THE ELECTION OUTLOOK IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001200050001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 12, 1982
• Content Type: SNIE

Director of
Central
Intelligence
The Election Outlook
in El Salvador
Special National Intelligence Estimate
768001200050001-4
Secret
Secret
SNIE 83.1-82
12 March 1982
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SNIE 83eL82
THE ELECTION OUTLOOK
IN EL SALVADOR
Information available as of 10 March 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We believe that the 28 March elections in El Salvador will take
place on schedule. Although a sudden shift in the balance of power
between the military and guerrilla forces, or a military coup, could
result in cancellation or postponement of the vote, neither appears
likely.
The vote is for a 60-member constitutent assembly that, on paper
at least, will have the power to reconstitute the political system
completely. The assembly will be empowered to draft a new constitu-
tion, appoint a new provisional government to replace the present junta,
and set dates for subsequent elections.
The "quality" of the voting on 28 March will be highly significant.
An election process perceived by most Salvadorans and foreign observ-
ers as legitimate could provide a turning point for El Salvador. The
legitimacy of the electoral process, of the assembly, and of the political
reforms it could set in motion will depend, however, on such factors as
voter turnout, the impact of violence, the manner in which the election
results are tabulated and announced, and international perceptions of
the process.
The guerrillas will try to disrupt the election with an escalating
series of military assaults and assassinations. They will probably try to
knock out electrical power and take over towns. They will attack
military outposts and interdict highways. We believe, nonetheless, that
the guerrillas are incapable of seizing and holding simultaneously a
large number of small towns or even a major city. Nonetheless, they
have the capability to launch widespread disruptive and violent actions
during the election period.
The violence will inevitably cause some voters to stay home, but it
is possible that the guerrilla campaign will prove counterproductive.
The extreme left and its international supporters will undoubtedly
denounce the election no matter what the outcome.
If the turnout is large and the electoral result is widely accepted as
legitimate, a blow could be dealt to the extreme left, isolating it and un-
dermining its internal support. The chances for success may be
enhanced by indications of increasing popular interest in the elections,
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by the presence of a large and diverse group of foreign observers, and
by the government's promise to hold fraud-free elections. Other factors,
in particular the threat of extreme leftist violence, will make such a
positive outcome uncertain, however.
It appears unlikely that any of the three major parties will emerge
with an outright majority in the assembly. While the Christian Demo-
crats are likely to win the largest number of seats, anything less than a
majority would leave them vulnerable to the conservative parties.
A Christian Democratic victory would be a strong affirmation of
the balanced political strategy the government has followed over the
last two years. It would also validate the Salvadoran military's efforts to
work with progressive civilians. A Christian Democratic landslide,
however, could exacerbate strains between the party and military
leaders.
There is a chance that a coalition between Roberto D'Aubuisson's
ultrarightwing National Republican Alliance (ARENA) and the conser-
vative National Conciliation Party (PCN) could emerge. A government
dominated by D'Aubuisson would be highly destabilizing; it would
remove moderate leaders from the political scene, isolate El Salvador
internationally, and probably boost the strength and credibility of the
guerrillas.
The most stable outcomes would be a narrow Christian Democratic
victory or a Christian Democratic coalition with the PCN. If the
Christian Democrats miss by only a seat or two, they could probably
strike a deal with individual PCN or other representatives. If Duarte
needs more than a few additional votes to form a majority, however, his
only likely remaining alternative would be to form a coalition with the
PCN.
The Salvadoran military will probably continue to support demo-
cratic processes as long as its critical interests are not threatened. It
would, however, move swiftly to prevent any civilian challenge to its
corporate identity and prerogatives. It would also seek to exercise a veto
over any negotiations between a civilian government and the guerrillas.
