia is in no condition-politically or militarily-to
try to regain its access to the Pacific Ocean. Ecuador is not likely to act
militarily against Peru, even if Peru were engaged in combat with
Chile.
Prospects for an outbreak of territorial conflict elsewhere in the
region will be affected mostly by events within the countries involved,
not by disputes elsewhere. Although the Falklands conflict has height-
ened concerns with regard to the disputes involving Venezuela and
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Guyana, Guatemala and Belize, and Nicaragua and Colombia, we
believe domestic and international political/military considerations will
continue to restrain the governments of those countries from using
force. Lesser disputes in the region have continued to lie dormant or are
moving toward negotiated solutions on their own merits.
Moscow will try to use the Falklands conflict to stimulate hemi-
spheric distrust of the United States and to expand its. own influence in
the region. It almost certainly sees the crisis as providing an opportunity
for gaining a military supply relationship with Argentina and for
consolidating its military supply relationship with Peru. Moscow offers a
full range of weaponry at attractive prices and more rapid delivery
rates than Western suppliers. However, the preference of the Latin
Americans for Western military equipment, along with their suspicions
of the USSR and its surrogates, will limit Soviet Bloc opportunities.
Any new conflicts would serve to reinforce Moscow's efforts and
provide increased opportunities to be exploited. If hostilities broke out
involving Chile, Moscow would support Argentina and Peru in interna-
tional forums and probably would offer arms to both countries as well.
The USSR, however, is likely to try to avoid being drawn into other ter-
ritorial disputes.
Additional hemispheric hostilities would adversely affect US inter-
ests in the region. There would be greater political and economic
instability; disruption of trade, finance, and commerce; additional
constraints on the OAS; and a new emphasis on arms acquisition. Most
Latin American countries, however, will look to the United States to
play a role in helping to resolve intraregional conflicts. While the
decades-old trend toward greater independence from Washington will
continue, there remains recognition that the United States will remain
the most important influence in the hemisphere for years to come.
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DISCUSSION
1. Impact of the Falklands Conflict
1. The recent fighting between Argentina and the
United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands has high-
lighted the potential for other armed clashes in a
region long troubled by territorial disputes. Through-
out mainland Latin America, most countries have
territorial or maritime disputes with one or more
neighbors. The disputes are a product of ill-defined
boundaries and ambiguously worded agreements in
colonial and early postindependence days, earlier in-
traregional wars, or-as with the Falklands-claims to
current and former colonial territories. Most of these
disputes have lain dormant for years, surfacing only
sporadically when the governments involved choose to
use them to fan nationalistic and patriotic sentiments.
Others remain simmering just below the surface,
occasionally erupting into border incidents.
0
In the Southern Cone
2. Of particular concern is the possibility that Ar-
gentina, having failed in its efforts to seize the Falk-
land Islands, may attempt to regain its honor and
prestige by employing force against Chile to assert its
claims in the Beagle Channel. If conflict broke out
over the Beagle Channel, Peru and possibly Bolivia
also might be tempted to attack Chile in order to
regain territory lost in the War of the Pacific (1879-
83). Ecuador, in turn, could view such developments
as an opportunity to reopen its boundary dispute with
Peru. The likelihood these events could occur over the
next year is assessed in detail below
On Other Territorial Disputes in the Hemisphere
3. Elsewhere in the hemisphere, the military resolu-
tion of the Falklands crisis appears to have had a
dampening effect on the willingness of other govern-
ments to use force to resolve territorial quarrels. For
example, the Falklands conflict focused the Venezue-
lan military's attention on its own logistic problems, its
lack of spare parts and replacement armaments, and
its dependence on conscripts for the majority of its
forces. Moreover, the crisis made the Nicaragu-
0
4. The Falklands episode did lead to heightened
irredentist rhetoric in several countries, but the pros-
pect that hostilities might break out elsewhere in the
region will depend to a far greater degree, if not
exclusively, on events in the countries involved.' Most
mainland countries supported Argentina's claim of
sovereignty, but there was little support for its use of
force:
? Venezuela, one of Argentina's most ardent sup-
porters, has resorted to some saber rattling in its
border dispute with Guyana, but domestic consid-
erations still incline it to favor a negotiated settle-
ment. It may periodically remind Guyana that its
patience is not limitless, underscoring this warning
with occasional military activity and a continued
buildup of forces in the border area.
? The Rios Montt government has reaffirmed Gua-
temala's claim to Belize, but has indicated that it
is willing to pursue negotiations. A military option
would be difficult for Guatemala to implement
because the government currently is preoccupied
with more pressing internal security and economic
problems.
? Colombia did not support Argentina, basing its
position on support for "the rule of law" and
opposition to the use of force. Bogota's major
concern is that Nicaragua might attempt to seize
Colombian-controlled islands in the Caribbean.
The Sandinista regime in Managua, however, is
far more concerned with its own internal prob-
'Annex A details the historical background, internal dynamics,
and current status of the disputes involving the following countries:
Chile-Peru-Bolivia; Ecuador-Peru; Venezuela-Guyana; Guatemala-
Belize; Colombia-Nicaragua; Colombia-Venezuela; Venezuela-
Tri d Tnbqco- Guyana-Suriname- and El -
ras.
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lems and the perceived military threat from its
Central American neighbors.
? Colombia and Venezuela both are seeking a
peaceful solution to their boundary dispute in the
Gulf of Venezuela. Venezuelan President Herrera
and Colombian President Betancur are old friends
who will probably promote the negotiation pro-
cess, but significant progress on the issue is not
likely until the next Venezuelan administration is
inaugurated in early 1984.
? Lesser disputes pitting Venezuela against Trinidad
and Tobago and El Salvador against Honduras are
moving toward resolution on their own merits.
Guyana and Suriname seem content with allowing
their boundary dispute to lie dormaniI
II. Possibility of Conflict Over the Beagle
Channel
Background of the Dispute
5. The dispute between Argentina and Chile over
the Beagle Channel and related territorial and mari-
time claims is more than a century old. At issue is
sovereignty over the Beagle Channel islands of Picton,
Nueva, and Lennox as well as several smaller islands in
the Wollaston Group to the south. Determination of
sovereignty in this area would affect the respective
spheres of influence in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
as well as offshore mineral and fishing rights and, by
extension, claims in the Antarctic.
