SNIE 12.6-82 POLAND'S PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT 12 TO 18 MONTHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001000150039-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: March 31, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DDI 2594-82
31 March 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM Acting National
intelligence fii cer tor USSR-EE
SUBJECT SNIE 12.6-82, Poland's Prospects Over the
Next 12 to 18 Months
1. In view of the length of the key judgments and text of
the Polish SNIE (12.6-82), I suggest you may wish to send NSPG
members a copy with a cover letter listing the major findings in
brief. A proposed cover letter is attached.
2. As anticipated in our first discussion, this SNIE was not
an easy one to put together. The on-going nature of events, the
variety of regional and functional inputs, as well as the
hesitant nature in which contradictory judgments were expressed
all made for a long and involved production process. I believe
the final product justifies the efforts. Most of the credit for
this accomplishment goes to (Assistant NIO for 25X1
USSR-EE) who molded the original inputs into a unified whole,
chaired most of the meetings, and finally took all views into
account to produce a coherent estimate acceptable to the entire
community.
3. There was general agreement throughout the production
process that the uppermost Soviet and Polish priority is on
control, that the most likely political course for the next 12 to
18 months is continued or intensified repression, and that the
economic situation and prospects are dismal. Community opinion
gradually evolved and changed on one major point. When we began
writing the SNIE, the community believed it quite possible that
Polish authorities could still lose control of the situation and
that the Soviets would then intervene militarily. In light of
developments in Poland and SOVA analyses, the community now feels
that there is little likelihood of such a development.
DERV CL BY SIGNER
REVW ON 31 MAR 1988
SECRET
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4. In addition you should know that the SNIE conceals a
number of continuing disagreements about the nature of the
Jaruzelski regime and future behavior of the population. Because
of the general concensus on the fundamental points highlighted in
the preceding paragraph, I felt that it was better to produce an
agreed text rather than one filled with footnotes--which would
have been the case had we started accommodating any footnotes at
all. For your own information, let me outline three broad areas
of disagreement:
--Jaruzelski's relationship with the Soviets: DIA felt
that he was a Soviet surrogate in Polish uniform whereas
CIA and State analysts believed that he was first and
foremost a Polish nationalist who may have accommodated
the Soviets but who still retained a significant freedom
of action. My own view is that, no matter what his own
individual preferences, his fundamental tactic toward the
Soviets has been preepmtive surrender and that his
imposition of martial law has so isolated him in the
Polish body politic that he has made himself more
dependent on the Soviets than ever.
--The governmental program: CIA and State
representatives attached greater weight to Jaruzelski's
public epousals of reform than do DIA analysts. I think
that the priority on control rules out prospects for
reforms in the short term.
--Possibility of resistance: DIA analysts saw the
prospects for significant resistance as small whereas CIA
analysts foresaw continued widespread passive resistance
significant enough to affect future political develop-
ments. Here I agree with CIA.
5. In general, then, DIA representatives see Poland as being
back in the Soviet fold whereas State and CIA representatives
view both Jaruzelski and the population as still resisting that
type of orthodoxy. Despite my almost completely negative
feelings about Jaruzelski, I do think that both popular rejection
of the regime (which was originally expressed almost entirely in
work slowdowns but which is now coming out in increasingly frank
public condemnations of martial law) and economic imperatives
(need for at least Western trade, inability of the hard-pressed
Soviets to offer acceptable substitutes) still leave open the
possibility of a governmental policy change and a gradual return
to societal dialogue. The prerequisites for this change are
spelled out in the last paragraph of the key judgments which is
reproduced verbatim in the proposed cover letter for your
signature.
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6. I am also attaching a recent message from the US
Ambassador to Poland, Francis Meehan. As you will see, his views
closely parallel my own.
Attachments:
1. Proposed Cover Letter
2. Message from Ambassador Meehan
3. SNIE 12.6-82
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DDI 2594-82
31 March 1982
MEMO FOR: DCI
VIA : C/NIC
SUBJECT.: SNIE 12.6-82: Poland's Prospects Over the
Next 12 to 18 Months
Distribution:
0 - DCI
I - DDCI
1 - ExDir (w/o SNIE 12.6-82)
1 - ER (w/o SNIE 12.6-82)
1 - DDI (w/o SNIE 12.6-82)
1 - C/NIC (w/o SNIE 12.6-82)
1 - NIO/USSR-EE Chrono
1 - NIO/USSR-EE File
1 - DDI Registry (w/o SNIE 12.6-82)
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The Director of Central intelligence
Washington, D. C 20505
1. I am sending you this copy of a Special National
Intelligence Estimate recently produced by the Intelligence
Community on Poland's Prospects Over the Next 12 to 18 Months.
2. The take-off point for the SNIE is the imposition of
martial law which so changed the country's political dynamics
that a very broad assessment of the situation was necessary. In
the process the SNIE became longer than we would have
preferred. For that reason, let me highlight for you the SNIE's
major findings:
--The primary Soviet and Polish regime priority is,
control.
--There is little prospect over the next year or so
for political accommodation between the Jaruzelski
regime and Polish society, although the regime may..
well approve certain cosmetic changes in martial law
designed to secure a relaxation of Western
sanctions. The likelihood is for continued or
intensified repression.
--The chances that unorganized violence will occur
in the coming months are very high. However, we
think that the internal security forces are strong
enough to keep any disturbances localized and
prevent nationwide disorder--if necessary with the
support of some reliable military units. Thus the
likelihood of a Soviet military intervention is
slight.
--The economic situation is still deteriorating, and
it is problematic whether a disastrous further slide
can be prevented. The key factor is a shortage of
Western imports, which-is exacerbated by the impact
of Western sanctions.
DERV CL BY SIGNS
REVW ON 5 APR 1988
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--Warsaw will be unable to make any significant
principal payments on its $27 billion dollar debt
for the foreseeable future, and will'not meet much
of the $2.5 billion dollars in interest due banks in
1982. The risk of default will continue to grow.
--In short, the West cannot expect its pressure to lead
to serious political liberalization in Poland over the
near term. The most we can hope for is that the
combination of Soviet and Polish need for Western
economic cooperation, steadfast Western rejection of
business-as-usual, and continued passive resistance to
the authorities by the Polish population will have some
moderating influence on the regime and maintain the
possibility of long-term compromise within Polish
society.
William J. Casey
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