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DISCUSSDON
1. With only about two weeks remaining before the
28 March elections in El Salvador, campaigning is
accelerating and violence is at high levels, as groups
across the political spectrum become more preoccu-
pied with the promise and perils of the vote. The
stakes are high for the political parties that have
fielded candidates and for the insurgent groups that
are trying to disrupt or abort the voting through
sabotage, intimidation, and guerrilla actions. The
stakes are high, too, for the military, which has stood
at the apex of political power in El Salvador for the
last 50 years, but which has promised to hold and
honor the elections and open the political system to
broader participation. Leaders of all these groups
probably recognize that the electoral process has al-
ready begun to alter the country's political landscape,
and that developments over the next few weeks could
result in decisive changes in the balance of political
forces.
2. Salvadorans are scheduled to vote for a constitu-
ent assembly that, on paper at least, will have the
power completely to reconstitute the national political
system. The 60-member assembly, with representa-
tives to be elected from each of the country's 14
departments (see map), will be empowered to draft a
new constitution, to appoint a new provisional govern-
ment to succeed the present four-man junta, and to set
dates for presidential and other elections. Its formal
authority will be so sweeping that it could confirm or
enlarge the junta, replace it with another, appoint an
interim president, or convert itself into a parliament.
Thus, if the elections are conducted without major
scandal or disruptions, the assembly will become the
official governing power in El Salvador soon after the
votes are counted, and the country will come under
the rule of popularly elected officials.
3. The "quality" of the voting on 28 March-
measured by the presence or lack of fraud, the size of
the vote, the impact of violence, the manner in which
the results are tabulated and announced, and other
intangibles-will be highly significant. An election
process perceived by most Salvadorans and foreign
observers present as legitimate could provide a turning
point for a nation that long has been wracked by
political fragmentation and polarization, and since
1980 by savage civil war. It could also deal a major
blow to the extreme left, isolating it and undermining
its sources of internal support. Legitimizing elections
would strengthen US interests and bolster democratic
forces in Central America and elsewhere in the region,
while reducing the appeal of violent methods and
groups. If, however, the elections are seriously marred
by violence, fraud, or low turnout, the legitimacy of
the process would be undermined.
4. The credibility of the elections will depend
significantly on their fairness and absence of major
fraud. They have been planned and will be supervised
by a three-man elections council, one member of
which was appointed by the governing junta, and the
others chosen by the junta from lists submitted by the
Supreme Court and the political parties. The election
law provides for poll oversight committees composed
of party representatives who may observe the voting
and the counting of ballots. The government has also
indicated that international observers may do the
same. Elections council chairman Bustamante claims
that 300 polling places with 4,500 voting tables will be
open. The government intends to set up voting stations
in 230 of the country's 261 municipalities and to
provide protection.'
' The election council has taken pains to prevent fraudulent
voting and irregularities in voting tabulations. Each ballot is num-
bered for purposes of ballot inventory control, and only those
properly validated are counted. The voter tears off the number
before voting, marks the party of his choice on the ballot, and drops
it into the ballot box. As the balloting proceeds, officials at each
voting table fill out report forms. Upon closing of the polls, the ballot
boxes are broken open, votes counted, and the results entered on
report forms. The ballots and the form-which is signed by elections
council representatives and witnessed by poll watchers-are sealed
in a pouch, which is then carried to the departmental elections
council. From there pouches are sent to council headquarters in San
Salvador. Furthermore, at the time the form is signed, the voting
table officials send a telegram with the results to the central council.
The telegram, however, will not be official; only the form represents
the official count. The council will use the telegrams on election
night to announce preliminary results. We expect that the extreme
left will try to disrupt these processes. The extreme right may also
attempt to do so.
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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5. For many Salvadorans and foreign observers, the
size of voter turnout on 28 March will also be a key
measure of the election's legitimacy. Approximately
1.5 million people-excluding those under 18 and in
the military-are theoretically eligible to vote, though
the number who have the necessary identity cards will
be smaller. Many people throughout the country,
however, hav~lined up to acquire proper
documentation. Others, including rural women who
have little need for identity cards, probably will not
get them and will not be able to vote. Thus, the
requirement for proper documentation, although it
will help to minimize fraud, will also tend to reduce
the size of the vote.