6. After nearly 90 years of haggling between the
two countries, Chile in 1967 sought to settle the issue
via British arbitration. Buenos Aires rejected this
attempt, but agreed in 1972 to a treaty calling for the
submission of the problem to the International Court
of Justice with review by the British Crown. In May
1977 the Court, with British concurrence, awarded the
three Channel islands to Chile. Argentina rejected the
Court's decision in January 1978 and took a number of
economic and military measures aimed at exacting
concessions from Chile. By late 1978 both sides were
on the brink of a military confrontation as it appeared
that the Ar entines might attempt to seize some
islands
7. A conflict was avoided by last-minute Vatican
avoided by last-minute Vatican
intervention and in early January 1979 both sides
accepted papal mediation and agreed to a partial
military withdrawal. The two sides, however, have not
drawn appreciably closer in the three and a half years
of this mediation_I
n January 1982, to underscore their determination
to wrest further concessions from Chile and the Pope,
the Argentines announced that they would not renew
the 1972 arbitration a reement when it expired in
December 1982
Stakes and Objectives
8. Ownership of the islands has long been a matter
of intense national pride. The islands themselves have
little intrinsic value, being sparsely inhabited and
having no known mineral or other resources of signifi-
cance. The Tierra del Fuego area in general, however,
is growing in importance. Oilfields and large sheep
ranches abound in the northern part of Isla Grande,
and the ocean area may also contain considerable
resources
9. Militarily, the Channel area contains potential
bases from which the Drake Passage south of Cape
Horn could be controlled, and would be especially
adaptable for facilities to support antisubmarine war-
fare operations. Such bases would have even greater
importance in t t the Panama Canal were
closed or crippled"
10. Argentina has the weaker legal position in the
dispute and has sought to shift the focus of any
settlement from the juridical to what Buenos Aires
perceives as the extant political realities. In particular,
Argentina wants Chile to accept and recognize the
principle of "bioceanality"- a geographic division of
the area, preferably along the Cape Horn meridian,
that once and for all would define Chile as exclusively
a Pacific power
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Beagle Channel Area
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Isla Herschel _rs/a Hornos (Horn Island)
Islands
by International Arbitration t Court in May 1977ed to Chile
Argentine-Chilean disputed boundary
Argentine boundary claim
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Isla Grande
de Tierra del Fuego
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11. Also motivating Buenos Aires is its desire to
project itself as the predominant naval power in the
South Atlantic. Equally significant are the oil and
natural gas discoveries since 1978 off Tierra del Fuego,
the growing profitability of fish harvesting in Antarc-
tic waters, and the potential mineral wealth off the
coast and in Antarctica-all of which make the south-
ern zone increasingly important
12. Chile's superior legal position and its national
pride will make it difficult for the Pinochet govern-
ment to make any nod toward Argentine territorial
aspirations insofar as the islands are concerned. The
Chileans initially might have been willing to accept a
proposal more favorable to Argentina, but with their
claims reinforced by a papal decision they are not
disposed to concede any territory. The Pinochet ad-
ministration is convinced that the Chilean public
supports this hard line and believes that giving up
Chilean territory could jeopardize its political support.
0
13. Chile, however, might be able to show some
flexibility on the principle of bioceanality. Pinochet
will resist a land anchor for Argentine claims, but he
probably could accept some wording that could be
construed as accepting the principle
The Situation in Buenos Aires
14. The new President of Argentina, retired Army
general Bignone, is a political moderate who, as a
negotiator on the Beagle issue in 1980, reportedly was
responsible for negotiating a tentative settlement with
Chile that later was rejected by military hardliners. At
present, as head of a transitional government, he is
likely to proceed cautiously, preferring to prolong
negotiations to force concessions from the Chileans
and the Vatican or, at the least, to put off what could
be a divisive and crippling issue
15. Argentina's defeat in the Falklands has made it
even more imperative to avoid an unfavorable settle-
ment of the Beagle Channel dispute, and Bignone-or
any successor regime-will be unable to accept a
solution that ignores what the Argentines believe are
their historical interests in the South Atlantic. Even if
Bignone has no intention of attempting to make
serious progress toward a settlement, a firm stand on
the Beagle will placate nationalists and demonstrate
Argentina's resolve to press its territorial claims, in-
cluding the Falklands. Buenos Aires suspects that the
Chileans assisted the British during the conflict a
perception likely to harden its position further.II
16. Despite some indications that Buenos Aires is
prepared to make what it believes are significant
concessions to keep the dispute out of the International
Court of Justice, Argentina will almost certainly have
to fall back on delaying tactics that have thus far
frustrated papal mediation. As the Falklands crisis
wore on, Argentina-despite early hints to Santiago of
flexibility in exchange for neutrality-hardened its
position on several key points. It remained adamant
about ruling out third parties in any new arbitration
agreement and, according to the Chileans, expanded
maritime boundary demands that would restrict se-
verely Chilean access to the South Atlantic. In addi-
tion, Bignone has stated publicly that the newly
elected congress assuming office in March 1984 will
have to approve a final settlement.
17. There are some indications that Argentine polit-
ical leaders, unwilling to assume the burden of making
a decision, have been pressuring Bignone to agree to
press for a solution before the elections. Despite such
civilian pressure, Bignon probably continue to
stall the mediation effort.
18. By delaying, Bignone can avoid having to con-
front the Chileans, as well as domestic critics, at a time
when his regime is politically vulnerable and militarily
weakened. An unfavorable draft proposal would spark
criticism from nationalists, limiting the regime's ma-
neuvering room elsewhere and possibly escalating
tensions with Chile. By shifting the burden to the
civilians, moreover, the military can avoid being
blamed for losing yet another crucial territorial dis-
pute. There is some possibility, although unlikely, that
Bignone, if pressed by hardliners, might choose to
heighten tensions with Santiago if it would help unite
the military and divert public attention away from
pressing domestic problem
... and in Santiago
19. The Falklands conflict has made the Chileans
more nervous than usual about their eastern neighbor.
Santiago expects that any Argentine government will
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attach increased importance to the disputed Beagle
islands, remain unyielding on its claims and, at a
minimum, continue its stalling tactics in the negotia-
tions. It also fears a scenario where a buffeted and
desperate Argentine military regime-already suspi-
cious of Chilean collusion with the British-might try
to seize the disputed islands in an effort to rally the
public and restore the credibility of the armed forces.
20. Chile nonetheless remains determined to stick
to its hard line on the Beagle Channel mediation.
Aside from war or the outright failure of the media-
tion, Santiago's greatest fear is that the Vatican will
modify its proposals to the detriment of Chile. Chile,
therefore, will continue to monitor Vatican moves and
try to nip in the bud any such vacillation. If the
Vatican were to alter the terms, Santiago could decide
to publish officially the 1980 proposals in an effort
o(-.k the Pon I d itself into his original suggestions.
21. Chile's intent ultimately is to force Argentine
acceptance of the Pope's proposals. Despite its com-
mitment to the mediation, however, Santiago appar-
ently decided to submit its case to the World Court if
no resolution has been reached by October.
Chile therefore is
determined to use international actors as a buffer to
protect them from Argentine intimidation and to exert
leverage on Buenos Aires to resolve the dispute. Santia-
go will try to promote stronger ties with other Latin
American nations, especially Brazil, and with Europe
and the United States as a means of deterring Argenti-
23. The Chileans will buttress their diplomatic
moves with a firm although nonbelligerent military
posture. Chile's improved military capabilities have
hardened Santiago's determination not to allow its
strong legal position to be swept aside by Argentine
military superiority. In the event of Argentine-initiat-
ed hostilities, the Chileans, who would fight fiercely,
also would be confident that international opprobrium
and pressure would force Argentina to end the con-
flict. Barring major Argentine provocation, however,
we doubt that Santiago would take a step such as
garrisoning the Beagle islands-s Aires
would regard as an aggressive act.
were lost in the fighting.
Military Factors 2
24. Argentina's military forces were seriously
bloodied in the Falkland Islands fighting, but they are
far from crippled. The Air Force is estimated to have
lost 53 to 58 frontline jet fighters (Mirages and A-4s)
and 26 second-line combat aircraft-or almost 38
percent of its total combat aircraft and about 46
percent of its frontline jets. The Navy lost the light
cruiser Belgrano, a submarine, and two transports, and
two patrol boats and a cargo ship were damaged. We
have no information yet on the extent of Argentine
ground force equipment losses. Some artillery, ar-
mored fighting vehicles, and perhaps self-propelled
antitank guns were sent to the Falklands, but we do
not believe the numbers were large or that their loss
will significantly reduce Argentina's capabilities. We
believe that a large number of air defense systems
25. Despite its losses, t e Argentine military retains
its overall numerical edge over the Chileans. The
considerably larger Argentine Army possesses substan-
tial numerical advantages over Chile in most weapon
categories; Argentina's air and air defense capabilities
remain greater than those of Chile; and Buenos Aires
already is moving to replace destroyed military air-
craft. The navies of both countries appear to be well
matched, but Argentina's slight numerical edge, to-
gether with its aircraft carrier and more modern naval
air arm robabl would tip the maritime scales in its
favor. II
26. Chile has made considerable progress over the
past several years in improving its overall military
capabilities. The Chilean armed forces now appear
more capable of mounting a strong defense against an
Argentine attack than they were in 1978, especially if
such an attack is confined to the Beagle area. The poor
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performance of the Argentine conscripts on the Falk-
lands, moreover, probably will engender greater opti-
mism among Chilean ground commanders about the
ability of their troops-perhaps the most highly
trained and disci lined in South America-to resist an
Argentine attack
27. Most Chilean force improvements in recent
years stem from foreign military equipment pur-
chases. Santiago has bought a wide variety of weapon-
ry, including a guided-missile destroyer from the
United Kingdom, surface-to-air missiles from France,
and tanks, artillery, air-to-air missiles, and guided-
missile patrol boats from Israel. In particular, Santia-
go's purchase of 150 Super Sherman tanks from Israel
and about 30 AMX-30 tanks from France has now
given Chile virtual parity with Argentina in that
weapon category. In addition, the 11 Mirage 50
aircraft obtained from the French-with five more to
come-give Chile for the first time aircraft capable of
striking targets well inside Argentina, including the
capital.
28. We have no evidence that either Chile or
Argentina is preparing to engage in military action
over the Beagle Channel for the period of this Esti-
mate. Both sides recognize, however, that a military
confrontation could nonetheless occur. Such a confron-
tation, if it did arise, probably would stem from a
period of escalating tensions and provocations in the
area
29. In the event of a confrontation, Chile would
prove a formidable foe, assuming a unilateral Argen-
tine attack confined to the south. Santiago maintains
about 6,000 troops in the south and units there
recently have enjoyed priority for men and new
equipment. Many of Chile's newly acquired tanks, as
well as other armored vehicles and modern jet fighters,
are now deployed in the southern part of the country.
The Chileans, if they believed an Argentine attack to
be imminent, reportedly would send their most mod-
ern equipment as well as additional troops and the
bulk of their fleet south in order to exact a heavy
Argentine price for an attemped seizure of the Beagle
islands. The Chilean forces would offer stiff resistance,
although they eventually would succumb to the weight
of a determined Argentine assaul
30. In any confrontation with Argentina, however,
Chile must also consider Peruvian intentions and
territory lost during the War of the Pacific (1879-83)
and was one of Argentina's most ardent supporters in
the Falklands crisis. Lima gave strong verbal support
to Buenos Aires, sought diplomatic formulas to stop
the fighting before Argentina's defeat, and provided
10 Mirage 5 aircraft and perhaps SA-7 shoulder-fired
surface-to-air missiles to the Argentines
33. Over the years, Argentina and Peru have devel-
oped a close relationship, particularly between the
military establishments which have dominated the
political life of both countries. In the wake of the
Falklands conflict, Santiago has become increasingly
concerned that, should Argentina attack Chile, Peru
would join in the conflict against Chile in order to
regain its territory as well as to aid an ally
34. The current Peruvian Government, however, is
highly unlikely to launch an attack on Chile, even if
Chile were embroiled in a conflict with Argentina.
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capabilities, and military planners intend to maintain
ground forces along the Peruvian border capable of
providing at least a minimal defense of that area. The
Chileans will rely on the fighting abilities of their
troops, demonstrated Peruvian logistic problems in
supporting a major assault, and the inhospitable ter-
rain of the border area to deter a Peruvian attack. A
decision by Lima to attack Chile in support of Argenti-
na, however robably would ensure Santiago's rapid
defeat
31. Argentine forces in the south number about
4,500, and additional troops and equipment would be
dispatched to the area to prepare for a confrontation.
For the period of this Estimate, however, we believe
that the Argentine military will be preoccupied with
difficult domestic problems and replacing its losses
sustained in the Falklands fighting, obtaining new and
more sophisticated weaponry, and revamping its strat-
egy, tactics, and force structure in the light of lessons
learned from the fighting. Until these steps are taken,
we do not believe that Buenos Aires would have
sufficient confidence in the ability of its armed forces
to successfully rosecute a war against Chile over the
Beagle.
Ill. Impact of a Beagle Channel Conflict on
Neighboring States
Peru
32. Peru has a longstanding dispute with Chile over
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President Fernando Belaunde Terry is convinced that
Latin American nations must accept their present
boundaries and concentrate on economic development
rather than irredentist distractions. If the military was
determined to initiate hostilities, Belaunde first would
have to be removed. Although the armed forces did
oust Belaunde from power once before and the coun-
try is suffering from some economic and internal
security problems, the military leadership is support-
ive of the civilian government and is proud of its role
in returning the country to democratic rule. There are
no signs that it is eager to assume power again soon. A
few strong-willed personalities in the armed forces-
particularly the Army-probably would urge action
against Chile, but they I sufficient support to pose a
serious threat.
35. During Belaunde's tenure, tensions between
Chile and Peru have eased considerably as attention
has turned toward Peru's domestic problems, particu-
larly the economy. A war with Chile would further
exacerbate Peru's economic difficulties and divert
attention away from the threat of a growing insurgent
problem in the Peruvian highlands. The military also
might be reluctant to engage in hostilities until its
military inventory was upgraded. Even before the
Falklands crisis, the Peruvian Air Force was looking
for a replacement fighter aircraft, and in the wake of
the Argentine conflict the military probably will be
seeking to purchase additional sophisticated weapon
syste Ecuador
36. In deciding whether to attack Chile, the Peruvi-
an military also would have to consider whether
Ecuador might decide to assert its claim to the border
area disputed with Peru, where armed clashes oc-
curred in early 1981. The Peruvians probably would
give the likelihood of such an Ecuadorean action
greater weight than it deserves. We doubt, however,
that Quito would act militarily against Peru whether
or not the latter was engaged in combat with Chile.
Ecuador's civilian and military leaders are seeking a
negotiated settlement to their claim against Peru.
Moreover, the economic costs would be extremely
difficult to absorb.
37. Perhaps more sobering, the Ecuadorean mili-
tary would anticipate that, after hostilities with Chile
were concluded, Lima would seek revenge against
Ecuador. In a one-on-one fight, Ecuador would cer-
tainly come out the loser. We believe that Ecuador is
not likely to initiate hostilities even if the military
seized power in Quito. A new military regime would
be more concerned with consolidating its position,
gaining armed forces unity, and keeping an eye on
popular reactions.
Bolivia
II
38. Bolivia would consider attacking Chile only in
conjunction with Peru and Argentina. Bolivia has long
sought the return of its Pacific coast territory-its
corridor to the sea-lost during the War of the Pacific.
Considering the unstable nature of Bolivian politics
and military domination of the government, such an
adventure might be considered to deflect popular
attention from the country's dismal domestic condi-
tions. Moreover, the Bolivian military would do badly
in a contest with Chile
39. If Chile initiated hostilities against Argentina,
Bolivia and Peru might be more disposed to assist
Argentina militarily. Both countries then could claim
that they were acting in defense of a sister nation and
under the guidelines of the Rio Treaty. We view such
a scenario, however, as highly improbable.
40. The outbreak of armed conflict in the Southern
Cone would greatly distress the Brazilians, who are
wedded to peaceful resolution of disputes and who
most likely would push for immediate negotiations to
end the hostilities. Brazilian leaders are concerned that
military conflict in Latin America would benefit only
the Soviet Union and its allies. Brazilians also would
see such conflict as ultimately threatening Brazil's
well-being.
41. Brasilia would be hesitant to take the lead in
negotiating a settlement-preferring instead that the
United States, the OAS, or the UN take the initiative-
but it would participate readily and effectively in a
peacekeeping effort.
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over Argentina, which it still sees as its greatest rival in
the region
42. Despite such historical antagonisms, Brazil
could become a supplier of limited quantities of less
sophisticated military equipment to Argentina in the
wake of the Falklands conflict. It provided a modicum
of assistance during the crisis, but was reluctant to
become a major source of military aid. Brazil's assist-
ance will be restrained, however, by the type and
amount of equipment Argentina acquires elsewhere
and the potential threat it poses for Brazil. In the event
of an Argentine conflict with Chile, Brazil almost
certainly would terminate any arms supply relation-
ship with Buenos Aires. It might give military assist-
ance to Chile and counsel Peru against escalating the
conflict, but we do not believe it would become
involved directly in a military conflict.