6. Furthermore, the guerrilla and front groups have
a major campaign under way to discredit and nullify
lr`l
the elections. They hold that the process is intrinsically
fraudulent because they are not represented, and
claim that voting will be manipulated by the govern-
ment. The strategy of the extreme left to disrupt the
elections and keep voters from the polls is meant in
part to provide it with potentially powerful propa-
ganda to use later in debunking the results. The left
hopes to keep large numbers from voting and then to
claim that they abstained voluntarily because they are
in its camp. Unless turnout is broadly perceived to be
high, that position will be credible to many in El
Salvador and in influential sectors in other countries.
7. Criticism of the elections could also center on
claims that voter turnout on 28 March compares
unfavorably with past Salvadoran elections. Official
statistics show that between 41 and 68 percent of
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eligible voters cast ballots in the four congressional and
two presidential elections between 1972 and 1977, but
many of the votes were forged. The actual turnout in
those elections was probably between 35 and 45
percent. In the 1978 congressional elections, in which
only one minor party opposed the government, nearly
a third of the votes counted are believed to have been
fraudulent. The official figures for past elections,
though inflated, could be used by the extreme left and
other critics of the elections to claim that this month's
elections had a comparatively small turnout and there-
fore lacked legitimacy.
8. We lack reliable data about the voters' awareness
of and interest in the elections and about their prefer-
ences and likely choices. Opinion polls in El Salvador
have been based on small samples and may be highly
biased because of the voters' fears, the disruptions of
the last few years, and improper sampling methods.
One group of pollsters found, for instance, that many
people would not answer their doors, much less state to
strangers their political preferences and intentions.
Any assumptions based on past party, personality, or
philosophical preferences would also be highly ciues-
tionable because of the distinct possibility that events
since 1979 have dramatically reshaped old attitudes.
Thus, there is little basis on which to predict either the
size of the turnout or the outcome of the vote.
9. Despite past electoral fraud, violence, threats
from the left, and other reasons for uncertainty,
countervailing forces could contribute to a large turn-
out. The government has taken a number of steps that
should facilitate voting. Electoral laws have been
revised so that citizens-many of whom have been
displaced by revolutionary violence-may vote out-
side their home departments. In response to guerrilla
threats to kill those who vote, the government has also
stipulated that personal identity cards will not be
stamped and that invisible, instead of indelible, ink
will be used to mark voters' thumbs both to ensure
against multiple voting and to preserve their anonym-
ity. The Catholic Church hierarchy has repeatedly
supported the elections and enjoined the populace
concerning its "moral obligation" to vote.
1 uggests that popular interest in the
elections is growing as the parties intensify their
campaigning and step up spending. With three major
parties and a few minor ones competing, voters are
presented with the types of clear choices that tend, in
other political settings at least, to increase turnout.
Junta President Jose Napoleon Duarte, leader of the
Christian Democratic Party, and Roberto D'Aubuis-
son, the rightwing ARENA party leader, represent
diametrically different philosophies, styles, and values.
As they and their parties become more active over the
next two weeks, previously undecided and apathetic
voters probably will be stimulated to vote. Interest in
the election may already have risen in recent weeks
because there has been less guerrilla-inspired violence
than expected.
11. The legitimacy of the elections should also be
enhanced by the presence of a large and diverse group
of foreign observers. So far, about 20 governments
have indicated that they will send observers, and there
will also be a large contingent of media representatives
from the United States and other countries, as well as
visitors from independent political and labor groups
from Europe and Latin America. The recent vote by
19 members of the Organization of American States to
send observers marks a significant break with the
majority's preference over the last several years to
avoid appearing to line up with the United States on
controversial issues that involve the internal affairs of
member states. The OAS vote-with three abstentions
(Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Grenada), no
dissents, and four countries, including Nicaragua, ab-
sent-demonstrates an increasing resolve by member
states to resist external subversion and to support
efforts to stem the spread of regional violence.
12. Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Founded
in 1960, Duarte's progressive reform party grew rapid-
ly over the next dozen years. Its support, centered in
San Salvador and the major provincial cities, has been
derived in large part from Duarte's enduring popular-
ity. In 1972 Duarte ran for the presidency in a
coalition with the social democratic party of Guil-
lermo Ungo, who was the vice-presidental candidate
that year and is now head of the far left's political
front group. Though they won a plurality of the vote,
the results were overturned by the military and the
Christian Democrats were forced underground or into
exile until late 1979.
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concerned about their election prospects. They
fear that rightwing parties may win a majority of
assembly seats and form a coalition that would dictate
national policy changes. charac-
terized the party's campaigning as lackluster, and said
that its support had precipitously declined in one
department that had once been solidly behind the
party. He complained that the Christian Democrats
have been unable-perhaps for security reasons-to
organize mass meetings. Party officials are also con-
vinced that senior military leaders and regional troop
commanders are secretly assisting the rightwing
parties.
17. National Conciliation Party (PCN). Like the
Christian Democrats, the PCN has existed for 20 years
and still commands the allegiance of many traditional
and conservative voters, though its support probably
has dwindled significantly since it left office. The
party is no longer directly tied to the military estab-
lishment, with which it ruled from 1962 through
October 1979, but still probably maintains solid sup-
port with retired and active-duty military, business,
and middle class voters and with rural peasants pre-
viously accustomed to its paternalism. The party has
moved over the last two years to broaden its support
and shed its old rightwing, promilitary image. The
present party leader, Raul Molina, has publicly
claimed that the PCN is a centrist party, and he
reportedly has approached the Christian Democrats
concerning the possibility of an alliance. There are
increasing signs that after the elections the PCN could
be in position to tip the balance of power by choosing
either of the other major parties as a coalition partner.
18. National Republican Alliance (ARENA). The
ultrarightwing ARENA is the personal vehicle of
former Army major Roberto "Bobby" D'Aubuisson. It
was founded in late 1980 and has grown so rapidly
through nationalistic appeals and by attracting former
PCN stalwarts that it has outpaced all of the minor
parties combined, and is now challenging the PCN for
the conservative vote. Some analysts even suspect that
has lsurpassed the PCN.
"]aimed that ARENA was making "great
strides" and that it had acquired "momentum.'
om
I Ito support his claim, and concern has been
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13. Since then, Christian Democratic leaders have
worked hard with support from international Chris-
tian Democratic movements-especially Venezuela's
ruling COPEI party-to rebuild cadre and grassroots
support. Although there is no reliable evidence of the
depth of the Christian Democrats' support, the party is
a genuinely national one that in the past, at least, has
attracted voters from diverse backgrounds and interest
groups. Christian Democrats serve as mayors of many
towns across the country, and others are department
governors. It is Duarte, however, who remains the
party's greatest asset. He probably is the best known
and most respected political figure in the country,
even though his standing may no longer translate
automatically into votes for the party and its assembly
candidates.
14. The Christian Democrats are handicapped,
however, by their participation since early 1980 in the
present government, which has been beleaguered by
soaring violence and steady economic deterioration.
Economic activity fell by about 10 percent in 1981,
matching the previous year's dismal performance. As
losses mount and businesses fail, unemployment hovers
around 35 percent in the cities and is higher in the
rural areas. The widespread perception that the gov-
ernment is unable to contain the guerrillas or to end
the violence has contributed to a continuing serious
flight of capital and to a 15-percent drop in real
investment in 1981. Regardless of the election out-
come, we believe that prospects for improvement in
the economy remain bleak.