IV. Potential Soviet Role and Involvement
43. Moscow regards the Falklands situation as an
opportunity to intensify Latin American alienation
from the United States, to stimulate distrust of the US
commitment to regional interests, and to expand its
own influence in the region. It probably also views the
crisis as weakening US ability to mobilize Latin Amer-
ican nations against Soviet, Cuban, and other leftist
advances in the area. Moreover, it almost certainly sees
the crisis as providing an opportunity for gaining a
military supply relationship with Argentina and for
consolidating its position as an arms supplier to Peru.
II
Arms Sales Potential
44. The post-Falklands era probably will afford
Moscow added opportunity to increase its penetration
of the Latin American arms market, particularly if
new hostilities break out in the region. Despite the
ideological distaste of many Latin American military
and conservative civilian regimes for dealing with the
Soviets, in the wake of the Falklands conflict they may
now be more willing to consider the USSR as a
potential source for arms if other avenues are closed.
Moscow offers a full range of weaponry and can grant
arms, finance them on concessional terms, or barter
them for commodities with greater flexibility than
Western suppliers. Moreover, because of high rates of
production and a large supply of older but still very
serviceable weaponry, the USSR can deliver more
rapidly than any other supplier. Although Soviet serv-
vice-after-sale is not as attractive as that provided by
Western suppliers, this drawback largely is offset by
the other advantages
45. Moscow probably hopes that its limited support
for Argentina in the Falklands dispute and interrup-
tions in the supply of arms from some Western sources
will make the Argentine military more receptive to
Soviet offers. The crisis has acted to reinforce existing
Soviet diplomatic and economic ties with Argentina,
but no purchases of military hardware have been
made despite longstanding Soviet offers. The Soviets
would be likely to offer to barter arms for grain, but,
in light of Argentina's serious economic problems,
Buenos Aires would prefer cash. We believe the
staunchly anti-Communist regime is unlikely to turn
to the Soviets for militar a uipment unless no other
sources are available. II
46. Peru's dependence on the USSR for military
equipment is likely to continue for the near term. Peru
is in the market for a more modern interceptor than its
Mirage 5's as well as for assault helicopters and air-
launched missiles-all of which could be provided by
the USSR. Peru's economic situation should severely
limit new arms purchases, but armed forces require-
ments historically have been given high priority, espe-
r~ally when concessional terms have been offered
47. Peru provided the most tangible support to
Argentina during the Falklands conflict. Argentina,
however, is not likely to look to Peru for Soviet
weaponry. Moreover, the Peruvian civilian and mili-
tary leadership is highly unlikely to approve such an
arrangement during the time of this Estimate. The
modest assistance Peru provided to Argentina was not
done at the behest of the Soviets. Despite its depend-
ence on the USSR for equipment and spare parts
during the last decade, Peru has never advocated the
Soviets as suppliers to other Latin American countries.
48. Cuba and the Warsaw Pact countries serve as
another potential source for Soviet-designed weapons,
though not normally the latest models. Cuba, however,
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has not yet been a supplier of Soviet arms to Latin
American countries other than Nicaragua and Grena-
da, in part because potential recipients are fearful of
possible Cuban attempts to subvert the military. The
Warsaw Pact countries are hungry for arms buyers
and might make attractive offers-matching Soviet
prices, terms, and early delivery dates. Argentina may
have explored possible arms acquisitions from Warsaw
Pact countries, but we see at best limited opportunities
for such sales. It is highly unlikely other countries
would look to the Warsaw Pact for arms during the
period of this Estimate
Political Considerations
49. The territorial disputes that would offer the
Soviets the most potential gain are those involving
Chile with Argentina and Peru. Buenos Aires has
already developed important economic ties with Mos-
cow, which has become Argentina's largest grain
buyer. Soviet purchases from Argentina account for
about 80 percent of that country's grain exports and
one-fourth of the USSR's grain imports. Peru, in turn,
has turned to the USSR for the bulk of its arms since
the early 1970s. Moscow gives high priority to improv-
ing relations with both countries. Chile's Pinochet
government, on the other hand, is considered a pariah
by the Soviets for having ousted the Marxist Allende
government and taken strong measures against the far
left. If hostilities broke out, Moscow would support
Argentina and Peru in international forums and prob-
ably offer arms to both countries as well.
50. Moscow probably would regard the ou reak of
hostilities elsewhere in Latin America as a positive
development in that it would provide new opportuni-
ties to expand its influence and exploit US vulnerabili-
ties in the region. The USSR, however, is likely to try
to avoid being drawn into some Latin American
territorial disputes, particularly those between coun-
tries with anti-Communist governments. Moscow-
along with the Cubans-probably would caution Nica-
ragua not to make any untoward moves against Co-
lombia in view of its own domestic problems and
military inadequacies, but in the event of a conflict
both Moscow and Havana could be expected to sup-
port the Nicaraguans both diplomatically and with
arms deliveries. In a dispute between Belize and
Guatemala, Moscow probably would try to avoid
direct involvement. Its inclination to oppose Guatema-
la diplomatically also would be tempered by the
de ree of Belize's reliance on the United Kingdorr[__J 2
2
51. Latin suspicions of Soviet purposes, correspond-
ing fears of subversion, and Moscow's inability to play
a major role in Latin American economic develop-
ment-the central problem of all states in the region-
will limit Soviet gains. Soviet weapons may be more
attractive in certain circumstances to some rearming
or arms-modernizing South American nations, but
attempts to ga 1 advantage from arms sales
will be resisted
52. While the persistent strain of anti-US sentiment
in the region, accentuated by the Falklands crisis,
offers the Soviets some new opportunities to expand
their influence, Soviet initiatives are of less intrinsic
significance than US policies and actions. The Soviets
probably have no firm expectation of any dramatic
new political payoffs in the near term, although they
probably hope that their support will moderate local
suspicions of Moscow and enable them to project an
image of the USSR as a distant but powerful supporter
of Latin American and anticolonial interests. They
may also calculate that the outcome of the crisis could
usher in a period of political instability and open
prospects for those in Buenos Aires who might be more
inclined toward closer relations with the USSR. The
Soviets are already seeking to profit from any general
deterioration in US influence in the hemisphere aris-
ing out of the Falklands crisis, but they realize that
Washington's losse a immediately registered
as Moscow's gains.
V. Implications for the United States
53. The Falklands crisis reinforced existing suspi-
cions about the relative importance of Latin America
to the United States and raised doubts about the
integrity and capabilities of the inter-American sys-
tem, especially the viability of its security and peace-
keeping role. Additional hemispheric hostilities would
adversely affect US interests in the region. There
would be greater political and economic instability,
disruption of trade, finance, and commerce, additional
strains in the OAS, new emphasis on arms acquisitions,
and more opportunities for Soviet and Soviet Bloc
involvement in the political, economic, and military
affairs of Latin American countries.