15. The Christian Democrats' chances on 28 March
could be significantly affected by a serious genera-
tional split it has suffered over the last few years. Some
of the best and brightest of the younger generation of
party leaders joined with the extreme left in late 1979
and 1980 after Duarte moved to ally the party with
the military. At 56, Duarte's age and long visibility in
public life could work either strongly for or against him
and the Christian Democratic candidates for the assem-
bly. He could be seen alternatively as a relic of the past
and the scapegoat for failed policies and turmoil, or as a
familiar and trusted father figure. On balance, the fact
that most of the Christian Democratic leaders are in
their forties and fifties probably works to their disad-
vantage in a country where in the late 1970s about 88
percent of the people were under 40.
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growing among Christian Democratic and PCN lead-
ers in recent weeks that ARENA is experiencing a
surge in public opinion. ARENA's appeal is based on
the charismatic and youthful leadership of the 38-
year-old D'Aubuisson, and on the simplistic law-and-
order solutions that he proposes for El Salvador's
complex problems.
19. D'Aubuisson's platform is strongly influenced
by his antipathy for the Christian Democrats and the
agrarian and other reforms they have enacted in
cooperation with the military. In a televised appear-
ance last month, for example, he once again accused
the Christian Democrats of being "the right wing of
the Salvadoran Communist Party" and of being "trai-
tors" directed by international Marxist forces. He
often describes Duarte and his colleagues as "water-
melons"-green on the outside, and red inside. His
slogan, "El Salvador will be the tomb of the reds," and
his promise to liquidate the insurgents in short order
are probably intended to recall the savage "matanza"
of 1932, when the military put down a small Commu-
nist Party uprising by massacring more than 10,000
peasants. D'Aubuisson seems to command the almost
blind loyalty of his subordinates.
20. D'Aubuisson's reputation for violence has been
well established over the last few years. He is widely
believed to have been involved in the assassination of
Archbishop Romero in March 1980 and to be a key
leader of rightwing death squads that have been
responsible for thousands of murders in recent years.
In 1980 he was arrested by the junta for organizing a
coup attempt, and had his US visa revoked after
threatening a US deputy assistant secretary of state
and accusing him of "playing the Communist game."
D'Aubuisson has been highly critical of US policy in
Central America and, if he gains power, would be
likely to seek military and other support from non-US
sources. He probably has some clandestine support in
the Salvadoran military, and will benefit from the help
of regional commanders on 28 March. He also report-
edly receives lavish funding from conservative Salva-
doran exiles.
21. The Small Parties. Three rightwing parties
have also fielded candidates and one on the left may
also be running. One or two are believed to have
pockets of support and thus may be able to win a few
seats. Their chances may be enhanced by the propor-
tional representation system that will be used to
apportion assembly seats. The extreme rightist Popular
Orientation Party (POP) is headed by retired general
Jose "Chele" Medrano, a hero of El Salvador's war
with Honduras in 1969 and the mentor of Roberto
D'Aubuisson. He no doubt still has the backing of
some traditional rightwing elements and of some
peasants. The Renewal Action Party (PAR), headed by
Ernesto Oyarbide, has attempted to attract voters
from the non-Christian Democratic left who other-
wise are unrepresented in the elections.
would like to offer his party's presidency to
former junta member Adolfo Majano, who for a time
was the leader of progressive military officers. It is not
certain, however, that the PAR has met all the require-
ments set out by the elections council and may be
disqualified. The rightist Salvadoran Popular Party
(PPS) is small, inconspicuous, and strongly opposed to
the Christian Democrats. The Democratic Action (AD)
party is a small, center-right party that was fow:ded
last year and so far has not attracted visible signs of
popular support.
22. We believe that the 28 March elections will take
place on schedule. Though a sudden shift in the
balance of power between the military and guerrilla
forces or a military coup could result in cancellation or
postponement of the vote, neither appears likely.