54. The initial, emotion-driven reactions of many
Latin American nations to the US position have eased
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with the termination of the fighting between Argenti-
na and the United Kingdom, and strains in US-Latin
American relations caused by US support for the
British are likely to ease over time. Bilateral relations
will be guided by the individual countries' perceptions
of their own national interests. In terms of multilateral
ties, many Latin American leaders have serious doubts
about the effectiveness of a Latin-America-only re-
gional organization, particularly one established solely
for political and security purposes. Therefore we
believe that calls for restructuring of the inter-Ameri-
can system through far-reaching revision of the OAS
and the Rio Treaty are unlikely to prevail. Further-
more, while the decades-old trend toward greater
independence from Washington will continue, there
appears to be recognition that the United States will
remain the most important influence in the hemi-
sphere for years to come and that Latin American
nations share important political, economic, and secu-
rity interests with the United States. Thus, the United
States is likely to be seen as a key actor in hemispheric
events and would be expected to play a role in helping
to resolve intraregional confrontations
Mediating Role
55. One such role could be as a mediator. Although
many Latin Americans were shocked and dismayed at
the US position in the Falklands crisis, most countries
were supportive of Washington's early efforts to re-
solve the dispute. In a purely hemispheric conflict
where Washington would not be torn between its
commitments to Latin America and its West European
allies, most nations would expect the United States to
be more impartial and to act positively in seeking a
settlement. The choice of mediator, however, would
depend greatly on where the particular countries
involved believed they could find the most sympathet-
ic ear. Countries like Argentina, because of the Falk-
lands, and Nicaragua, because of the continuing poor
relations with the United States, would not be recep-
tive to a US mediating role; however, we believe most
others would accept-if not anticipate-a US offer of
h a solution0
56. In some instances Washington would be a likely
choice because of treaty language or previous involve-
ment in the dispute. In the case of Peru and Chile, the
United States is identified in the 1929 border treaty as
the arbiter of any dispute over the treaty provisions-
although Washington has never formally acknowl-
edged the role. Chile most likely would seek US
assistance to resolve a confrontation with Peru. The
Peruvian military, on the other hand, probably would
be reluctant in light of Peru's ardent support of
Argentina in the Falklands crisis, especially if Peru
were the aggressor. In the event of a conflict between
Peru and Ecuador the United States most likely would
be called upon as one of the four guarantors of the
1942 Rio Protocol
57. The parties to a dispute probably would also
look to international organizations to plead their case
and seek an end to any armed conflict. The United
States could exercise influence in some of these bodies.
Despite the concerns expressed about the value of the
OAS, it remains the principal hemispheric organiza-
tion established to handle such situations. The UN
would also be used by the disputants, although some
countries may not feel comfortable dealing in the
Security Council because of the veto power of certain
nations or the makeup of the Council at the time.
They most likely would prefer General Assembly
consideration of a dispute. Some might also turn to the
Nonaligned Movement for help, but only if they were
assured of the su ort of the more radical Third
World countries
Arms Sales and Military Assistance
58. The Falklands crisis has focused Latin Ameri-
can military attention on the question of the depend-
ability of supply and the usefulness of modern, ultraso-
phisticated weapon systems, especially aircraft,
missiles, and electronics. Additional conflicts would
heighten this interest and be likely to lead to a search
for the fastest delivery at the lowest cost. There would
be greater diversion of scarce economic resources,
increased demand for domestic arms production and
copro~bilities, and the potential for arms
races.
59. The United States would remain a major con-
tender as an arms supplier in many countries. Despite
severe Latin American criticism of US arms sales and
transfer policies, and high cost and delivery problems,
US-made weapons are highly regarded and in many
cases preferred. The same holds true for US training
and military doctrine. It has largely been in areas where
a country has felt no alternative or where timing and
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cost have been unacceptable that Latin nations have
turned elsewhere. Therefore, the door remains open
for US involvement in Latin American force develop-
ment
60. Venezuela, for example, despite its support for
Argentina and its virtually unprecedented criticism of
the United States, is proceeding with the purchase of
F-16 fighter aircraft. Peru, which is currently consid-
ering a replacement fighter aircraft and which strong-
ly backed Argentina, continues to keep the F-16/79
under consideration. Other Latin American countries
will look to the United States for arms, but much will
depend on price and availability. They also will look
for a balanced and fairly applied US sales policy. Few
of them would understand why one of their number
was denied a weapon system that had been sold to a
sister Latin American nation. II
61. Some of these nations would look specifically to
the United States for military assistance. Chile has
been seeking improved ties with Washington for some
time and is especially eager to reestablish the formerly
close military relationship. Most Latin Americans,
however, seem to realize that, if a country is seen as
the aggressor, US and possibly other Western support
will not be forthcoming. Guatemala, for example,
sorely needs military assistance to counter its insurgent
threat but has been cut off from US assistance primari-
ly because of its poor human rights record. It does not
62. If the United States is not forthcoming or its
terms are not acceptable, Latin American countries
will look elsewhere. The larger West European nations
are likely to keep a major portion of the hemispheric
arms market. Other countries, such as Israel, smaller
West European nations, and South Africa, probably
will also benefit from any increase in Latin American
arms purchases. Some of these nations might be
reluctant to continue arms sales to a country actively
involved in a war, but they will remain eager to sell
their products at almost any time.
63. The Falklands crisis, having reemphasized to
Latin Americans that arms supplies are not always
readily available, has heightened interest in self-suffi-
ciency and the need for domestic production capabili-
ties. Brazil and Argentina are well on the way toward
this goal, and other nations are seeking to develop or
enhance their own production capacity. Until they can
achieve this capability, coproduction agreements will
be sought, mostly from Western Europe. Such agree-
ments will allow Latin American countries reduced
dependence on foreign suppliers, cost reduction in
production, and-as with Brazil and to a lesser extent
Argentina- revenues from arms exports. Under prop-
er circumstances, some of these countries might enter-
tain undertaki~greements with US weapons
manufacturers.
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ANNEX A
OTHER LATIN AMERICAN TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
Chile-Peru-Bolivia
1. The War of the Pacific (1879-83) was fought by
Chile against Peru and Bolivia over possession of
present-day northern Chile. It involved territory, then
controlled by Peru and Bolivia, rich in guano, nitrates,
copper, and other resources. In 1873, Peru and Bolivia
concluded a secret defense alliance directed against
possible Chilean aggression. Subsequent Peruvian and
Bolivian moves against Chilean-owned investments in
the region were seen as provocations, and Chile occu-
pied the Bolivian port of Antofagasta in February
1879. Bolivia responded by declaring war on Chile
and calling on Peru to fulfill its commitment under the
alliance. Peru, ill prepared for an armed conflict,
sought to avert war, but its efforts failed when Chile,
aware of the secret alliance, declared war on that
country.=
2. Bolivia and Peru suffered humiliating defeats in
the four years of war. The Bolivians, quickly driven
from their coastal territory in 1879, played no further
major role. By 1881 the Peruvian Navy, after initial
success, was virtually destroyed; meanwhile, a Chilean
expeditionary force swept north to Tacna while other
forces arriving by sea occupied Lima. In the Treaty of
Ancon, signed in 1883, Peru was forced to cede
southern territory, while, in a treaty signed in 1904,
Bolivia formally lost its coastal holdings. A treaty
signed in 1929 with the encouragement of the United
States finally delineated the present Peruvian-Chilean
border, providing for the return of some territory
occupied by Chile, including the city of Tacna. The
treaty provided that any dispute over the interpreta-
tion of its provisions would be arbitrated by the
President of the United States.II
3. Bolivia repudiates the notion that the 1904 treaty
is valid "in perpetuity," arguing that it was imposed
by force after an unjust war. Recent Bolivian presi-
dents have strongly reaffirmed this stance. Bolivia has
strengthened its ties with Peru, which has authority to
approve a Chilean-Bolivian corridor agreement. Boliv-
Peru
area proposed,,, to he ceded to
i
!ago
Ti'icacc
form or
Peruvian
3 i3rr120f;r
\1} Kilometers
1 WUe ope a close with Argenti-
na.
4. Chile's position is clear-the 1904 treaty resolved
once and for all the frontier between Bolivia and
Chile. Some support exists in Chile for granting Bolivia
access to the sea under conditions favorable to Chile.
However, Chileans are an intensely nationalistic peo-
ple and an issue as important as the cession of territory
without the overwhelming consent of the population
would be impossible. Strong opposition also exists
within Bolivian public opinion to the idea of a territo-
rial swap. Some other form of compensation-mone-
tary, water rights, or trade concessions-might be
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t~aa
Paapa
Bolivia
Antofaga wi3nner ~3t tivirn ?errirrry
,~Argentina
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tary, water rights, or trade concessions-might be
possible. While no active negotiations are under way,
Bolivia constantly restates its conditions for resolving
the question of access to the sea.^
5. In Peru the strong irredentist sentiment preva-
lent in the early and middle 1970s lessened considera-
bly with the passage of the centennial of the war in
1979 and the advent of the civilian government in
1980. It remains a highly emotional issue, however,
Peru maintains large forces in its
southern region for defensive purposes because it
perceives its greatest external threat as emanating
from Chile. For a variety of reasons, as explained in
the. main text' no offensive moves against Chile are
anticipated.
6. Chile will keep a watchful eye on Peru, con-
cerned that it one day may seek to regain its former
territory. In the near term, however, Santiago's atten-
tion will remain focused on Argentina and the Beagle
Channel=
Ecuador-Peru
7. Since gaining independence from Spain in the
1820s, Ecuador and Peru have been embroiled in a
continuing boundary dispute over Ecuadorean access
to the Amazon. The dispute, centered on territorial
division in the upper Amazon basin, has provoked
numerous significant armed clashes. Two undemarcat-
ed border segments are in dispute: one at Peru's
extreme northern boundary and the other near Ecua-
dor's southern border. Both are part of a much larger
area-the so-called "Oriente"-which was disputed
before 1942.
8. The origins of the controversy can be traced to
the vague or incorrect descriptions of boundaries in
Spanish documents during the colonial period. Dis-
agreement over possession of the area providing access
to navigable portions of the Amazon River system was
a factor leading to war between Gran Colombia (a
federation of Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador) and
Peru in 1829 in which Gran Colombia gained the
upper hand. Peru was prepared at the end of hostilities
to surrender the territory north of the Maranon River,
but, before the details could be worked out, Ecuador
split off from Gran Colombiyand the balance of
power tilted in favor of Peru.
i
9. The issue came to a head in July 1941 when a
limited war broke out along the border after Peru
occupied and administered territory long claimed by
Ecuador. Peace was restored on 29 January 1942 with
the signing of the Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and
Boundaries in Rio de Janeiro. This treaty was guaran-
teed by the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile
and became known as the Rio Protocol of 1942. ^
10. The Protocol itself, which was highly favorable
to Peru, is resented by the Ecuadoreans, who claim it
was forced on them to achieve the appearance of
hemispheric unity at the outbreak of World War II
and denies them "their historic right to the Amazon."
A series of Ecuadorean governments have pointed out
that the Protocol is geographically inaccurate and have
called for its revision to give Ecuador a corridor to the
Maranon River, a main tributary of the Amazon. In
1960, Ecuadorean President Ibarra declared that the
Rio Protocol was not bindin on the grounds that it
was signed under duress.
11. In the last few years, border violations and
troop movements on both sides have raised tensions. In
January 1981 a conflict broke out after Peru discov-
ered Ecuadorean troops occupying outposts on the
eastern slope of the Condor Mountains, territory long
claimed by Peru. Peru regained the land, and an
uneasy truce has been maintained.^
12. Ecuador seems to have accepte
the fact that it will never regain all of what it
considers its former territory. Until several months
ago, it insisted, as a minimum, on a restoration of
sovereign access to the Maranon, but has since shown
some flexibility. Peru is unwilling to cede sovereignty
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partly because of Peruvian oilfields in the region but
also, perhaps more importantly, because the surrender
of territory could lead to the ouster of the government.
Additionally, it would set an unsatisfactory prece
for handling the separate border issue with Chile."
13. The dispute is quiet at present and is expected
to remain so. Peru, for its part, does not acknowledge
that there is a dispute, because it controls the area in
question and believes the Rio Protocol settled the
problem. The only military action Peru would under-
take would be defensive. Ecuador does not want to
challenge Peru's military superiority and is hoping for
a negotiated solution to its claim
Venezuela-Guyana
14. The area in dispute between Venezuela and
Guyana involves the land between the Essequibo
River and the Venezuelan borders-five-eighths of
Guyana. Venezuela claims that an award-made by a
panel of a Russian, two British, and two US judges in
1899 giving 90 percent of the disputed territory to
what was then British Guiana-is invalid because of
British bribery of the Russian judge, as claimed in
1944 by one of the US counselL-w-ho represented
Venezuela during the arbitration.
15. The Geneva Agreement of 1966 set up a mixed
commission-which was unsuccessful in resolving the
dispute-and provided the diplomatic framework for
the Port-of-Spain Protocol of 1970. The Protocol called
for a 12-year freeze of the boundary discussions under
the framework of the Geneva Agreement, with a
provision allowing for the Protocol's termination
should the two sides reach a solution. When Venezuela
refused to renew the Protocol, it lapsed on 18 June
1982. The next step, as set out in the Geneva Agree-
ment, is to select one of the settlement processes
detailed in Article 33 of the UN Charter. If, within
three months of the expiration of the Protocol, the two
governments have not reached agreement on the
means of settlement, they will refer the choice either
to an international organ or the Secretary General. 71
16. Venezuela prefers bilateral negotiations to max-
imize its advantages of size and force and minimize
what even many Venezuelans acknowledge to be a
weak legal case. As diplomatic resolutions are dis-
cussed in coming months, however, Venezuela may be
tempted to press its advantage by using its military
presence along the border to intimidate Guyana. It is
Venezuela
?
'.~ P/ Georgetown
Ankoko
Island 11
Guya>r>I'a
N
chimed"
by_
Ver,,ezuele
Suriname
150 300
Kilometers
unlikely, however, that Caracas would incur the costs
associated with a significant buildup unless a deterio-
rating political situation called for such a buildup.
17. The recent strengthening of military outposts
along the border is part of Venezuela's plan to im-
prove the Army's overall capabilities and to encourage
colonization by constructing communities attached to
the military posts. As military units, these border posts
are isolated and underdeveloped. The Army's primary
concern is to strengthen and gradually improve them.
Supplies must be flown in weekly and none of the
airstrips has significant storage. Although two airstrips
have been lengthened and are to be paved within two
years, the lack of any unusual training or other activit
in the area suggests this program is routine
18. Plans to improve the military in the east will
encounter major maintenance and logistic problems.
Even with a large portion of the military budget
allocated to maintenance, Venezuela is hard pressed to
keep its equipment functioning. High-ranking officers
acknowledge that the Army could sustain operations
outside the country only for a few days, not weeks.
These problems suggest that a sustained operation
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outside of Venezuela by a large force would be
extremely difficult at present
0
0
20. The international environment in general
should restrain Venezuela, at least in the short term.
Guyana's position in international forums generally
has been considered stronger than Venezuela's, and
most countries, including the United States, have
expressed support for a peaceful settlement. Brazil has
recently entered into several joint development proj-
ects with Guyana, which should have a sobering effect
on Caracas. In addition, the outcome of the Falklands
war seems so far to have had a dampening effect on
nationalistic Venezuelan politicians. The dispute, how-
ever, is likely to be a major political issue in the
forthcoming election campaign. It will probably gen-
erate considerable national rhetoric, but it is not
expected to reach the level of sparking armed conflict.