Military leaders-notably junta Vice President Gutier-
rez and Defense Minister Garcia-continue to joust
behind the scenes, but there is broad consensus in the
military that it and the country are most likely to
benefit from the elections. Even the most cynical and
aggressive military leaders who favor D'Aubuisson's
approaches or other rightwing methods seem to recog-
nize that the legitimacy and ultimate survivability of
the military institution are best served by opening the
political system to a civilian government that has
international support and legitimacy.
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23. Though some guerrilla leader are 25
concerned that large-scale violence o two
weeks could be counterproductive, major assaults in
various parts of the country undoubtedly will be
mounted. The guerrillas will probably try to orches-
trate their campaigns so that they build momentum
and achieve maximum effectiveness on election week-
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end. There will be a higher-than-usual chance that
Duarte, president of the elections council Bustamante,
senior government and military leaders, and perhaps
even foreign representatives and observers will be
targeted for assassination. The guerrillas plan to attack
military outposts, take over towns, interdict major
roads and lines of communication, and sabotage the
economic infrastructure. They may place high priority
on efforts to knock out electrical power in large areas
of the country. Increased cooperation among the
insurgent factions and continuing support from Cuba
and Nicaragua-which are also determined to dis-
credit the elections-have increased the potential of
the extreme left.
24. If violence is widespread and well coordinated
it could severely affect turnout and undermine the
legitimacy of the electoral process. Much will depend
on how effectively the military can defend critical
installations, lines of communication, and voting
places. On balance, however, we believe that the
insurgents are incapable of seizing and holding simul-
taneously a large number of small towns or even a
major city, and that a basic shift in the military
balance is unlikely during the election period. More-
over, even amid considerable violence on election day
it is possible that Salvadorans will react indignantly-
as voters in other Latin American countries have in
similar circumstances-and vote in large numbers.
That possibility is perhaps buoyed by the unique
resiliency and resourcefulness in the Salvadoran na-
tional character, which could prove even more formi-
dable than the threats and assaults of the far left.
The Outlook for a One-Party Majority
25. It appears at present unlikely that any of the
three major parties will emerge with an outright
majority in the assembly after 28 March, and thus
control the new government, though the Christian
Democrats are likely to win the largest number of
seats. A victory by them would constitute a strong
public affirmation of their political strategy which
combines reforms, opposition to the extreme right, and
determination to defeat the extreme left. In addition, a
victory by Duarte's party probably would result in
increased support for it and a new government from
international Christian Democratic parties and groups,
labor organizations, and Latin American governments.
26. Ironically, a commanding victory by any of the
three major parties could create more problems than it
would solve. A Christian Democratic landslide, for
example, could exacerbate strains between the party
and some military leaders. General Garcia and other
leading conservative officers would be highly con-
cerned that a strong Christian Democratic assembly
would launch constitutional and other reforms that
they could not accept. Indeed, a landslide victory
would probably cause some party leaders to push
aggressively for "communitarian" and other reforms
they have long advocated. Under such circumstances,
the chance of a coup by conservative military officers
would increase significantly. If Duarte's party wins a
landslide, there is even a small chance that such
officers would try to mount a coup immediately.
27. A win by D'Aubuisson's ARENA party would
be even more destabilizing. Most Christian Democrats,
General Gutierrez, and many others from the political
center and democratic left would go into hiding or
exile, many of them literally fearing for their lives.
The Catholic Church hierarchy would be greatly
concerned about the likelihood of greater waves of
counterterrorist violence, and prelates would speak out
despite their fears that they would become targets of
assassination. International opinion would be resound-
ingly negative, and El Salvador would become even
more isolated than it has been. For the United States,
and other strong supporters such as Venezuela, such an
outcome would be a repudiation of their backing for
peaceful political evolution and for human rights. US
positions elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbe-
an probably would also be damaged. If D'Aubuisson
actually carried out policies like those he has advocat-
ed, his government would be likely soon to face a
much more powerful guerrilla challenge, openly sup-
ported by a number of foreign governments.