At least for the near term, therefore, we judge that
Venezuela will proceed with efforts to achieve a
peaceful settlement of the dispute
21. Although Venezuela might
consider making
threatening military moves as a form of intimidation,
this could prove counterproductive. Border inci-
dents-the crash of a Venezuelan overflight or incur-
sions by patrols-could escalate tensions, and George-
town would use such actions to rally international
support for its cause. In fact, Guyana feels that
internationalizing the situation is its most effective
weapon
22. Guyana's response has been largely rhetorical.
The flamboyant President of the Cooperative Repub-
lic of Guyana, Forbes Burnham, has exhorted his
people to prepare for a Venezuelan attack; and he has
used the opportunity to peddle "defense bonds" to
bolster his sagging treasury. More recently, Burnham
has moderated his tone, and he now seems prepared to
negotiate with Venezuela=
Guatemala-Belize
23. In the early 1800s, as Central American coun-
tries were gaining independence from Spain, the
British expanded their activities and influence into
most parts of what is now Belizean territory and
exercised what amounted to de facto sovereignty. In
1859, Britain and independent Guatemala signed a
treaty that delimited the present boundary between
Guatemala and Belize. This treaty contained an article
calling for a route to be established by Britain and
Guatemala from Guatemala City to the Caribbean
"near the settlement of Belize." Guatemala, declaring
that Britain had reneged on the route-building portion
of the treaty, abrogated the entire treaty in 1939 and
claimed sovereignty over the area as part of the
former Spanish colonial Captaincy General of Guate-
mala0
24. The dispute remained relatively dormant until
the 1970s, when the British became increasingly anx-
ious to grant independence to Belize but also wanted
an agreement to be worked out with Guatemala. In
1978, Guatemala rejected a proposed British solution
that would have included a significant concession on
maritime access to Guatemalan ports. When Britain
also considered tranferring sovereignty to Guatemala
in
dispute
~ ~?i' CSrIUilC_n
Bel' a s-
"Belmopan
J
claimed ,r
by disputed
Guate 'a .cat's
-JJ L/
1 ~ t
SU4temala
"Guatemala
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Honduras
Et Salvador I
25
25
25
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of a portion of southern Belize, strong objections by
the Belizeans caused the plan to be dropped
25. Continuing negotiations finally resulted in the
Heads of Agreement of March 1981 signed by Guate-
mala,. Great Britain, and Belize (as a self-governing
colony). This agreement only outlined issues to be
brought up in future discussions including: use by
Guatemala of an improved road network through
Belize, free use of Belize's ports and two offshore cays,
and unimpeded access to the high seas. Rioting broke
out in Belize over what was considered a too generous
relinquishing of sovereignty. In September 1981, Be-
lize gained its independence with no agreement hav-
ing been reached with Guatemala. F1
26. In the past Mexico has also laid claim to part of
Belize on the basis that during Spanish colonial times
administrative control over the area was exercised out
of Yucatan. But Mexico has made it clear that it is not
likely to press its claim unless Guatemala attempts to
take over Belize=
27. The Guatemalan Government headed by Presi-
dent Rios Montt has declared that the Heads of
Agreement reached in March 1981 was abrogated by
the United Kingdom's "unilateral" grant of independ-
ence to Belize last September. Guatemalan officials
have reiterated their longstanding claim to sovereignty
over the entire territory of Belize. Although Guatema-
lan leaders have expressed a willingness to resume
negotiations, they are insisting that new talks should
primarily involve the British and must be based upon
a new Heads of Agreemen
28. Despite the Rios Montt government's strong
public pronouncements, it is apparent that the Belize
issue is not currently a priority. The strong British
reaction in the Falklands crisis and the continuing
preoccupation of the Guatemalan armed forces with
the domestic insurgency reinforce our judgment that
neither a Guatemalan military effort to secure territo-
ry nor a negotiated settlement of the dispute during
the period of this Estimate is likel
29. Rios Montt, the driving force behind current
Guatemalan foreign policy, supported the Argentine
invasion of the Falkland Islands to the point of
symbolically offering a small number of troops and
equipment. He was utilizing that conflict, however, to
arouse Guatemalan nationalism over the Belize issue in
an attempt to reinforce his own popularity and to
consolidate his power within the military. His state-
ments on Belize also help distance his administration
from its predecessor, which entered into the now-
discredited-by Guatemala-Heads of Agreement.
Despite some posturing, Rios has not intimated-nor is
he believed to have planned-the use of force to settle
the disputel
30. Rios Montt is only now defining his position
concerning Belize. Since the March coup, the Presi-
dent's immediate goals have been to promote econom-
ic recovery, improve Guatemala's international image,
increase access to foreign assistance, and end the
insurgent threat. Inasmuch as the United Nations
General Assembly has overwhelmingly supported Be-
lizean independence for years-only Guatemala dis-
sented in 1980-Guatemalan leaders recognize that
armed aggression would be condemned international-
ly. An attempt to annex Belizean territory would also
severely strain Guatemalan military and economic
capabilities. Furthermore, hostilities would discourage
tourism and private investment, and result in forfei-
ture of potential sources of foreign aid-further damp-
ening hopes for economic recovery
31. Guatemala has never resorted to military action
over the 140-year evolution of this dispute and, rheto-
ric aside, Guatemalan leaders do not appear to believe
that all possibilities for a negotiated settlement have
been exhausted. Moreover, the Falklands war suggests
not only that a Guatemalan surprise attack aimed at
presenting the United Kingdom with a military fait
accompli would fail, but that-in light of Argentina's
failure-any such attempt i~ not likely t be popular
with the Guatemalan people] 1
32. In view of the hardline position of Rios Montt, a
negotiated settlement over the short term seems un-
likely. Guatemalan leaders admit the necessity of
Belizean participation in negotiations, but have stated
that negotiations must proceed with the British in the
first instance. Additionally, we believe the Guatema-
lans are unlikely to employ experienced negotiators
from previous adminstrations and have yet to develop
a negotiating posturel
33. Rios Montt is in no hurry to begin negotiations,
since concessions necessary to reach an accord would
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be politically damaging. Invocations against the British
might rally the population and military, but actual
bargaining would be divisive and could jeopardize his
already tenuous hold on power by arousing opposition
within the military
34. Rios Montt's public statements suggest that his
objective is sovereignty over a strip of land along
Belize's southern border and some offshore cays. He
has stated that the sea lane which would have been
provided for in the Heads of Agreement is not in itself
adequate to ensure access to the Caribbean. Belizean
Prime Minister Price has successfully resisted territori-
al concessions in the ast and will be no more
receptive in future talks.
II
35. Price has indicated that Belize is also willing to
resume negotiations, but he is likely to insist that
Belize represent its own interests. Furthermore, he
believes that the Heads of Agreement is a legitimate
point of departure, despite his domestic opponents'
belief that that document is already too concessionary.
In view of this, he is not likely to yield his position that
no land concession is possible. Price's hand is strength-
ened by his role in guiding Belize to independence last
year, by the forceful British response in the Falklands,
and by overwhelming international support for Belize.
Although cession of an uninhabited cay may hold the
greatest potential for compromise, negotiations over
any transfer rri r would be extremely sensitive
and arduous
36. Price has publicly pledged to submit any pro-
posed agreement to a popular referendum, however,
and any territorial concession would be strongly op-
posed by the opposition party, which won 47 percent
of the vote in the last national election. The strong
possibility of violence and the defeat of such a referen-
dum militates further against Belizean concessions.
Moreover, definitive resolution of the issue would
hasten the withdrawal of British troops, another move
that opposition parties resist because of security con-
cernsl
37. Rios Montt might be provoked to attempt to
annex some Belizean territory by a combination of
Belizean intransigence, the withdrawal of British
troops, and a dramatic improvement or deterioration
in Guatemala's domestic situation. We judge, however,
that the possibility of such a confluence of events and
resulting Guatemalan military action to resolve the
dispute are unlikely over the next year. A resumption
of negotiations is more probable, but we do not believe
these will succeed in the near ter
Colombia-Nicaragua
38. At issue between Colombia and Nicaragua is
sovereignty over the islands of San Andres and Provi-
dencia as well as a number of small cays in the
Caribbean which at one time were US possessions. The
disputed cays are 225 to 240 kilometers from the
Nicaraguan mainland and 600 to 750 kilometers from
Colombia=
39. In the late 19th century the disputed cays, the
largest of which are Quita Sueno, Roncador, and
Serrana, were declared appurtenant to the United
States under provisions of the Guano Islands Act of
1856. In 1890, Colombia claimed the cays, asserting
that it alone had inherited sovereign title from Spain.