The Outlook for a Coalition Government
28. Even the Christian Democrats' own early and
optimistic election forecasts had them winning only
about 35 seats, and since then party leaders have
become increasingly concerned that support has di-
minished. Thus, they may now be considering coali-
tion possibilities in the event they fail to win a
majority in the assembly. If they miss by only a seat or
two, the Christian Democrats could probably strike a
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deal with individual PCN or other representatives. If
Duarte needs more than a few additional votes to form
a majority, however, his only likely remaining alterna-
tive would be to form a coalition with the PCN. He
might have to negotiate with PCN leaders even as
ARENA was also trying to woo them. Though many
PCN leaders distrust the Christian Democrats, we
believe that under most circumstances they could be
persuaded that a government dominated by D'Aubuis-
son would be calamitous.
29. There is a chance, nonetheless, that an ARENA-
PCN coalition could emerge, particularly if D'Aubuis-
son's party were to win a plurality. Despite efforts by
PCN leaders to transform the party's image, the rank
and file are probably deeply conservative. D'Aubuis-
son might be able to suborn some PCN leaders and
elected assembly delegates through intimidation or
promises of large financial payoffs. The prospects for
such a coalition and the implications for relations with
the United States and other countries would be much
the same as those discussed in paragraph 27.
30. A Christian Democratic-PCN coalition after 28
March would be one of the most stabilizing possible
outcomes of what will, after all, be an interim govern-
ment. It would probably enjoy the strongest support
from within the military, and would considerably
broaden the legitimacy of the present military-Chris-
tian Democratic alliance. Even some of D'Aubuisson's
partisans would probably be persuaded to cooperate
with such a government once the heat of the campaign
had passed. Such an alliance would be vulnerable to
more extreme propaganda attacks from the far left
because the PCN is associated with the conservative,
military-dominated governments of the 1960s and
1970s. Nonetheless, if the election process is widely
seen as legitimate and honest, such a government
would probably stand a good chance of maintaining
broad international support. For their part, most of the
Christian Democratic leaders would probably have
few qualms about forming a coalition with the PCN if
it were the only means of their staying in power,
though they would have to tone down and even
abandon some of their pet programs. A few, however,
probably including junta member Morales Ehrlich,
would be likely to be forced out or would leave.
The Outlook for the Military
31. Despite the reservations of many top officers,
including General Garcia, the military is likely to
continue supporting democratic processes as long as its
critical interests are not threatened. The military
would, however, move swiftly to prevent any chal-
lenge by a civilian government to its corporate identity
and prerogatives. Virtually all officers believe, for
instance, that they collectively should retain the right
to choose their own leaders, to remain under the
command of a uniformed defense minister, and to
maintain control over decisions relating to internal
security and defense. Under most circumstances, fur-
thermore, nearly all military leaders would seek to
exercise a veto over negotiations between a civilian
government and the guerrillas. A strong majority of
commanders could also be expected to try to contain
what they consider excessive reformist zeal by the
elected assembly, especially if a left-of-center majority
emerges. In addition, military leaders will seek to
uphold their influence over time by supporting the
candidacies for high office of retired colleagues and by
collaborating with conservative and wealthy exiles.
32. Through its 50 years in power the Salvadoran
military has been nationalistic and institutionally inde-
pendent. Unlike the military castes in neighboring
countries, it never came under the strong influence of
the United States, nor did it or any other elements in
El Salvador ever have to deal with invading or
occupying US forces. Those unusual attributes of
autonomy and nationalism, combined with the mili-
tary's willingness since 1979 to work with left-of-
center civilian politicians, indicate that it is a strong
institution. Unlike many other, more dependent mili-
tary forces in less developed countries, it is probably
one that is capable of surviving and working over the
long term for constructive political and economic
change in El Salvador.
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