In 1928 the United States and Colombia exchanged
notes, each side recognizing the existence of the other's
claims while agreeing to maintain the status quo
without prejudice to the legal position of either coun-
try. Also in 1928, Nicaragua signed a separate treaty
yielding sovereignty of the cays to Colombia. In the
Gulf of
Mexico
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Y PROVIDENCIA
Quita Serrana Cay
'Suena
Cay ` Roncador Cay
Isla de Providencia
Thee ?
Bahamas.
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1960s, undersea petroleum exploration brought a re-
newal of interest in the region, and of claims by both
Colombia and Nicaragua, the latter basing its rights on
the assertion that the cays are part of its continental
shelf
0
40. In 1972 the United States negotiated a treaty
with Colombia to drop the US claims. Colombia
maintained that its maritime domain in the San
Andres Archipelago, which it has administered since
1928, included the disputed cays. Nicaragua claimed
that the mere signing of a treaty between the United
States and Colombia would enhance Colombia's claim
to the cays. Colombia at times encouraged this reading
of the Quita Sueno Treaty, especially for its domestic
audience. The United States, however, sought only to
renounce its own claims and took no position on the
claims of any third partiel I
41. In 1980, Nicaragua's new Sandinista govern-
ment rejected the 1928 boundary treaty with Colom-
bia, claiming that Nicaragua was coerced to sign by
occupying US forces that were in Nicaragua in re-
sponse to instability problems. At the same time, the
Sandinista government extended its claim to include
not only the cays in dispute but also the inhabited
islands to the south, San Andres and Providencia, that
now belong to Colombia and have a predominantly
Colombian population.
42. Earlier this year Colombia strengthened its
military position on San Andres and Providencia.
Fearing that Nicaragua might attempt an occupation
as in the Falklands situation, Colombia has also in-
creased its vigilance over the other cays. Nicaragua has
used its claim to bolster domestic support by appealing
to nationalistic emotions but is not expected to make
any military moves. It does not wish to become
militarily involved with a large South American coun-
try, and the Sandinista-led government is preoccupied
with internal security problems, consolidating power,
and the perceived threat from its Central American
neighbors. Furthermore, Nicaragua does not possess
the military capal~ilities to nt a successful attack
against the islands
43. The US Senate ratified the Quita Sueno Treaty
in 1981, renouncing all US claims to the three cays of
Quita Sueno, Roncador, and Serrano. The United
States also offered several times to exchange diplomat-
ic notes with Nicaragua (which would have the same
effect under international law as the Quita Sueno
Treaty) and renounce US claims to the islands. The
Nicaraguans showed little interest in such an ex-
change
44. Colombia and Nicaragua have shown little in-
clination to discuss these boundary disputes bilaterally,
even though relations between the two countries were
relatively good immediately following the 1979 revo-
lution in Nicaragua. Colombia would be unwilling to
cede control of any of the dis uted territories and
exercises control over the area
Colombia-Venezuela
45. The dispute between Colombia and Venezuela
over jurisdiction in the Gulf of Venezuela has existed
for almost 150 years. In October 1980, agreement
reportedly was reached on a draft treaty, with both
sides compromising on their claims, but no consensus
was reached in Venezuela and further discussion will
have to await the inauguration of the new Venezuelan
government in 1984
46. The two states share a and boundary on the
peninsula west of the Gulf of Venezuela. Small Vene-
zuelan islands (Los Monies) are located approximately
30 kilometers northeast of the peninsula where the
Gulf meets the Caribbean. Venezuela had maintained
that the Gulf of Venezuela with its valuable deposits of
maritime
boundary
Caribbean
Marac atho~ V e n e z u e l a
Los
?Monjes
wen,
Aruba
eth Ant,ites+
Gulf of
Layo We
r;;creceivo o
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oil is Venezuelan internal waters and that the treaty
should have reflected that fact. Colombia had argued
for the application of an equidistant line ignoring Los
Monies in its calculatio
Venezuela-Trinidad and Tobago
47. Maritime boundary claims affecting fishing
rights and oil and gas exploitation are involved in a
dispute pitting Trinidad and Tobago against Venezue-
la. Representatives of the two countries have been
negotiating regularly in recent years, and agreement
was reached in 1980 on a draft treaty that still leaves
some overlapping claims
gas exploitation by Trinidad and Tobago along Vene-
zuela's continental shelf would drain off Venezuelan
oil and gas resources. The two countries, however,
have recently begun talks to find solutions to their
differences. Press reports from Trinidad in late June
noted that the countries had agreed to a formula to
avoid fishing disputes. On 1 July they opened "conver-
sations" regarding the maritime borders.
Guyana-Suriname
50. Although the issue is currently dormant, Suri-
name has in the past claimed ownership of a wedge-
shaped piece of land in southeastern Guyana. In 1799
the local governors agreed that the Courantyne River
formed the dividing line between their respective
territories, but problems arose from the fact that the
Courantyne does not flow the entire length of the
border. Guyana, following British precedence, claims
that the Kutari River is the main headwater of the
Courantyne River and that the boundary at present is
correct. Suriname maintains that the New River to the
west of the present boundary is the principal affluent
of the Courantyne River and that the boundary should
be shifted westward to reflect this. =
51. Complicating the issue between the two coun-
tries has been the discovery of rich mineral deposits in
the disputed region and Guyana's attempts to block
Trinidad
and
Tobago
48. The two sides concluded a continental shelf
boundary agreement in the Gulf of Paria in 1942.
Present negotiations deal with proposed Venezuelan
modifications to the 1942 line and extensions of the
existing maritime boundary north into the Caribbean
and east into the Atlantic Ocean. Problems arise with
the eastward extension and involve the baseline used
in calculating the equidistant line. The baseline Vene-
zuela favors would push the equidistant line north into
waters of Trinidad and Tobago
49. Since mid-1981, there have been incidents in-
volving fishing boats from Venezuela and patrol boats
from Trinidad and Tobago in the disputed areas. In
May 1982 the Venezuelan press alleged that oil and
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the construction of a large hydroelectric project in
Suriname that would use the water from the Couran-
tyne. Efforts to initiate talks on the boundary have
stalled, and neither country is expected to press the
issue in the near term
El Salvador-Honduras
52. Although agreements in the 19th century estab-
lished most of the boundary between El Salvador and
Honduras, no treaty delimited the entire boundary.
Honduras
El S1Iva ar i
San*
,rte
I~IE8P8gt58
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Disputes have been common along the frontier espe-
cially in the east. Any loss of land is more vital to
densely populated El Salvador than to sparsely popu-
lated Honduras.
53. Incidents between the two countries became
intense in the late 1960s, culminating in a full-scale
war in 1969. The conflict stemmed mostly from
economic and population pressures but was referred to
as the "soccer war" because it was preceded by an
inflammatory soccer game between the two countries'
national teams. Salvadoran troops penetrated 25 kilo-
meters into Honduras. Both sides agreed in 1970 to a
demilitarized zone on either side of the border and in
1976 a peace protocol to settle the dispute was signed.
54. In October 1980 agreement was reached on a
General Peace Treaty that called for demarcation of
two-thirds of the boundary and set up a commission to
work toward resolving the boundary in the undemar-
cated area. The agreement is designed to achieve a
solution in an area being exploited by leftist insurgents
for training and infiltration. Coordination occurs regu-
larly between Honduran and Salvadoran military units
along the border. In June 1982 the Presidents of the
two countries met in Honduras and called for a
settlement and demarcation of the boundary as soon as
nnqqihlp. w* hout recourse to international arbitration.
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